DETAILED ACTION
This communication is in response to the claims filed on 02/07/2024.
Application No: 18/428,505
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U. S. C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U. S. C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U. S. C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U. S. C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-6 and 9-20 are rejected under 35 U. S. C. 103 as being unpatentable over CHEN et al. (CN 106304046 A) in view of LiHe et al. (US 20200015079 A1).
Regarding claim 1, CHEN teaches a transmission method ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), comprising:
generating, by a first device, a first authentication code based on first information , a first key, and first data ([invention contents], e.g. in some embodiments, generating a static ID for each iBeacon base station, which does not change with time, a transmission and a message authentication code or a digital signature, for indicating the public key (i.e. first key) corresponding to the message authentication code or digital signature corresponding to the plaintext information (i.e. first data) and generating a message authentication code or a digital signature (i.e. generating authentication code with first information of data or key)),
generating, by the first device, a first data packet based on the first authentication code and the first data ([[invention contents], e.g.], e.g. adding additional Bluetooth broadcast packets, the additional Bluetooth broadcast packet comprises a first dynamic identifier and the digital signature (i.e. generating data packet with an authentication code and the message data)); and
sending, by the first device, the first data packet, the first device being part of a first transmission system ([invention contents], e.g. the invention adds additional Bluetooth broadcast packets it sends a dynamic identifier in the Bluetooth broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet (ID), effectively solves the iBeacon base station by the third party. in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
the first information includes at least one of sending time information or first context information
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
the first information includes at least one of sending time information or first context information ([0004], e.g. so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication. [0096] in some optional solutions, the first security key is a key derived based on a security key in the security context information of the UE and a first fresh protection parameter (i.e. authentication code is generated using first context information).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Regarding claim 2, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 1. CHEN further teaches wherein obtaining, by the first device, the first key, through negotiation with a second device in a second transmission system, and the first transmission system is different from the second transmission system ([invention contents], e.g. in one example, by including information generate hash UUID, Major, Minor, taking part of the hash value, as a static ID, another portion of the hash value of the adding time stamp information as message (i.e. hash value generated by another device and transmitted in message), static ID with short signature short digital signature using BLS algorithm combining with the private key to generate 20 bytes (i.e. using hash value, generated authentication code) , the finally generated are sent to the Scan Response iBeacon base station of the broadcast packet. the server receives static ID submitted by the hand-held device (i.e. another device) and a short signature, according to static ID, taking out corresponding public key and uses the same base station message obtained by the method (i.e. obtaining, by the first device, the first key, through negotiation with a second device in a second transmission system)).
Regarding claim 3, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 1. CHEN further teaches wherein before the generating the first authentication code based on the first information, the first key, and the first data, the method further comprises: establishing a communication connection to a fourth device; and obtaining the first key through the fourth device ([invention contents], e.g. 6) of the iBeacon base station an additional Bluetooth broadcast packet (i.e. establishing a communication connection for a broadcast message to scan devices), can be a BLE (Bluetooth (LowEnergy) scanning device Passive Scanning obtained, also may be a scanning device (i.e. a fourth scan device) when Active Scanning Scan Response sent by the broadcast device broadcast packet. Scan Response broadcast packet only when the central device sending Scan Request (scan request) when using the ScanResponse broadcast packet sent, therefore, sending the encryption and the authentication information is a more energy-saving method (i.e. generating and sending a data packet)).
Regarding claim 4, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 2. LiHe further teaches wherein the second transmission system includes a cellular transmission system or a wireless local area network (WLAN) transmission system, and the first transmission system includes a satellite transmission system ([0009], e.g. sending a first request message to a non-3GPP interworking function network element (i.e. N3IWF (Non-3GPP Interworking Function) plays a crucial role in enabling communication between 5G networks and non-3GPP networks, including satellite networks), where the first request message carries the first authentication code, the AMF indication information, and key identifier information, the first authentication code is used by the N3IWF to perform security authentication on the UE, and the key identifier information is used to obtain the first security key; and [0130] The trusted non-3GPP IP access untrusted non-3GPP IP access network such as a wireless local area network WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network, WLAN) provides a radio resource for access of the UE).
