DETAILED ACTION
This is a final office action on the merits. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the Office) has received claims 1–20 in application number 18/478,917.
Claims 6 and 11-20 are currently canceled.
Claims 1–3 and 7–10 are currently amended.
Claims 1–5 and 7–10 are pending and have been examined on the merits.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after 16 March 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 1 is objected to because it does not comply with 37 C.F.R. 1.75(i) because claims must begin with a capital letter and end with a period (.), and periods may not be used elsewhere in the claims except for abbreviations. See MPEP § 608.01(m). Claim 1 uses periods after the romanettes (e.g., “i.” “ii.” and “iii.”) listing what Live-ID comprise following the “validating” steps. Appropriate correction is appreciated.
Claim 9 is objected to for use of the initialism “JWT” in the claims with out establishing what “JWT” stands for. The examiner notes that “JWT” also appears in the specification at 0115 and 0120 without apparent definition.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a):
IN GENERAL—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1–5 and 7–10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding claim 1–5 and 7–10. Claim 1 recites where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage in lines 17–18 and the originally filed disclosure fails to demonstrate that applicant invented and had possession of “encrypting [the file] includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file.”
MPEP 2161.01 explains that to satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention and that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention at the time of filing. The only mention of “shredding” in the originally filed disclosure occurs at 0042. This paragraph briefly summarizes U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 16/695,182, which is incorporated by reference and appears to share the inventive entity with the present application, discloses processes and system for the secure storage of digital files including the shredding of the files.
First, with respect to incorporation by reference, MPEP 608.01(p) and 37 C.F.R. 1.57 explains:
(d) “Essential material” may be incorporated by reference, but only by way of an incorporation by reference to a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication, which patent or patent application publication does not itself incorporate such essential material by reference. “Essential material” is material that is necessary to:
(1) Provide a written description of the claimed invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a);
To the extent that the content of the U.S. Patent Application 16/695,182 is “essential material” necessary to provide written description support for “encrypting . . . includes shredding” the reference does not meet the requirements of 37 C.F.R. 1.57 because it is not a U.S. Patent or U.S. patent application publication. In fact, the Application Data Sheet of U.S. Patent Application 16/695,182 contains a request not to publish under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), so it would not have been possible for one of skill in the art to have considered this non-published application to assess whether applicant had possession.
Second, even upon inspection of the unpublished specification filed in U.S. Patent Application 16/695,182, the examiner cannot identify any disclosure of “encrypting . . . includes shredding” to show one of skill in the art that applicant had possession of and invented this feature newly added to claim 1 of the present application.
Because the originally filed disclosure of the present application, including the documents improperly incorporated by reference, fails to show that applicant had possession of and invented where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage, claim 1 lacks written description support under 112(a). Additionally, as this is newly added to the claims, it comprises new matter.
Claims 2–5 and 7–10 depend from claim 1 and incorporate the subject matter that lacks written description support.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 1–5 and 7–10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
Regarding claim 1–5 and 7–10. Claim 1 recites encrypting and storing by a computer system in line 15. It is not clear if “a computer system” is the same computer system previously introduced in line 3 (“creating, by a user using a computer system”) and referred to again in line 13 (“iii. confirming, using the computer system . . .”), or if it is introducing a new (i.e., second) computer system into the claim. Accordingly, one of skill in the art would not know if performing the claimed method requires only one computer system or multiple computer systems.
Regarding claim 1–5 and 7–10. Claim 1 recites encrypting and storing by a computer system a CPS file in lines 15–16. It is not clear if “a CPS file” in line 16 is the same CPS file introduced in lines 4–5 (“controlled dispensation of a CPS file to one or more authorized individuals”) and referred to again in line 7 (“to access the CPS file”) or if it is introducing a new CPS file. Accordingly, one of skill in the art would not know if the method requires all steps to be performed with respect to a single CPS file or requires some steps to be performed with respect to a first CPS file and other steps to be performed with respect to a second CPS file.
Regarding claim 1–5 and 7–10. Claim 1 recites encrypting and storing by a computer system a CPS file . . . where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage in lines 17–18. One of skill in the art would not have understood the scope of “encrypting . . . includes shredding.”
