DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claims 1-23 and 35-36 are the currently pending claims. Claims 24-34 and 37-40 have been canceled; Claim 16 has been withdrawn; and Claims 1-15, 17-23, and 35-36 are hereby under examination.
Election/Restrictions
Claim 16 is withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected Species, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on 1/21/2026.
Claim Interpretation
The Examiner interprets the limitation “establishing a secret key with a [display device or sensor electronics module] over one or more primary invitation channels” recited in claims 1, 9, and 14 under a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI), in view of the specification, as establishing and sharing a cryptographic shared secret between the analyte sensor system and the display device by exchanging key establishment information using connectionless invitation or advertisement type channels used to invite or initiate communications between devices, as distinguished from data channels. This interpretation is consistent with the specification’s description that the analyte sensor system and the display device “only communicate over the three primary invitation channels” to circumvent pairing, bonding, connecting, and disconnecting, and that the devices “establish[] and shar[e] a shared secret (hereinafter, ‘secret key’) … over the primary invitation channels,” including by participating in a cryptographic key exchange protocol over the primary invitation channels (Instant Application, [0079]-[0080]).
Claim Objections
Claim 17 is objected to because of the following informalities:
In claim 17, line 2: “so as to produce the encrypted analyte data” should be inserted after “encrypting data using the secret key” so as to provide proper context between “data” prior to encryption and the “encrypted data” of claim 14, line 5;
Appropriate correction is required.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claim 35 is non-provisionally rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 13 of U.S. Patent No. US 12284519 B2, hereto referred to as Reference or Ref. This is a nonstatutory double patenting rejection.
The analysis as follows (please note the bolded portions of the entries under the Instant Application, IA, are those portions of the IA claims that the claims of Patent Application 18/781767, Reference, does not have or are different from in some form):
Instant Application (IA) claim language (bold = not in / different from reference)
Reference – US 12,284,519 B2 (key claim language)
Analysis (DP / obviousness-type)
Claim 35:
A computer-implemented method for communicating analyte data performed by a sensor electronics module of an analyte sensor system, comprising:
Ref Claim 13 preamble: “A method of facilitating secure communications between a sensor system for measuring analyte levels and a display device, comprising:”
Same general subject matter (secure communications between analyte sensor system and display device).
obtaining analyte data from an analyte sensor electrically coupled to the sensor electronics module;
Ref Cl.13: “transmitting, from the sensor system to the display device, analyte data indicative of measured analyte levels …”
Corresponding subject matter (analyte data for transmission).
establishing a secret key with a display device, based on executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module;
Ref Cl.13: “executing, at an application layer of the sensor system, a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with the display device to derive an authentication key;”
Corresponding “application-layer cryptographic key exchange” concept (PAKE at application layer to derive a key). Difference: Ref derives an “authentication key” and then proceeds through an authenticated pairing workflow; IA states establishing a “secret key” based on the application-layer exchange (no explicit pairing/passkey steps in IA).
(Analysis continues in next row.)
(no express limitation in IA)
Ref Cl.13: “executing … an authenticated pairing protocol …” including passkey derivation/verification (based on the authentication key)
Key delta to acknowledge: Ref claim explicitly recites authenticated pairing protocol steps (passkey derivation and verification) that IA does not recite. For OTDP framing, the IA remains an obvious variant because Ref’s PAKE step derives an “authentication key” at the application layer that is then used as part of Ref’s authenticated pairing workflow, including passkey derivation and verification, to confirm possession/validity of the PAKE-derived key material and to gate creation of the secure channel. The IA claim captures the same fundamental inventive concept of using an application-layer key exchange to establish key material shared between the sensor system and display device for secure analyte communications, but omits reciting the intermediate passkey-pairing formalities. Omitting those intermediate confirmation steps while still relying on key material derived from the application-layer key exchange to serve as the operative “secret key” for confidentiality is a predictable and commonly used simplification/streamlining of the same secure key-establishment workflow, and does not render the IA patentably distinct from Ref claim 13 for OTDP purposes.
encrypting the analyte data using the secret key;
Ref Cl.13: “after the authenticating is successful, establishing an encrypted connection …” and “transmitting … analyte data … via the encrypted connection.”