The motivation to combine reference of LiHe within the method of CHEN before the effective filing date of the invention is that the new method provides that present invention disclose a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network, and a related device, so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication, which reduces overhead in the authentication process (See LiHe [0004]).
Regarding claim 5, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 1. LiHe further teaches wherein the sending the first data packet comprises: after processing the first data packet into at least one second data packet at a message data convergence protocol (MDCP) layer of the first device or a satellite link control (SLC) layer of the first device, sending the at least one second data packet to a second device through a third device ([0019], e.g. After performing the foregoing steps, the user equipment adds the fourth request message into the IPsec protocol (i.e. a part of SLC layer of the first device) and sends the fourth request message to the N3IWF, so that the first AMF on a network side can perform security authentication on the UE. [0144] The security context information may include a key generated in an authentication procedure, and a non-access stratum (NAS) key, a radio resource control (RRC) key, and a user plane protection key that are still used subsequently, for example, Kamf, Knas-int, Knas-enc, Krrc-int, Krrc-enc, Kup-int, and Kup-enc, or an anchor key Kseaf, an AMF key Kamf, and an encryption/decryption key and an integrity protection key that are used to protect a NAS layer, an AS layer, and a user plane in 5G (i.e. NAS layer protocol can be replaced by MDCP or SLC layer protocol in view of ordinary skills in the art known as 3GPP standards: for example, a Satellite Network Core (SNC) includes portions of the MAC layer, the Satellite Link Control (SLC) layer, the IP layer, and the acceleration layers. The SNC may include a TCP/IP stack and a satellite stack to communicate with the terminal).
The motivation to combine reference of LiHe within the method of CHEN before the effective filing date of the invention is that the new method provides that present invention disclose a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network, and a related device, so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication, which reduces overhead in the authentication process (See LiHe [0004]).
Regarding claim 6, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 1. CHEN further teaches wherein the sending time information is useable to indicate a sending time of the first data packet ([invention contents], e.g. in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature, solves the problem of iBeacon base station to be forged. … In one implementation, from a real UUID, Major Minor information generate a hash of the hash of part or all as the input of the pseudo-random number generator at a fixed time node generates a pseudo random number, the whole or part of the random number as the dynamic identifier. short digital signature taking all or part of the hash and timestamp information as message, use the BLS algorithm combining with the private key to generate 20 bytes of the dynamic identification of the finally generated with a digital signature are sent to the Scan Response iBeacon base station of the broadcast packet. dynamic identifying server after receiving the dynamic identification and digital signature submitted by the handheld device (i.e. broadcast message includes timestamp of when the authentication message is generated)).
Regarding claim 9, CHEN teaches a secure transmission method ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), comprising:
receiving, by a second device in a first transmission system, a first data packet ([invention contents], e.g. based on each of the iBeacon base stations, when the receiving end receives the first message authentication code, the key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station);
generating a second authentication code based on second information, a first key and the first data packet ([[invention contents], e.g. based on each of the iBeacon base stations, when the receiving end receives the first message authentication code, the key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station and the iBeacon base station the same plaintext message to generate a second message authentication code, the first message authentication code and said second message authentication code); and
determining a receiving status of the first data packet based on the second authentication code ([[invention contents], e.g. generating a second message authentication code key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station and the iBeacon base station the same plaintext message, transmitting the first message authentication code and said second message authentication code. if yes, then determining the authenticity of the message (i.e. if YES status, determines the authenticity of the message)).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
the second information includes at least one of receiving time information or second context information.
