DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
2. The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 04/04/2024 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Interpretation
3. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
4. The claims (claim 15) in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
5. This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: “a security detection system configured to subject the individual to security scanning upon entering the interior cabin region; and a communication system configured to interact with people in a vicinity of the vehicle by providing incident related information to the people directly outside the vehicle” in claim 15 (specification, par 0008-0015).
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
6. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
7. Claims 1-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Regarding claim 1:
Claim 1 is directed to certain methods of organizing human activity (abstract idea). The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the following reason(s):
Step 1: Claim 1 recites series of acts for deploying, directing and interacting. Thus, the claim is directed to a process, which is one of the statutory categories of the invention.
Step 2A, the claimed directing and interacting steps are directed to abstract idea for the reason that these steps are processes found by the courts (e.g. certain methods of organizing human activity) to be abstract ideas in that related to “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions)” that can be performed mentally abstract such as certain methods of organizing human activity. Also, the claimed deploying step is directed to abstract idea for the reason that these steps processes found by the courts (e.g. certain methods of organizing human activity) to be abstract ideas in that related to organizing human activity that is insignificant extra-solution activity (Prong One). This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea (Prong Two). Thus, the claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B, the additional limitations left in the claim is “vehicle”. The claimed vehicle is merely device that the judicial exception being applied to. Treating claim 1 as a whole, the additional limitations do not show inventive concept in applying the judicial exception (e.g. improvements to the vehicle) or do not provide other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Therefore, claim 1 as a whole, is not significantly more than the abstract idea itself and is ineligible.
Regarding claims 2-11:
Claims 2-11, respectively, depend on claim 1 and are without significantly more than the judicial exception itself as explained in claim 1. Thus, claims 2-11 are rejected for the same reason as in claim 1.
Regarding claim 12:
Claim 12 is directed to certain methods of organizing human activity (abstract idea). The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the following reason(s):
Step 1: Claim 12 recites series of acts for monitoring, uploading and interacting. Thus, the claim is directed to a process, which is one of the statutory categories of the invention.
Step 2A, the claimed directing and interacting steps are directed to abstract idea for the reason that these steps are processes found by the courts (e.g. certain methods of organizing human activity) to be abstract ideas in that related to “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions)” that can be performed mentally abstract such as certain methods of organizing human activity. Also, the claimed monitoring step is directed to abstract idea for the reason that these steps processes found by the courts (e.g. certain methods of organizing human activity) to be abstract ideas in that related to organizing human activity that is insignificant extra-solution activity (Prong One). This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea (Prong Two). Thus, the claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B, the additional limitations left in the claim is “vehicle”. The claimed vehicle is merely device that the judicial exception being applied to. Treating claim 12 as a whole, the additional limitations do not show inventive concept in applying the judicial exception (e.g. improvements to the vehicle) or do not provide other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Therefore, claim 12 as a whole, is not significantly more than the abstract idea itself and is ineligible.
Regarding claims 13-14:
Claims 13-14, respectively, depend on claim 12 and are without significantly more than the judicial exception itself as explained in claim 12. Thus, claims 13-14 are rejected for the same reason as in claim 12.
Double Patenting
8. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
9. Claim 12 is rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 14 of U.S. Patent No. 11882510.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because application claim 12 defines an obvious variation of the invention claimed in U.S. Patent No. 11882510.
The assignee of all applications of all applications is the same.
Claim 12 of the instant application is anticipated by patent claim 14 in that claim of the patent contains all the limitations of claim 12 of the instant application. Claim 12 of the instant application therefore is not patently distinct from the earlier patent claim and as such is unpatentable for obvious-type double patenting.
To the extent that the instant claim is broaden and therefore generic to the claimed invention of U.S. Patent No. 11882510, in re Goodman 29 USPQ 2d 2010 CAFC 1993, states that a generic claim cannot be issued without a terminal disclaimer, if a species claim has been previously been claimed in a co-pending application. For example:
Claims of instant application:
12. A method of interacting with people about an incident involving a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual using a conflict de-escalation system including a vehicle having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region into which the individual is directed comprising: monitoring an environment of the scene to develop incident related information;
uploading the incident related information to a portal of the conflict de-escalation system; and interacting with non-law enforcement people about the incident by allowing the non-law enforcement people to access the portal through a computer or cellphone app.
Claims of US Patent No. 11882510:
14. A method of interacting with people about an incident involving a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual using a conflict de-escalation system including a vehicle having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region into which the individual is directed comprising: monitoring an environment of the scene to develop incident related information;
uploading the incident related information to a portal of the conflict de-escalation system, wherein the portal includes separate public and law enforcement portals; and
interacting with the people about the incident by allowing the people to access the portal through a computer or cellphone app.
10. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Please note: Examiner has cited particular columns, line numbers, and figures in the references as applied to the claims below for the convenience of the applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teaching of the art and are applied to the specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well.
