Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6-12 are presented for examination.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1, 2, and 6-10 are unpatentable under 35 USC 103 over Kawano et al., U.S. 2024/0101142 in view of Musa 2020.
On claim 1, Kawano cites except as underlined:
A warning device comprising:
a sensor that detects a speed of a vehicle;
figure 1 and [0040] determination part determines whether or not the speed of the vehicle exceeds the first set speed or second set speed.
and
at least one processing circuit that:
determines to perform warning when the speed detected by the speed sensor is higher than a first threshold,
Figure 4, s110, has vehicle speed exceed the first set speed? If yes, provide the first notification
and
while the warning is being performed, determines to stop performing the warning when the speed detected by the speed sensor is lower than a second threshold,
wherein the second threshold is lower than the first threshold, and a difference between the first threshold and the second threshold is 0.9 kilometers per hour, and wherein the first threshold and the second threshold are greater than a speed limit.
Regarding the excepted claim limitations, Kawano discloses:
Figure 5. Has the vehicle speed exceed the second set speed? S106. If no, loop back to START. [0041-42] also discloses a scenario where the first set speed is higher than the second set speed.
In short, Kawano discloses an embodiment in which two different speed detection thresholds are provided. Kawano doesn’t disclose the excepted claim limitations.
In the related art of alarm deadband operations, Musa, pages 1-2 discloses a feature in which alarm deadband usage is desired.
As many of you will know, one of the most common form of nuisance to operators working industrial controls are repeating or chattering alarms. On a typical plant, repeating alarms may account for around 50% of the alarm annunciations. They are a problem because the operator will have to silence the alarm hooter and/or accept the alarm each time it occurs. This burden can overwhelm them and can possibly lead to operator fatigue. It could also cause them to ignore the alarms altogether, which has the potential to lead to serious safety and operability concerns.
And
A situation like this can be effectively managed using deadbands. The deadband will prevent an alarm from returning to normal until the alarm condition is cleared by a defined increment of percentage of the range. It is also a required function of control systems as per ISA-18.2 10.5.5.2 which states: “The control system shall provide the capability for implementing the deadband functionality.”
Musa discloses measurement types and percentages used in deadband practices. For example, a deadband of 5% is used for flow. Temperature at 1%, and the like. Using these examples as they are applied to the applicant’s published specification on [0038], a speed limit at 40 km/h would have at least a 0.2 km/h deadband if the speed deadband is 5%. Since the chosen deadband range for the current application is 0.9 km/h, it is clear 0.2 km/h is within the claimed range of 0.9 km/h.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the filing of the claimed invention to try include into Kawano the deadband features disclosed in Musa such that the claimed invention is realized. Musa discloses known deadband ranges for different environmental parameters and one of ordinary skill, apprised of these ranges, would have included at least a deadband range proximate to the cited deadband ranges to prevent alarm fatigue as indicated in Musa for the purposes of mitigating alarm fatigue. Furthermore, see:
MPEP 2131.03 Anticipation of Ranges II. PRIOR ART WHICH TEACHES A RANGE OVERLAPPING OR TOUCHING THE CLAIMED RANGE ANTICIPATES IF THE PRIOR ART RANGE DISCLOSES THE CLAIMED RANGE WITH "SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY"
On claim 2, Kawano cites:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein:
the at least one processing circuit determines to perform the warning due to the speed detected by the speed sensor, the speed being higher than the first threshold;
figure 5 and S112
and when the warning is performed, the speed detected by the speed sensor is lower than the first threshold, and the speed detected by the speed sensor is higher than the second threshold, the determination unit determines to perform the warning.
figure 5 and S108
On claim 6, Kawano cites except as underlined:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein: the first threshold is a value higher than the speed limit by 1 kilometer per hour; and the second threshold is a value higher than the speed limit by 0.1 kilometers per hour.
Kawano cites:
[0043] When the vehicle speed exceeds the first set speed, the notification control part 36 changes a display mode of a first icon (the icon G1 in FIG. 2) related to the speed limit as the first notification, and when the vehicle speed exceeds the second set speed, the notification control part 36 changes a display mode of a second icon (icon G2 in FIG. 2) related to the second set speed as the second notification.
The reference is saying any quantity that is above the cited set speeds includes “the first threshold is a value higher than a speed limit by 1 kilometer per hour; and the second threshold is a value higher than the speed limit by 0.1 kilometers per hour.”
Based on the limited but known features of the reference, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention to try to arrive at an embodiment meeting the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success:
MPEP 2141 (E) "Obvious to try" – choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success.
On claim 7, Kawano cites: The warning device according to claim 1, wherein the warning is warning for overspeed.
figure 5, S108 and S112
On claim 8, Kawano cites:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein the at least one processing circuit performs the warning to a user of the vehicle
Figure 1, notification part 7 and figure 2m which is the same as the warning unit for a user.
when the at least one processing circuit determines to perform the warning.
