DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-6, 8-25 and 27-28 have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The invention of claims 1-6, 8-25 and 27-28 is directed to “mental steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• table of data
• feature recipes
• performing…, automated feature discovery with respect to a table of data
• the table includes a plurality of columns representing data fields having assigned semantic types
• semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• selecting…, a plurality of transformation operations
• a plurality of transformation operations
• generating… a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features
• each computer-executable feature recipe of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes includes at least one operation of the selected plurality of transformation operations, such that the generating of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes is limited based on the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• generating…, values of one or more features of the plurality of features
• feature catalog
• machine learning model trained to predict a target based on the one or more features
• predicting, … based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target
Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computer-implemented method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES”.
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps”:
• table of data
• feature recipes
• performing…, automated feature discovery with respect to a table of data
• the table includes a plurality of columns representing data fields having assigned semantic types
• semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• selecting…, a plurality of transformation operations
• a plurality of transformation operations
• generating… a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features
• each computer-executable feature recipe of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes includes at least one operation of the selected plurality of transformation operations, such that the generating of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes is limited based on the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• generating…, values of one or more features of the plurality of features
• feature catalog
• machine learning model trained to predict a target based on the one or more features
• predicting, … based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “storing” “of the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog”
(3) A “providing” of “the values of the one or more features as input…”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “storing” “of the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
This “storing” “of the plurality of generated feature recipes in a feature catalog” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “providing” of “the values of the one or more features as input…” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “providing” of “the values of the one or more features as input…” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “storing” “of the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog”
(3) A “providing” of “the values of the one or more features as input…”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “storing” “of the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “providing” of “the values of the one or more features as input…” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 2
Claim 2 recites:
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the table is associated with a view and a first entity.
Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches the mental step of an “association”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
3. The method of claim 2, wherein selecting the plurality of transformation operations is further based on an entity type of the first entity.
Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the selecting the plurality of transformation operations is further based on entity types of one or more second entities related to the first entity.
Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 5
Claim 5 recites:
5. The method of claim 2, wherein the selecting the plurality of transformation operations is further based on one or more entity relationships between the first entity and one or more second entities.
Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the selecting the plurality of transformation operations is further based on a data type of the view.
Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches a selection. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites:
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more computer-executable feature recipes comprise one or more first computer-executable feature recipes, wherein the one or more features comprise one or more first features, wherein the one or more transformation operations comprise one or more first transformation operations, and wherein the method further comprises:
generating a second computer-executable feature recipe including one or more second transformation operations executable to generate a second feature, wherein generating the second feature comprises applying the one or more second transformation operations to the one or more first features.
Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches calculation of feature data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 9
Claim 9 recites:
9. The method of claim 8, wherein generating the second computer-executable feature recipe further comprises selecting the one or more second transformation operations based on one or more attributes of the one or more first features.
Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on signal types of the one or more first features.
Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11
Claim 11 recites:
11. The method of claim 10, wherein the one or more first features include a first feature having a bucketing signal type, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on the first feature having the bucketing signal type, and wherein applying the one or more second operations to the one of more first features includes applying the one or more second operations to the first feature having the bucketing signal type.
Applicant’s Claim 11 merely teaches features. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 12
Claim 12 recites:
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the one or more second transformation operations include an entropy operation, a unique count operation, a most frequent operation, a relative frequency operation, and/or a rank operation.
Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 13
Claim 13 recites:
13. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on feature lineages of the one or more first features.
Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches selection of operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The method of claim 13, wherein the one or more first features include a feature having a first feature lineage including a plurality of attributes and a first aggregation attribute, and a feature having a second feature lineage including the plurality of attributes and a second aggregation attribute, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on the first aggregation attribute differing from the second aggregation attribute.
Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches feature data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 15
Claim 15 recites:
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the first aggregation attribute is a first aggregation window and the second aggregation attribute is a second aggregation window, wherein the one or more second transformation operations include a comparison operation, and wherein a signal type of the second feature includes a stability signal type.
Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches an attribute and an operation. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
16. The method of claim 14, wherein the first aggregation attribute is a first aggregation grouping key and the second aggregation attribute is a second aggregation grouping key, wherein the one or more second transformation operations include a comparison operation, and wherein a signal type of the second feature includes a similarity signal type.
Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches an attribute, an operation, and a signal type. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 17
Claim 17 recites:
17. The method of claim 13, wherein the one or more first features include a lookup feature derived from a column of a view and an aggregate feature having a feature lineage including an aggregation column equal to the column of the view, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on the feature lineage of the aggregate feature, and wherein a signal type of the second feature includes a similarity signal type.
Applicant’s Claim 17 merely teaches a lookup feature and operations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites:
18. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on data types of the one or more first features.
Applicant’s Claim 18 merely teaches selection of a calculation. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 18 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 19
Claim 19 recites:
19. The method of claim 18, wherein the one or more first features include a first feature having a date-time data type, wherein the one or more second transformation operations are selected based on the first feature having the date-time data type, wherein applying the one or more second operations to the one or more first features comprises applying the one or more second operations to the first feature having the date-time data type, and wherein a signal type of the second feature includes a recency signal type.
Applicant’s Claim 19 merely teaches features, operations, and a signal type. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 19 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 20
Claim 20 recites:
20. The method of claim 1, further comprising obtaining one or more descriptive statistics characterizing values in a particular column of the table, wherein the one or more descriptive statistics include a unique count of the values in the particular column, a percentage of rows of the table in which a value of the particular column is missing, a minimum value in the particular column, and/or a maximum value in the particular column.
Applicant’s Claim 20 merely teaches statistics. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 21
Claim 21 recites:
21. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table are selected from an ontology of types.
Applicant’s Claim 21 merely teaches assignment of a “type”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 21 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 22
Claim 22 recites:
22. The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality of transformation operations include a table join operation and wherein the join operation comprises joining the table with one or more other tables.
Applicant’s Claim 22 merely teaches the mental step of concatenating tables of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 22 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 23
Claim 23 recites:
23. The method of claim 2, further comprising receiving user input identifying the first entity and the view.
Applicant’s Claim 23 merely teaches receiving and identifying data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 23 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 24
Claim 24 recites:
24. The method of claim 2, further comprising: receiving user input identifying a use case; and identifying the first entity and the view based on the use case.
Applicant’s Claim 24 merely teaches receiving and identifying data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 24 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 25
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “25. A machine learning system comprising…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES”.
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 25 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 25 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps”:
• table of data
• feature recipes
• performing…, automated feature discovery with respect to a table of data
• the table includes a plurality of columns representing data fields having assigned semantic types
• semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• selecting…, a plurality of transformation operations
• a plurality of transformation operations
• generating… a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features
• each computer-executable feature recipe of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes includes at least one operation of the selected plurality of transformation operations, such that the generating of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes is limited based on the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• generating…, values of one or more features of the plurality of features
• feature catalog
• machine learning model trained to predict a target based on the one or more features
• predicting, by the machine learning model based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “computer readable storage medium”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “computer readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
This “computer readable storage medium” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “computer readable storage medium”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “computer readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 25 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 27
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “27. A computer-implemented method, the method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES”.
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 27 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 27 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps”:
• table of data
• feature recipes
• performing…, automated feature discovery with respect to a table of data
• the table includes a plurality of columns representing data fields having assigned semantic types
• semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• selecting…, a plurality of transformation operations
• a plurality of transformation operations
• generating… a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features
• each computer-executable feature recipe of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes includes at least one operation of the selected plurality of transformation operations, such that the generating of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes is limited based on the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table
• generating…, values of one or more features of the plurality of features
• feature catalog
• machine learning model trained to predict a target based on the one or more features
• predicting, … based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target.
