DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claims 1-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the January 2019 patentable subject matter eligibility guidance (2019 PEG) analysis which follows.
Step 1 - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims 1-7 are directed to the statutory category of a process, and claims 8-9 are directed to the statutory category of a machine. Therefore, we proceed to step 2A, Prong 1.
Step 2A, Prong One - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2A, Prong 1 analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Here, with respect to independent claims 1, 8, and 9, the claims recite the abstract idea of
(A) determining, directly in a control unit of the brake booster, a virtual dynamic brake pressure value representing a driver braking request of a driver of the vehicle
(B) using a pedal travel of a brake pedal of the vehicle acquired directly at the brake booster
(C) using a clearance value of the brake system read in via a data bus of the vehicle from a brake control unit of the brake system
(D) using a stiffness factor of the brake system read in via the data bus from the brake control unit
(E) a method for operating an electromechanical brake booster of a brake system of a vehicle
(F) a control unit for an electromechanical brake booster
(G) a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium on which is stored a computer program for operating an electromechanical brake booster of a brake system of a vehicle
(H) the computer program, when executed by a processor, causing the processor to perform a method
Mental Process:
Steps B-E fall within one or more of the three enumerated 2019 PEG categories of patent ineligible subject matter, specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that section 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. see also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
For example, a human could perform steps B-E entirely mentally when using a pen and paper while reading and recording print outs from the control unit. These limitations exemplify abstract idea of a mental process since details include concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Mathematical Concepts: (Mathematical Relationships, Mathematical Formulas or Equations, Mathematical Calculations)
In addition, limitation A falls within the abstract idea of a mathematical concept in addition to being a mental process since the limitations invoke the functions of determining a pressure value representing a braking request based on data. The instant Specification fails to attribute special definitions to the language used in limitations A and F. Consequently, the words and phrases of the limitation(s) have been given the plain meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. (See MPEP §§ 2173.01, 2173.05(a), and 2111.01). These steps are common computer processing functions that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known generic computers were capable of performing and would have associated with generic computers. (See MPEP § 2106.05(d)II). See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter eligibility p. 3-4 “Mathematical Relationships” and “Mathematical Calculations” (“A mathematical relationship may be expressed in words or using mathematical symbols . . . [t]here is no particular word or set of words that indicates a claim recites a mathematical calculation. That is, a claim does not have to recite the word “calculating” in order to be considered a mathematical calculation. For example, a step of “determining” a variable or number using mathematical methods or “performing” a mathematical operation may also be considered mathematical calculations when the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification encompasses a mathematical calculation.”) citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89, 209 USPQ 1, 9 (1981), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), and Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“using a formula to convert geospatial coordinates into natural numbers”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2A, Prong 2 analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. (See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f)). This follows conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic “non-transitory computer readable medium” outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional elements of a control unit or a braking request or the computer limitations F-H do not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitation “a driver braking request of a driver of the vehicle” constitutes insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Step 2B - Revised Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as a “a control unit for an electromechanical brake booster” does not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the step 2A, Prong 2 analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming (See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f)). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim under the 2019 PEG analysis. None of the dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., “operating an electromechanical brake booster of a brake system of a vehicle” in Claim 1).
Regarding Claims 2-7: These claims depend from Claim 1 and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim. Therefore, they are also rejected on the same grounds as Claim 1.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 1-9 would be allowable if rewritten to overcome the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 set forth in this Office action and to include all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
The prior art of record fails to teach or render obvious all of a method for operating an electromechanical brake booster of a brake system of a vehicle, the method comprising: determining, directly in a control unit of the brake booster, a virtual dynamic brake pressure value representing a driver braking request of a driver of the vehicle, using all three of a pedal travel of a brake pedal of the vehicle acquired directly at the brake booster, a clearance value of the brake system read in via a data bus of the vehicle from a brake control unit of the brake system, and a stiffness factor of the brake system read in via the data bus from the brake control unit as claimed in claim 1. Claims 8 and 9 contain similar allowable subject matter. Claims 2-7 are allowable based on their dependence on an allowable claim.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed December 11, 2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding applicant’s arguments that the claims represent a specific and practical improvement in the operation of a vehicle’s brake system by allowing a brake booster to calculate a virtual dynamic brake pressure value locally, the examiner disagrees. The claims are directed towards calculating a virtual dynamic brake pressure using calculated and sensed values from the brake booster system. These values are abstract ideas and the location of their calculation is not material to the functioning of the system that does the calculation of the virtual dynamic brake pressure. The limitations in the claims that enable real time control of the brake booster with minimal computational burden does not change the fact that the computation itself is abstract. Therefore, the claims will continue to be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record on PTO-892 and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
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/Susan E Scharpf/Examiner, Art Unit 3747
/LINDSAY M LOW/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3747