Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
1. Claims 1-2, 4, 6-9, 11 and 16 have been amended. Claims 1-20 have been examined.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
2. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 06/11/2026 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
3. Applicant’s amendment, filed 06/11/2026, with respect to claims 6-10 has overcome the 35 USC 112(a) rejection. The 35 USC 112 rejection of 03/26/2026 has been withdrawn.
Regarding the 35 USC 103 rejection, Applicant argues, “The applied references do not disclose or render obvious at least these elements of claim 1, as amended” (note Remarks, page 14). Applicant argues:
“Buffard does not disclose that the provisioning involves the other ECU receiving an encrypted message from the main ECU, the other ECU decrypting the encrypted message using a device key of the other ECU, and the other ECU extracting a binding key from the message, the binding key for decrypting session keys to be received from the main ECU via the Ethernet link, the session keys for use by the other ECU to encrypt data to be sent to the main ECU via the Ethernet link” (note Remarks, pages 14-15).
“Fukada does not disclose that the secret key is a binding key obtained from a backend server, or that node A obtains the binding key by receiving an encrypted message, decrypting the encrypted message using a device key, and extracting the binding key from the message” (note Remarks, page 15).
“Lewis does not disclose that the secret key is a binding key obtained from a backend server, or that node A obtains the binding key by receiving an encrypted message, decrypting the encrypted message using a device key, and extracting the binding key from the message” (note Remarks, page 16).
Applicant’s arguments are not directed towards the limitations that each reference were relied upon by the Examiner in the 35 USC 103 rejection. Instead, Applicant appears to be arguing that each reference individually does not disclose all the claimed limitations.
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Applicant asserts “Because the applied references, individually or in any combination, fail to disclose or render obvious each and every element of claim 1 as amended, claim 1 is allowable over the applied references” (note Remarks, page 16).
However, Applicant has not provided any arguments regarding the applied references in combination.
Buffard discloses a system where a main ECU distributes a key generated by a sub-system (note Fig. 1 and paragraphs [0027] and [0053]) to other ECUs, i.e. a vehicle subsystem assembly (note paragraphs [0055] and [0072]), for secure communication between the main ECU and the other ECU (note paragraphs [0035] and [0055]) via an Ethernet link (note Fig. 1, Ethernet) .
Fukada discloses an alternative method for key distribution where a Node A receives an encrypted message containing a key from a server via a Node B (note paragraph [0061]). The encrypted message is decrypted with a key shared between the server and Node A, i.e. a device key (note paragraph [0062]). The key extracted from the message is shared between Node A and Node B, i.e. a binding key, for use in secure communication between Node A and Node B (note paragraphs [0104] and [0106]).
One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Buffard and Fukada because the key distribution method of Fukada would be in an improvement that allows for both the main ECU and the other ECU to receive a key with a MAC value encrypted for each node that assures authenticity of the key (note paragraphs [0006] and [0009] of Fukuda). The secure ECU communication of Buffard and the encryption key distribution of Fukuda would form a combination where a security sub-system (i.e. authentication server) distributes symmetric encryption keys to a main ECU (i.e. node B) and subsystem ECUs (i.e. node A) in encrypted messages. The subsystem ECUs would then decrypt the messages with a key shared with the security sub-system, i.e. device key, to extract a key shared with the main ECU, i.e. a binding key.
Lewis discloses a system where an ECU and a sensor use a shared key, i.e. a binding key, to encrypted messages that contain a session key (note paragraph [0037]). The session key may then be used for encrypting data messages between the ECU and the sensor (note paragraph [0038]).
One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the combination of Buffard and Fukada with the session key distribution of Lewis because it would improve security by making it more difficult for an attacker to learn the current session key if the key is changed in a secure manner after short intervals (note paragraph [0036] of Lewis). The combination of Buffard and Fukuda and the distribution of a session key using a shared key of Lewis would form a combination where the key shared between the main ECU and the other ECU established by the distribution method of Fukada would be used to encrypt messages that contain new session keys as taught by Lewis.