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “registering” of “source data”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “registering” of “source data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. MPEP 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “registering” of “source data” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A “registering” of “source data”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “registering” of “source data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. MPEP 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 27 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 28
Claim 28 recites:
28. The method of claim 1, wherein the values of the one or more features are first values of the one or more features, the method further comprising, prior to generating the first values of the one or more features:
generating, by one or more processors of the machine learning system, second values of the one or more features, wherein generating the second values of the one or more features includes executing the one or more computer-executable feature recipes; and
training the machine learning model based on the second values of the one or more features.
Applicant’s Claim 28 merely teaches merely the “generation” of “values” (i.e., mental step or mathematical step) and the training of a generic “machine learning model” with unspecified data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 28 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 01 APR 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically, Applicant argues:
Argument 1
I. Objections to the Claims
The Office Action objected to claims 2-5 as being informal because these claims depended from claim 6, a higher-numbered claim. Claims 2-6 are amended herein to correct this informality. Withdrawal of the objection to the claims is respectfully requested.
The argued claim objections are WITHDRAWN.
Argument 2
B. Alice Test - Step 2A, Prong One
The Office Action alleges that independent claim 1 recites one or more mental processes. Even assuming (without conceding) that amended claim 1 recites one or more limitations that could, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, be characterized as performable in the human mind, claim 1 recites additional elements that are not mental processes.
"The courts consider a mental process (thinking) that 'can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper,' to be an abstract idea." Memorandum from Deputy Commissioner for Patents Charles Kim to Technology Centers 2100, 2600, and 3600 of the USPTO, dated August 4, 2025, and titled "Reminders on evaluating subject matter eligibility claims under 35 U.S.C. 101" (hereinafter "August 4 Memo") at p. 2. "[A] claim does not recite a mental process when it contains limitation(s) that cannot practically be performed in the human mind, for instance when the human mind is not equipped to perform the claim limitation(s). The mental process grouping is not without limits. Examiners are reminded not to expand this grouping in a manner that encompasses claim limitations that cannot practically be performed in the human mind." August 4 Memo at p. 2 (emphasis added).
Amended independent claim 1 recites steps that cannot be practically performed within the human mind, including at least the following:
(1) "generating a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features,"
(2) "storing the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog,"
(3) "generating values of one or more features of the plurality of features wherein generating the values of the one or more features includes executing one or more computer-executable feature recipes,"
(4) "providing the values of the one or more features as input to a machine learning model," and
(5) "predicting, by the machine learning model based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target."
The Office Action (pp. 5-6) acknowledges that above-identified steps (2) and (4) are additional elements, not mental processes. In addition, steps (1) and (3) are additional elements (not mental processes) at least because the human mind is not practically equipped to perform "generating computer-executable feature recipes" or "executing computer-executable feature recipes." In addition, step (5) is an additional element (not a mental process) at least because the human mind is not practically equipped to perform "predicting, by the machine learning model a value of the target."
For reasons that should be apparent from the discussion of claim 1 above, independent claims 25 and 27 also include several additional elements.
In addition, at least the portion of new claim 28 reciting "training the machine learning model based on the second values of the one or more features" is an additional step (not a mental process) for at least the same reasons that "[t]he claim limitation 'training the neural network in a first stage using the first training set' of example 39 does not recite a judicial exception." See August 4 Memo at p. 3.
For a complete treatment regarding the above amendments, see the rejection above. However, to quickly address this step, one clear example of an abstract idea is in step (5) reiterated here:
(5) "predicting, by the machine learning model based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target."