Figure 1, determination part 35 and notification control part 36
On claim 9, Kawano cites:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein the speed sensor is mounted in and/or on the vehicle.
[0015] FIG. 1 shows a configuration of a vehicle V. Here, the vehicle V is a heavy vehicle such as a truck, but the present embodiment is not limited thereto. The vehicle V includes an imaging part 2, a map unit 3, an operation part 5, a vehicle speed sensor 6, a notification part 7, and an electronic device 10.
On claim 10, Kawano cites:
The warning device according to claim 8, further comprising a human machine interface provided on the vehicle; and
wherein the warning is performed by at least one of the human machine interface making a sound and the human machine interface displaying an image.
Figure 2 and [0027] When the vehicle speed exceeds the set speed, the audio output part 9 outputs sound as the first notification or the second notification. The audio output part 9 is a speaker provided in the vehicle, and outputs the sound so as to be heard by the driver, for example.
Claim 4 is unpatentable under 35 USC 103 over Kawano et al., U.S. 2024/0101142 in view of Musa 2020 and Scherl et al., U.S. 2005/0006165.
On claim 4, Kawano cites except as underlined:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein: the first threshold is a value for determining whether the speed detected by the speed sensor exceeds the speed limit;
figure 5 and S112
and
the second threshold is a value for determining whether the speed detected by the speed sensor falls behind the speed limit.
Regarding the above excepted claim limitations, while Kawano discloses a known embodiment wherein there is a second set speed, Kawano does not disclose the cited second set speed “value for determining whether the speed detected by the speed detection unit falls behind the speed limit.”
In the same art of speed regulation embodiments,
Scherl, figure 3 and [0035-36] discloses an adaptive cruise control, or ACC, feature wherein there are two setpoints provided and indicated on the speedometer 28. Furthermore, [0037] discloses a feature where the speed limit is set to 60 km/h and the ACC system is set to 60 km/h.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the filing time of the claimed invention to include into Kawano the cruise control feature disclosed in Scherl such that the claimed invention is realized. Scherl’s embodiment is directed to setting the speed limit and a set speed identical to the speed limit. While Scherl’s embodiment does not disclose the claimed “speed detecting unit falling behind the speed limit,” the function of the cited cruise control is to control the vehicle such that if the detected vehicle speed falls below the cruise control setting, the vehicle compensates for the falling velocity by accelerating the engine. Accordingly, this cited operation is analogous to the claimed the second threshold is a value for determining whether the speed detected by the speed detection unit falls behind the speed limit. One of ordinary skill would have modified Kawano’s warning system to include the cruise control feature disclosed in Scherl to allow the user’s vehicle to follow the speed limit.
Claims 11 and 12 are unpatentable under 35 USC 103 over Kawano et al., U.S. 2024/0101142 in view of Musa 2020 and Custer et al., U.S. 2017/0217435.
On claim 11, Kawano and Musa cites except as underlined:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein the at least one processing circuit:
detects a speed limit sign and an auxiliary sign, the auxiliary sign indicating at least one of: date, time, section, or vehicle category to which the speed limit sign applies; and determines the speed limit based on the speed limit sign and the auxiliary sign.
In the rejection of claim 1, Kawano cites:
figure 1 and [0040] determination part determines whether or not the speed of the vehicle exceeds the first set speed or second set speed.
Kawano doesn’t disclose the excepted claim limtations.
In the same art of vehicle controls, Custer cites:
[0022] In a step 134, the type of the vehicle 10, which it is assumed was previously programmed into the controller 20, is identified. For example, the vehicle 10 may be of a passenger care type or a heavy vehicle type (e.g., a truck at least 26,000 lbs. or 13 tons). In a step 136, if the vehicle type is a passenger car, the controller 20 assigns the higher (e.g., highest) of the possible speed limits as the posted (e.g., identified) speed limit; otherwise if the vehicle type is a heavy vehicle (e.g., truck), the controller 20 assigns the lower (e.g., lowest) of the possible speed limits as the posted (e.g., identified) speed limit (e.g., the actual speed limit). Control then passes to the step 126.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Kawano’s embodiment with Custer’s vehicle identification and discrimination feature to control a vehicle based on the vehicle class which the system identifies via the postage signage. One of ordinary skill in the art would have desired automatic speed limit controls corresponding to the vehicle which they operate to prevent citations according to the class of vehicle being operated.
On claim 12, Kawano, Musa, and Custer cites:
The warning device according to claim 1, wherein the at least one processing circuit: identifies, based on information which the at least one processing circuit stores in advance, a vehicle category to which the vehicle corresponds; detects a speed limit sign and an auxiliary sign, the auxiliary sign indicating at least a vehicle category to which the speed limit sign applies; and determines the speed limit based on: the identified vehicle category of the vehicle; and the detected vehicle category of the auxiliary sign.