Applicants are reminded that MPEP 2141.02 states:
A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
11. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
12. Claims 1-3, 5-6, and 9-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Marron et al. (US 10049419) (hereinafter Marron).
Regarding claims 1 and 15:
As shown in figures 1-3, Marron discloses a method of operating a conflict de-escalation system employing a vehicle having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region (figure 1 shows the vehicle having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region of the vehicle) comprising:
deploying the vehicle to a scene in dealing with an incident involving a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual (in col 2, line 28-36, Marron teaches “a self-driving vehicle 122 (also referred to as an autonomous vehicle) arrives on scene at 120, where the detained or arrested individual (interpreted to be a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual) (both shall be referred to as a detainee) is placed into the self-driving vehicle 122 for initial processing. Depending on the type of incident or alleged infraction, the individual may or may not remain handcuffed within the vehicle, but is detained within at least a portion of the vehicle throughout the process, such as a backseat area”);
directing the individual into the interior cabin region (col 2, lines 28-36) such that the vehicle establishes a physical barrier between the individual and others directly outside the vehicle (figure 1, section 3 shows the individual being inside the vehicle, which establishes a physical barrier between the individual and others directly outside the vehicle); and
interacting with people in a vicinity of the vehicle by providing incident related information to the others directly outside the vehicle through the conflict de-escalation system (col 2, lines 51-59 Marron teaches “As air sensors and scanners continue to evolve, the detained individual may simply remain within the vehicle while the tests are processed, analyzed, and results communicated to one or more appropriate recipients. Depending on the status of the detainee's confinement, results may be communicated, over one or more wireless communications networks, to law enforcement, a remote attorney, and/or an on-call judge which may be contacted by the communication as part of the mobile processes and proceedings”).
Also, Marron teaches “a security detection system configured to subject the individual to security scanning upon entering the interior cabin region” as recited in claim 15 (col 2, lines 40-67, col 3, lines 1-3).
Regarding claim 12:
As shown in figures 1-3, Marron discloses a method of interacting with people about an incident involving a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual (in col 2, line 28-36, Marron teaches “a self-driving vehicle 122 (also referred to as an autonomous vehicle) arrives on scene at 120, where the detained or arrested individual (interpreted to be a mentally challenged, drug controlled, handicapped, incapacitated and/or unpredictable individual) (both shall be referred to as a detainee) is placed into the self-driving vehicle 122 for initial processing. Depending on the type of incident or alleged infraction, the individual may or may not remain handcuffed within the vehicle, but is detained within at least a portion of the vehicle throughout the process, such as a backseat area”) using a conflict de-escalation system including a vehicle (col 2, lines 51-59 Marron teaches “As air sensors and scanners continue to evolve, the detained individual may simply remain within the vehicle while the tests are processed, analyzed, and results communicated to one or more appropriate recipients. Depending on the status of the detainee's confinement, results may be communicated, over one or more wireless communications networks, to law enforcement, a remote attorney, and/or an on-call judge which may be contacted by the communication as part of the mobile processes and proceedings”) having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region into which the individual is directed (figure 1 shows the vehicle having at least one door leading to an interior cabin region of the vehicle) comprising:
monitoring an environment of the scene to develop incident related information (in col 2, lines 8-16, Marron teaches “During a typical detention scene, an officer temporarily stops an individual for questioning, without transporting the individual to another location. A detention stop allows the officer to determine whether to make an arrest, investigate further, or take no further action. In accordance with some embodiments, the processing provided by the mobile law enforcement communication system to be described herein can be used as an initial test hub for suspected infractions of alcohol, weapons and/or drug use”);
uploading the incident related information to a portal of the conflict de-escalation system (in col 4, lines 46-52 Marron teaches “the plurality of interface devices 230 are configured to acquire input pertaining to a detainee within the self-driving vehicle and a law enforcement infraction associated with the detainee. The electronic processor of controller device 202 is programmed to receive the acquired input pertaining to the detainee and the law enforcement infraction”. Also see col 2, line 50-65, col 5, lines 40-57); and
interacting with non-law enforcement people (attorney and/or judge interpreted to be non-law enforcement people. Col 2, lines 50-65) about the incident by allowing the non-law enforcement people to access the portal through a computer or cellphone app (col 2, lines 50-65).
Regarding claim 2:
Marron further discloses subjecting the individual to security detection upon entrance into the interior cabin region (figure 2, parts 1 and 2 show the individual is subjected to security detection upon entrance into the interior cabin region of the vehicle).
Regarding claims 3 and 20:
Marron further discloses monitoring an environment of the scene to develop the incident related information, wherein monitoring the environment of the scene includes obtaining at least one of audio and video recordings. (col 4, lines 59-67).
Regarding claim 5:
Marron further discloses wherein interacting with people includes providing two-way communication between within the vehicle and one or more law enforcement personnel located outside the vehicle (col 2, lines 40-59).
