DETAILED ACTION
This is a response to Application # 18/482,219 filed on October 6, 2023 in which claims 1-20 were presented for examination.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
Claims 1-20 are pending, which are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 112(b), and 102(a)(1).
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement filed October 6, 2023 complies with the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.97, 1.98 and MPEP § 609. It has been placed in the application file and the information referred to therein has been considered as to the merits.
Drawings
The drawings are objected to because the Figs. 6B and 6C are small, unfocused, and difficult to read. As a result, these figures are not reproducible. 37 C.F.R. § 1.84(J). Additionally, Fig. 6C appears to include photographs, which will only be accepted if they are “the only practicable medium for illustrating the claimed invention,” (37 C.F.R. § 1.84(b)(1)) for which no evidence exists this is the case.
Therefore, Applicant should replace these figures with line drawings.
Corrected drawing sheets in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(d) are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. Any amended replacement drawing sheet should include all of the figures appearing on the immediate prior version of the sheet, even if only one figure is being amended. The figure or figure number of an amended drawing should not be labeled as “amended.” If a drawing figure is to be canceled, the appropriate figure must be removed from the replacement sheet, and where necessary, the remaining figures must be renumbered and appropriate changes made to the brief description of the several views of the drawings for consistency. Additional replacement sheets may be necessary to show the renumbering of the remaining figures. Each drawing sheet submitted after the filing date of an application must be labeled in the top margin as either “Replacement Sheet” or “New Sheet” pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(d). If the changes are not accepted by the Examiner, the applicant will be notified and informed of any required corrective action in the next Office action. The objection to the drawings will not be held in abeyance.
Claim Interpretation
Claim 2 recites “quantum computing component to operative quantum-enhanced sensors to provide accurate and sensitive measurements of various physical quantities.” This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum-enhanced sensors. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 5 recites “wherein the fusion component engages the artificial intelligence component to manage complex decision-making, object recognition, natural language processing for human-vehicle interaction, and predictive modeling below a second threshold and above the first threshold for computational intensity.” (Emphasis added). This appears to recite the intended use of the fusion component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 7 recites “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimizing complex vehicle routing in real-time.” (Emphasis added). This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum computing component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 8 recites “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimize energy usage using an energy management component or encryption in real-time using an encryption component.” (Emphasis added). This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum computing component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 10 recites “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to improve artificial intelligence models for adaptive processes using real-world data.” (Emphasis added). This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum computing component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 14 recites “using a fusion component to dynamically engage one of more of a classical computing component, an artificial intelligence component or a quantum computing component in connection with operation of a vehicle.” (Emphasis added)/ This appears to recite the intended use of the fusion component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 15 recites “further comprising engaging the quantum computing component to operate quantum-enhanced sensors to provide accurate and sensitive measurements of various physical quantities” This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum-enhanced sensors. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 18 recites “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimizing complex vehicle routing in real-time.” (Emphasis added). This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum computing component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 19 recites “use a fusion component to dynamically engage one of more of a classical computing component, an artificial intelligence component or a quantum computing component in connection with operation of a vehicle.” (Emphasis added)/ This appears to recite the intended use of the fusion component. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 20 recites “operate quantum-enhanced sensors to provide accurate and sensitive measurements of various physical quantities” This appears to recite the intended use of the quantum-enhanced sensors. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim Interpretation—35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f):
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), because the claim limitations uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitations are: “fusion component” in claims 1-14 and 19; “classical computing component” in claim 4; “artificial intelligence component” in claim 5; “quantum component” in claims 2, 6-13, 15, 18, and 20; “energy management component in claim 8;” and “encryption component” in claim 8.