Therefore, the combination of Buffard, Fukada and Lewis teaches:
"receiving, at the vehicle subsystem assembly, a first encrypted message from the ECU via the Ethernet link (Buffard) as part of [a] procedure for obtaining [a] binding key (Fukada) [which is for decrypting session keys to be received from the ECU via the Ethernet link (Lewis), the session keys for use by the vehicle subsystem assembly to encrypt data to be sent to the ECU via the Ethernet link] (Lewis);
decrypting, at the vehicle subsystem assembly, the first encrypted message using a device key stored at the vehicle subsystem assembly to generate a first decrypted message [from which the binding key can be extracted] (Fukada); [and]
using, at the vehicle subsystem assembly, the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages received from the ECU via the Ethernet link (Lewis), the second encrypted messages including session keys for secure communications with the ECU (Lewis)"
The combination of Buffard, Fukada and Lewis teach each and every element of claims 1, 6, 11 and 16
Claim Interpretation
4. The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
5. This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: “backend system that provides keys” in claims 6 and 16.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
6. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
7. Claims 1, 3-6 and 8-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Buffard et al. (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2022/0094695; hereafter “Buffard”), and further in view of Fukuda (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2012/0106735) , and further in view of Lewis et al. (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2014/0301550; hereafter “Lewis”).
For claims 1 and 6, Buffard teaches a method and an apparatus for use in a vehicle subsystem assembly (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0027], ECUs) within a system that comprises i) a backend system that provides keys for symmetric encryption in vehicles (note Fig. 1 and paragraphs [0027] and [0053], sub-system 104 generates security keys), ii) an electronic control unit (ECU) communicatively coupled to the backend system (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0027], main ECU), and iii) the vehicle subsystem assembly communicatively coupled to the ECU via an Ethernet link (note Fig. 1, Ethernet), the apparatus comprising:
an Ethernet communication interface configured to communicate with the ECU via the Ethernet link (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0068], ECUs may communicate via Ethernet);
a memory configured to-store a first identifier of the vehicle subsystem assembly and a device key (note paragraphs [0051] and [0067], ECU memory stores unique identifier, keys and authentication data);
decryption circuitry (note paragraph [0068], decryption component); and
a controller coupled to i) the Ethernet communication interface, ii) the memory, and iii) the decryption circuitry (note paragraph [0069], processors), the controller configured to:
control the Ethernet communication interface to transmit the first identifier of the vehicle subsystem assembly to the ECU (note paragraph [0051], ECUs transmit their identifier to the main ECU) via the Ethernet link (note Fig. 1, ECUs are connected to main ECU via Ethernet) as part of a procedure for obtaining, from the backend system, a binding key for decrypting [data] to be received from the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraphs [0049] and [0053], transmitting the ECU identifier is part of a method for obtaining a security key generated by security sub-system server),
after the Ethernet communication interface transmits the first identifier, receive a first encrypted message from the ECU via the Ethernet link and the Ethernet communication interface as part of the procedure for obtaining the binding key (note paragraphs [0055] and [0072], ECUs received signed security keys message from main ECU),
use the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages received from the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraphs [0035] and [0055], security keys are used for secure communication between the ECUs).
Buffard differs from the claimed invention in that they fail to teach:
control the decryption circuitry to decrypt the first encrypted message using the device key to generate a first decrypted message,
determine whether the first decrypted message includes a second identifier that matches the first identifier;
extract the binding key from the first decrypted message; and
in response to determining that the first decrypted message includes the second identifier that matches the first identifier, use the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages received from the ECU.
Fukuda teaches:
control the [Ethernet] communication interface to transmit the first identifier [of the vehicle subsystem assembly to the ECU] (note paragraphs [0056] and [0082], node A transmits a nonce Nas and identification information IDa to node B) [via the Ethernet link] as part of a procedure for obtaining, from the backend system, a binding key for secure communications with the [ECU via the Ethernet link] (note paragraph [0053], transmitting identifier is part of a method for obtaining a session key for nodes A and B generated by authentication server S),
after the [Ethernet] communication interface transmits the first identifier, receive a first encrypted message from the [ECU via the Ethernet link and the Ethernet] communication interface as part of the procedure for obtaining the binding key (note paragraph [0061], node A receives an encrypted message from node B),
control the decryption circuitry to decrypt the first encrypted message using the device key to generate a first decrypted message (note paragraphs [0062] and [0100], node A decrypts the encrypted message with Kas, i.e. the device key),
determine whether the first decrypted message includes a second identifier that matches the first identifier (note paragraphs [0062]-[0064] and [0101]-[0102], node A determines if message MAC including identifier Nas matches first stored Nas);
extract the binding key from the decrypted message (note paragraphs [0062] and [0100], session key Ks, i.e. binding key, is extracted from the message); and
in response to determining that the first decrypted message includes the second identifier that matches the first identifier, use the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages received from [the ECU] (note paragraphs [0104] and [0106], in response to MAC is valid, session key Ks is used for communication between node A and node B).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the secure ECU communication of Buffard and the encryption key distribution of Fukuda to form a combination where a security sub-system (i.e. authentication server) distributes symmetric encryption keys to a main ECU (i.e. node B) and subsystem ECUs (i.e. node A). One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the secure vehicle communication of Buffard with the key distribution of Fukuda because it would allow both nodes to receive a session key with a MAC value encrypted for each node that assures authenticity (note paragraphs [0006] and [0009] of Fukuda).
