Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-20 are pending.
Examiner Notes
Examiner cites particular paragraphs and/or columns and lines in the references as applied to Applicant’s claims for the convenience of the Applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings in the art and are applied to the specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested that, in preparing responses, the Applicant fully consider the references in entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the examiner. The prompt development of a clear issue requires that the replies of the Applicant meet the objections to and rejections of the claims. Applicant should also specifically point out the support for any amendments made to the disclosure. See MPEP § 2163.06.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Authorization for Internet Communications in a Patent Application
Applicant is encouraged to file an Authorization for Internet Communications in a Patent Application form (http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sb0439.pdf) along with the response to this office action to facilitate and expedite future communication between Applicant and the examiner. If the form is submitted then Applicant is requested to provide a contact email address in the signature block at the conclusion of the official reply.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 1-20 would be allowable over the prior art of record if rewritten to overcome the applicable rejection(s) and/or objection(s) set forth in this Office action because the examiner found no prior art reference found that would primarily teach the majority of the recited limitations. Furthermore, neither any of the prior art cited in its entirety, nor based on the prior art, was there any motivation to combine any of the said prior art without resorting to using piecemeal examination (see MPEP 707.07(g)).
Applicant’s Reply Not Fully Responsive
The reply filed on 08/26/2026 is not fully responsive to the prior Office action because of the following omission(s) or matter(s): Applicant’s arguments fail to comply with 37 CFR 1.111(b)-(c) because they amount to a general allegation that the dependent claims are 35 U.S.C. 101 eligible without specifically pointing out how the language of the dependent claims makes the dependent claims eligible in view of the rejections made. Further, they do not show how the amendments avoid such rejections. Applicant’s Remarks are only directed to the independent claims and fail to address any of the abstract idea rejections to the dependent claims. Even if an independent claim is deemed eligible then it does not necessarily mean that all of the dependent claims are also eligible (see MPEP 2106.07). The response appears to be bona fide, but through an apparent oversight or inadvertence, consideration of some matter or compliance with some requirement has been omitted. Applicant is required to supply the omission or correction to thereby provide a full response to the prior Office action.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Step 1: The claim is a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter:
Claim 1. A computer-implemented method when executed on data processing hardware causes the data processing hardware to perform operations comprising.
Step 2A Prong One: The claim recites an abstract idea because it includes limitations that can be considered mental processes (concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion). If a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the human mind or via pen and paper, then it falls within the “Mental Processes” grouping of abstract ideas. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea:
for each device of the plurality of devices:
validating the device based on the obtained device identifier (abstract idea mental process); and
classifying the device based on the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of the device (abstract idea mental process); and
generating a device controller matrix by:
identifying, based on the respective resource needs of each device of the plurality of devices, an ecosystem resource requirement for the plurality of devices in the ecosystem of the vehicle (abstract idea mental process);
predicting, based on the device classifications for the plurality of devices, an ecosystem resource availability for the plurality of devices in the ecosystem of the vehicle (abstract idea mental process); and
prioritizing the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of each device of the plurality of devices based on the ecosystem resource requirement and the ecosystem resource availability (abstract idea mental process).
Step 2A Prong Two: The abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application because the abstract idea is recited but for generically recited additional computer elements (i.e. data storage, processor, memory, computer readable medium, etc.) which do not add meaningful limitations to the abstract idea amounting to simply implementing the abstract idea on a generic computer using generic computing hardware and/or software (e.g. generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (see MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. The generic computing components are recited at a high-level of generality such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using the recited generic computer components. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea:
Claim 1. A computer-implemented method when executed on data processing hardware (generic computing components) causes the data processing hardware to perform operations comprising:
obtaining a device identifier for each of a plurality of devices within an ecosystem of a vehicle (generic computing components), each device identifier including respective resource capabilities and respective resource needs of the device (generic computing components performing extra-solution activity of receiving data/information);
based on the device controller matrix, generating one or more resource assignments that assign the respective resource capabilities of at least one device of the plurality of devices to the respective resource needs of at least one other device of the plurality of devices (generic computing components performing extra-solution activity of generating data/information); and
communicating the one or more resource assignments to the respective devices within the ecosystem of the vehicle (generic computing components performing extra-solution activity of sending/receiving data/information).