The applicant’s originally filed disclosure does not provide any additional explanation as to the particular meaning of “shredding” in the claim, so the broadest reasonable interpretation encompasses the plain and ordinary meaning. One of skill would have understood that “encrypting” is typically understood to operate on information or data whereas the plain and ordinary meaning of “shredding” is an operation typically performed on physical media or material such as paper.
Even if “shredding” were interpreted to mean “destroying” such that the limitation recites the concept of destroying the file by the computer system, the limitation as a whole is indefinite because it is unclear how a file that is destroyed by shredding can subsequently be stored, i.e., “encrypting [the file] includes destroying . . . of the file prior to storage.”
Accordingly, under either construction of the limitation, the metes and bounds of the claim are unclear because one of skill in the art would not have understood what is meant by the limitation where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage.
Regarding claim 1–5 and 7–10. Claim 1 recites the named individuals in line 21. The element “the named individuals” lacks antecedent basis and it is not clear if it refers to “a user” in line 3, “one or more authorized individuals” in line 5, “the user” in line 10, another “user” or “individual” previously recited, or introduces a new element into the claim.
The examiner notes that former limitation “d)” has been deleted by strikethrough and formerly introduced “recovery instructions including named individuals.” Because that phrasing has not been used in the claim it is unclear what if any other newly recite element now provides antecedent basis for “the named individuals.” Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1–5 and 7–10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Regarding claims 1–5 and 7–10. In the present application, claims 1–5 and 7–10 are directed to a method (i.e., process). Thus, the eligibility analysis proceeds to Step 2A, prong 1.
The judicial exceptions recited in claim 1 are identified in bold below:
A method for storing and regenerating a confidential, private or secret (CPS) file comprising:
a) creating, by a user using a computer system, a Digital Directive account for the controlled dispensation of a CPS file to one or more authorized individuals; wherein the Digital Directive account includes the identity of the one or more individuals authorized by the user to access the CPS file;
b) validating the identity of the user using Live-ID; wherein Live-ID validation comprises: i. confirming that the user is human; ii. identifying the user using biometric analysis of one or more biometric markers of the user; and iii. confirming, using the computer system, that the user identified in step (b)(ii) is the individual who created the Digital Directive account of (a);
c) encrypting and storing by a computer system a CPS file comprising confidential, private or secret information of the user, where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage; and
d) validating the named individuals using Live-ID; wherein Live-ID validation comprises: i. confirming that the individual is human, ii. identifying the individual using biometric analysis of one or more biometric markers of the user; and iii. confirming, using the computer system, that the individual identified in step (d)(ii) is an individual authorized by the user in (a).
The limitations of claim 1 under the broadest reasonable interpretation recite an abstract idea that falls under “certain methods of organizing human activity,” including commercial or legal interactions because the steps/functions closely follow traditional legal or contractual arrangements. Specifically, creating a digital directive account to control access and dispensation only to individuals authorized by the creating user is similar to designating a power of attorney so that certain individuals can access confidential files that might, for instance, be stored with an attorney or in a safety deposit box, where the attorney or bank would have a list of people who the file owner has given permission to access that file. This is also similar to completing forms that permit release of certain educational or medical information or files to certain individuals other than the student or patient.
Limitations [C] and [E] recite a “Live-ID” process that includes confirming the user is human, the identification of the user based on one or more biometrics, and confirmation that the user is also the individual who created the account and wherein the biometric identification is chosen (e.g., using one or more of fingerprints, voice recognition, facial recognition, or eye scans) (e.g., claim 7; App. Spec. 0047, 0110). The claims do not specify the technique other than using biometrics which can be done practically in the human mind using observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion, such as when a clerk or teller compares a person to a photo identification card prior to granting them access to certain information or a particular transaction. Therefore, limitations [C] and [E] recite an abstract idea that falls under the “mental process” grouping.
These interpretations are consistent with applicant’s disclosure which is titled “METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR IMPROVED SECURITY DURING TRANSFER OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AND NFTs IN A TRUST OR ESTATE USING LIVE-ID.” The disclosure also describes issues in wills, trusts, and estate law regarding estate administration, i.e., who can access and take ownership over or dispense of assets when the owner dies. (App. Spec. 0001–0010). Accordingly, claim 1 recites an abstract idea and the analysis proceeds to Step 2A, prong 2.
The judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, the claim recites the additional elements “a computer system.” First, the “computer system” is recited at a high level of generality (e.g., consistent with Applicant’s specification at 0105 et seq.). As such the claim amounts to no more than instructions to carry out the abstract idea by “applying it” on a generic computer. Other aspects of the claim such as the account being a “digital” directive account at most provides a general link to an implied technological environment. Accordingly, the additional element(s) do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because the combination of additional elements, and the claim as a whole, merely provides instructions to implement an abstract ideas in a generic computer environment, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Therefore, the claim is directed to an abstract idea and the analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
The additional elements, both individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because when the considerations of Step 2A, prong 2 are reconsidered, the result is the same. In short, claim 1 lacks additional elements or a combination of additional elements to provide an inventive concept. Therefore, claim 1 is not patent eligible.
Dependent claim 2 elaborates on the abstract idea while—like claim 1—reciting these steps are “by the computer system.” Claim 2 is therefore ineligible for the same reason as claim 1 above.
Dependent claim 3 recite the step of verifying that a person trying to access the protected file meets certain authentication factors prior to verification by Live-ID. The authentication factors in claim 3 are recited at a high level of generality and do not remove claim 3 from further reciting a mental process as in claim 1. Accordingly, claim 3 only elaborates on the abstract idea in claim 1 and does not recite new additional elements for further consideration under Step 2A, prong 2 or Step 2B, so the claim is ineligible.
Dependent claim 4 and 5 elaborate on the authentication factors and content of the protected file but do not positively recite further methods steps. Accordingly, these claims do not further limit the scope of claim 1, so they are ineligible for the same reasons as claim 1.
Dependent claim 7 elaborates on the types of biometric identification used in the Live-ID recited in claim 1, which include “one or more of fingerprints, voice recognition, facial recognition, or eye scans.” As noted with respect to claim 1, these parameters can be used in observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion of a person to identify another person and therefore fall under the mental process grouping of abstract ideas. There are no new additional elements for further consideration under Step 2A, prong 2 or Step 2B, so the claim is ineligible
Dependent claim 8 elaborates on the abstract idea of claim 1 by confirming user identity based on a stored image. This also recites a mental process. Claim 8 has been amended to recite that the image is store “in the computer system.” Like claim 1, this provides only a general link to a computer recited at a high level of generality and as such is merely an instruction to “apply it” on a computer. Accordingly, claim 8 is ineligible for the same reason as claim 1 above.
Dependent claim 9 recites a further step of generating a temporary “JWT” token for identification of the user. The initials “JWT” are merely a label for the token and undefined in the claims or specification. Claim 9 has been amended to recite that the token is generated “by the computer system” which is an additional element that provides only a general link to the technological environment in the same manner as discussed with respect to claim 1. Accordingly, the additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and claim 9 continues to be directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Dependent claim 10 further recites that the “JWT” token of claim 9 is stored in “the computer system” is matched prior to the release and regeneration of the CPS file. Matching data is part of the mental process abstract idea. The computer system provides only a general link to the technological environment in the same manner as discussed with respect to claims 1 and 9. Accordingly, the additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and claim 10 is ineligible for the same reason as claims 1 and 9.
In summary, the dependent claims considered both individually and as an ordered combination do not provide meaningful limitations to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. The claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or provide meaningful limitations beyond generally linking an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Therefore, the claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1–5 and 7–8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Chintala (US 2019/0147554 A1).