Because these claim limitations are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), they are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If Applicant does not intend to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations recite sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
This application includes one or more claim limitations that use the word “means,” “step,” or a generic placeholder, but are nonetheless not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) because the claim limitations recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to entirely perform the recited function. Such claim limitations are: “classical computing component” in claims 1, 3, 6, 14, 16, 17, and 19; “an artificial intelligence component” in claims 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 19; and “quantum computing component” in claims 1, 3, 14, 16, and 19 because the usage in these claims does not meet element (B) as set forth in MPEP § 2181. Specifically, these limitations, unlike those of claims 2, 6-13, 15, 18, and 20, are not “configured to” perform a function and, instead, are merely components that present.
Because these claim limitations are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), they are not being interpreted to cover only the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If Applicant intends to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to remove the structure, materials, or acts that performs the claimed function; or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations do not recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to perform the claimed function.
Claim Objections
Claims 1-20 are objected to for failing to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(g), which requires “[t]he least restrictive claim should be presented as claim number 1” (emphasis added). See also, MPEP § 608.01(i)). In the present application, the claim presented as claim number 14 is the least restrictive claim of the independent claims.
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claim 2 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim limitation “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to operative quantum-enhanced sensors” is grammatically incorrect. (Emphasis added). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 4 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim limitation “wherein the fusion component engages the classical computing component for routine control tasks, basic sensor data processing, and compute-intensive operations below a first threshold” is grammatically incorrect. (Emphasis added). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: the limitation “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimizing complex vehicle routing in real-time” is grammatically incorrect. (Emphasis added). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 10 is objected to because of the following informalities: the limitation “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component as a specialized accelerators for specific tasks” is grammatically incorrect. (Emphasis added). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 11 is objected to because of the following informalities: the limitation “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component at least one of the following data preprocessing tasks: feature selection, dimensionality reduction, or data clustering” is grammatically incorrect. (Emphasis added). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 17 is objected to because of the following informalities: “the second threshold for computational intensity” lacks antecedent basis. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claims contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Regarding claims 1-15 and 18-20, these claims are interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), as discussed above. As a result, these claims fail comply with the enablement requirement. The claims contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. Specifically, when a claim invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) for a computer implemented means-plus-function claim, the specification must disclose the specific algorithm required to transform the general-purpose computing equipment into the required special purpose computer. See MPEP § 2181(II)(B). The examiner could not find any specific structure or specific algorithm in the present specification, nor has Applicant pointed to such structure or algorithm. Therefore, these claims fail to properly enable the invention.
Regarding claims 2-13, 15-18, and 20, these claims depend from one or more of the above claims and, therefore, inherit the rejection of those claims.
Regarding claims 14 and 19, these claims are interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), as discussed above, and only recite a single “means” element. As such, these claims fail to recite a combination of elements as required by that statutory provision and thus cannot rely on the specification to provide the structure, material or acts to support the claimed function. As such, the claim recites a function that has no limits and covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated function, while the specification discloses at most only those means known to the inventor. Accordingly, the disclosure is not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Regarding claims 15-18 and 20, it is noted that these claims do not inherit the rejection of claims 14 and 19 for being “single means claims” because they recite additional programmed functions and, therefore, this rejection does not apply to those claims. See MPEP § 2183(V). However, these claims do inherit the rejection of claims 14 and 19 for failing to comply with the enablement requirement due to failure to provide adequate support for limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See MPEP § 2183(IV).
Regarding claims 1-20, the specification does not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. The specification, while introducing a conceptual framework for integrating classical computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing (QC) in vehicle operations, lacks the specific, detailed technical information necessary to implement the claimed invention without undue experimentation.
The Federal Circuit, in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988), established eight factors to consider when determining whether a given amount of experimentation is “undue:”
(A) The breadth of the claims;
(B) The nature of the invention;
(C) The state of the prior art;
(D) The level of ordinary skill in the art;
(E) The predictability in the art;
(F) The amount of direction provided by the inventor;
(G) The existence of working examples;
(H) The quantity of experimentation need to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure.