The combination of Buffard and Fukuda differ from the claimed invention in that they fail to teach:
a binding key for decrypting session keys to be received from the ECU via the Ethernet link, the session keys for use by the vehicle subsystem assembly to encrypt data to be sent to the ECU via the Ethernet link
the second encrypted messages including session keys for secure communications with the ECU via the Ethernet link
Lewis teaches:
a binding key for decrypting session keys to be received from the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0037], a message encrypted with KAB,Auth is received from the ECU that contains session key KS), the session keys for use by the vehicle subsystem assembly to encrypt data to be sent to the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0038], session key KS is used in encryption and decryption between ECU and sensor)
the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages received from the ECU via the Ethernet link, the second encrypted messages including session keys for secure communications with the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0037], a message encrypted with KAB,Auth is received from the ECU that contains session key KS)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the combination of Buffard and Fukuda and the distribution of a session key using a shared key of Lewis. One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Buffard and Fukuda to use the key shared between two nodes to transmit new session keys as taught by Lewis because it would make it more difficult for an attacker to learn the current session key if the key is changed in a secure manner after short intervals (note paragraph [0036] of Lewis).
For claims 11 and 16, the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis teaches an apparatus for use in a vehicle subsystem assembly (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0027] of Buffard, ECUs) within a system that comprises i) a backend system that provides keys for symmetric encryption in vehicles (note Fig. 1 and paragraphs [0027] and [0053] of Buffard, sub-system 104 generates security keys), ii) an electronic control unit (ECU) communicatively coupled to the backend system (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0027] of Buffard, main ECU), and iii) the vehicle subsystem assembly communicatively coupled to the ECU via an Ethernet link (note Fig. 1 of Buffard, Ethernet), the apparatus comprising:
an Ethernet communication interface configured to communicate with the vehicle subsystem assembly via the Ethernet link (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0068] of Buffard, ECUs may communicate via Ethernet);
another communication interface configured to communicate with a computer system separate from the vehicle subsystem assembly, the computer system being communicatively coupled to the backend system (note Fig. 1 and paragraphs [0027]-[0028] of Buffard, interface to network coupled to security sub-system 104);
a memory (note paragraph [0067] of Buffard, memory); and
a controller coupled to i) the Ethernet communication interface, ii) the other communication interface, and iii) the memory, (note paragraph [0069] of Buffard, processors) the controller configured to:
receive a first identifier of the vehicle subsystem assembly from the vehicle subsystem assembly (note paragraphs [0056] and [0082] of Fukuda, node B receives a nonce Nas and identification information IDa from node A) via the Ethernet link and the Ethernet communication interface (note Fig. 1 of Buffard, ECUs are connected to main ECU via Ethernet) as part of a procedure for i) obtaining a binding key for use by the vehicle subsystem assembly to decrypt session keys to be sent by the ECU to the vehicle subsystem assembly via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0037] of Lewis, a message encrypted with KAB,Auth is received from the ECU that contains session key KS) and ii) providing the binding key to the vehicle subsystem assembly via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0053] of Fukuda, transmitting identifier is part of a method for obtaining a session key, i.e. binding key, for nodes A and B generated by authentication server S), the session keys for use by the vehicle subsystem assembly to encrypt data to be sent to the ECU via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0038] of Lewis, session key KS is used in encryption and decryption between ECU and sensor),
control the other communication interface to transmit the first identifier to the computer system (note paragraph [0057] of Fukuda, node B sends Ida and Nas to the authentication server S) as part of the procedure for i) obtaining the binding key and ii) providing the binding key to the vehicle subsystem assembly,
in response to transmitting the first identifier to the computer system, receive the binding key from the backend system via the other communication interface (note paragraph [0059] of Fukuda, node B receives the session key Ks, i.e. the binding key, from the authentication server) as part of the procedure for i) obtaining the binding key and ii) providing the binding key to the vehicle subsystem assembly,
store the binding key in the memory (note paragraph [0112], the session key Ks is stored in memory),