Regarding claim 1, Chintala teaches:
1. (Currently Amended) A method for storing and regenerating a confidential, private or secret (CPS) file comprising: [
a) creating, by a user using a computer system, a Digital Directive account for the controlled dispensation of a CPS file to one or more authorized individuals; wherein the Digital Directive account includes the identity of the one or more individuals authorized by the user to access the CPS file; [The user 102, the notary 106, the witness 110 and the custodians 114, 118 may have one or more communication devices for communicating among themselves. (i.e., the user using a computer system) (Chintala 0038); The user 102 has digital contents recorded or stored in a digital locker. The digital contents in a digital locker correspond to images, music and documents comprising personal and business information of the user 102. (Chintala 0039); the user 102 selects and assigns custodians (i.e., one or more authorized individuals) . . . the degree of access to the digital locker (i.e., digital directive account) for the custodians 114 and 118 is based on a user preference input set by the user 102 as at least one of a contribute mode, a restricted mode, a read-only mode, an edit mode, and a full access mode (Chintala 0043); See also Chintala 0041; 0053; 0055; 0072; 0075; 0082; 0094; 0119]
b) validating the identity of the user using Live-ID; wherein Live-ID validation comprises: i. confirming that the user is human; ii. identifying the user using biometric analysis of one or more biometric markers of the user; and iii. confirming, using the computer system, that the user identified in step (b)(ii) is the individual who created the Digital Directive account of (a); [the notary 106 creates the live-sign event. . .verifies identity of the participants. . .by multiple ways, such as but not limited to identity cards, facial recognition, biometric fingerprints, voice and retinal scan . . . one or more participants (notary, custodians, witnesses, or testators) can be physically present in the room while recording the authorization event. (Chintala 0041); The notary 106 verifies identity of the user 102 and the witness 110 prior to recording the authorization session. In an embodiment, the notary 106 initiates recording of the authorization session upon displaying the authorization document and the live-sign document (existing documents) for the user 102 and the witness 110 and requests the user 102 to sign the authorization documents. (Chintala 0050); the method 1200 includes verifying, by the processor, identity of the participants of the authorization event. The identity of the participants of the authorization session participating virtually and physically (Chintala 0163); See also Chintala 0040; 0064; 0065; 0076; 0087; 0145)]
NOTE: The broadest reasonable interpretation of “confirming that the user is human” consistent with the specification is confirming that the user is an actual person and not a machine to prevent hacking. (App. Spec. 0113). The examiner finds that the teaching of Chintala that the user is physically participating in the authorization session teaches that the notary confirms that the user is a person and not a machine because one of skill in the art would know that at the time of filing that a notary could distinguish between a physically present machine and a physically present person.
c) encrypting and storing by a computer system a CPS file comprising confidential, private or secret information of the user, where encrypting of the CPS file includes shredding, by the computer system, of the file prior to storage; and [the digital contents of the digital locker are remotely stored in the server 124 (i.e., “a computer system”) (Chintala 0039); FIG. 14 is a block diagram that illustrates a server 1400, which may be an example of the server 124 . . . The storage module 1425 consists of a proprietary logic that stored executable instructions to shred ( or shard) the encrypted or unencrypted files, and store the shreds on a network of distributed cloud storage systems such as cloud storage systems 1430a, 1430b, 1430c and 1430d connected through a network 1435. (Chintala 0174)]
d) validating, by the processor, the named individuals using Live-ID; wherein Live-ID validation comprises: i. confirming that the individual is human, ii. identifying the individual using biometric analysis of one or more biometric markers of the user; and iii. confirming, using the computer system, that the individual identified in step (d)(ii) is an individual authorized by the user in (a). [the notary 106 creates the live-sign event. . .verifies identity of the participants. . .by multiple ways, such as but not limited to identity cards, facial recognition, biometric fingerprints, voice and retinal scan . . . one or more participants (notary, custodians, witnesses, or testators) can be physically present in the room while recording the authorization event. (Chintala 0041); The notary 106 verifies identity of the user 102 and the witness 110 prior to recording the authorization session. In an embodiment, the notary 106 initiates recording of the authorization session upon displaying the authorization document and the live-sign document (existing documents) for the user 102 and the witness 110 and requests the user 102 to sign the authorization documents. (Chintala 0050); the method 1200 includes verifying, by the processor, identity of the participants of the authorization event. The identity of the participants of the authorization session participating virtually and physically (Chintala 0163); See also Chintala 0040; 0064; 0065; 0076; 0087; 0145)]
NOTE: The broadest reasonable interpretation of “confirming that the user is human” consistent with the specification is confirming that the user is an actual person and not a machine to prevent hacking. (App. Spec. 0113). The examiner finds that the teaching of Chintala that the user is physically participating in the authorization session teaches that the notary confirms that the user is a person and not a machine because one of skill in the art would know that at the time of filing that a notary could distinguish between a physically present machine and a physically present person.
