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Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
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Examiner acknowledges the following data:
Child data
PCT/US24/50454 filed on 10/09/2024 is a of 18379017, filed on 10/11/2023.
Information Disclosure statements
The information disclosure statements (IDS) were submitted and filed on 01/09/2025. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statements are being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Banjade et al (US 2022/0014923) in view of Kim (US 2016/0164831).
Regarding claim 1, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system) for mitigating malicious attacks, the system comprising (if a malicious user (e.g., a jammer or attacker) invades the network, identifying location of such a malicious node is beneficial to reduce the adverse impact caused by the malicious user, the system comprising, [0021], lines 3-5):
one or more processors (fig. 7b, item 752, processor); and
one or more computer-readable media storing computer-usable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to (instructions 782 provided via the memory 754, the storage 758, or the processor 752 may be embodied as a non-transitory, machine-readable medium 760 including code to direct the processor 752 to perform electronic operations in the edge computing node 750, [0093], lines 1-3):
identify a radio frequency (RF) footprint for one or more cell sites, wherein the RF footprint comprises one or more RF footprint metrics (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish (identify) location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area (footprint) at the edge infrastructure (cell site) based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal (metrics) from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region, [0023], lines 1-5, [0124], lines 7-9);
identify a change in at least one RF footprint metric of the one or more RF footprint metrics at a first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell site) located, [0162], lines 2-6);
based on the change in the at least one RF footprint metric, determine a presence of an unauthorized device (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located. In some examples, using the techniques and systems described herein, a potentially malicious (unauthorized device) device may appear that is not actually malicious, but is identified as such based on system changes at the edge, [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2); and
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a lower power off to a higher power on than the off power, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 2, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the at least one RF footprint metric is a decrease in a number of user devices connected to the first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels (loss of service). For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell site) located; thus is seen as loss of signals and or channel may bring a loss of service within the user devices; hence less number of user devices are connected to the base station (cell site), [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 3, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the change in the at least one RF footprint metric is identified based on a comparison to a historical baseline of RF footprint metrics for the first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (compared to a baseline RF footprint) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located; thus is seen as when system identifies a change in the physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) or Landscape of a particular appliance at a base station (first cell site) that may cause changes in signals or channels (compared to a baseline RF footprint) within a specific area of the base station (first cell site), [0162], lines 2-6).
Regarding claim 4, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system),
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of further comprising reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of further comprising reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a higher power on to a lower power off; hence reducing the power from its original power level “on”, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of further comprising reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 5, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the unauthorized device is an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher (nfrastructure may identify the presence of a potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer). Because the malicious user may be any UE inside or outside the network ie. international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher, [0022], lines 6-7).
Regarding claim 6, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), further comprising receiving feedback data from at least one user device that connected to the unauthorized device, wherein the feedback data includes at least an identifier of the unauthorized device (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area at the edge infrastructure based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region. This mapping may be used in identifying or verifying the Potential Malicious User (PMU) region, lines 1-6).
Regarding claim 7, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), further comprising creating an exclusion list including the identifier of the unauthorized device to prevent the at least one user device from connecting to the unauthorized device (access-layer based technique of LBV may be combined with higher layer (facility or middleware) techniques to enhance reliability of misbehavior detection. In 5G/B5G ITS Vertical, the facility layer has collective perception services (CPS) where UEs (Vehicles, RSU) periodically share their local or on-board perception as a list of detected objects and their attributes (e.g., location, dimension, speed, acceleration, direction, etc. of objects) among proximate UEs. When a PMU (e.g., jammer or attacker) has been identified and its region of operation has been localized by the proposed LBV, CPS may be used to cross-check presence of the malicious user in the identified bin or region, [0158]).