See MPEP § 2164.01(a)
Under element (A), the claims are exceptionally broad, encompassing “fusion of classical computing, artificial intelligence or quantum computing for vehicle operation.” For example, independent claim 1 covers a “a fusion component configured to dynamically engage one or more of a classical computing component, an artificial intelligence component or a quantum computing component in connection with operation of a vehicle.” This claim covers a wide range of implementations, hardware configurations, and operational scenarios. The specification provides a conceptual basis for this breadth but fails to provide commensurate disclosure across the claimed scope. The lack of specific quantum hardware details and the generic nature of its use for “vehicle operation” mean that the claims cover far more than what is enabled by the disclosure. The specification does not provide sufficient information to make and use all conceivable embodiments falling within the claims without undue experimentation.
Under element (B), the invention concerns the fusion of classical computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing for vehicle operations. This field, especially the integration of quantum computing into vehicular systems is brand new and complex. Quantum computing itself is still largely in a research and development phase, with practical, scalable, and stable quantum hardware for real-time applications being an active area of intense research. The claims are broad enough to cover various “vehicle operations” that would necessitate significant specific implementations not enabled by the general disclosure. The nature of integrating such evolving computing ideas requires a high degree of technical specificity that is lacking from the specification in order to be enabling.
Under element (C), the current state of the art in quantum computing is still largely in a research and development phase. While a person of ordinary skill in the art of vehicle systems or artificial intelligence would understand classical and artificial intelligence computing, the integration of real-time quantum computing for dynamic vehicle operations is beyond the ordinary skill level of such a person without specific, detailed guidance from the present patent application, which is not present.
Under element (D), a person of ordinary skill in the art of this field would likely have expertise in classical vehicle control systems, embedded programming, and artificial intelligence for autonomous driving. However, a person of ordinary skill would not necessarily be skilled in designing, manufacturing, or integrating practical, real-time quantum computing hardware and algorithms into a vehicle, particularly for dynamic computational task allocation. The level of skill required to provide a working implementation of the quantum system is significantly higher than that of an ordinary skilled person, particularly in light of the present specification, thereby necessitating undue experimentation.
Under element (E), the integration of quantum computing with classical and artificial intelligence systems for real-time, safety-critical vehicle operations is highly unpredictable. The behavior and performance of quantum algorithms on real-world quantum hardware are still subjects of active research, with issues like decoherence, error rates, and scalability posing significant challenges. Applying such unpredictable systems to critical vehicle functions introduces substantial uncertainty. The specification provides no guidance on how to mitigate these unpredictable aspects, how to ensure reliability of quantum outputs, or how to handle potential failures in a mixed computing environment in a vehicle. Without such guidance, a person of ordinary skill in the art would face undue experimentation in attempting to make the invention work reliably across the claimed scope.
Under element (F), the specification only provides a high-level architectural overview with components like “Classical Computing Component 106,” “Artificial Intelligence Component 108,” “Quantum Computing Component 110,” and “Fusion Component 112.” While these components are named, the practical details of their specific hardware implementations, inter-communication protocols, and the exact algorithms running within the “Fusion Component 112” that manage the dynamic selection are absent. For instance, the specification merely states the fusion component “dynamically engages one or more of a classical computing component, an artificial intelligence component, or a quantum computing component.” (Spec. ¶ 40). However, the detailed logic, parameters, and training required for such dynamic engagement are not provided. The abstract mentions establishing “computational intensity thresholds,” but how these are quantitatively defined, measured in real-time, and used by the fusion component to trigger the engagement of different computing types remains undisclosed. The guidance is primarily conceptual rather than practically enabling.
Under element (G), no working example has been provided or alleged by Applicant.