Important precision: Ref claim encrypts the communications channel (encrypted connection) such that analyte data is transmitted in encrypted form, but it does not expressly recite application-layer payload encryption using the PAKE-derived key. For OTDP, the IA's payload-encrypt wording is an obvious implementation/architectural variant relative to channel encryption (both provide confidentiality of analyte data in transit).
and transmitting the encrypted analyte data.
Ref Cl.13: “transmitting … analyte data … via the encrypted connection.”
Corresponding secure transmission (data sent over an encrypted connection). IA’s “encrypted analyte data” can be treated as data transmitted in encrypted form (whether via payload or channel encryption). Accordingly, claim 35 is not patentably distinct from Ref claim 13 for OTDP purposes.
Claim 36 is non-provisionally rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 13 of U.S. Patent No. US 12284519 B2, hereto referred to as Reference or Ref, and further in view of Mandapaka et al. (US-20180027104-A1), hereto referred as Mandapaka.
The analysis as follows (please note the bolded portions of the entries under the Instant Application, IA, are those portions of the IA claims that the claims of Patent Application 18/781767, Reference, does not have or are different from in some form):
Instant Application (IA) claim language (bold = not in / different from reference)
Reference – US 12,284,519 B2 (key claim language)
Analysis (DP / obviousness-type)
Claim 36:
The computer-implemented method of claim 35, wherein the analyte data is encrypted at the application layer of the communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Ref Cl.13: application-layer PAKE (“executing, at an application layer … a PAKE … to derive an authentication key”), plus establishing an encrypted connection and transmitting analyte data via the encrypted connection
Comparator for OTDP (in the form of §103): Ref claim 13 (application-layer PAKE/key establishment and encrypted connection) in view of Mandapaka (Mandapaka ¶[0354]-¶[0355]: “...the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710...”; “In example deployments, the application key may be generated at a software/application level of analyte sensor system 708 and/or display device 710.”) (application/software-level encryption of analyte data using an application key generated at the analyte sensor system). IA places analyte-data encryption at the application layer. Conclusion: once Ref claim 13 establishes an application-layer authentication key and encrypted connection, it would have been an obvious and technically straightforward design choice to implement payload/analyte-data encryption at the application (software) layer of the sensor electronics module as taught by Mandapaka (i.e., encrypt the analyte data at the software/application level prior to handing the data to lower protocol layers for transmission), and therefore claim 36 is not patentably distinct from Ref claim 13 as modified in view of Mandapaka for OTDP purposes.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-2, 8-10, 13-15, 17, 21, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Burnette et al. (US-20170181628-A1), hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Mandapaka et al. (US-20180027104-A1), hereto referred as Mandapaka, hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Keenan et al. (Keenan, Kathryn E et al. “Development and Evaluation of Bluetooth Low-Energy Device for Electronic Encounter Metrics.” Journal of research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 126 (2021)), hereto referred as Keenan.
Regarding claim 1, Burnette teaches a computer-implemented method for communicating analyte data performed by a sensor electronics module of an analyte sensor system (Burnette, ¶[0098], “CGM processor 506 may then transmit raw sensor data 504 from AFE 500, apply one or more algorithms to create/calculate an EGV value, and store that EGV value in memory, e.g., flash database”, Burnette describes processor-executed operations performed by the CGM electronics/module in an analyte sensor system, i.e., a computer-implemented method performed by the sensor electronics module) comprising: obtaining analyte data from an analyte sensor electrically coupled to the sensor electronics module (Burnette, ¶[0029], “a sensor electronics module physically connected to the continuous analyte sensor to receive the analyte concentration measurements and communicate them to display devices”, Burnette expressly teaches the sensor electronics module receiving analyte concentration measurements from a continuous analyte sensor that is physically connected to the module; ¶[0084], “CGM processor 506… can take a measurement(s) of one or more analyte values… using implantable continuous analyte sensor 312 and sensor measurement circuitry 310 or AFE 500”, Burnette further explains that the sensor electronics module actively takes analyte measurements via the coupled analyte sensor and associated measurement circuitry); and broadcasting the encrypted analyte data over the one or more primary invitation channels (Burnette, ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows broadcasting encrypted analyte data in advertising beacons, which are broadcast signals usable to communicate data without first establishing a two-way protocol).
Also regarding claim 1, Burnette does not fully teach establishing a secret key with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels and encrypting the analyte data using the secret key.
