DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Introduction
This is a response to applicant’s submissions filed on August 5, 2025. Claims 1-11 are pending.
Examiner' s Note
Examiner has cited particular paragraphs / columns and line numbers or figures in the references as applied to the claims below for the convenience of the applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings in the art and are applied to the specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested from the applicant, in preparing the responses, to fully consider the references in their entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the examiner. Applicant is reminded that the Examiner is entitled to give the broadest reasonable interpretation to the language of the claims. Furthermore, the Examiner is not limited to Applicants' definition which is not specifically set forth in the disclosure.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claims 1-11 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Drawings
The drawings were received on August 5, 2025. These drawings are acceptable.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
In claim 11, line 4, the limitation “wherein the first deceleration charge threshold is smaller than the predetermined value” appears to be new matter. Paragraph 0141 states regeneration charge coasting control is executed when the battery-stored electricity amount is equal to or smaller than a predetermined value or a first deceleration charge threshold, but there is no detail within the specification stating that the deceleration charge threshold is smaller than the predetermined value.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
In claim 1, lines 12-13, claim 9, lines 11-12, and claim 10, lines 12-13, the limitation “the second autonomous moving control [to accelerate the own vehicle] including an acceleration control” renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear if this is part of the “second autonomous moving control including (i) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained within a target speed range, and (ii) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance is maintained within a target distance range” (lines 19-23, lines 17-21, and lines 18-22, respectively) or something else. Fig. 9, which is performed during the second inter-vehicle distance control (S835), and Fig. 10, which is performed during the second moving speed control (S840), include a power charge optimum acceleration control (S940 and S1040) and a normal optimum acceleration control (S945 and S1045), but it is not clear if the limitation is referring to these two steps or is something separate.
In claim 1, lines 12-13, claim 9, lines 11-12, and claim 10, lines 12-13, the limitation “the second autonomous moving control [to accelerate the own vehicle] including a coasting control” renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear if this is part of the “second autonomous moving control including (i) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained within a target speed range, and (ii) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance is maintained within a target distance range” (lines 19-23, lines 17-21, and lines 18-22, respectively) or something else. Fig. 9, which is performed during the second inter-vehicle distance control (S835), and Fig. 10, which is performed during the second moving speed control (S840), include a regeneration charge coasting control (S915 and S1015) and a power charge coasting control (S925 and S1025), but it is not clear if the limitation is referring to these two steps or is something separate.
In claim 11, lines 2-4, the limitation “maintain the stored amount of the electricity at an amount equal to or greater than a predetermined value, and wherein the first deceleration charge threshold is smaller than the predetermined value” in combination with “execute a regeneration charge coasting control as the coasting control when a stored amount of electricity stored in an electricity storage device of the own vehicle is equal to or smaller than a first deceleration charge threshold” of claim 1 (lines 25-27) renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear how the regeneration charge coasting control would ever be performed. Since the stored amount of electricity must be greater than the predetermined value, which is greater than the first deceleration charge threshold, the batter would not be allowed to get low enough to being performing the regeneration charge coasting control.
Claims 2-11 are also rejected as being dependent upon a rejected base claim as they do not clear the deficiencies of the claims from which they depend.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d):
(d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph:
Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements.
In claim 11, lines 2-4, the limitation “maintain the stored amount of the electricity at an amount equal to or greater than a predetermined value, and wherein the first deceleration charge threshold is smaller than the predetermined value” fails to include all of the limitations of claim 1 which states “execute a regeneration charge coasting control as the coasting control when a stored amount of electricity stored in an electricity storage device of the own vehicle is equal to or smaller than a first deceleration charge threshold” (lines 25-27). Claim 11 requires that the deceleration charge threshold is lower than the predetermined value (i.e., amount of electricity > predetermined value > deceleration charge threshold). Claim 1 requires the stored amount of electricity be less than the deceleration charge threshold. Therefore, claim 11 contradicts claim 1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1 and 9-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue (US 2022/0305901) in view of Lacaze (US 2021/0253097) and Prestl (US 6,192,309).
