DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This Office Action is in response to Application filed on December 27, 2023 in which claims 1-20 are presented for examination.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on December 27, 2023 and June 20, 2024 are in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 1-7 and 9-20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18)", 3GPP Standard, technical report 33.809, no. V0.18.0 10 March 2022, pages 1-130, XP052511946, retrieved from the Internet: URL: https://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/latest/Rel-17/33_series/ 33809-0i0.zip 33809-0n0.docx [retrieved on 2022-03-10].
Regarding claim 1, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “a terminal device, comprising:
at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor” (pages 91/92; paragraph 6.22.1, Fig. 6.22.1-1 describing UE reporting PRS to core network includes a processor and a memory including instructions for this purpose), cause the terminal device at least to:
“obtain timing advance, TA, information of one or more network nodes, wherein
the TA information indicates at least a TA value corresponding to one of the one
or more network nodes” (page 93, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure detail 2b; UE reports TA received from serving gNB); and “perform, using the obtained TA information of the one or more network nodes, integrity check of a positioning reference signal, PRS; or report, to a location management function, LMF, the obtained TA information of
the one or more network nodes for the integrity check of the PRS” (See pages
93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4; false gNBs are discarded
based on integrity checks of RSTD(PRS) and TA reports).
As per claim 2, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the obtaining the TA information of the one or more network nodes comprises: collecting, by the terminal device, the TA information of the one or more network nodes for performing the integrity check of the PRS” (See 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4).
As per claim 3, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the performing the integrity check of the PRS comprises: verifying whether a reference value of the PRS used for positioning is within an interval range around the TA value of the one or more network nodes” (See pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2).
As per claim 4, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the terminal device is further caused to: transmit, to the LMF, an indication of the integrity check result of the PRS” (See page 93 describing The LMF updates the assistance data to the UE, indicating each of the PRS sources (i.e., the gNBs) as legitimate or not based on the outcome of step 4. For example, the assistance data specified in TS36.355 [x] may include updated information on TDOANeighbourCellingoList IE, where the false BS is flagged. For a specified time interval in the future, the PRS transmitted by the false BS is not considered by the UE and excluded from being reported to the core network).
As per claim 5, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the terminal device is further caused to: transmit, to the one or more network nodes, an indication for obtaining the TA information, wherein the indication is transmitted in message 1 of a 4-step or message A of a 2-step random access channel procedure” since the procedure of 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) is compatible with LTE standard.
As per claim 6, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the indication for obtaining the TA information comprises at least a binary field or a preconfigured preamble” since binary field and pre-configuration are state of the art.
As per claim 7, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the terminal device is further caused to: transmit, to the LMF, the obtained TA information via long term evolution positioning protocol” (See page 93 describing The LMF updates the assistance data to the UE, indicating each of the PRS sources (i.e., the gNBs) as legitimate or not based on the outcome of step 4. For example, the assistance data specified in TS36.355 [x] may include updated information on TDOANeighbourCellingoList IE, where the false BS is flagged. For a specified time interval in the future, the PRS transmitted by the false BS is not considered by the UE and excluded from being reported to the core network).
As per claim 9, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the terminal device obtains the TA information of the one or more network nodes when at least one of the following is fulfilled: the terminal device receives, from any one or more network nodes, an indication indicating the terminal device to obtain the TA information; the terminal device is configured with an integrity class; the terminal device moves to another serving network node; or the terminal device performs radio access network based notification area change or update” (pages 91/92; paragraph 6.22.1, Fig. 6.22.1-1 describing UE reporting PRS to core network includes a processor and a memory including instructions for this purpose; page 93, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure detail 2b; UE reports TA received from serving gNB; (See pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4; false gNBs are discarded based on integrity checks of RSTD(PRS) and TA reports).
Regarding claim 10, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18)" discloses “a positioning entity comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the positioning entity at least to:” (pages 91/92; paragraph 6.22.1, Fig. 6.22.1-1 describing UE reporting PRS to core network includes a processor and a memory including instructions for this purpose), “cause the positioning entity at least to: “determine a positioning reference signal (PRS)”; (See pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4; false gNBs are discarded based on integrity checks of RSTD(PRS) and TA reports); “obtain timing advance (TA) information of one or more network nodes, or an integrity check result of the PRS, wherein the TA information indicates at least a TA value corresponding to one of the one or more network nodes” (page 93, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure detail 2b; UE reports TA received from serving gNB); and “determine, based on the obtained TA information or integrity check result whether the PRS is valid for positioning of a terminal device” (See page 93 describing The LMF updates the assistance data to the UE, indicating each of the PRS sources (i.e., the gNBs) as legitimate or not based on the outcome of step 4. For example, the assistance data specified in TS36.355 [x] may include updated information on TDOANeighbourCellingoList IE, where the false BS is flagged. For a specified time interval in the future, the PRS transmitted by the false BS is not considered by the UE and excluded from being reported to the core network).
As per claim 11, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the obtaining the TA information of the one or more network nodes or the integrity check result of the PRS comprises: receiving, from the terminal device, the TA information of the one or more network nodes or the integrity check result of the PRS; or receiving, from the one or more network nodes, the TA information of the one or more network nodes” (page 93, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure detail 2b; UE reports TA received from serving gNB).