Rather, Burnette teaches broadcasting “first advertising beacons 700 (also referred as advertisement signals 412 in FIG. 4)” (Burnette, ¶[0099]) and that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). Burnette further teaches a bonding exchange context with a display device, stating that the whitelist may be populated with “a Generic Access Profile (GAP) Address or an Identity Resolving Key (IRK) entry upon a display device … sending its configuration during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, Burnette does not expressly teach that the encryption uses a secret key established with the display device over the primary invitation channel(s) (i.e., the advertising/invitation signaling used to initiate pairing/connection), nor does Burnette expressly teach encrypting the analyte data using such an established secret key.
Mandapaka teaches establishing a shared secret key (application key) between an analyte sensor system and a display device and using that shared key to encrypt analyte data for transmission. Mandapaka discloses that “the information related to authentication includes an application key” and that the application key may be used to encrypt analyte data, stating that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710 , and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0008]; ¶[0354]). Mandapaka further teaches that encrypted analyte values may be transmitted using invitation-type signaling, disclosing that “at least a portion of the encrypted analyte value is transmitted to the display device in one or more advertisement messages transmitted by the analyte sensor system” (Mandapaka, ¶[0010]). In context, Mandapaka’s application key functions as a shared secret key established between the analyte sensor system and the display device and is used to encrypt analyte data that is transmitted via advertisement messages.
Keenan teaches establishing a shared secret key via Bluetooth advertising channels, stating that “a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1). Keenan further teaches generating a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman, where “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519” and “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” and “each device could generate a shared secret unique key” (Keenan, p. 3-4, Sec. 2.1.1)). One of ordinary skill in the art would have used Keenan’s Diffie-Hellman derived shared secret key as the ‘application key’ of Mandapaka for encrypting analyte data, and would have applied that encryption to the analyte data placed in Burnette’s advertising beacons.
It would have been prima facie obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Keenan to establish a secret key with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels and to encrypt the analyte data using the secret key. It would have been possible to combine the teachings of Burnette, Mandapaka, and Keenan because Burnette already employs Bluetooth advertising beacons as invitation signaling for communicating analyte data to display devices, Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting public keys via those same Bluetooth advertising channels and generating a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman, and Mandapaka teaches using a shared application key between an analyte sensor system and a display device to encrypt analyte data that is transmitted via advertisement messages. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Keenan’s advertising-channel Diffie-Hellman exchange could be used during Burnette’s advertising-based invitation phase to establish a shared secret key with a display device, and that Mandapaka’s application-key-based encryption could then be applied to encrypt analyte data prior to broadcasting it in Burnette’s advertising beacons. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling Burnette’s encrypted advertising-beacon analyte communications to use a shared secret established over the advertising or invitation channels themselves, improving privacy and security for broadcast analyte-data communications while maintaining low power operation and avoiding the overhead of connection establishment when transmitting analyte data.
Regarding claim 2, the modified Burnette does not fully teach establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches establishing a secret key with the display device and further teaches a sensor electronics module communicating with a display device in a BLE environment where device association information may be exchanged, including that a display device sends configuration “during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, the modified Burnette does not teach that establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels.
Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange over Bluetooth advertisements on the advertising channels. Keenan discloses that “In the Bluetooth Standard [10], a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1). Keenan further discloses that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1). In context, Keenan teaches that the devices participate in a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting the public keys using Bluetooth advertisements over the advertising channels, and that the result of that key exchange is a shared secret key.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan to have establishing the secret key comprise participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already operates using Bluetooth Low Energy communications between a sensor electronics module and a display device and already employs advertising-based signaling as part of its communication framework, and Keenan teaches a specific, implementable cryptographic key exchange in which devices broadcast public keys within Bluetooth advertisement payloads transmitted on the advertising channels and independently compute a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Keenan’s advertisement-based public key exchange could be incorporated into the modified Burnette’s advertising phase, such that the sensor electronics module and the display device exchange public keys via advertisement messages and derive the shared secret key prior to or in parallel with subsequent secure communications. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling a shared secret key to be established using the primary invitation channels, thereby improving privacy and security for invitation-channel communications while reducing reliance on extended connection establishment overhead.