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
the second information includes at least one of receiving time information or second context information ([0004], e.g. so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication. [0096] in some optional solutions, the first security key is a key derived based on a security key in the security context information of the UE and a first fresh protection parameter (i.e. authentication code is generated using second context information).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Regarding claim 10, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 9. CHEN further teaches wherein before the generating the second authentication code based on the second information, the first key and the first data packet, the method further comprises: obtaining, by the second device, the first key, through negotiation with a first device in a second transmission system, and the second transmission system is different from the first transmission system ([invention contents], e.g. in one example, by including information generate hash UUID, Major, Minor, taking part of the hash value, as a static ID, another portion of the hash value of the adding time stamp information as message (i.e. hash value generated by another device and transmitted in message), static ID with short signature short digital signature using BLS algorithm combining with the private key to generate 20 bytes (i.e. using hash value, generated authentication code) , the finally generated are sent to the Scan Response iBeacon base station of the broadcast packet. the server receives static ID submitted by the hand-held device (i.e. another device) and a short signature, according to static ID, taking out corresponding public key and uses the same base station message obtained by the method (i.e. obtaining, by the first device, the first key, through negotiation with a second device in a second transmission system)).
Regarding claim 11, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 9. LiHe further teaches wherein the second transmission system includes a cellular transmission system or a wireless local area network (WLAN) transmission system, and the first transmission system includes a satellite transmission system ([0009], e.g. sending a first request message to a non-3GPP interworking function network element (i.e. N3IWF (Non-3GPP Interworking Function) plays a crucial role in enabling communication between 5G networks and non-3GPP networks, including satellite networks), where the first request message carries the first authentication code, the AMF indication information, and key identifier information, the first authentication code is used by the N3IWF to perform security authentication on the UE, and the key identifier information is used to obtain the first security key; and [0130] The trusted non-3GPP IP access untrusted non-3GPP IP access network such as a wireless local area network WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network, WLAN) provides a radio resource for access of the UE).
The motivation to combine reference of LiHe within the method of CHEN before the effective filing date of the invention is that the new method provides that present invention disclose a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network, and a related device, so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication, which reduces overhead in the authentication process (See LiHe [0004]).
Regarding claim 12, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 9. CHEN further teaches wherein the receiving, the first data packet specifically comprises: receiving, in the first transmission system, the first data packet sent by from a third device ([invention contents], e.g. 6) of the iBeacon base station an additional Bluetooth broadcast packet (i.e. establishing a communication connection for a broadcast message to scan devices), can be a BLE (Bluetooth (LowEnergy) scanning device Passive Scanning obtained, also may be a scanning device (i.e. a third scan device) when Active Scanning Scan Response sent by the broadcast device broadcast packet. Scan Response broadcast packet only when the central device sending Scan Request (scan request) when using the ScanResponse broadcast packet sent, therefore, sending the encryption and the authentication information is a more energy-saving method (i.e. generating and sending a data packet)).
Regarding claim 13, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 9. CHEN further teaches wherein the method further comprises: determining, by the second device, a first authentication code based on the first data packet ([invention contents], e.g. in one example, by including information generate hash UUID, Major, Minor, taking part of the hash value, as a static ID, another portion of the hash value of the adding time stamp information as message (i.e. hash value generated by another device and transmitted in message), static ID with short signature short digital signature using BLS algorithm combining with the private key to generate 20 bytes (i.e. using hash value, generated authentication code) , the finally generated are sent to the Scan Response iBeacon base station of the broadcast packet. the server receives static ID submitted by the hand-held device (i.e. another device) and a short signature, according to static ID, taking out corresponding public key and uses the same base station message obtained by the method (i.e. obtaining, by the first device, the first key, through negotiation with a second device in a second transmission system)).
Regarding claim 14, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 9. CHEN further teaches wherein before the generating the second authentication code based on the second information, the first key and the first data packet, the method further comprises: receiving the second information from a third device ([invention contents], e.g. 6) of the iBeacon base station an additional Bluetooth broadcast packet (i.e. establishing a communication connection for a broadcast message to scan devices), can be a BLE (Bluetooth (LowEnergy) scanning device Passive Scanning obtained, also may be a scanning device (i.e. a third scan device) when Active Scanning Scan Response sent by the broadcast device broadcast packet. Scan Response broadcast packet only when the central device sending Scan Request (scan request) when using the ScanResponse broadcast packet sent, therefore, sending the encryption and the authentication information is a more energy-saving method (i.e. generating and sending a data packet)).