in response to transmitting the first identifier to the computer system, receive a first encrypted message from the backend system via the other communication interface (note paragraph [0059] of Fukuda, node B receives a message that is encrypted with Kas) as part of the procedure for i) obtaining the binding key and ii) providing the binding key to the vehicle subsystem assembly, the first encrypted message including the binding key, the binding key originating from the backend system (note paragraph [0058] of Fukuda, authentication server generates the session key Ks),
control the Ethernet communication interface (note Fig. 1 of Buffard, ECUs are connected to main ECU via Ethernet) to transmit the first encrypted message to the vehicle subsystem assembly (note paragraph [0061] of Fukuda, node B transfers to the node A the encrypted message) via the Ethernet link as part of the procedure for i) obtaining the binding key and ii) providing the binding key to the vehicle subsystem assembly, and
use the binding key to generate second encrypted messages to be transmitted to the vehicle subsystem assembly via the Ethernet link(note paragraphs [0035] and [0055] of Buffard, security keys are used for secure communication between the ECUs; paragraphs [0104] and [0106] of Fukuda, in response to MAC is valid, session key Ks is used for communication between node A and node B), the second encrypted messages including session keys to secure communications with the vehicle subsystem assembly via the Ethernet link (note paragraph [0037] of Lewis, a message encrypted with KAB,Auth is received from the ECU that contains session key KS).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the secure ECU communication of Buffard and the encryption key distribution of Fukuda to form a combination where a security sub-system (i.e. authentication server) distributes symmetric encryption keys to a main ECU (i.e. node B) and subsystem ECUs (i.e. node A). One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the secure vehicle communication of Buffard with the key distribution of Fukuda because it would allow both nodes to receive a session key with a MAC value encrypted for each node that assures authenticity (note paragraphs [0006] and [0009] of Fukuda).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the combination of Buffard and Fukuda and the distribution of a session key using a shared key of Lewis. One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Buffard and Fukuda to use the key shared between two nodes to transmit new session keys as taught by Lewis because it would make it more difficult for an attacker to learn the current session key if the key is changed in a secure manner after short intervals (note paragraph [0036] of Lewis).
For claims 3, 8, 12 and 17, the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis teaches claims 1, 6, 11 and 16, further comprising:
after receiving the first encrypted message (note paragraph [0035] of Lewis, secret key KAB,Auth was received in a prior execution of key establishment), receive one of the second encrypted messages from the ECU via the Ethernet link and via the Ethernet communication interface (note paragraph [0037] of Lewis, a message encrypted with KAB,Auth is received from the ECU that contains session key KS); and
control the decryption circuity to decrypt the one of the second encrypted messages using the binding key to generate a second decrypted message, extract a third key from the second decrypted message, the third key corresponding to one of the session keys (note paragraph [0037] of Lewis, the message is decrypted with KAB,Auth to extract session key KS), and
control the encryption circuity to encrypt data to be transmitted to the ECU via the Ethernet link using the third key (note paragraph [0038] of Lewis, session key KS is used in encryption and decryption between ECU and sensor).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the combination of Buffard and Fukuda and the distribution of a session key using a shared key of Lewis. One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Buffard and Fukuda to use the key shared between two nodes to transmit new session keys as taught by Lewis because it would make it more difficult for an attacker to learn the current session key if the key is changed in a secure manner after short intervals (note paragraph [0036] of Lewis).
For claims 4, 9, 13 and 18, the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis teaches claims 3, 8, 12 and 17, wherein the controller is further configured to:
control the decryption circuitry to decrypt data received from the ECU via the Ethernet link using the third key (note paragraph [0038] of Lewis, session key KS is used in encryption and decryption between ECU and sensor).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the combination of Buffard and Fukuda and the distribution of a session key using a shared key of Lewis. One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Buffard and Fukuda to use the key shared between two nodes to transmit new session keys as taught by Lewis because it would make it more difficult for an attacker to learn the current session key if the key is changed in a secure manner after short intervals (note paragraph [0036] of Lewis).