Regarding claims 1 and 9-10, Inoue discloses the acceleration control being a control to accelerate the own vehicle by (i) activating a power source of the own vehicle to generate power and (ii) accelerating the own vehicle by the generated power (Inoue, [0050] regarding the power output from the engine being distributed to the wheels), and
the coasting control being a control to cause the own vehicle to coast by stopping an activation of the power source (Inoue, [0057] regarding coasting being determined by the accelerator and brake pedal not being used),
wherein the electronic control unit is configured to:
execute a regeneration charge coasting control as the coasting control when a stored amount of electricity stored in an electricity storage device of the own vehicle is equal to or smaller than a first deceleration charge threshold while a deceleration condition for decelerating the won vehicle is satisfied (Inoue, [0060] regarding performing energy regeneration when the SOC of the battery is less than or equal to a threshold & [0057] regarding the threshold being 95%. Stopping the activation of the power source, performing a regeneration of moving energy of the vehicle by an electricity generation device of the vehicle to generate the electricity, and storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device are inherently part of charging while coasting),
the regeneration charge coasting control being a control to cause the own vehicle to coast and store the electricity into the electricity storage device by (i) stopping the activation of the power source, (ii) performing a regeneration of moving energy of the own vehicle by an electricity generation device of the vehicle to generate the electricity, and (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device; and
execute a normal coasting control as the coasting control when the stored amount of the electricity is greater than the first deceleration charge threshold while the deceleration condition is satisfied (Inoue, [0057-0058] regarding proceeding to a motor stop mode when the SOC of the battery is greater than 95%.),
the normal coasting control being a control to cause the own vehicle to coast by stopping the activation of the power source without performing the regeneration of the moving energy of the own vehicle.
Inoue does not disclose a vehicle moving control apparatus, method and non-transitory storage medium storing a vehicle moving control program, comprising an electronic control unit configured to execute an autonomous moving control for autonomously accelerating or decelerating an own vehicle,
the autonomous moving control including a first autonomous moving control and a second autonomous moving control,
the first autonomous moving control including (i) a first moving speed control to autonomously control an acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained at a target speed, and (ii) a first inter-vehicle distance control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance between a preceding vehicle and the own vehicle is maintained at a target distance,
the second autonomous moving control including an acceleration control and a coasting control,
the second autonomous moving control including (i) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained within a target speed range, and (ii) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance is maintained within a target distance range.
Lacaze teaches a vehicle moving control apparatus, method and non-transitory storage medium storing a vehicle moving control program, comprising an electronic control unit configured to execute an autonomous moving control for autonomously accelerating or decelerating an own vehicle (Lacaze, [0032] regarding cruise control for optimizing speed),
the second autonomous moving control including an acceleration control and a coasting control (Lacaze, [0025] regarding accelerating & [0081] regarding coasting to slow the vehicle down).
Inoue and Lacaze are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue to incorporate autonomous moving control, as disclosed by Lacaze, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of maximizing hybrid vehicle battery control during autonomous driving.
Prestl teaches the autonomous moving control including a first autonomous moving control and a second autonomous moving control,
the first autonomous moving control including (i) a first moving speed control to autonomously control an acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained at a target speed, and (ii) a first inter-vehicle distance control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance between a preceding vehicle and the own vehicle is maintained at a target distance (Prestl, Col. 1, lines 8-18 regarding controlling a vehicle at a preset speed until a predetermined distance to a target vehicle ahead is reached and regulating speed to maintain the minimum distance to the target vehicle), and
the second autonomous moving control including (i) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and deceleration of the own vehicle such that a moving speed of the own vehicle is maintained within a target speed range, and (ii) a second moving speed control to autonomously control the acceleration and the deceleration of the own vehicle such that an inter-vehicle distance is maintained within a target distance range (Prestl, Col. 1, lines 8-18 regarding controlling a vehicle at a preset speed until a predetermined distance to a target vehicle ahead is reached and regulating speed to maintain the minimum distance to the target vehicle. (See paragraphs 0118 and 0131 of the specification regarding the highest and lowest values of ranges being the same value)).
Inoue and Prestl are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate controlling the vehicle at a fixed speed and inter-vehicle distance, as disclosed by Prestl, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of increasing safety by preventing the vehicle from getting too close to the vehicle in front and comfort by allowing the driver to remove their foot from the accelerator.
Regarding claim 11, as best understood, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the electronic control unit is configured to maintain the stored amount of the electricity at an amount equal to or greater than a predetermined value, and
wherein the first deceleration charge threshold is smaller than the predetermined value (Inoue, [0060] regarding performing energy regeneration when the SOC of the battery is less than or equal to a threshold).
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Minesawa (JP 08317505).