Regarding claim 15, CHEN teaches a transmission method ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), comprising:
receiving, by a third device, at least one second data packet ([invention contents], e.g. the invention adds additional Bluetooth broadcast packets it sends a dynamic identifier in the Bluetooth broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet (ID), effectively solves the iBeacon base station by the third party (i.e. receiving by a third device). in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature),
generating, by the third device, a first data packet based on the at least one second data packet ([invention contents], e.g. 6) of the iBeacon base station an additional Bluetooth broadcast packet (i.e. establishing a communication connection for a broadcast message to scan devices), can be a BLE (Bluetooth (LowEnergy) scanning device Passive Scanning obtained, also may be a scanning device (i.e. a third scan device) when Active Scanning Scan Response sent by the broadcast device broadcast packet. Scan Response broadcast packet only when the central device sending Scan Request (scan request) when using the ScanResponse broadcast packet sent, therefore, sending the encryption and the authentication information is a more energy-saving method (i.e. generating and sending a data packet)).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
sending, by the third device, the first data packet.
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
sending, by the third device, the first data packet [0060], e.g. the receiving, by a first AMF, a second request message sent by an N3IWF specifically includes: [0061] receiving a second request message sent by a second AMF, where the second request message is sent by the second AMF based on a received third request message sent by the N3IWF; and [0062] the sending a second response message to the N3IWF specifically includes: [0063] sending a third response message to the second AMF, so that the second AMF sends a second response message to the N3IWF, where the second response message and the third response message each carry the first security key (i.e. sending, by the third N3IWF device, the first data packet).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Regarding claim 16, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 15. CHEN further teaches wherein the method further comprises: sending second information or fourth information, wherein the second information or the fourth information includes receiving time information ([invention contents], e.g. in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature, solves the problem of iBeacon base station to be forged. … In one implementation, from a real UUID, Major Minor information generate a hash of the hash of part or all as the input of the pseudo-random number generator at a fixed time node generates a pseudo random number, the whole or part of the random number as the dynamic identifier. short digital signature taking all or part of the hash and timestamp information as message (i.e. information includes receiving time information)).
Regarding claim 17, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 16. CHEN further teaches wherein the receiving time information indicates is useable to indicate a corresponding time at which the third device receives the first data packet in the at least one second data packet ([invention contents], e.g. in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature, solves the problem of iBeacon base station to be forged. … In one implementation, from a real UUID, Major Minor information generate a hash of the hash of part or all as the input of the pseudo-random number generator at a fixed time node generates a pseudo random number, the whole or part of the random number as the dynamic identifier. short digital signature taking all or part of the hash and timestamp information as message, use the BLS algorithm combining with the private key to generate 20 bytes of the dynamic identification of the finally generated with a digital signature are sent to the Scan Response iBeacon base station of the broadcast packet. dynamic identifying server after receiving the dynamic identification and digital signature submitted by the handheld device (i.e. broadcast message includes timestamp of when the authentication message is generated)).
Regarding claim 18, CHEN teaches a communication apparatus ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), comprising
one or more processors coupled with one or more memories, wherein the one or more memories are configured to store non- transitory instructions, the one or more processors are configured to execute the non-transitory instructions ([invention contents], e.g. the invention provides method for iBeacon broadcast message from the iBeacon base station (i.e. base station with a processor and a non-transitory memory executing instructions to perform data communication) sends a Bluetooth broadcast packet to the receiving end), thereby causing the communication apparatus to perform operations comprising:
generating a first authentication code based on first information, a first key, and first data [invention contents], e.g. in some embodiments, generating a static ID for each iBeacon base station, which does not change with time, a transmission and a message authentication code or a digital signature, for indicating the public key (i.e. first key) corresponding to the message authentication code or digital signature corresponding to the plaintext information (i.e. first data) and generating a message authentication code or a digital signature (i.e. generating authentication code with first information of data or key)),
generating a first data packet based on the first authentication code and the first data ([[invention contents], e.g.], e.g. adding additional Bluetooth broadcast packets, the additional Bluetooth broadcast packet comprises a first dynamic identifier and the digital signature (i.e. generating data packet with an authentication code and the message data)); and
and sending the first data packet ([invention contents], e.g. the invention adds additional Bluetooth broadcast packets it sends a dynamic identifier in the Bluetooth broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet (ID), effectively solves the iBeacon base station by the third party. in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
the first information includes at least one of sending time information or first context information.