As per claim 12, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the TA information of the one or more network nodes or the integrity check result of the PRS is received from the terminal device via long term evolution positioning protocol” (See page 93 describing The LMF updates the assistance data to the UE, indicating each of the PRS sources (i.e., the gNBs) as legitimate or not based on the outcome of step 4. For example, the assistance data specified in TS36.355 [x] may include updated information on TDOANeighbourCellingoList IE, where the false BS is flagged. For a specified time interval in the future, the PRS transmitted by the false BS is not considered by the UE and excluded from being reported to the core network).
As per claim 13, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the TA information of the one or more network nodes is received from the one or more network nodes via new radio positioning protocol A” (Page 34, Figure 6.7.2.1.2 describing a 5G New Radio (NR) which is the global standard for a unified, more capable 5G wireless air interface wherein the TA information of network nodes is received from the one or more network nodes).
As per claim 14, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the determining, based on the obtained TA information, whether the PRS is valid for positioning of the terminal device comprises: verifying whether an energy peak of the PRS is within an interval range around the TA value of the one or more network nodes” (See Page 93).
As per claim 15, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the positioning entity is further caused to: transmit, to the terminal device, an indication indicating to the terminal device to obtain the TA information of the one or more network nodes” (Page 34, Figure 6.7.2.1.2 describing a 5G New Radio (NR) which is the global standard for a unified, more capable 5G wireless air interface that transmit, to terminal devices indication indicating to the terminal device to obtain the TA information of network nodes).
Regarding claim 16, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18)" discloses “a method for a terminal device comprising: obtaining timing advance (TA) information of one or more network nodes, wherein the TA information indicates at least a TA value corresponding to one of the one or more network nodes” (pages 91/92; paragraph 6.22.1, Fig. 6.22.1-1 describing UE reporting PRS to core network includes a processor and a memory including instructions for this purpose; page 93, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure detail 2b; UE reports TA received from serving gNB); and “performing, using the obtained TA information of the one or more network nodes, integrity check of a positioning reference signal (PRS), or reporting, to a location management function (LMF) the obtained TA information of the one or more network nodes for the integrity check of the PRS” (See pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4; false gNBs are discarded based on integrity checks of RSTD(PRS) and TA reports).
As per claim 17, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein obtaining the TA information of the one or more network nodes comprises: Collecting the TA information of the one or more network nodes for performing the integrity check of the PRS” (See 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2; procedure details 2b/3a/4).
As per claim 18, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “wherein the performing the integrity check of the PRS comprises: verifying whether an energy peak of the PRS used for positioning is within an interval range around the TA value of the one or more network nodes” (See pages 93/94, paragraph 6.22.2).
As per claim 19, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “transmitting, to the LMF, an indication of the integrity check result of the PRS” (See page 93 describing The LMF updates the assistance data to the UE, indicating each of the PRS sources (i.e., the gNBs) as legitimate or not based on the outcome of step 4. For example, the assistance data specified in TS36.355 [x] may include updated information on TDOANeighbourCellingoList IE, where the false BS is flagged. For a specified time interval in the future, the PRS transmitted by the false BS is not considered by the UE and excluded from being reported to the core network).
As per claim 20, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “transmitting, to the one or more network nodes, an indication for obtaining the TA information, wherein the indication is transmitted in message 1 of a 4-step or message A of a 2-step of random access channel procedure” since the procedure of 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) is compatible with LTE standard.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18).
As per claim 8, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) discloses “the terminal device is further caused to:
request, by the terminal device, a positioning measurement gap for collecting TA
information of one or more neighbouring network nodes” since a positioning measurement gap is an obvious enhancement. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to have improved based on the versatility of 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Study on 5G Security Enhancement against False Base Stations (FBS) (Release 18) to have arrived with measuring mechanism.
Other Reference(s) Cited
WO 2021076037 A1 describing "Positioning and timing advance determination"
" POSITIONING AND TIMING ADVANCE DETERMINATION TECHNICAL FIELD " "[0030] A UE performs a random access procedure for achieving uplink transmission timing synchronization. The uplink transmission timing synchronization is achieved by the UE applying a timing advance (TA), such as a transmission timing offset".
WO 2021061338 A1 describing " same timing, (b) the UE is not expected to perform an autonomous timing advance (TA) adjustment, and (c) the UE does not expect to receive a TA command during one span of the uplink PRS transmission occasions" " CONDITIONS FOR MULTI-ROUND-TRIP-TIME POSITIONING " "Conditions for multi-round-trip-time positioning"
US 11388693 B2 describing a positioning reference identifier associated with the timing advance measurement for the user device" ": 1) the positioning reference identifier associated with a timing advance measurement procedure with respect to the user device and one or more base stations" " synchronization sequence and a second part of the positioning reference identifier to cause the multiple base stations to measure a timing advance with respect to the user device and report the timing advance to a network entity."
Conclusion
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/FRANTZ COBY/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2459
January 22, 2026