For claims 5, 10, 15 and 20, the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis teaches claims 1, 6, 11 and 16, wherein the ECU and the vehicle subsystem assembly are included within an in-vehicle communication network (note Fig. 1 and paragraph [0027] of Buffard, ECU are part of Ethernet network).
For clams 14 and 19, the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis teaches claims 11 and 16, further comprising decryption circuitry, wherein the controller is further configured to:
receive the binding key in a third encrypted message from the backend system (note paragraphs [0058]-[0059] of Fukuda, node B receives Ks in a second message that is encrypted with Kbs); and
control the decryption circuitry to decrypt the third encrypted message using a device key stored in the memory (note paragraph [0108] of Fukuda, decryption unit of node B decrypts the message with the stored Kbs).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the secure ECU communication of Buffard and the encryption key distribution of Fukuda to form a combination where a security sub-system (i.e. authentication server) distributes symmetric encryption keys to a main ECU (i.e. node B) and subsystem ECUs (i.e. node A). One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the secure vehicle communication of Buffard with the key distribution of Fukuda because it would allow both nodes to receive a session key with a MAC value encrypted for each node that assures authenticity (note paragraphs [0006] and [0009] of Fukuda).
8. Claims 2 and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis as applied to claims 1 and 6 above, and further in view of Takemori et al. (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2019/0199524; hereafter “Takemori”).
For claims 2 and 7, the combination of Buffard and Fukuda teaches claims 1 and 6, wherein the controller is further configured to:
generate a challenge number (note paragraph [0079] of Fukuda, node A uses a nonce creation unit to create a nonce Nas);
control the Ethernet communication interface (note Fig. 1 of Buffard, ECUs are connected to main ECU via Ethernet) to transmit the challenge number to the ECU via the Ethernet link in connection with transmitting the first identifier to the ECU as part of the procedure for obtaining the binding key (note paragraphs [0056] and [0082] of Fukuda, node A transmits a nonce Nas and identification information IDa to node B); and
determine whether the first decrypted message includes the challenge number (note paragraphs [0062]-[0064] and [0101]-[0102] of Fukuda, node A determines if message MAC including identifier Nas matches first stored Nas);
use the binding key for decrypting second encrypted messages further in response to determining that the decrypted message includes the challenge number (note paragraphs [0104] and [0106] of Fukuda, in response to MAC is valid, session key Ks is used for communication between node A and node B).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the secure ECU communication of Buffard and the encryption key distribution of Fukuda to form a combination where a security sub-system (i.e. authentication server) distributes symmetric encryption keys to a main ECU (i.e. node B) and subsystem ECUs (i.e. node A). One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the secure vehicle communication of Buffard with the key distribution of Fukuda because it would allow both nodes to receive a session key with a MAC value encrypted for each node that assures authenticity (note paragraphs [0006] and [0009] of Fukuda).
The combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis differ from the claimed invention in that they fail to explicitly teach:
randomly or pseudorandomly generate a challenge number;
Takemori teaches:
randomly or pseudorandomly generate a challenge number (note paragraph [0209], generate a random number to use as a nonce);
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the clamed invention to combine the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis and the random number nonce of Takemori. One of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Buffard, Fukuda and Lewis to use the shared key between two nodes to transmit new session keys as taught by Takemori because using a random number would make it more difficult for an attacker to guess at the nonce used by the ECU for message verification.
Conclusion
9. All claims are identical to or patentably indistinct from, or have unity of invention with claims in the application prior to the entry of the submission under 37 CFR 1.114 (that is, restriction (including a lack of unity of invention) would not be proper) and all claims could have been finally rejected on the grounds and art of record in the next Office action if they had been entered in the application prior to entry under 37 CFR 1.114. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL even though it is a first action after the filing of a request for continued examination and the submission under 37 CFR 1.114. See MPEP § 706.07(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
10. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DAVID J PEARSON whose telephone number is (571)272-0711. The examiner can normally be reached 8:30 - 6:00 pm; Monday through Friday.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Catherine Thiaw can be reached at (571)270-1138. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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DAVID J. PEARSON
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 2407
/David J Pearson/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2407
Prosecution Insights