See the rejection of claim 11 which discloses the same subject matter as claim 12 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Response to Argument
The applicant’s arguments with respect to amended claims 1 are disclosed in the following manner as disclosed in the response filed 11 February 2026:
“First, although Musa appears to identify different deadbands pertaining, respectively, to a variety of measurement types (reproduced below), Musa fails to even recognize "vehicle speed" as potential measurement type-much less describe any deadband value for a vehicle-speed warning system, according to claim 1.”
The examiner included Musa as using examples of deadbands available to one of ordinary skill in the art. The examiner agrees Musa fails to disclose “vehicle speed.” However, Musa’s failure to provide ‘vehicle speed” shouldn’t dissuade one of ordinary skill to use the principle of deadbands to apply to any embodiment wherein “alarm fatigue” may be involved.
Accordingly, would one of ordinary skill, apprised of a scenario such as the claimed “wherein the second threshold is lower than the first threshold, and a difference between the first threshold and the second threshold is 0.9 kilometers per hour, and wherein the first threshold and the second threshold are greater than a speed limit” identify the features of deadbands disclosed in these claim limitations? The examiner asserts this is known in the art for other measured parameters and transferring this knowledge to vehicle velocities shouldn’t be unforeseeable. Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments regarding this issue is unpersuasive.
“Second, contrary to the assertion that "the chosen deadband range for the current application is 0.9 km/h... [and] it is clear 0.2 km/h is within the claimed range of 0.9 km/h [emphasis added]", the "0.9 kilometers per hour" in claim 1 is not a range. Instead, "0.9 kilometers per hour" refers to a specific value, namely a value of the difference between the first threshold and the second threshold". Therefore, the rejection is demonstrably incorrect in its assertion that "it is clear 0.2 km/h is within the claimed range of 0.9 km/h" because the claimed "0.9 kilometers per hour" does not refer to a range.”
The examiner has carefully read the applicant’s argument. The claimed embodiment is clearly claiming a range between a first and second threshold of 0.9 km/h. As was suggested in Musa and disclosed in the Office Action, a suggested deadband of 5%. Using the example set in [0038] of the applicant’s specification, a speed limit of 40 km/h is provided. Taking 5% of this figure would yield a deadband of 0.2 km/h. If the clamed deadband is 0.9 km/h, this deadband of 0.9 km/h exists between the first and second threshold speeds. Thus, the suggestion of the 5%, if the first threshold speed is 40 km/h would yield 0.2 km/h, which is a deadband within claimed deadband of 0.9 km/h. For this reason, the applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
“Third, as Applicant previously demonstrated at pages 8-9 of Applicant's Remarks filed October 16, 2025 (hereafter "Applicant's Remarks"), the recited value wherein the "difference between the first threshold and the second threshold is 0.9 kilometers per hour" is critical to the device of claim 1. Furthermore, it is improper to rely on rationales derived from case-law in an obviousness rejection because the above features are critical to the claimed embodiment. See MPEP § 2144(III) ("If the applicant has demonstrated the criticality of a specific limitation, it would not be appropriate to rely solely on the rationale used by the court to support an obviousness rejection").”
In response, the examiner asserts the following:
Applicant's arguments fail to comply with 37 CFR 1.111(b) because they amount to a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically pointing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them from the references. Thus, merely asserting a criticality of the cited threshold is insufficient to render the claim limitations patentable since the arguments have not shown how the threshold is patently distinguished from the cited art. For this reason, the examiner finds the applicant’s arguments unpersuasive.
“Fourth, because the cited art does not teach every element of claim 1, Applicant asserts that any determination of obviousness by the Office is necessarily based on impermissible hindsight. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure explicitly prohibits the use of hindsight bias, stating that "impermissible hindsight must be avoided and the legal conclusion must be reached on the basis of the facts gleaned from the prior art"
In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).
As previously stated in the response, the claim limitations regarding the 0.9 km/h deadband is anticipated in the renderings of Musa and the 5% deadband disclosed in that reference. Thus, because Musa is available as prior art to determine if one of ordinary skill would have known at the time of the filing of the invention if this principle was available in the analysis of the claim. Since Musa preceded the claimed invention, the allegation of “impermissible hindsight” is unpersuasive.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CAL EUSTAQUIO whose telephone number is (571)270-7229. The examiner can normally be reached on 8am-5pm. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Brian Zimmerman, can be reached at (571) 272-3059. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application lnformation Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAlR only. For more information about the PAlR system, see http:/lpair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAlR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-91 99 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/CAL J EUSTAQUIO/Examiner, Art Unit 2686
/BRIAN A ZIMMERMAN/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2686
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