Regarding claim 8, the modified Burnette teaches that the encrypted analyte data is broadcast without establishing a connection with the display device (Burnette, ¶[0148], “the advertising beacons can be configured to include EGV trend data, for example, and a wireless communications session need not be established”, Burnette explains that advertising beacons may be configured to include analyte related data and that a wireless communications session need not be established, which corresponds to broadcasting the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection with the display device; ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows that encrypted analyte data may be directly communicated in advertising beacons without establishing a two-way communication protocol, which is conceptually and functionally consistent with broadcasting the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection with the display device).
Regarding claim 9, Burnette teaches an analyte sensor system comprising: an analyte sensor; and a sensor electronics module electrically coupled to the analyte sensor and configured to perform an operation comprising: (Burnette, ¶[0029], “a sensor electronics module physically connected to the continuous analyte sensor to receive the analyte concentration measurements and communicate them to display devices”, Burnette expressly teaches an analyte sensor system including a continuous analyte sensor and a sensor electronics module physically connected to the analyte sensor) obtaining analyte data from the analyte sensor (Burnette, ¶[0029], “a sensor electronics module physically connected to the continuous analyte sensor to receive the analyte concentration measurements and communicate them to display devices”, Burnette expressly teaches the sensor electronics module receiving analyte concentration measurements from a continuous analyte sensor that is physically connected to the module; ¶[0084], “CGM processor 506… can take a measurement(s) of one or more analyte values… using implantable continuous analyte sensor 312 and sensor measurement circuitry 310 or AFE 500”, Burnette further explains that the sensor electronics module actively takes analyte measurements via the coupled analyte sensor and associated measurement circuitry); and broadcasting the encrypted analyte data over the one or more primary invitation channels (Burnette, ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows broadcasting encrypted analyte data in advertising beacons, which are broadcast signals usable to communicate data without first establishing a two-way protocol).
Also regarding claim 9, Burnette does not fully teach establishing a secret key with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels; and encrypting the analyte data using the secret key. Rather, Burnette teaches broadcasting “first advertising beacons 700 (also referred as advertisement signals 412 in FIG. 4)” (Burnette, ¶[0099]) and that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). Burnette further teaches a bonding exchange context with a display device, stating that the whitelist may be populated with “a Generic Access Profile (GAP) Address or an Identity Resolving Key (IRK) entry upon a display device … sending its configuration during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, Burnette does not expressly teach that the encryption uses a secret key established with the display device over the primary invitation channel(s), nor does Burnette expressly teach encrypting the analyte data using such an established secret key.
Mandapaka teaches establishing a shared secret key (application key) between an analyte sensor system and a display device and using that shared key to encrypt analyte data for transmission. Mandapaka discloses that “the information related to authentication includes an application key” and that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710 , and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0008]; ¶[0354]). Mandapaka further teaches that “at least a portion of the encrypted analyte value is transmitted to the display device in one or more advertisement messages transmitted by the analyte sensor system” (Mandapaka, ¶[0010]).
Keenan teaches establishing a shared secret key via Bluetooth advertising channels, stating that “a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1) and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519” where “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” and “each device could generate a shared secret unique key” (Keenan, p. 3–4, Sec. 2.1.1).
It would have been prima facie obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Keenan to establish a secret key with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels and to encrypt the analyte data using the secret key. It would have been possible to combine the teachings of Burnette, Mandapaka, and Keenan because Burnette already employs Bluetooth advertising beacons as invitation signaling for communicating analyte data to display devices, Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting public keys via those same Bluetooth advertising channels and generating a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman, and Mandapaka teaches using a shared application key between an analyte sensor system and a display device to encrypt analyte data that is transmitted via advertisement messages. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling Burnette’s encrypted advertising-beacon analyte communications to use a shared secret established over the advertising or invitation channels themselves, improving privacy and security for broadcast analyte-data communications while maintaining low power operation and avoiding the overhead of connection establishment when transmitting analyte data.
Regarding claim 10, the modified Burnette does not fully teach establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches establishing secure communications with a display device in a Bluetooth Low Energy environment and exchanging device-related information during association or bonding procedures, including that a whitelist entry may be populated when a display device sends its configuration information “during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, the modified Burnette does not teach that establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels, i.e., over advertising or invitation signaling used prior to or independent of a connected communication session.
Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange over Bluetooth advertisements on the advertising channels. Keenan discloses that “In the Bluetooth Standard [10], a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1). Keenan further discloses that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1). In context, Keenan teaches that the devices participate in a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting the public keys using Bluetooth advertisements over the advertising channels, and that the result of that key exchange is a shared secret key.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan to have establishing the secret key comprise participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already operates using Bluetooth Low Energy communications between a sensor electronics module and a display device and already employs advertising-based signaling as part of its communication framework, and Keenan teaches a specific, implementable cryptographic key exchange in which devices broadcast public keys within Bluetooth advertisement payloads transmitted on the advertising channels and independently compute a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Keenan’s advertisement-based public key exchange could be incorporated into the modified Burnette’s advertising phase, such that the sensor electronics module and the display device exchange public keys via advertisement messages and derive the shared secret key prior to or in parallel with subsequent secure communications. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling a shared secret key to be established using the primary invitation channels, thereby improving privacy and security for invitation-channel communications while reducing reliance on extended connection establishment overhead.
Regarding claim 13, the modified Burnette teaches wherein the encrypted analyte data is broadcast without establishing a connection with the display device (Burnette, ¶[0148], “the advertising beacons can be configured to include EGV trend data, for example, and a wireless communications session need not be established”, Burnette explains that advertising beacons may be configured to include analyte related data and that a wireless communications session need not be established, which corresponds to broadcasting the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection with the display device; ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows that encrypted analyte data may be directly communicated in advertising beacons without establishing a two-way communication protocol, which is conceptually and functionally consistent with broadcasting the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection with the display device).
Regarding claim 14, Burnette teaches a computer-implemented method for communicating analyte data performed by a display device (Burnette, ¶[0161]–¶[0163], “computing module 1000 may be one embodiment of one of display devices 120, sensor electronics module 106, etc... might include, for example, one or more processors”, Burnette explains that the display device includes computing or processing capabilities; ¶[0029], “a sensor electronics module physically connected to the continuous analyte sensor to receive the analyte concentration measurements and communicate them to display devices”, Burnette expressly teaches the analyte sensor system communicating analyte concentration measurements to display devices, which corresponds to operations performed by a display device in communicating analyte data) comprising: receiving encrypted analyte data from the sensor electronics module over the one or more primary invitation channels (Burnette, ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows encrypted analyte data being communicated in advertising beacons without establishing a two-way protocol, and the advertising beacons are invitation-channel communications received by a display device).
Also regarding claim 14, Burnette does not fully teach establishing a secret key with a sensor electronics module of an analyte sensor system over one or more primary invitation channels and decrypting the encrypted analyte data using the secret key. Rather, Burnette teaches broadcasting “first advertising beacons 700 (also referred as advertisement signals 412 in FIG. 4)” (Burnette, ¶[0099]) and that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). Burnette further teaches a bonding exchange context with a display device, stating that the whitelist may be populated with “a Generic Access Profile (GAP) Address or an Identity Resolving Key (IRK) entry upon a display device … sending its configuration during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, Burnette does not expressly teach that the display device establishes a secret key with the sensor electronics module over one or more primary invitation channels, nor does Burnette expressly teach decrypting the encrypted analyte data using such a secret key.
Mandapaka teaches establishing a shared secret key (application key) between an analyte sensor system and a display device, transmitting encrypted analyte values to the display device in advertisement messages, and decrypting received analyte data at the display device using the shared secret key. Mandapaka discloses that “the information related to authentication includes an application key” and that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710 , and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0008]; ¶[0354]). Mandapaka further teaches that “at least a portion of the encrypted analyte value is transmitted to the display device in one or more advertisement messages transmitted by the analyte sensor system” (Mandapaka, ¶[0010]). In context, Mandapaka teaches that the display device uses the shared application key to decrypt encrypted analyte data received via advertisement messages.
Keenan teaches establishing a shared secret key via Bluetooth advertisements on the advertising channels. Keenan discloses that “In the Bluetooth Standard [10], a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1). Keenan further discloses that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1). In context, Keenan teaches that the devices participate in a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting the public keys using Bluetooth advertisements over the advertising channels, and that the result of that key exchange is a shared secret key.