Under element (H), once again, the specification broadly claims systems and methods for “fusion of classical computing, artificial intelligence or quantum computing for vehicle operations.” However, as repeatedly discussed above, it fails to provide concrete guidance on how to establish “computational intensity thresholds” for switching between classical, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing for various vehicle operations. The transitions between computing types are based on “computational intensity” thresholds that are defined in abstract and unmeasurable terms. For example, the specification provides no specific metrics or algorithms for determining when a given vehicle operation's computational intensity crosses the thresholds. Developing these thresholds and the associated switching logic for a diverse range of vehicle operations would require extensive and undue experimentation by a person of ordinary skill in the art, as the specification does not provide any starting point or methodology for this critical aspect.
Thus, after reviewing all the factors put forth in In re Wands, each prong supports a finding that the claims are not enabled by the present specification.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Regarding claims 1-15 and 18-20, the claim limitations “fusion component” in claims 1-14 and 19; “classical computing component” in claim 4; “artificial intelligence component” in claim 5; “quantum component” in claims 2, 6-13, 15, 18, and 20; “energy management component” in claim 8; and “encryption component” in claim 8 invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), as discussed above. However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the entire claimed function and to clearly link the structure, material, or acts to the function.
When a claim invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) for a computer implemented means-plus-function claim, the specification must disclose the specific algorithm required to transform the general-purpose computing equipment into the required special purpose computer. See MPEP § 2181(II)(B).
The examiner could not find any specific structure or specific algorithm in the present specification, nor has Applicant pointed to such structure or algorithm.
Therefore, the claim is indefinite and is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Applicant may:
(a) Amend the claim so that the claim limitation will no longer be interpreted as a limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f);
(b) Amend the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites what structure, material, or acts perform the entire claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. § 132(a)); or
(c) Amend the written description of the specification such that it clearly links the structure, material, or acts disclosed therein to the function recited in the claim, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. § 132(a)).
If Applicant is of the opinion that the written description of the specification already implicitly or inherently discloses the corresponding structure, material, or acts and clearly links them to the function so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed function, applicant should clarify the record by either:
(a) Amending the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function and clearly links or associates the structure, material, or acts to the claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. § 132(a)); or
(b) Stating on the record what the corresponding structure, material, or acts, which are implicitly or inherently set forth in the written description of the specification, perform the claimed function. For more information, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d) and MPEP §§ 608.01(o) and 2181.
Therefore, these claims are indefinite.
Regarding claim 2, the terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are relative terms that render the claim indefinite. The terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 4, this claim is indefinite for two reasons.
First, the terms “routine,” “basic,” and “compute-intensive” are relative terms that render the claim indefinite. The terms “routine,” “basic,” and “compute-intensive” are not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Second, this claim is subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. The phrase “below a first threshold” may be interpreted to apply to each item of the list; namely that the route control tasks must be below a first threshold, the basic sensor data processing must be below a first threshold, and that the compute-intensive operations must be below a first threshold. The phrase “below a first threshold” may also be interpreted to apply to only the compute-intensive operations.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 5, this claim is indefinite for two reasons.
First, the term “complex” is a the relative term that render the claim indefinite. The term “complex” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Second, this claim is subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. The phrase “below a second threshold and above the first threshold for computational intensity” may be interpreted to apply to each item of the list. The phrase “below a second threshold and above the first threshold for computational intensity” may also be interpreted to apply only to the predictive modelling.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 6, this claim is indefinite for two reasons.
First, the term “significant” is a the relative term that render the claim indefinite. The term “significant” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Second, this claim is subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. The phrase “above the second threshold for computational intensity” may be interpreted to apply to each item of the list. The phrase “above the second threshold for computational intensity” may also be interpreted to apply only to the artificial intelligence.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 15, the terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are relative terms that render the claim indefinite. The terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 17, this claim is indefinite for two reasons.
First, the term “significant” is a the relative term that render the claim indefinite. The term “significant” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Second, this claim is subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. The phrase “above the second threshold for computational intensity” may be interpreted to apply to each item of the list. The phrase “above the second threshold for computational intensity” may also be interpreted to apply only to the artificial intelligence.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Regarding claim 20, the terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are relative terms that render the claim indefinite. The terms “accurate” and “sensitive” are not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Tran et al. US Patent 10,637,142 (hereinafter Tran).