Regarding claim 2. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala further teaches:
2. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, further comprising
e) receiving, by the computer system, a request to regenerate the CPS file; [0040; 0045; 0094; 0100; 0134];
f) validating, using Live-ID, the identity of the individuals authorized to recreate and access the CPS file; and [0056; 0094; 0102; 0105; 0109; 0110; 0135]
g) regenerating and providing the individuals access to the CPS file. [0056; 0094; 0135]
Regarding claim 3. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala further teaches:
3. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, further comprising
wherein verification of verifying the user in step (b) and/or the named individuals in step (d) further includes the use of one or more authentication factors prior to verification by Live-ID. [In an embodiment, the notary 106 verifies identity of the participants (the witness 110, the user 102 and optionally the custodians 114, 118) of the authorization event. (Chintala 0041) The access credentials may include login information for joining the authorization session virtually such as, user name, password, web link. (Chintala 0059); see also Chintala 0065; 0109; 0135; 0160; 0163]
By the user, witness(es), and custodians joining the authentication event, the notary has leveraged authentication factors such as login information (i.e., passwords) prior to the actual notarization event that reads on the claimed Live-ID verification.
Regarding claim 4. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 3 above. Chintala further teaches:
4. (Original) The method of claim 3, wherein the authentication factors are chosen from passwords, phone numbers, social security numbers, fingerprints, voice recognition, facial recognition, eye scans, digital certificates, or authentication tokens. [0041; 0059; 0065; 0135; 0160; 0163]
Regarding claim 5. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala further teaches:
5. (Original) The method of claim 1, wherein the CPS file contains one or more keys or passwords.
NOTE: The contents of the CPS file are not used in any step of the claimed method (i.e., do not impact how any positively claimed step is performed) and as such comprise non-functional descriptive material and have no patentable weight to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.
Regarding claim 7. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala further teaches:
7. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, wherein the biometric identification is chosen from one or more of fingerprints, voice recognition, facial recognition, or eye scans. [0041; 0059; 0065; 0135; 0160; 0163]
Regarding claim 8. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala further teaches:
8. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, wherein confirmation of the user identity as the account creator is based upon a stored image in the computer system. [At step 680, all of the assignees (assignees A, B, C and D) are notified to submit the relevant documents for the
disbursement process. Some examples of the relevant documents include legal documents such as no objection certificate, identity proof, address proof, medical certificates, and documents associated with valid claims for the disbursement of the digital locker, etc. All of the assignees upload these documents at the platform. (i.e., they are stored on the computer system) (Chintala 0109)]
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Chintala, as applied to claim 1 above, in view of Lebowitz (US Pat. No. 11,954,215).
Regarding claim 9. Chintala teaches all the limitations of claim 1 above. Chintala does not explicitly teach further comprising identification of the user based on one or more temporary tokens.
However, Lebowitz—which like the present invention is directed to techniques for memorializing document signatures in a digital realm—teaches
9. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, further comprising
h) generating, by the computer system, one or more temporary JWT tokens for identification of the user. [In various embodiments of this disclosure, communications between the front end application 502 and the API gateway 504 are first established by providing (i.e., generating) a token, such as a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT), identifying a user of the front end application 502, with the front end application 502 transmitting this token to an authentication service 506 associated with the API gateway 504. The token may be generated via a login or authentication process in which the user inputs certain information, and, in some embodiments, the authentication process can be a multifactor authentication process. The authentication token provided by the front end application 502 can be included in an authorization header of a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request. The authentication service 506 then validates the token on behalf of the server-side system. (Lebowitz c28:59–c29:7)]
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to incorporate identifying tokens as taught by Lebowitz into the digital asset protection and management system of Chintala because assuring user identification is critical in Chintala, particularly in the remote user attestation scenarios taught by Chintala, and a user-identifying token as in Lebowitz would facilitate and improve upon that feature.
Regarding claim 10. The combination of Chintala in view of Lebowitz teaches all the limitations of claim 9 above. Lebowitz further teaches:
10. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 9, further comprising
i) storing the temporary JWT token in the computer system and matching the JWT token to the user prior to release and regeneration of the CPS file. [In various embodiments of this disclosure, communications between the front end application 502 and the API gateway 504 are first established by providing (i.e., generating) a token, such as a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT), identifying a user of the front end application 502, with the front end application 502 transmitting this token to an authentication service 506 associated with the API gateway 504. The token may be generated via a login or authentication process in which the user inputs certain information, and, in some embodiments, the authentication process can be a multifactor authentication process. The authentication token provided by the front end application 502 can be included in an authorization header of a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request. The authentication service 506 then validates the token on behalf of the server-side system. (Lebowitz c28:59–c29:7)]
The motivation for further modifying the combination of Chintala in view of Lebowitz of claim 9 with the features of Lebowitz cited for claim 10 is the same as provided for claim 9.