It would have been prima facie obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Keenan to establish a secret key with a sensor electronics module of an analyte sensor system over one or more primary invitation channels and to decrypt the encrypted analyte data using the secret key. It would have been possible to combine the teachings of Burnette, Mandapaka, and Keenan because Burnette already employs Bluetooth advertising beacons as invitation signaling for communicating encrypted analyte data to display devices, Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting public keys via those same Bluetooth advertising channels and generating a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman, and Mandapaka teaches using a shared application key between an analyte sensor system and a display device such that the analyte sensor system encrypts analyte data for transmission and the display device decrypts the received analyte data using the shared key. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Keenan’s advertising-channel Diffie-Hellman exchange could be used during Burnette’s advertising-based invitation phase between the display device and the sensor electronics module to establish the shared secret key over the primary invitation channels, and that Mandapaka’s application-key-based decryption could then be applied at the display device to decrypt the encrypted analyte data received in Burnette’s advertising beacons. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure, privacy-preserving reception and decryption of encrypted analyte data at the display device based on a shared secret established over the invitation channels, while maintaining low power operation and avoiding the overhead of connection establishment when receiving analyte data.
Regarding claim 15, Burnette teaches that further comprising displaying the decrypted analyte data (Burnette, ¶[0044], “display devices 120 are configured for displaying, alarming, and/or basing medicament delivery on the sensor information that has been transmitted by the sensor electronics module 106”, Burnette explains that the display device displays sensor information communicated from the sensor electronics module, which corresponds to displaying the decrypted analyte data; ¶[0045], “one of the plurality of display devices 120 may be a custom display device 120 a specially designed for displaying certain types of displayable sensor information associated with analyte values received from the sensor electronics module 106”, Burnette explains that the display device is specially designed to display sensor information associated with analyte values received from the sensor electronics module, which corresponds to displaying the decrypted analyte data).
Regarding claim 17, Burnette does not fully teach encrypting data using the secret key; and broadcasting the encrypted data over the one or more primary invitation channels. Rather, Burnette teaches that advertising beacons may be used to communicate data to and from display devices, including that “first advertising beacons 700 (also referred as advertisement signals 412 in FIG. 4)” are broadcast (Burnette, ¶[0099]) and that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). However, Burnette does not expressly teach that the display device encrypts data using a secret key and broadcasts that encrypted data over the one or more primary invitation channels.
Mandapaka teaches encrypting data at a display device using a shared application key and transmitting the encrypted data using advertisement-type signaling. Mandapaka discloses that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710, and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0008]; ¶[0354]). Mandapaka further teaches that “at least a portion of the encrypted analyte value is transmitted to the display device in one or more advertisement messages transmitted by the analyte sensor system” (Mandapaka, ¶[0010]). In context, Mandapaka teaches that application-level encryption using a shared key is applied to data that is communicated via advertisement messages between devices.
Keenan teaches establishing the shared secret key used for encryption via Bluetooth advertising channels. Keenan discloses that “In the Bluetooth Standard [10], a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1), that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1).
It would have been prima facie obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Keenan to have the display device encrypt data using the secret key and broadcast the encrypted data over the one or more primary invitation channels. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because Burnette already employs advertising beacons as the primary invitation channels for bidirectional communication with display devices, Keenan teaches establishing a shared secret key over those advertising channels, and Mandapaka teaches using a shared application key to encrypt data prior to transmission via advertisement messages. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that once the shared secret key is established, the display device could encrypt data using that key and broadcast the encrypted data using the same invitation-channel advertising mechanism. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure, low-power transmission of encrypted data from the display device to the analyte sensor system without requiring connection establishment.
Regarding claim 21, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the sensor electronics module over the one or more primary invitation channels. Rather, Burnette teaches a display device and a sensor electronics module communicating in a BLE environment where device association information may be exchanged, including that the whitelist may be populated with “a Generic Access Profile (GAP) Address or an Identity Resolving Key (IRK) entry upon a display device … sending its configuration during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, it does not teach that establishing the secret key comprises participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the sensor electronics module over the one or more primary invitation channels.
Keenan teaches performing a cryptographic key exchange over Bluetooth advertisements on the advertising channels. Keenan discloses that “In the Bluetooth Standard [10], a device can advertise its presence by transmitting a short message in one of three channels designated for advertising (channels 37, 38, and 39)” (Keenan, p. 3, Sec. 2.1.1). Keenan further discloses that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1). In context, Keenan teaches that the devices participate in a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting the public keys using Bluetooth advertisements over the advertising channels, and that the result of that key exchange is a shared secret key.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan to have establishing the secret key comprise participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the sensor electronics module over the one or more primary invitation channels. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already operates using Bluetooth Low Energy communications between a display device and a sensor electronics module and already employs advertising-based signaling as the primary invitation channels, and Keenan teaches a specific, implementable cryptographic key exchange in which devices broadcast public keys within Bluetooth advertisement payloads transmitted on the advertising channels and independently compute a shared secret key using Diffie-Hellman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Keenan’s advertisement-based public key exchange could be incorporated into the modified Burnette’s advertising phase, such that the display device and the sensor electronics module exchange public keys via advertisement messages and derive the shared secret key prior to or in parallel with subsequent secure communications. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling a shared secret key to be established using the primary invitation channels, thereby improving privacy and security for invitation-channel communications while reducing reliance on extended connection establishment overhead.