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
the first information includes at least one of sending time information or first context information ([0004], e.g. so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication. [0096] in some optional solutions, the first security key is a key derived based on a security key in the security context information of the UE and a first fresh protection parameter (i.e. authentication code is generated using first context information ).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Regarding claim 19, CHEN teaches a communication apparatus ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), , comprising
one or more processors coupled with one or more memories, wherein the one or more memories are configured to store non- transitory instructions, the one or more processors are configured to execute the non-transitory instructions ([invention contents], e.g. the invention provides method for iBeacon broadcast message from the iBeacon base station sends a Bluetooth broadcast packet to the receiving end (i.e. a receiving device with a processor and a non-transitory memory executing instructions to perform data communication)), thereby causing computer instructions, the communication apparatus is enabled to perform operations comprising:
receiving a first data packet ([invention contents], e.g. based on each of the iBeacon base stations, when the receiving end receives the first message authentication code, the key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station);
generating a second authentication code based on second information, a first key and the first data packet ([[invention contents], e.g. based on each of the iBeacon base stations, when the receiving end receives the first message authentication code, the key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station and the iBeacon base station the same plaintext message to generate a second message authentication code, the first message authentication code and said second message authentication code);
determining a receiving status of the first data packet based on the second authentication code ([[invention contents], e.g. generating a second message authentication code key with the first message authentication code from the iBeacon corresponding to the base station and the iBeacon base station the same plaintext message, transmitting the first message authentication code and said second message authentication code, if yes, then determining the authenticity of the message (i.e. if YES status, determines the authenticity of the message)).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
the second information includes at least one of receiving time information or second context information.
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
the second information includes at least one of receiving time information or second context information ([0004], e.g. so that security context information stored after UE successfully accesses a network last time can be used to complete current non-3GPP-based network access authentication. [0096] in some optional solutions, the first security key is a key derived based on a security key in the security context information of the UE and a first fresh protection parameter (i.e. authentication code is generated using second context information).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Regarding claim 20, CHEN teaches a communication apparatus ([invention contents], e.g. Therefore, it is an object of the present invention is to provide a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method, which effectively prevents iBeacon in the existing technology base station (i.e. first device) broadcast message can be used by any person (i.e. a terminal device, a second device, a receiving device), and the iBeacon base station can be easily forged), comprising
one or more processors coupled with one or more memories, wherein the one or more memories are configured to store non- transitory instructions, the one or more processors are configured to execute the non-transitory instructions ([invention contents], e.g. the invention provides method for iBeacon broadcast message from the iBeacon base station sends a Bluetooth broadcast packet to the receiving end (i.e. a receiving device with a processor and a non-transitory memory executing instructions to perform data communication)), thereby causing the communication apparatus to perform operations comprising:
.receiving at least one second data packet ([invention contents], e.g. the invention adds additional Bluetooth broadcast packets it sends a dynamic identifier in the Bluetooth broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet (ID), effectively solves the iBeacon base station by the third party (i.e. receiving by a third party a second data packet). in the broadcast packet other than the iBeacon original broadcast packet sending dynamic change with time of message authentication code (Message Authentication Code) or digital signature),
generating a first data packet based on the at least one second data packet ([invention contents], e.g. 6) of the iBeacon base station an additional Bluetooth broadcast packet (i.e. establishing a communication connection for a broadcast message to scan devices), can be a BLE (Bluetooth (LowEnergy) scanning device Passive Scanning obtained, also may be a scanning device (i.e. a second scan device) when Active Scanning Scan Response sent by the broadcast device broadcast packet. Scan Response broadcast packet only when the central device sending Scan Request (scan request) when using the ScanResponse broadcast packet sent, therefore, sending the encryption and the authentication information is a more energy-saving method (i.e. generating and sending a data packet)).