Response to Remarks
With respect to the rejection of claims 2 and 10 under § 112(b), Applicant asserts on page 5 of Applicant’s remarks that the amendments address the rejection.
Response: Notwithstanding applicant’s remarks, the amendments have overcome the rejections. However, the amendments to the claims have created new issues under 112(b) which are detailed in the rejections above.
With respect to the rejection of claims 1–20 under § 101, Applicant asserts on pages 5–9 of Applicant’s remarks:
First of all, Applicant submits that the foregoing amendments, including the specific steps relating to Live-ID obviate the 101 rejection presented in the office action.
Response: Applicant’s remarks have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Examiners should determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for subject matter eligibility by evaluating the claim in accordance with the following flowchart, which is shown in MPEP 2106(III). The statement above argues that a general feature of the claim (Live-ID) makes the claim eligible independent of the required analysis, and therefore is not persuasive.
Applicant further asserts:
The rejection is based on the assertion that:
“the claims are directed to abstract ideas and specifically, methods of organizing human activity, “because the steps/functions closely follow traditional legal or contractual arrangements”.
As will be seen, this conclusion is contrary to the standards set forth in the MPEP.
First of all, attention is directed to MPEP 2106.04(2) which broadly defines the meaning of “abstract ideas” under Section 101 as being limited to three distinct groups:
[quoting MPEP 2106.04(a)]
The only abstract ideas that trigger the judicially created exceptions are those 3 groupings set forth in the MPEP. Here, the rejection asserts that the claims relate to “methods of organizing human activities.”
The MPEP section points out that the grouping in question is limited to “certain methods of organizing human activities” with a focus on “certain.”
[further quoting MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)]
Once again, the MPEP makes clear that all methods of organizing human activity do not trigger the judicially created exceptions, only those certain methods specifically outlined therein.
Response: The summary of the MPEP is not an argument, but the examiner notes that it appears applicant is quoting from MPEP 2106.04(a) rather than MPEP “2106.04(2),” as the latter is not a subsection of MPEP 2106.04.
Applicant further asserts:
The rejection asserts that the claimed invention falls into commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations), however, the standard applied in the rejection is not the standard set forth in the MPEP. Specifically, the rejection asserts that “because the steps/functions closely follow traditional legal or contractual arrangements.
Specifically, the bolded language recites a user creating an account that allows the user to create a file and then dictate rules around how that file can be accessed and copied.” This, however, is not the standard for commercial or legal interactions.
To illustrate how “legal interactions” cited in the MPEP differ from “traditional legal or contractual arrangements” cited in the action, attention is directed to the following discussion in the MPEP:
[quoting from MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B)]
Response: The remarks above assert the rejection is contrary to the MPEP but this assertion is incorrect. MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II) elaborates on the certain methods of organizing human activity grouping. Not only does this include the list of subgroupings and succinct examples of each subgrouping, it also includes a discussion of federal court decisions that are found to be consistent with, or “fall within” the enumerated subgroupings. Not only do the abstract ideas in those court cases stray from the strict language used to establish the groupings, subgroupings, and examples, but the MPEP notes that the Supreme Court in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 218, 110 USPQ2d at 1982, described the concept of intermediated settlement without the claims ever explicitly using the words “intermediated” or “settlement.” MPEP 2106.04(II)(A)(1) (discussing Step 2A, prong 1 of the Alice/Mayo subject matter eligibility analysis).
Here, the rejection evaluates whether an abstract idea is set forth or described in the claims and identifies the language in the claim that does set forth or describe the abstract idea. MPEP 2106.04(II)(A)(1). Examiners should determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea by (1) identifying the specific limitation(s) in the claim under examination that the examiner believes recites an abstract idea, and (2) determining whether the identified limitations(s) fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas listed above. MPEP 2106.04(a). The abstract idea set forth or described in claim 1, as indicated by the language bolded in Step 2A, prong 1 in the rejection, falls within the grouping “certain methods of organizing human activity” because the process of creating a file containing assets (digital or otherwise) and then setting up a legal framework that controls what individuals can access those assets and using ID verification as part of that control “falls within” “certain methods of organizing human activity” subgrouping of “commercial or legal interactions.” This finding is consistent with applicant’s specification which itself compares the claimed invention to “methods for holding (accounts/trusts), allocating (naming trust recipients or heirs) and transferring those assets in a manner akin to the way money and other physical assets are transferred now.” (App. Spec. 0009), in addition to the title of application describing the invention using “trust or estate” which are legal concepts. The process of setting up a trust that contains the assets of a trustor/grantor so those assets can be managed according to rules and also passed with the trustor/grantor’s estate is a process that attorneys perform for clients, which are people or humans.