This step is about “predicting” a “value” based on other “values.” The prediction step may be performed by an inference, which is well within the capability of a human. Using the argued, generic “machine learning model” to perform the same abstract step that a human may do adds nothing to the basic abstract idea of “predicting” a “value” based on other “values.” Machine learning is shown in Applicant's Specification to be a generic “technique” of “pattern recognition and/or statistical inference”
[0018] In certain examples, “machine learning” generally refers to the application of certain techniques (e.g., pattern recognition and/or statistical inference techniques) by computer systems to perform specific tasks. Machine learning techniques (automated or otherwise) may be used to build data analytics models based on sample data (e.g., “training data”) and to validate the models using validation data (e.g., “testing data”). The sample and validation data may be organized as sets of records (e.g., “observations” or “data samples”), with each record indicating values of specified data fields (e.g., “independent variables,” “inputs,” “features,” or “predictors”) and corresponding values of other data fields (e.g., “dependent variables,” “outputs,” or “targets”). Machine learning techniques may be used to train models to infer the values of the outputs based on the values of the inputs. When presented with other data (e.g., “inference data”) similar to or related to the sample data, such models may accurately infer the unknown values of the targets of the inference data set.
Therefore, under Step 2A, Prong One, an abstract idea is found in the claims.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 3
C. Alice Test - Step 2A, Prong Two
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Here, the additional elements of "generating a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features" and "storing the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog," as recited in amended claim 1, reflect an improvement to the technical field of feature discovery. As described above in Section II.A, Applicant's Specification describes some embodiments of a feature discovery process that involves discovering useful features, creating computer-executable feature recipes for the discovered features, and storing these computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog, and one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the feature discovery process can reduce the amount of storage used by the feature catalog, relative to feature catalogs populated using existing feature discovery techniques. In this way, some embodiments of the feature discovery process disclosed in Applicant's Specification can reduce the use of storage capacity by a feature catalog of a machine learning system.
Reducing the storage capacity used by a computer system to perform a task in a technical field is a technological improvement that must be credited at Step 2A, Prong Two of the Alice analysis. "In Ex Parte Desjardins, Appeal No. 2024-000567 (PTAB September 26, 2025, Appeals Review Panel Decision) (precedential), the claimed invention was a method of training a machine learning model on a series of tasks. The Appeals Review Panel (ARP) overall credited benefits including reduced storage as technological improvements that were disclosed in the patent application specification." December 5 Memo at p. 2. "Indeed, enumerated improvements identified in the Desjardins specification included allowing the system to reduce use of storage capacity." December 5 Memo at p. 3. For at least the same reasons, the reduction in storage capacity afforded by the feature discovery process disclosed in Applicant's Specification is a technological improvement at Step 2A, Prong Two.
Note that Applicant argues:
In this way, some embodiments of the feature discovery process disclosed in Applicant's Specification can reduce the use of storage capacity by a feature catalog of a machine learning system.
Note that Applicant argues that some, not all, embodiments can reduce (not always) “reduce the use of storage capacity.” Therefore, Applicant admits that some embodiments do not reduce storage at all. Further, of those that might do so, sometimes they don’t “reduce the use of storage capacity.”
Further, the argued “additional element” of:
"generating a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features"
is simply the mental act of programming “generating computer-executable feature recipes”.
Further, the argued “additional element” of:
"storing the plurality of generated computer-executable feature recipes in a feature catalog,"
Is a generic storing step. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0274] recites:
[0274] (B16) At least one computer-readable storage medium encoded with computer-executable instructions that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform operations including registering source data from a plurality of data sources; populating a feature catalog, wherein populating the feature catalog includes generating a plurality of features based on the source data, wherein generating each feature in the plurality of features comprises applying one or more data transformations associated with the feature to a respective subset of the source data;…
Further, the computer readable medium is defined in Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0311] as follows:
[0311] Computer readable media suitable for storing computer program instructions and data include all forms of nonvolatile memory, media and memory devices, including by way of example semiconductor memory devices, e.g., EPROM, EEPROM, and flash memory devices; magnetic disks, e.g., internal hard disks or removable disks; magneto optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks. The processor and the memory can be supplemented by, or incorporated in, special purpose logic circuitry.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 4
Furthermore, the additional elements of "generating values of one or more features of the plurality of features wherein generating the values of the one or more features includes executing one or more computer-executable feature recipes," "providing the values of the one or more features as input to a machine learning model," and "predicting, by the machine learning model based on the values of the one or more features, a value of the target," as recited in amended claim 1, reflect an improvement to the technical field of machine learning.