Regarding claim 8, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system) for mitigating malicious attacks, the system comprising (if a malicious user (e.g., a jammer or attacker) invades the network, identifying location of such a malicious node is beneficial to reduce the adverse impact caused by the malicious user, the system comprising, [0021], lines 3-5):
one or more processors (fig. 7b, item 752, processor); and
one or more computer-readable media storing computer-usable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to (instructions 782 provided via the memory 754, the storage 758, or the processor 752 may be embodied as a non-transitory, machine-readable medium 760 including code to direct the processor 752 to perform electronic operations in the edge computing node 750, [0093], lines 1-3):
identify a radio frequency (RF) footprint for one or more cell sites, wherein the RF footprint comprises one or more RF footprint metrics (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish (identify) location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area (footprint) at the edge infrastructure (cell site) based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal (metrics) from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region, [0023], lines 1-5, [0124], lines 7-9);
identify a change in at least one RF footprint metric of the one or more RF footprint metrics at a first cell site compared to a baseline RF footprint for the first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (compared to a baseline RF footprint) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located; thus is seen as when system identifies a change in the physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) or Landscape of a particular appliance at a base station (first cell site) that may cause changes in signals or channels (compared to a baseline RF footprint) within a specific area of the base station (first cell site), [0162], lines 2-6);
identify a loss of service for a plurality of user devices at the first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels (loss of service). For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located; thus is seen as loss of signals and or channel may bring a loss of service within the user devices, [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2);
based on the change in the at least one RF footprint metrics and the loss of service, determine a presence of an unauthorized device (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels (a change in signals and or channel may bring a loss of service). For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located. In some examples, using the techniques and systems described herein, a potentially malicious (unauthorized device) device may appear that is not actually malicious, but is identified as such based on system changes at the edge, [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2); and
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a lower power off to a higher power on than the off power, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of initiate a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 9, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the unauthorized action is an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher (infrastructure may identify the presence of a potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer). Because the malicious user may be any UE inside or outside the network ie. international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher, [0022], lines 6-7).
Regarding claim 10, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the processor is further configured to receive feedback data from at least one user device of the plurality of user devices, wherein the feedback data includes at least an identifier of the unauthorized device (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area at the edge infrastructure based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region. This mapping may be used in identifying or verifying the Potential Malicious User (PMU) region, lines 1-6).
Regarding claim 11, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system), wherein the processor is further configured to create an exclusion list including the identifier of the unauthorized device to prevent the at least one user device from connecting to the unauthorized device (access-layer based technique of LBV may be combined with higher layer (facility or middleware) techniques to enhance reliability of misbehavior detection. In 5G/B5G ITS Vertical, the facility layer has collective perception services (CPS) where UEs (Vehicles, RSU) periodically share their local or on-board perception as a list of detected objects and their attributes (e.g., location, dimension, speed, acceleration, direction, etc. of objects) among proximate UEs. When a PMU (e.g., jammer or attacker) has been identified and its region of operation has been localized by the proposed LBV, CPS may be used to cross-check presence of the malicious user in the identified bin or region, [0158]).
Regarding claim 12, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system),
wherein the processor is further configured to communicate the exclusion list to the plurality of user devices (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels (loss of service). For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell site) located; thus is seen as loss of signals and or channel may bring a loss of service within the user devices; hence less number of user devices are connected to the base station (cell site), [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 13, Banjade et al discloses system (fig. 1, system),
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of wherein the processor is further configured to maintain the power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device until the unauthorized device is not detected.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of wherein the processor is further configured to maintain the power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device until the unauthorized device is not detected (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a higher power on to a lower power off; hence reducing the power from its original power level “on”, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of wherein the processor is further configured to maintain the power level higher than both the current power level and a power level associated with the unauthorized device until the unauthorized device is not detected of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 14, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method),
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of wherein the dynamic power level adjustment comprises transmitting a targeted beamform to an area surrounding the unauthorized device.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of wherein the dynamic power level adjustment comprises transmitting a targeted beamform to an area surrounding the unauthorized device (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a higher power on to a lower power off; hence reducing the power from its original power level “on”, [0121], lines 17-18)..