Accordingly, the conclusion in the rejection at Step 2A, prong 1 that the claims set forth or describe traditional legal or contractual arrangements (i.e., setting up a trust) is supported by the language of the claim when read in light of the specification and is consistent with the MPEP, office policy, and court precedent. Therefore, the applicant’s remarks are not persuasive.
Applicant further asserts:
In order to appreciate claim language that does trigger the judicial exception, attention is directed to Claim 1 of the patent in the buySAFE case discussed above which reads:
[quoting claim 1 from buySAFE]
As can be seen from the highlighted portions, the claim in buySAFE is directed to establishing a transaction performance guaranty service, i.e., a legal obligation that establishes a contractual relationship between parties. As such it differs significantly from the present claims which are directed to a process, not establishing a contractual relationship.
In fact, assuming arguendo that the Examiner characterization that the claim “language recites a user creating an account that allows the user to create a file and then dictate rules around how that file can be accessed and copied” is accurate, the claimed invention is not directed to a contractual relationship. Thus, the claim is not directed to “certain methods of organizing human activity.”
Put another way, the burden is on the Patent Office to establish prima facie rejections. Moreover, the MPEP makes clear the requirements that must be met for such a rejection under Section 101 based on the judicial created exception of “certain methods of organizing human activity.” However, the rejection substitutes its own standard of organizing human activity for that in the MPEP. Thus, the rejection does not establish that the claimed invention falls within the subgroups set forth in the MPEP. Accordingly, the rejection is, on its face, improper.
Response: Applicant’s remarks have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. The applicant’s citation to buySAFE attempts to show that the rejection has strayed from office guidance or court precedent but does the opposite. The example in buySAFE supports the examiner’s position above that the language used to articulate the abstract idea that is set forth or described in the claim is not limited to specific language or labels so long as it reasonably falls within one of the groupings. The rejection and the response above further explains why the claims recite an abstract idea that does fall within “certain methods of organizing human activity.” As evidenced by applicant’s specification and the title of the invention the claims set forth or describe a legal concept of trusts or estates (which are so fundamental to the practice of law that they may be required courses in some law schools).
The legal concepts in the claim are clear and as such it isn’t necessary to debate whether the claims recite a contractual relationship. Nonetheless, there is a clear analogy between a traditional legal contract based on offer and acceptance and the establishment of a trust which is an agreement between trustor(s)/grantor(s) and the trustee/executor of that trust. The trustee must agree to even be a trustee before the trust can be executed. Accordingly, along with the evidence in the specification and title, there is a reasonable basis for the rejection to identify that the abstract idea set forth or described in the claim “falls within” “commercial or legal interactions” because setting up a trust is a legal interaction similar to a contract where parties (i.e., trustor and trustee) agree to the terms of how assets will be managed through life events.
Applicant further asserts:
In addition, the rejection, as shown by the text from page 5 above, improperly focuses on the individual elements of the claim and not the claim in its entirety. Specifically, the rejection reads “[t]he judicial exceptions recited in claim 11 are identified in bold.”
Because of this, the rejection fails to meet the standard enunciated by the Federal Circuit, in Chargepoint v. Semaconnect, Inc., 18-1739 (Fed. Cir., March 28, 2019) where the court recognized that when addressing the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry, one must bear in mind that “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”‘ Id. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 ). (Emphasis added) They concluded that at step one, “it is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim; we must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is ‘directed to.” (Emphasis added).
Response: Applicant’s remarks have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. MPEP 2106.07 explains the requirements for formulating and supporting rejections for lack of subject matter eligibility. This analysis illustrated and summarized in the flowchart in MPEP 2106(III). A complete review of these materials shows that Step 2A, prong 1 of this analysis is an assessment of whether the claim recites an abstract idea, and then Step 2A, prong 2 assess any additional elements to determine if the claim is directed to an abstract idea. The court decision cited by the applicant is consistent with the analysis outlined in the MPEP, but it also does not state the complete analysis, and the remarks fail to otherwise show that the rejection is incomplete or inconsistent with the MPEP. The remarks imply the rejection merely finds the claims recite an abstract idea without assessing what the claims are directed to. But in fact the rejection clearly articulates the findings and analysis at both Step 2A, prong 1 and Step 2A, prong 2 and as such meets the burden described in the MPEP for assessing what the claim is directed to. The rejection also reconsiders the claim at Step 2B to consider the claim as a whole, again consistent with the analysis outlined in the MPEP.