Regarding claim 2, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, but fail to teach wherein the electronic control unit is configured to:
execute a power charge moving control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than a second deceleration charge threshold smaller than the first deceleration charge threshold while the deceleration condition is satisfied,
the power charge moving control being a control to cause the own vehicle to move by (i) activating the power source to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device by the generated power to generate the electricity, and (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device; and
execute the regeneration charge coasting control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than the first deceleration charge threshold and greater than the second deceleration charge threshold while the deceleration condition is satisfied.
Minesawa teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to:
execute a power charge moving control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than a second deceleration charge threshold smaller than the first deceleration charge threshold while the deceleration condition is satisfied (Minesawa, [0025-0026] regarding setting the engine throttle to the maximum efficiency when the remaining battery charge does not exceed 70% & [0008] regarding charging the battery with the power generated by the driving torque of the engine. Inoue discloses performing a coasting control when the battery is below 95% and Minesawa discloses performing a power charge moving control when the battery is below 70%.),
the power charge moving control being a control to cause the own vehicle to move by (i) activating the power source to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device by the generated power to generate the electricity, and (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device; and
execute the regeneration charge coasting control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than the first deceleration charge threshold and greater than the second deceleration charge threshold while the deceleration condition is satisfied (This is inherent as Inoue is done below 95% and Minesawa is done below 70%).
Inoue and Minesawa are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle charging control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate charging the battery by using the power source, as disclosed by Minesawa, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of decreasing the charging time.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Sisk (US 2014/0200763).
Regarding claim 3, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, but do not explicitly disclose wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute the regeneration charge coasting control so as to store an amount of the electricity depending on an amount of the electricity consumed from the electricity storage device by at least one electric load of the own vehicle.
Sisk teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute the regeneration charge coasting control so as to store an amount of the electricity depending on an amount of the electricity consumed from the electricity storage device by at least one electric load of the own vehicle (Sisk, [0058] regarding commencing operation of one or more accessories to reduce the SOC level to enable receipt of all or most of the power provided during the next regenerative event).
Inoue and Sisk are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate the amount of electricity stored being dependent on the amount of electricity consumed, as disclosed by Sisk, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of preventing overcharging of the battery.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Kinoshita (US 2019/0232789).
Regarding claim 4, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, but fails to teach wherein the electronic control unit is configured to limit a generated amount of the electricity generated by the regeneration of the moving energy of the vehicle by the electricity generation device so as to maintain a deceleration rate of the vehicle equal to or smaller than a predetermined deceleration rate while the regeneration charge coasting control is executed.
Kinoshita teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to limit a generated amount of the electricity generated by the regeneration of the moving energy of the vehicle by the electricity generation device so as to maintain a deceleration rate of the vehicle equal to or smaller than a predetermined deceleration rate while the regeneration charge coasting control is executed (Kinoshita, [0056] regarding limiting the regenerative torque of the starter to suppress the vehicle deceleration rate to the ideal deceleration rate or less).
Inoue and Kinoshita are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate limiting the deceleration rate, as disclosed by Kinoshita, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of improving passenger comfort.
Claims 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto (US 2010/0332062) and Kuwabara (US 2018/0097261).
Regarding claim 5, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, but fails to explicitly teach wherein the power source includes an internal combustion engine,
wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute a power charge acceleration control as the acceleration control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than an acceleration charge threshold while an acceleration condition for accelerating the vehicle is satisfied,
the power charge acceleration control being a control to accelerate the own vehicle and store the electricity into the electricity storage device by (i) activating the internal combustion engine to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device to generate the electricity by a part of the generated power, (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device, and (iv) accelerating the vehicle by the remaining generated power, and
wherein the electronic control unit is configured to extend a time of executing the power charge acceleration control such that the time of executing the power charge acceleration control increases as the stored amount of the electricity decreases.
Goto teaches wherein the power source includes an internal combustion engine (Goto, [0009] regarding an internal combustion engine), and
wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute a power charge acceleration control as the acceleration control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than an acceleration charge threshold while an acceleration condition for accelerating the own vehicle is satisfied (Goto, Table 1, regarding performing acceleration charging when the battery SOC is low, the vehicle state is in acceleration or low acceleration, and there is low or medium ascending gradient),
the power charge acceleration control being a control to accelerate the vehicle and store the electricity into the electricity storage device by (i) activating the internal combustion engine to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device to generate the electricity by a part of the generated power, (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device, and (iv) accelerating the vehicle by the remaining generated power (Goto, [0085] regarding adjusting the amount of power generated by the motor to a higher value to charge the battery and accelerate the vehicle).
Kuwabara teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to extend a time of executing the power charge acceleration control such that the time of executing the power charge acceleration control increases as the stored amount of the electricity decreases (Kuwabara, [0084] regarding a shorter charge time for higher charge voltage and longer charge time for a lower charge voltage).