Step 2B: The claim includes limitations which can be considered extra-solution activity (see MPEP 2106.05(g)) insufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because the additional limitations only perform at least one of collecting, gathering, displaying, generating, modifying, updating, storing, retrieving, sending, and receiving data/information data which are well-understood, routine, conventional computer functions as recognized by the court decisions listed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)II. The claim further includes limitations that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because they merely recite the words "apply it" (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f). Therefore, the claim, and its limitations when considered separately and in combination, is directed to patent ineligible subject matter:
obtaining a device identifier for each of a plurality of devices within an ecosystem of a vehicle, each device identifier including respective resource capabilities and respective resource needs of the device (extra-solution activity of receiving data/information);
based on the device controller matrix, generating one or more resource assignments that assign the respective resource capabilities of at least one device of the plurality of devices to the respective resource needs of at least one other device of the plurality of devices (extra-solution activity of generating data/information); and
communicating the one or more resource assignments to the respective devices within the ecosystem of the vehicle (extra-solution activity of sending/receiving data/information).
Claim 2. The method of Claim 1, wherein classifying each device of the plurality of devices based on the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of the device further comprises assigning a role to each device of the plurality of devices (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 3. The method of Claim 2, wherein the assigned role of each device of the plurality of devices includes one of a donor device, a recipient device, or a hybrid device (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 4. The method of Claim 3, wherein generating the device controller matrix further includes reassigning a hybrid device as one of a donor device or a recipient device based on the ecosystem resource requirement and the ecosystem resource availability (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 5. The method of Claim 1, wherein classifying each device of the plurality of devices based on the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of the device includes assigning a role to the device (abstract idea mental process); and
wherein prioritizing the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of each device of the plurality of devices comprises identifying a first device of the plurality of devices having respective resource capabilities that exceed respective resource needs (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 6. The method of Claim 5, wherein generating the device controller matrix further comprises:
updating the device classification of the first device by reassigning the role of the first device to a donor device role (abstract idea mental process); and
assigning the respective resource capabilities of the first device that exceed the respective resource needs of the first device to a second device having a recipient device role (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 7. The method of Claim 1, wherein classifying each device of the plurality of devices based on the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of the device includes assigning a role to the device (abstract idea mental process); and
wherein prioritizing the respective resource capabilities and the respective resource needs of each device of the plurality of devices comprises identifying a first device of the plurality of devices having respective resource needs that exceed respective resource capabilities (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 8. The method of Claim 7, wherein generating the device controller matrix further comprises:
updating the device classification of the first device by reassigning the role of the first device to a recipient device role (abstract idea mental process); and
assigning the respective resource capabilities of a second device having a donor device role to the first device (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 9. The method of Claim 1, wherein the generating the device controller matrix is further based on a device presence pattern (abstract idea mental process).
Claim 10. The method of Claim 1, wherein a first device of the plurality of devices includes a first communication protocol, and a second device of the plurality of devices includes a second communication protocol, the first device and the second device in communication through the ecosystem of the vehicle (extra-solution activity of sending/receiving data/information).
As per claim 11, it has similar limitations as claim 1 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 12, it has similar limitations as claim 2 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 13, it has similar limitations as claim 3 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 14, it has similar limitations as claim 4 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 15, it has similar limitations as claim 5 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 16, it has similar limitations as claim 6 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 17, it has similar limitations as claim 7 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 18, it has similar limitations as claim 8 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 19, it has similar limitations as claim 9 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
As per claim 20, it has similar limitations as claim 10 and is therefore rejected using the same rationale.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
In the Remarks on pg. 8-9, Applicant argues that the claims do not recite a mental process under Step 2A, Prong 1. The examiner respectfully traverses. In response to Applicant’s argument that the claims “operate within a dynamic vehicle IoT ecosystem, where a plurality of heterogeneous devices spanning electric vehicle charging stations, guest vehicles, cellular devices, personal computers, tablets, televisions, and camera systems continuously enter and exit the ecosystem of the vehicle depending on the location of the vehicle relative to the IoT devices”, “(2) validate each device in real time”, “(4) predict near-future ecosystem resource availability based on historical data and device presence patterns”, “Each of these steps is performed at a machine speed and at a scale that no human could replicate with pen and paper”, “operations that necessarily involve continuous, real-time computation over dynamically changing device populations, historical data stores, and prediction models”, “simultaneously track the resource capabilities and resource needs of a plurality of IoT devices that dynamically join and leave a vehicle network, predict near-future ecosystem resource availability based on historical patterns, all within the time constraints required for meaningful operation of a vehicle IoT ecosystem”, it is noted that the features upon which Applicant relies are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the amended language most recently added by the Applicant is being considered as extra-solution activity and not mental process limitations. Thus, for at least the reasons provided above, Applicant’s arguments are unpersuasive and the rejections are sustained.