Regarding claim 6:
Marron further discloses wherein interacting with people includes providing messages and/or announcements to non-law enforcement people (attorney and/or judge interpreted to be non-law enforcement people) in the vicinity of the vehicle (col 2, lines 40-59).
Regarding claims 9 and 18:
Marron further discloses using a public portal accessible through a computer or cellphone app in interacting with people (judge) outside the vehicle (col 7, lines 40-50).
Regarding claims 10 and 19:
Marron further discloses using a law enforcement portal accessible through a computer or cellphone app in interacting with law enforcement personnel (col 7, lines 40-50).
Regarding claim 11:
Marron further discloses providing the law enforcement portal with certain information not available on the public portal (abstract, col 6, lines 46-57, col 7, lines 40-50).
Regarding claim 13:
Marron further discloses wherein establishing the portal includes establishing separate public and law enforcement portals (col 7, lines 40-50).
Regarding claim 14:
Marron further discloses providing the law enforcement portal with certain information not available on the public portal (abstract, col 6, lines 46-57, col 7, lines 40-50).
Regarding claim 16:
Marron further discloses wherein the security detection system includes multiple body scanning detectors (col 2, lines 46-59).
Regarding claim 17:
Marron further discloses wherein the multiple body scanning detectors include at least two of a visual detector of the individual, an explosive detector, a flammable materials detector, an x-ray system (col 2, lines 46-59, col 5, lines 9-17).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
13. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
14. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
15. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Marron in view of Kawasaki et al. (US 20030125854) (hereinafter Kawasaki).
Regarding claim 4:
Marron discloses all of the subject matter as described above except for specifically teaching wherein at least some of the recordings are obtained from both interior and exterior cameras on the vehicle.
However, Kawasaki in the same field of endeavor teaches wherein at least some of the recordings are obtained from both interior and exterior cameras on the vehicle (par 0008, 0052-0054). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use the recording system as taught by Kawasaki to modify the system and method of Marron in order to provide a vehicle information recording system that allows specific analysis of an accident (par 0011) (See KSR Rationale: Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results).
16. Claims 7-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Marron in view of Carruthers et al. (US 20210097315) (hereinafter Carruthers).
Regarding claim 7:
Marron discloses all of the subject matter as described above except for specifically teaching discloses wherein interacting with people includes providing public awareness broadcasts originating from within the vehicle.
However, Kawasaki in the same field of endeavor teaches discloses wherein interacting with people includes providing public awareness broadcasts originating from within the vehicle (in par 0037, Kawasaki teaches “Further the in-vehicle monitoring device may provide remote monitoring of vehicle information and/or streaming of audio and/or video from the in-vehicle monitoring device to remote devices such as a mobile phone or tablet”. Also see par 0043, 0054-0055). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use the vehicle monitoring system as taught by Kawasaki to modify the system and method of Marron in order to provide remote monitoring of vehicle information and/or streaming of audio and/or video from the in-vehicle monitoring device to remote devices such as a mobile phone or tablet (par 0037) (See KSR Rationale: Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results).
Regarding claim 8:
Marron discloses all of the subject matter as described above except for specifically teaching wherein the public awareness broadcasts include one or more of internet, television, radio and cell phone broadcasts.
However, Kawasaki in the same field of endeavor teaches wherein the public awareness broadcasts include one or more of internet, television, radio and cell phone broadcasts (in par 0037, Kawasaki teaches “Further the in-vehicle monitoring device may provide remote monitoring of vehicle information and/or streaming of audio and/or video from the in-vehicle monitoring device to remote devices such as a mobile phone or tablet”. Also see par 0043, 0054-0055). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use the vehicle monitoring system as taught by Kawasaki to modify the system and method of Marron in order to provide remote monitoring of vehicle information and/or streaming of audio and/or video from the in-vehicle monitoring device to remote devices such as a mobile phone or tablet (par 0037) (See KSR Rationale: Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results).
Conclusion
17. The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Guzik et al. (US 9841865) disclose techniques for providing in-vehicle user interfaces to a person that is contacted by a law enforcement officer. The person may be a member of the community, an eyewitness, or a suspect that is arrested by the law enforcement officer. The in-vehicle user interfaces may be presented by an in-vehicle information device. The in-vehicle information device may provide user interfaces that include video via a display device and/or audio via an audio device to a person that is in a secure holding area (e.g., backseat, rear passenger compartment, etc.) of a law enforcement vehicle. Furthermore, the in-vehicle information device may also include a first input device that is controllable by the law enforcement officer from an area of the vehicle that is intended for use by the law enforcement officer. The input device may include a touch display screen, a keyboard, a pointing device, and/or so forth. The in-vehicle information device may further include a second input device (e.g., a touch screen) that is accessible to the person in the secure holding area.
18. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KABIR A TIMORY whose telephone number is (571)270-1674. The examiner can normally be reached Mon-Fri 7:00 AM-3:00 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hannah S Wang can be reached at 571-272-9018. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/KABIR A TIMORY/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2631