Inoue and Goto are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate charging the battery and accelerating the vehicle simultaneously, as disclosed by Goto, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of maximizing the use of power generated by the engine.
Inoue and Kuwabara are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of vehicle battery charging. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate extending the charging time when the battery is lower, as disclosed by Kuwabara, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of improving battery health.
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto and Kuwabara, and even further in view of Higuchi (US 2021/0155218).
Regarding claim 6, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto and Kuwabara teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 5, but fails to teach wherein the electronic control unit is configured to set the acceleration charge threshold such that the acceleration charge threshold decreases as a moving speed of the own vehicle increases.
Higuchi teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to set the acceleration charge threshold such that the acceleration charge threshold decreases as a moving speed of the own vehicle increases (Higuchi, [0067] regarding the upper limit of a range of charge amount to be lower as vehicle speed becomes higher).
Inoue and Higuchi are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate lowering the charge threshold as the vehicle speed increases, as disclosed by Higuchi, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of decreasing likelihood of excess speeding while trying to charge the battery, thus improving safety.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto and Kuwabara, and even further in view of Lee (US 2021/0387545) and Tatourian (US 2016/0280224).
Regarding claim 7, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto and Kuwabara teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 5, but fails to teach wherein the electronic control unit is configured to set the acceleration charge threshold such that the acceleration charge threshold when the own vehicle is predicted to move on a downward slope, based on map information and a predicted moving route of the own vehicle, is smaller than the acceleration charge threshold when the own vehicle is not predicted to move on the downward slope, based on the map information and the predicted moving route of the own vehicle.
Lee teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to set the acceleration charge threshold such that the acceleration charge threshold when the own vehicle is predicted to move on a downward slope is smaller than the acceleration charge threshold when the own vehicle is not predicted to move on the downward slope (Lee, [0049] regarding increasing the target state of charge when it is determine that the vehicle is performing uphill driving and decreasing the target state of charge when the sensor determines that the vehicle performs downhill driving).
Tatourian teaches when the own vehicle is predicted to move on a downward slope, based on map information and a predicted moving route of the own vehicle, and when the own vehicle is not predicted to move on the downward slope, based on the map information and the predicted moving route of the vehicle (Tatourian, [0047] regarding obtaining road grade based on the predicted route & [0036] regarding a navigational map which include road grade information).
Inoue and Lee are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of hybrid vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate lowering the charging threshold when going downhill, as disclosed by Lee, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of decreasing likelihood of excess speeding while trying to charge the battery, thus improving safety.
Inoue and Tatourian are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of vehicle control. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Inoue, as modified, to incorporate predicting road slope based on the vehicle’s predicted route and map information, as disclosed by Tatourian, with a reasonable expectation of success because doing so would yield the predictable result of improving slope grade prediction.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl, and further in view of Goto.
Regarding claim 8, Inoue in view of Lacaze and Prestl teaches the vehicle moving control apparatus as claimed in claim 1, but fails to disclose wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute a power charge acceleration control as the acceleration control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than an acceleration charge threshold while an acceleration condition for accelerating the own vehicle is satisfied,
the power charge acceleration control being a control to accelerate the own vehicle and store the electricity into the electricity storage device by (i) activating the power source to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device to generate the electricity by a part of the generated power, (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device, and (iv) accelerating the own vehicle by the remaining generated power.
Goto teaches wherein the electronic control unit is configured to execute a power charge acceleration control as the acceleration control when the stored amount of the electricity is equal to or smaller than an acceleration charge threshold while an acceleration condition for accelerating the own vehicle is satisfied (Goto, Table 1, regarding performing acceleration charging when the battery SOC is low, the vehicle state is in acceleration or low acceleration, and there is low or medium ascending gradient),
the power charge acceleration control being a control to accelerate the own vehicle and store the electricity into the electricity storage device by (i) activating the power source to generate the power, (ii) activating the electricity generation device to generate the electricity by a part of the generated power, (iii) storing the generated electricity into the electricity storage device, and (iv) accelerating the own vehicle by the remaining generated power (Goto, [0085] regarding adjusting the amount of power generated by the motor to a higher value to charge the battery and accelerate the vehicle).
Motivation to combine Inoue, as modified, and Goto, in the instant claim, is the same as that stated above with respect to claim 5.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/ALEX B GRIFFIN/Examiner, Art Unit 3665
/Erin D Bishop/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3665
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