On pg. 9-11 of the Remarks, Applicant alleges that the claims provide an improvement. The examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to Applicant’s argument that the “claimed invention solves this specific technical problem by providing a device controller system that is communication agnostic and operates to integrate/facilitate communication between devices that are otherwise unaware of devices outside of their own communication fabrics”, “opportunistically allocates resources of the devices based on predictions of near-future resource availability to reduce cost and increase efficiency, thereby improving utilization of the devices”, “real-world device control action”, “converts the analytical output of the device controller matrix into tangible, real-world control of physical IoT devices i.e., the system actually commands devices to donate their underutilized resource capabilities to other devices that need them”, “the system may send resource assignments to a guest vehicle to perform tasks using its underutilized resource capabilities, or assign the imaging resources of a donor vehicle device to a camera system operating as a recipient device”, and “the present invention describes a system that is technically architected to handle this complex, multi-variable resource optimization problem and translate it into concrete device control actions within a vehicle ecosystem”, it is noted that the features upon which Applicant relies are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is important to note that a general purpose computer that applies a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, by use of conventional computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17, 112 USPQ2d 1750, 1755-56 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See also TLI Communications LLC v. AV Automotive LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623, 114 USPQ2d 1711, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Merely adding a generic computer, generic computer components, or a programmed computer to perform generic computer functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358-59, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1983-84 (2014)). A claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry does not qualify as significantly more. The use of generic computer components to transmit information through an unspecified interface does not impose any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract idea. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than a judicial exception. Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide for a conventional computer implementation. Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient. Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology. See MPEP § 2106.05(f) for more information about mere instructions to apply an exception. It is noted that while the application of a judicial exception by or with a particular machine is an important clue, it is not a stand-alone test for eligibility. While the machine-or-transformation test is an important clue to eligibility, it should not be used as a separate test for eligibility, but instead should be considered as part of the “significantly more” determination in the Alice/Mayo test. Likewise, eligibility should not be evaluated based on whether the claim recites a “useful, concrete, and tangible result”. The programmed computer or “special purpose computer” test of In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (i.e. the rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer to the claim for the “special purpose” of executing the algorithm or software) was also superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice Corp. decisions. An abstract idea does not become non-abstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet or a computer. Lastly eligibility should not be evaluated based on whether the claimed invention has utility, because utility is not the test for patent-eligible subject matter (see MPEP 2106). If a claim fails the Alice/Mayo test (i.e., is directed to an exception at Step 2A and does not amount to significantly more than the exception in Step 2B), then the claim is ineligible even if it passes the M-or-T test. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256, 113 USPQ2d 1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[I]n Mayo, the Supreme Court emphasized that satisfying the machine-to- transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transformations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an "inventive concept."). It is notable that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in Step 2B. As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception is not in itself an inventive concept and does not guarantee eligibility: The fact that a computer "necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm," is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a "machine"), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an Applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of patent eligibility "depend simply on the draftsman’s art," Flook, supra, at 593, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 57 L. Ed. 2d 451, thereby eviscerating the rule that "‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,’" Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 1289, 186 L. Ed. 2d 124, 133). Hence, for at least the rationale provided above, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive and the rejections are maintained.