Regarding claim 1, Tran discloses a system, comprising “a processor that executes computer-executable components stored in a non-transitory quantum or non-quantum computer-readable memory” (Tran col. 28, ll. 3-42) by describing various processors used in vehicle controlled related instances. Additionally, Tran discloses “the computer-executable components comprising: a classical computing component; an artificial intelligence component; a quantum computing component” (Tran col. 72, l. 64-col. 73, l. 5) by describing a classical/quantum hybrid computing component that includes a neural network (i.e., an artificial intelligence component). Finally, Tran discloses “a fusion component that dynamically engages one of more of the classical computing component, the artificial intelligence component or the quantum computing component in connection with operation of a vehicle” (Tran col. 73, ll. 6-28) by describing a system that selects which component to use based on which component is “best suited” to perform the task.
Regarding claim 14, Tran discloses a computer-implemented method, comprising “using a fusion component to dynamically engage one of more of a classical computing component, an artificial intelligence component or a quantum computing component in connection with operation of a vehicle” (Tran col. 72, l. 64-col. 73 l. 28) by describing a system that selects which component of a classical/quantum hybrid computing component that includes a neural network (i.e., an artificial intelligence component) to use based on which component is “best suited” to perform the task.
Regarding claim 19, it merely recites a computer program product for performing the method of claim 14. The computer program product comprises computer software modules for performing the various functions. Tran comprises computer software modules for performing the same functions. Thus, claim 19 is rejected using the same rationale set forth in the above rejection for claim 14.
Regarding claims 2, 15, and 20, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 1, 14, and 19 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to operative quantum-enhanced sensors to provide accurate and sensitive measurements of various physical quantities.” (Tran col. 72, ll. 56-63).
Regarding claims 3 and 16, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 1 and 4 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component respectively assigns tasks to the classical computing component, the artificial intelligence component or the quantum computing component as a function of relative computing strength for given tasks” (Tran col. 73, ll. 6-28) by describing a system that selects which component to use based on which component is “best suited” to perform the task. Being “best suited” is a function of computing strength within the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term.
Regarding claim 4, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 3 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the classical computing component for routine control tasks, basic sensor data processing, and compute-intensive operations below a first threshold” (Tran col. 73, ll. 6-28) where any task may be performed by the classical computing component.
Regarding claim 5, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 3 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the artificial intelligence component to manage complex decision-making, object recognition, natural language processing for human-vehicle interaction, and predictive modeling below a second threshold and above the first threshold for computational intensity” (Tran col. 73, ll. 6-28) where all task are performed by the artificial intelligence component that is operated by either the classical or quantum component and Tran discloses that decision making task (Tran col. 27, l. 64-col. 28, l. 41), natural language processing (Tran col. 77, ll. 20-45), and predictive modeling (Tran col. 77, ll. 20-45) may be performed.
Regarding claims 6 and 17, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 3 and 14 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to specific problems where quantum algorithms provide a significant advantage over classical computing and artificial intelligence above the second threshold for computational intensity” (Tran col. 73, ll. 6-28) where being “best suited” means it provides advantages over other forms of computing.
Regarding claims 7 and 18, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 6 and 14 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimizing complex vehicle routing in real-time.” (Tran col. 60, ll. 19-23).
Regarding claim 8, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 1 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component to optimize energy usage using an energy management component or encryption in real-time using an encryption component” (Tran col. 78, l. 29-col. 79, l. 30) by engaging an encryption component, which may be in real-time. (Tran col. 60, ll. 19-23).
Regarding claim 9, Tran discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 1 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Tran discloses “wherein the fusion component engages the quantum computing component as a specialized accelerators for specific tasks.” (Tran col. 84, ll. 53-55).
Regarding claim 10, Tran disclose