DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
This action is in reply to the communication filed on . The disposition of claims is as follows:
Pending:
Rejected:
Response to Arguments and Amendments
Applicant's arguments filed have been fully considered. The Examiner proceeds below with a response.
Regarding Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § :
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive
The Examiner has determined that the claims as a whole are directed towards the processing of state-based maintenance of a coupling and as such a well-established abstract idea.
Once it is established that the claims are directed towards an abstract idea, the claims elements are considered alone and in combination to determine if there is significantly more than the abstract idea itself. While the Applicants have argued that sensors for sensing parameters associated with the coupling arrangement data and the surroundings data which are concrete structures and provide significantly more, the Examiner disagrees. The instant PgPub describes these hardware components as a generic sensor system mounted or integrated firmly on and in the coupling arrangement. Therefore, the Examiner maintains that the claims do not amount to an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of a computer itself; the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment; the claims merely amount to the application or instructions to apply the abstract idea on a computer; and/or that the claim amounts to nothing more than requiring a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.
The asserted claims here do not require the use of technology in an unconventional manner. Nor do they require an unconventional configuration of components. For the reasons discussed above, The Examiner determines that the additional elements recited in the steps of claim 1 are recited at a high-level of generality. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. The independent claims merely a use a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. In other words, claims 1 and 15 merely recite a generic components to carry out the abstract idea which is not indicative of integration into a practical application
Therefore, the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § for Claims have been maintained.
Regarding Claims , Applicant's arguments are based only upon dependencies from claims . Therefore, the arguments are not persuasive.
Regarding Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § :
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive
Regarding Claims :
Applicant presents the following arguments:
Applicant respectfully argues that Fig. 2, and thus paras. 74-85 of the specification, explain in detail subpart (d) of claim 1 and how the maintenance of the vehicle is monitored via the coupling arrangement data (KAD), surroundings data (UD), and the images. Fig. 2, and these paragraphs, explain the logic and thus the sequence and process of the evaluations and determinations being made.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees.
The Examiner finds Applicant’s argument to be conclusory because, other than reciting paragraph numbers, reproducing portions of the specification, and stating that “”, Applicant provides no further substantive explanation or evidence in support. Such conclusory attorney arguments are afforded little weight. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”). Applicant’s arguments amount to no more than reciting the disputed Claim numbers, reproducing portions of the Specification and generally alleging that the claim limitation has adequate written description without identifying how the invention achieves the claimed function.
Although applicant contends that , this conclusory argument is insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement. To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
The portions of the Specification cited by Applicant are silent as to the steps or functions involved in . For example, it the specification does not describe how the target specification is formed from the operating and state data or coupling arrangement data KAD and surroundings data UD. Moreover, Applicant does not direct Examiner to any language, steps or flow charts in the disclosure to show particular hardware or an algorithm, such that a skilled artisan would understand how to . There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs and output a value. As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I.)
Absent from the Specification is any discussion as to the particular steps, i.e., algorithm, necessary to perform the claimed functions. As such, the rejection is maintained as the instant Specification does not disclose sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including how to (See Applicant Cited Instant Specification ¶¶). Stated differently, the steps, procedure or algorithm taken to perform the claimed functions are not described in sufficient detail in the instant Specification to demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of that knowledge.
Therefore, the rejection has been maintained.
Dependent Claims
Regarding Claims , Applicant's arguments are based only upon dependencies from claims . Therefore, the arguments are not persuasive.
Claim Interpretation – 35 USC § 112(f)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitations are:
cloud structure
coupling arrangement
data processing system
data providing device
edge device
first device
individual components
monitoring system
plurality of components
providing devices
second device
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the analysis which follows.
For purposes of compact prosecution and clarity, designations have been assigned to limitations of Claim for purposes of evaluation under 35 USC § 101 as follows:
(A) “”
(B) “”
(C) “”
(D) “”
(E) “”
Step 1 – Statutory Category Determination - MPEP § 2106.03
Under Eligibility Step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying Eligibility Step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a . Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One.
Step 2A, Prong One – Does the claim recite an abstract idea? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong One analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Abstract Ideas:
With respect to Independent Claim , claim limitations ()-() recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a).
Mental Processes – MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
Claim limitations ()-() fall within the mental process grouping of patent ineligible subject matter. Each limitation relates to functions that could be performed alternatively as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion).
Specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
Claim limitations ()-() encompass concepts within the mental process abstract idea grouping in that that capable of being performed in the human mind, by a human using a pen and paper. Limitations ()-() include concepts that exemplify processes performed in the human mind including observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. See MPEP §2106.05(f). This conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional element(s) of a(n) do(es) not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
A plain reading of the figures and associated descriptions in the specification reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitation () constitutes insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Step 2B – Whether a Claim Amounts to Significantly More – See MPEP § 2106.05:
Under the Step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a ” does/do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the rejected dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim. None of the rejected dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., “” in Claim ).
Regarding Claims : These claims depend from Claim and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim and do not recite any further limitations that cause the claims to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, dependent claims are not patent eligible and are also rejected on the same grounds provided for in the rejection of Claim .
Claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the analysis which follows.
