DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 3/2/2026 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 3/2/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
As to Applicant’s argument that, “As stated in the Remarks below, it is this dual communication path that is not described in Czaja, not that the user communicates with a vehicle device through the user device. The user device does not play a role in the communication with the vehicle as that communication comes from the server” (Remarks, p. 6), the Examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Czaja as modified states, “Here each vehicle can be provisioned by the use of an enrollment station that is in communication with the credential issuing device located at the organization’s headquarters”(Stewart, at least [0123]). It is clear that the combined references do contemplate the dual communication as claimed. The car rental company, for example, provides the user with vehicle access authorization (Czaja, at least [0017, 0019, 0058, and 0063]) and the car rental company also provisions the vehicle with information about the next user to use the vehicle (Stewart, at least [0123]). This is allows for better monitoring of both the user and the vehicle. Therefore, the rejection is maintained.
As to Applicant’s argument that, “The communications described in Czaja are not communications with a second user device. Nor is there any suggestion in Czaja that a device associated with an owner of the vehicle (i.e. the second user device) would send information to the server that would communicate information to the vehicle about the first user permissions” (Remarks, p. 9), the Examiner respectfully disagrees. Czaja gets rental contract(s) from the issuer server (second user device) (Czaja, [0067]). Therefore, the rejection is maintained.
As to Applicant’s argument that, “The claimed dual communication path of the ‘second user device’ is not described in Czaja” (Remarks, p. 8 and p. 9), the Examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Czaja as modified states, “Here each vehicle can be provisioned by the use of an enrollment station that is in communication with the credential issuing device located at the organization’s headquarters” (Stewart, at least [0123]). It is clear that the combined references do contemplate the dual communication as claimed. The car rental company, for example, provides the user with vehicle access authorization (Czaja, at least [0017, 0019, 0058, and 0063]) and the car rental company also provisions the vehicle with information about the next user to use the vehicle. This is allows for better monitoring of both the user and the vehicle. Therefore, the rejection is maintained.
As to Applicant’s argument that, “In Gavie, the user device receives expiration information from a base station, not a second user device” (Remarks, p. 11), the Examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Therefore, the rejection is maintained.
Response to Amendment
Claims 1-20, 24, 28, 32-36, and 38-40 have been cancelled.
Claims 21-23, 25-27, 29-31, 37, and 41-50 are pending.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 21-23, 25, 31, 41-45, and 50 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PG Pub. No. 2012/0252420 to Czaja et al. (hereinafter Czaja) in view of US PG Pub. No. 2010/0178901 to Gavie in view of US PG Pub. No. 2005/0125669 to Stewart et al. (hereinafter Stewart).
As to claims 21, 37, and 42, Czaja teaches:
a. Sending, by a server, over a network to a first user device, vehicle access authorization that was provided by a second user device, wherein the vehicle access authorization comprises encoded information with a time expiry set to a termination time of vehicle access (user’s device receives authorization and access information about rental contract terms from a server of the rental firm after scanning QR code on vehicle) (Czaja, at least [0017, 0019, 0058, and 0063]).
Czaja does not expressly mention the server sending vehicle associated with a user. However, in analogous art, Stewart teaches:
b. Sending, by the server, vehicle configuration information to the vehicle that is associated with a user of the first user device and the vehicle access authorization (server provisions with the user’s certificate) (Stewart, at least [0123-0124]).
Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application would have been motivated to implement the remote vehicle rental procedure of Czaja with the provisioning of the vehicle by the server of Stewart in order to for better monitoring of both the user and the vehicle as suggested by Stewart (Stewart, [0123-0124]).
Czaja as modified teaches the terms and conditions of the rental agreement but does not expressly mention alerting the user to the end of the rental agreement. However, in an analogous art, Gavie teaches:
c. Indicating that the time expiry is approaching by alerting the first user device (alarm can be set to alert user of nearing the end of the rental period) (Gavie, [0054]).
Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application would have been motivated to implement the remote vehicle rental procedure of Czaja with the notification of the approaching rental expiration of Gavie in order to enable the user to extend the rental period before any late fees are assessed as suggested by Gavie (Gavie, [0004]).
Czaja as modified further teaches:
d. Revoking the vehicle access authorization once the time expiry is met, wherein ownership of the vehicle is associated with the second user device (revoking the credential (access) at the end of the rental period) (Stewart, [0123-0124]).
As to claims 22 and 43, Czaja as modified teaches the encoded information comprises a specified code that is scannable (Czaja, at least [0019, 0058, and 0063]).
As to claims 23 and 44, Czaja as modified teaches the encoded information comprises bootstrapping information used by the first user device to establish a secure connection with the vehicle (member device uses credential(s) to open a secure communication channel with the vehicle) (Stewart, [0112]).
As to claims 25 and 45, Czaja as modified teaches revoking of vehicle access authorization further comprises transmitting, to the first user device, revocation information (receiving a certificate revocation list from provisioning service (configurator device)) (Stewart, [0052]).
As to claims 31 and 50, Czaja as modified teaches the encoded information comprises either a token that uniquely identifies an agreement governing rental of the vehicle, bootstrapping information, or both (“message number” (token that uniquely identifies contract) is used to access the actual text of the particular rental contract) (Czaja, [0067]).
As to claim 41, Czaja as modified teaches:
a. Bootstrapping information used by the first user device to establish a secure connection with the vehicle (member device uses credential(s) to open a secure communication channel with the vehicle) (Stewart, [0112]).
b. A token that uniquely identifies an agreement governing rental of the vehicle (“message number” (token that uniquely identifies contract) is used to access the actual text of the particular rental contract) (Czaja, [0067]).
Claims 26, 27, 29, and 30 and claims 46-49 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PG Pub. No. 2012/0252420 to Czaja et al. (hereinafter Czaja) in view of US PG Pub. No. 2010/0178901 to Gavie in view of US PG Pub. No. 2005/0125669 to Stewart et al. (hereinafter Stewart) as applied to claim 21 and claim 42 respectively above, and further in view of US PG Pub. No. 2017/0295448 to McCann et al. (hereinafter McCann).
As to claims 26 and 46, Czaja as modified does not mention Device Provisioning Protocol. However, in an analogous art, McCann teaches the vehicle access information is provided according to Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) information (provisioning a device with credentials utilizing DPP) (McCann, [0014]).
Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application would have been motivated to implement the remote vehicle rental procedure of Czaja as modified with McCann’s use of DPP in order to make the provisioning process more streamlined as suggested by McCann (McCann, [0014]).
As to claims 27 and 47, Czaja as modified teaches the vehicle configuration information comprises credentials or configurator signing keys or both (configuration information provides for at least secure communication information and credentials) (Stewart, [0057]).
The Examiner sees no patentable distinction between a connector and a configurator. Both terms describe the same functionality (Specification, [0032 and 0042]).
As to claims 29 and 48, Czaja as modified the second user device comprises a DPP Configurator (configurator device can be a DPP configurator) (McCann, [0022])
As to claims 30 and 49, Czaja as modified teaches the vehicle configuration information comprises service information relating to a service accessible by the first user device (configuration information includes vehicle operation rules, insurance information and the like) (Czaja, [0054]).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to WILLIAM S POWERS whose telephone number is (571)272-8573. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 7:30-17:30.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jorge L Ortiz-Criado can be reached at (571) 272-7624. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/WILLIAM S POWERS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2496
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