As described above in Section II.A, Applicant's Specification describes some embodiments of a machine learning system in which the feature recipes in the feature catalog are used to generate values of the discovered features, and those feature values are used to train a machine-learning model or used by a trained model to produce predictions. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the use of feature recipes discovered through the feature discovery process described in Applicant's Specification can improve the efficiency (e.g., computational efficiency and/or energy efficiency) of model training and model inference tasks performed by a machine learning system by reducing the number of features used by a model.
For substantially the same reasons that reducing the use of storage capacity by a computer system is a technological improvement, improving the efficiency of model inference tasks performed by a machine learning system is also a technological improvement at Step 2A, Prong Two.
In addition, amended claim 1 reflects the improvements disclosed in Applicant's Specification, as shown by at least the portions of claim 1 emphasized below:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
performing, by one or more processors of a machine learning system, automated feature discovery with respect to a table of data, wherein the table includes a plurality of columns representing data fields having assigned semantic types, and wherein performing the automated feature discovery includes selecting, by one or more processors of the machine learning system, a plurality of transformation operations applicable to the table or portions thereof based on one or more of the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table;
generating, by one or more processors of the machine learning system, a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features, wherein each computer-executable feature recipe of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes includes at least one operation of the selected plurality of transformation operations, such that the generating of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes is limited based on the semantic types assigned to the data fields of the table; and
storing the plurality of generated computer-executable feature
recipes in a feature catalog;
generating, by one or more processors of the machine learning system, values of one or more features of the plurality of features, wherein generating the values of the one or more features includes executing one or more computer- executable feature recipes of the plurality of computer-executable feature recipes;
providing the values of the one or more features as input to a machine learning model trained to predict a target based on the one or more features; and
predicting, by the machine learning model based on the values of the one
or more features, a value of the target. (Emphasis added.)
For at least the foregoing reasons, claim 1 is directed to eligible subject matter under § 101. The claims depending from claim 1 are directed to eligible subject matter for at least the same reasons. For reasons that should be apparent from the foregoing discussion of claim 1, independent claims 25 and 27 and the claims depending therefrom are also directed to eligible subject matter under § 101. Withdrawal of the rejections of all claims under § 101 is respectfully requested.
Note that Applicant argues:
In this way, some embodiments of the feature discovery process disclosed in Applicant's Specification can reduce the use of storage capacity by a feature catalog of a machine learning system.
Note that Applicant argues that some, not all, embodiments can reduce (not always) “reduce the use of storage capacity.” Therefore, Applicant admits that some embodiments do not reduce storage at all. Further, of those that might do so, sometimes they don’t “reduce the use of storage capacity.”
Further, the argued “additional element” of:
"generating a plurality of computer-executable feature recipes for a plurality of features"
Is simply the mental act of programming “generating computer-executable feature recipes”.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 5
D. Response to Office Action's Analysis at Step 2A, Prong Two
Applicant notes that the Office Action, which was prepared shortly after the issuance of the August 4 Memo and prior to the issuance of the December 5 Memo, includes arguments that are inconsistent with some of the guidance provided in the Memos.
For example, the Office Action's analysis at Step 2A, Prong Two is inconsistent with the guidance provided in the Memos because this analysis fails to consider each claim as a whole. As noted above, "[t]he analysis in Step 2A Prong Two considers the claim as a whole. The way in which the additional elements use or interact with the exception may integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Accordingly, the additional limitations should not be evaluated in a vacuum, completely separate from the recited judicial exception. Instead, the analysis should take into consideration all the claim limitations and how these limitations interact and impact each other when evaluating whether the exception is integrated into a practical application." August 4 Memo at pp. 3-4. In clear contrast to this guidance, the Office Action considers only the so-called additional elements at Step 2A, Prong Two, and considers each of those so-called additional elements only in isolation, not in combination with each other or with the other elements of the claim. See, e.g., Office Action at pp. 5-11.