In the Remarks on pg. 11-12, Applicant argues that the examiner’s own prior art finding undermines the Step 2B analysis. The examiner respectfully disagrees. Applicant is reminded that the lack of prior art (i.e. novelty) does not avoid the problem of abstractness. While § 101 subject matter eligibility is a threshold test that typically precedes the novelty or obviousness inquiry (Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010)), it is a requirement separate from those other patentability inquiries (see Return Mail, Inc. v. USPS, 123 USPQ2d 1813, 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Mayo Collaborative Servs v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012)). It is important to recognize that the 35 U.S.C. 101 inquiry and other patentability inquiries might sometimes overlap. However, shifting the 35 U.S.C. 101 patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to the 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, and assumes that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to do. While material may be relevant to a novelty and obviousness analysis it may be the case where the material is not relevant to a determination of eligible subject matter. Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries (see Affinity Labs of Tex., v. DirecTV, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1208 Fed. Cir. 2016 and Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 120 USPQ2d 1473, 1483 Fed. Cir. 2016). Even assuming that a particular claimed feature was novel does not avoid the problem of abstractness. The search for an inventive concept under 35 U.S.C. 101 is thus distinct from demonstrating 35 U.S.C. 102 novelty. The novelty and nonobviousness of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 does not bear on whether the claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 (see 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107478, [WL] and *4). As made clear by the courts, the "‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89, 209 USPQ at 9). See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151, 120 USPQ2d 1473, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty."). In addition, the search for an inventive concept is different from an obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. 103. See, e.g., BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350, 119 USPQ2d 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("The inventive concept inquiry requires more than recognizing that each claim element, by itself, was known in the art. . . . [A]n inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces."). Specifically, lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C. 102 or obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 of a claimed invention does not necessarily indicate that additional elements are well-understood, routine, conventional elements. Because they are separate and distinct requirements from eligibility, patentability of the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 with respect to the prior art is neither required for, nor a guarantee of, patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101. The distinction between eligibility (under 35 U.S.C. 101) and patentability over the art (under 35 U.S.C. 102 and/or 103) is further discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d). A prior art search should not be necessary to resolve the inquiry as to whether an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. The Supreme Court’s decisions make it clear that judicial exceptions need not be old or long-prevalent, and that even newly discovered or novel judicial exceptions are still exceptions. The Supreme Court’s cited rationale for considering even "just discovered" judicial exceptions as exceptions stems from the concern that "without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’" Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 106 USPQ2d at 1978-79 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86, 101 USPQ2d at 1971). See also Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117, 106 USPQ2d at 1979 ("Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the §101 inquiry."). Thus, for at least the reasons provided above, Applicant’s arguments are unpersuasive and the rejections are sustained.
Citation of Relevant Prior Art
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure:
Aggarwal et al. (US 2006/0047813) in at least [0044] disclose prioritization information associated with a ranking of available resources in terms of their compatibility with desired attributes for a requested resource and prioritizing resource capacity and processing capability of a resource.
Hamilton et al. (US 2004/0230974) in at least [0053] disclose donors donating resources to recipients in need of resources.
Merg et al. (US 2019/0266808) in at least [0127] and [0131] disclose computing tasks and stored data associated with a computing device and/or server can be distributed across different computing devices based at least in part on the processing/communication requirements of a computing device and/or server and the processing/communication capabilities of computing devices.
Oesterling et al. (US 2019/0259227) in at least [0113] disclose a device identifier of a personal device can be used to facilitate the pairing process and/or to authenticate the device.
Abdelwahab et al. (US 2025/0231813) in at least [0007] disclose classifying devices based on resource capabilities and a resource preference/requirement associated with a module to be deployed to / executed on the device.
Doostnejad et al. (US 2023/0305895) in at least [0276] disclose that a resource demand may be associated with any combination of devices within an electric vehicle.
Hicks et al. (US 2007/0061461) in at least [0029] disclose forecasting resource availability based on the number and types of devices to be migrated.
Moravapalle et al. (US 2018/0376348) in at least [0008] disclose classifying each device based on a quantity of resources demanded by the device over a period of time and a predicted resource share.
Hassan et al. (US 2021/0212096) in at least [0083] disclose a donor donating resources.
Karout et al. (US 2023/0345437) in at least [0050] disclose a donor donating resources.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Adam Lee whose telephone number is (571) 270-3369. The examiner can normally be reached on M-TH 8AM-5PM.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Pierre Vital can be reached on 571-272-4215. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Adam Lee/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2198 September 8, 2026
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