Applicant further asserts:
Finally, consideration of the rationale behind the judicially created exceptions shows that the rationale is not applicable to the present claims. Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F .3d at 1379 explains that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” under section 101. No one person should be entitled to own or control natural phenomenon or abstract ideas. If a claim is so broadly constructed that is subsumes a natural phenomenon or abstract idea taking them out of the public domain, then the claim is preemptive. (Emphasis added) See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (noting “the pre-emption concern that undergirds our§ 101 jurisprudence”).
Here, the instant claims are directed to a process that includes the controlled storing and regenerating of a CPS file. The claim in no way subsumes a natural phenomenon or abstract idea taking them out of the public domain. For all of these reasons, Applicant believes the outstanding rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 is improper and should be withdrawn.
Response: Applicant’s remarks have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. In contrast to the standalone argument about preemption raised by applicant, the MPEP notes that while preemption is the concern underlying the judicial exceptions, it is not a standalone test for determining eligibility. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052, 119 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, questions of preemption are inherent in and resolved by the two-part framework from Alice Corp. and Mayo (the Alice/Mayo test referred to by the Office as Steps 2A and 2B). MPEP 2106.04. Because the rejection of the claims is based on a complete and clear application of the appropriate framework, the question of preemption is considered to be resolved.
As none of the applicant’s remarks have demonstrated that the rejection is in error or otherwise inconsistent with office guidance, policy, or case law, the 101 rejection has been updated based on the amended claims and is maintained.
With respect to the rejection of the claims under §§ 102 and 103, Applicant asserts on pages 11–12 of Applicant’s remarks:
Each of the rejections rely on the assertion that one or more claim limitations are not entitled to patentable weight.
For example, the rejection of Claim 6 asserts:
The Examiner notes, “wherein Live-ID includes ... “ only describes characteristics of Live-ID, which is stored data, and these characteristics are not processed or used to carry out any functionality that specifically relies on these particular characteristics. Therefore, the limitations recites non-functional descriptive material and does not serve to differentiate the claims from the prior art. When descriptive material is not functionally related to the substrate, the descriptive material will not distinguish the invention from prior art in terms of patentability.
Claim 1 has been amended to (1) include subject matter from original Claim 6 and (2) positively recite the steps associated with Live-ID. While Applicant does not agree with the Examiner’s position, the claims, as amended, include the steps of Live-ID and thus, have obviated the position presented in the rejection.
Similarly, in rejecting Claims 9, and 10, Examiner asserts that the language “wherein the temporary token is further stored ... matched ... “ is not positively recited and does not have patentable weight.
Once again, while Applicant disagrees with that position, the foregoing amendment is submitted to have obviated that argument as the claims the have been amended to explicitly recite the steps relating to the generation and use of a temporary token.
The outstanding rejections do not address the limitations which have been introduced into claim 1, and they certainly do not establish that the combination of features recited in the present claims are taught or suggested by any combination of the art of record. Accordingly, the claimed invention, as a whole, is not taught nor suggested by Chintala, either alone, or in view of Bernardi.
For all these reasons, the 102 and 103 rejections should be withdrawn.
Response: Applicant’s remarks have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. The examiner acknowledges that the amendments result in positively reciting certain functions or tying steps/functions to data that previously lacked patentable weight. Accordingly, the rejections have been updated to cite new portions of Chintala as well as introduce a new reference, Lebowitz, that alone or in combination teach the claimed invention. Because applicant’s remarks are based on the amendments, and the rejection has been updated to address those amendments, the examiner considers the remarks to be fully addressed by the updated rejections. The rejections have been maintained.
Conclusion
Applicant’s amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 C.F.R. 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Patrick McAtee whose telephone number is (571)272-7575. The examiner can normally be reached Weekdays 8:30am - 4:30pm ET.
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Patrick McAtee
Supervisory Patent Examiner
Art Unit 3698
/PATRICK MCATEE/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3698