As another example, the Office Action appears to argue that improvements to automated feature engineering, model building, and/or feature discovery are improvements in the field of "machine learning," and that improvements in the field of machine learning are improvements to "mathematical statistical inference," not technological improvements. See Office Action at pp. 53- 58. This conclusion is inconsistent with controlling USPTO guidance and Federal Circuit precedent. Many improvements in the field of machine learning are technological improvements, including improved ways of training machine learning models and improvements to computer system performance based on adjustments to parameters, tasks, or workflows associated with a machine learning model. December 5 Memo at p. 4. As discussed above, Applicant's Specification describes technological improvements to computer system performance in the fields of feature discovery and machine learning.
As yet another Example, at Step 2A, Prong Two of the Alice inquiry for claim 1, the Office Action repeatedly argues that additional elements of claim 1 do not integrate the claim's subject matter into a practical application because those additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Office Action at pp. 8-10. This position is inconsistent with the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (2019 PEG). In accordance with the 2019 PEG, such considerations are legally relevant, if at all, only at Step 2B, not at Step 2A, Prong Two. The "improvements" analysis in Step 2A, Prong Two determines whether the claim pertains to an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to another technology without reference to what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity.
Should the rejections under § 101 be maintained in a subsequent Office Action, Applicant respectfully requests that the Examiner's analysis be updated to conform to the standards set forth in the 2019 PEG, the August 4 Memo, and the December 5 Memo.
The rejections did conform to the memo.
The PTAB case of Ex Parte Desjardins is not the only law that relates to 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Federal Circuit case of Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. also applies. Note that the Federal Circuit held that patents claiming the use of generic machine learning to automate or speed up tasks—without disclosing specific, novel improvements to the machine learning models themselves—are invalid and ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In Applicant's Specification, machine learning is shown to be a generic “technique” of “pattern recognition and/or statistical inference”:
[0018] In certain examples, “machine learning” generally refers to the application of certain techniques (e.g., pattern recognition and/or statistical inference techniques) by computer systems to perform specific tasks. Machine learning techniques (automated or otherwise) may be used to build data analytics models based on sample data (e.g., “training data”) and to validate the models using validation data (e.g., “testing data”). The sample and validation data may be organized as sets of records (e.g., “observations” or “data samples”), with each record indicating values of specified data fields (e.g., “independent variables,” “inputs,” “features,” or “predictors”) and corresponding values of other data fields (e.g., “dependent variables,” “outputs,” or “targets”). Machine learning techniques may be used to train models to infer the values of the outputs based on the values of the inputs. When presented with other data (e.g., “inference data”) similar to or related to the sample data, such models may accurately infer the unknown values of the targets of the inference data set.
This paragraph shows that Applicant's claimed “machine learning techniques” are merely generic, unspecified inference “techniques” (Note that the term “techniques” is plural and represents a list of possible techniques. The scope of the term is open-ended and includes any and all generic techniques.) Applicant teaches no improvements to these “techniques.” Therefore, under Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp., the term adds nothing to the basic abstract idea. The claim is invalid and ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Note, also that the machine learning “techniques (e.g., pattern recognition and/or statistical inference techniques)”, as defined by Applicant, may also be mathematical “statistical inference techniques” and/or “pattern recognition” steps, which are abstract mental steps.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 6
III. General Comments on Dependent Claims
As each of the dependent claims depends from a base claim that is believed to be in condition for allowance, Applicant believes arguing the further distinguishing features of all of the dependent claims is unnecessary at this time. However, Applicant does not necessarily concur with the interpretation of the dependent claims as set forth in the Office Action, nor does Applicant concur that the basis for the rejection of any of the dependent claims is proper. Therefore, Applicant reserves the right to specifically address in the future the further patentability of dependent claims not specifically addressed herein.
The independent claims are not eligible. therefore, there is no eligible matter in the independent clams that may be incorporated by reference to the dependent claims.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov.
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/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122
WLS
30 MAY 2026
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