CHEN teaches a iBeacon broadcast message encryption and authentication method. However CHEN differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly describing wherein
sending the first data packet.
However, in the analogous field of endeavor, LiHe teaches wherein
sending the first data packet [0060], e.g. the receiving, by a first AMF, a second request message sent by an N3IWF specifically includes: [0061] receiving a second request message sent by a second AMF, where the second request message is sent by the second AMF based on a received third request message sent by the N3IWF; and [0062] the sending a second response message to the N3IWF specifically includes: [0063] sending a third response message to the second AMF, so that the second AMF sends a second response message to the N3IWF, where the second response message and the third response message each carry the first security key (i.e. sending, by the third N3IWF device, the first data packet).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to implement the method of LiHe within the method of CHEN. The motivation to combine references is that the combined system provides a method and a system for performing network access authentication based on a non-3GPP network and the UE can quickly access the network (See LiHe [0002]).
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U. S. C. 103 as being unpatentable over CHEN et al. (CN 106304046 A) in view of LiHe et al. (US 20200015079 A1) and further in view of Statica et al. (US 9866591 B1).
Regarding claim 8, CHEN in view of LiHe teaches all the limitations of claim 1.
CHEN in view of LiHe differs from the claimed invention in not specifically and clearly teaching wherein
after the sending the first data packet , the method further comprises: displaying sending prompt information, wherein the sending prompt information prompts is useable to prompt the user that the first device has sent the first data packet to a second device, the second device being part of the first transmission system.
However, in the same field of endeavor, Statica teaches that wherein
after the sending the first data packet , the method further comprises: displaying sending prompt information, wherein the sending prompt information prompts is useable to prompt the user that the first device has sent the first data packet to a second device, the second device being part of the first transmission system ([Col 20, lines 34-44], e.g. Further, a different TTL value may be set for different recipients. [Col 20, lines 45-62] The TTL may be encrypted and sent with the secure message. When the recipient opens the message, the message and corresponding TTL value may be decrypted and displayed on the recipient's device. According to some embodiments, the TTL may be converted into a message expiry time by adding the TTL (e.g., expressed in seconds) to the current time. In other embodiments, the TTL may be stored in the recipient's device's secure database and encrypted to prevent the recipient, or other user of the recipient's device, from tampering with the secure TTL (i.e. TTL can program to indicate receiving of the message and prompts the user that the first device has sent the first data packet to a second device)).
The motivation to combine reference of Statica and LiHe within the method of CHEN before the effective filing date of the invention is that the new method provides a secure messaging platform for companies to help them comply with statutory and regulatory obligations for protecting consumer information (See Statica [col 3, lines 10-14]).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claim 7 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable, if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims (e.g. 7 plus 6 plus 1), and amending claims to overcome any objection(s) and /or rejection(s) set forth in this Office action.
Prior Art Record
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent
to applicant’s disclosure.
RAVISHANKAR; Channasandra (US-20150052360-A1) – METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING ENHANCED DATA ENCRYPTION PROTOCOLS IN A MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
TORRES; Rob (US-20190327738-A1) - MAINTAINING AND DISTRIBUTING STATE DUE TO TEMPORARY FAILURES IN A SHARED BANDWIDTH NETWORK.
Qi; Jimmy (US-20200145191-A1) - BLOCKCHAIN ENHANCED V2X COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD.
Keith, JR.; Robert O. (US-20220394465-A1) - DYNAMIC KEY EXCHANGE FOR MOVING TARGET.
Pan; Kai (US-11576038-B2) - Key generation method, apparatus, and system.
YU, Dongyan (WO-2014169568-A1) - SECURITY CONTEXT HANDLING METHOD AND APPARATUS.
BECK ANDREW (WO-2019040963-A1) - TERMINAL IDENTITY PROTECTION METHOD IN A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.
Conclusion
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/MAHENDRA R PATEL/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2645
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