For purposes of compact prosecution and clarity, designations have been assigned to limitations of Claim for purposes of evaluation under 35 USC § 101 as follows:
(A) “”
(B) “”
(C) “”
(D) “”
(E) “”
Step 1 – Statutory Category Determination - MPEP § 2106.03
Under Eligibility Step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying Eligibility Step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a . Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One.
Step 2A, Prong One – Does the claim recite an abstract idea? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong One analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Abstract Ideas:
With respect to Independent Claim , claim limitations ()-() recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a).
Mental Processes – MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
Claim limitations ()-() fall within the mental process grouping of patent ineligible subject matter. Each limitation relates to functions that could be performed alternatively as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion).
Specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
Claim limitations ()-() encompass concepts within the mental process abstract idea grouping in that that capable of being performed in the human mind, by a human using a pen and paper. Limitations ()-() include concepts that exemplify processes performed in the human mind including observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? - MPEP § 2106.04:
Under the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. See MPEP §2106.05(f). This conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional elements of a do(es) not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
A plain reading of the figures and associated descriptions in the specification reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitation () constitutes insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Step 2B – Whether a Claim Amounts to Significantly More – See MPEP § 2106.05:
Under the Step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a ” does/do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the rejected dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim. None of the rejected dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., “” in Claim ).
Regarding Claims : These claims depend from Claim and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim and do not recite any further limitations that cause the claim(s) to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, dependent claims are not patent eligible and are also rejected on the same grounds provided for in the rejection of Claim .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding Claim ,
The claim recites “evaluating an optical actual state of the coupling arrangement from the plurality of images taking account of the target specification (Xsoll), which is formed from the operating data and the state data, for the maintenance requirement at an evaluation time and taking the evaluating as a basis for correcting the target specification (Xsoll) of the maintenance requirement.”
The specification does not provide adequate written description of how . There is no written content as to how or what specific algorithms are performed (i.e. formulas, algorithms, sequence of mathematical steps, process of determination, for example)
To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
At best, the Specification vaguely and generically describes the following:
(See at least Instant PgPub ¶¶)
There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs () and output a . As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I). In particular, the MPEP requires description of “an algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function."
Claimed subject matter should be described in the specification in such a manner as to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. The specification does not at all describe the steps / procedure involved in which would necessarily involve some calculations or steps that have not been described.
It is noted that this is not an enablement rejection. Applicant’s failure to disclose any meaningful structure/algorithm as to how this value is generated raises questions whether applicant truly had possession of this feature at the time of filing.
Regarding Claim ,
The claim recites “A monitoring system for the state-based maintenance of a coupling arrangement of a track-bound vehicle, the coupling arrangement including at least one coupling head for coupling to a diametrically opposed coupling head of a mating coupling, the monitoring system comprising: at least one first device configured for capturing and for providing at least one of coupling arrangement data (KAD) and surroundings data (UD); a second device configured for recording and providing a plurality of images of at least one of the coupling arrangement and a plurality of components thereof; at least one data memory configured for storing the coupling arrangement data (KAD), the surroundings data (UD), and the plurality of images; and a data processing system configured for analyzing and for processing the coupling arrangement data (KAD), the surroundings data (UD), and the plurality of images, the data processing system being configured for being coupled to the at least one first device and the second device so as to transmit data..”
The specification does not provide adequate written description of how . There is no written content as to how or what specific algorithms are performed (i.e. formulas, algorithms, sequence of mathematical steps, process of determination, for example)
To satisfy the written description requirement, the Specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, to have “possession,” the Specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Original claims may fail to satisfy the written description requirement when the invention is claimed and described in functional language but the specification does not sufficiently identify how the invention achieves the claimed function. Id. This can occur when the algorithm or steps for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681–683 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
At best, the Specification vaguely and generically describes the following:
(See at least Instant PgPub ¶¶)
There is no description of what the steps / procedure actually entail. They are simply treated as black boxes that accept certain inputs () and output an . As noted in the MPEP, “original claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved” (See MPEP § 2161.01 I). In particular, the MPEP requires description of “an algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function."
Claimed subject matter should be described in the specification in such a manner as to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. The specification does not at all describe the steps / procedure involved in which would necessarily involve some calculations or steps that have not been described.
It is noted that this is not an enablement rejection. Applicant’s failure to disclose any meaningful structure/algorithm as to how this value is generated raises questions whether applicant truly had possession of this feature at the time of filing.
Regarding Claims ,
The claims ultimately depend from a claim that fails to comply with the written description requirement and is/are rejected for depending therefrom.
Special Definitions for Claim Language - MPEP § 2111.01(III)-(IV)
No special definitions are seen as present in the specification regarding the language used in the claims. Consequently, the words and phrases of the claims are given the plain meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. (See MPEP §§ 2173.01, 2173.05(a), and 2111.01).
If special definitions are present, Applicant should bring them to the attention of the Examiner and the prosecution history in the next response.
To date, Applicant has provided no indication of special definitions.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure is provided on the attached PTO-892 Notice of References Cited form.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SCOTT A REINBOLD whose telephone number is (313)446-6607. The examiner can normally be reached on MON - FRI: 8AM - 5PM EST.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Logan Kraft, can be reached on (571)270-5065. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/SCOTT A REINBOLD/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3747