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of wherein the dynamic power level adjustment comprises transmitting a targeted beamform to an area surrounding the unauthorized device of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 15, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method) for mitigating malicious attacks, the method comprising (if a malicious user (e.g., a jammer or attacker) invades the network, identifying location of such a malicious node is beneficial to reduce the adverse impact caused by the malicious user, the system comprising, [0021], lines 3-5):
identifying a radio frequency (RF) footprint for one or more cell sites, wherein the RF footprint comprises one or more RF footprint metrics (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish (identify) location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area (footprint) at the edge infrastructure (cell site) based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal (metrics) from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region, [0023], lines 1-5, [0124], lines 7-9);
identifying a change in at least one of RF footprint metrics of the one or more RF footprint metrics at a first cell site (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located, [0162], lines 2-6);
based on the change in the at least one RF footprint metrics, determining a presence of an unauthorized device (edge infrastructure may change over time, such as physical properties of an area (footprint metrics) of the edge. Landscape of a particular appliance may change, causing changes in signals (footprint metrics) or channels. For example, a new scaffolding may be added in a building where a base station (cell) located. In some examples, using the techniques and systems described herein, a potentially malicious (unauthorized device) device may appear that is not actually malicious, but is identified as such based on system changes at the edge, [0162], lines 2-6 and [0163], lines 1-2); and
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of initiating a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of initiating a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a lower power off to a higher power on than the off power, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of initiating a dynamic power level adjustment to change a current power level of the first cell site to a power level higher than the current power level of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Regarding claim 16, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method), wherein the unauthorized action is an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher (infrastructure may identify the presence of a potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer). Because the malicious user may be any UE inside or outside the network ie. international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)-catcher, [0022], lines 6-7).
Regarding claim 17, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method), further comprising receiving feedback data from at least one user device that connected to the unauthorized device, wherein the feedback data includes at least an identifier of the unauthorized device (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area at the edge infrastructure based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region. This mapping may be used in identifying or verifying the Potential Malicious User (PMU) region, lines 1-6).
Regarding claim 18, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method), further comprising creating an exclusion list including the identifier of the unauthorized device to prevent the at least one user device from connecting to the unauthorized device (access-layer based technique of LBV may be combined with higher layer (facility or middleware) techniques to enhance reliability of misbehavior detection. In 5G/B5G ITS Vertical, the facility layer has collective perception services (CPS) where UEs (Vehicles, RSU) periodically share their local or on-board perception as a list of detected objects and their attributes (e.g., location, dimension, speed, acceleration, direction, etc. of objects) among proximate UEs. When a PMU (e.g., jammer or attacker) has been identified and its region of operation has been localized by the proposed LBV, CPS may be used to cross-check presence of the malicious user in the identified bin or region, [0158]).
Regarding claim 19, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method), further comprising assigning a confidence level to unauthorized device detections based on the UE feedback data (systems and techniques described herein use crowdsourcing to construct or establish location-based fingerprinting (LBF) of an area at the edge infrastructure based on exploitation of wireless channel properties, which then may be used to establish unique fingerprinting regions (FPRs). After such ground truth regions are established, they may be used to test the received signal from any potentially malicious user (e.g., a jammer or misbehaving user) and map it to particular fingerprinting region. This mapping may be used in identifying or verifying the Potential Malicious User (PMU) region, lines 1-6).
Regarding claim 20, Banjade et al discloses method (fog. 14, item 1400, method),
Banjade et al does not specifically disclose concept of reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected.
However, Kim specifically teaches concept of reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected (network devices 202, 204, or 206 may periodically power on (power level higher) and off for various reasons, such as to save battery power, to periodically receive messages, or the like; thus is seen as system is powered from a higher power on to a lower power off; hence reducing the power from its original power level “on”, [0121], lines 17-18).
At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Banjade et al with concept of further comprising reducing the power level higher than the current power level back to the current power level when the authorized device is no longer detected of Kim. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve implementation, coordination, and use of computing and resources at locations closer to the “edge” or collection of “edges” of the network, (Kim, [0001], lines 1-2).
Conclusion
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/FRANTZ BATAILLE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2681