Regarding claim 23, the modified Burnette teaches that the encrypted analyte data is received from the sensor electronics module without establishing a connection with the sensor electronics module (Burnette, ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows that encrypted analyte data is directly communicated via advertising beacons without establishing a two-way communication protocol, which is conceptually and functionally consistent with the display device receiving the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection with the sensor electronics module; Burnette, ¶[0148], “the advertising beacons can be configured to include EGV trend data, for example, and a wireless communications session need not be established”, Burnette further explains that advertising beacons may carry analyte-related data while a wireless communications session need not be established, which corresponds to receiving the encrypted analyte data without establishing a connection).
Claims 3-4, 11-12, 18, 22, and 35-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Burnette et al. (US-20170181628-A1), hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Mandapaka et al. (US-20180027104-A1), hereto referred as Mandapaka, hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Keenan et al. (Keenan, Kathryn E et al. “Development and Evaluation of Bluetooth Low-Energy Device for Electronic Encounter Metrics.” Journal of research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 126 (2021)), hereto referred as Keenan, and further in view of Loh et al. (US-20040198223-A1), hereto referred as Loh.
The modified Burnette teaches claim 1 as described above.
The modified Burnette teaches claim 9 as described above.
Regarding claim 3, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette (as modified for claim 1 and claim 2) teaches participating in a cryptographic key exchange with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels, but does not teach that the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm specifically at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Keenan teaches executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key, specifically disclosing that a “shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519” (Keenan, p. 3-4, Sec. 2.1.1, “shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519”).
Loh does not teach executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm; rather, Loh is relied upon solely to establish that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes a software-implemented application layer above L2CAP, within which higher-level applications may be executed (Loh, ¶[0050]: “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29”) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]).
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan and Loh to have participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprise executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already relies on invitation-channel communications between the sensor electronics module and a display device (as modified for claim 1 and claim 2), Keenan provides an explicit Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique for generating a shared secret key between devices, and Loh establishes that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack in which higher-level software functionality resides in an application layer that interacts with L2CAP for transmitting and receiving data, such that the sensor electronics module could execute Keenan’s key exchange algorithm within the application-layer software of its Bluetooth protocol stack while using the existing invitation-channel messaging path to exchange the key material. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling the sensor electronics module to implement the key exchange as application-layer software within the protocol stack (rather than as a lower-layer function), improving design flexibility for security updates while maintaining Bluetooth stack interoperability and secure communications
Regarding claim 4, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the analyte data is encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette (as modified for claim 1) teaches encrypting analyte data using a secret key, but does not teach that the analyte data is encrypted specifically at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Mandapaka teaches application-level encryption in an analyte sensor system context, including that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0354], “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710”, Mandapaka explains that the analyte sensor system encrypts analyte data using an application key) and that “the application key may be generated at a software / application level of analyte sensor system 708 and / or display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0355], “the application key may be generated at a software / application level of analyte sensor system 708 and / or display device 710”, Mandapaka shows that the encryption key is generated at a software or application level of the analyte sensor system). In context, Mandapaka’s disclosure that the application key is generated at a software / application level and is used by the analyte sensor system to encrypt analyte data indicates that the encryption operation is performed as part of application-level processing, rather than as a lower-layer communication function.
Loh teaches that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes a software-implemented application layer above L2CAP, including that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” showing that higher-level applications in the application layer interact with L2CAP to transmit and receive data (Loh, ¶[0051]).
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Loh to have the analyte data encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already transmits analyte information from the sensor electronics module to a display device over invitation channels and already uses cryptography to protect transmitted analyte information, Mandapaka provides a directly applicable analyte-sensor context where an application key generated at a software or application level of the analyte sensor system is used to encrypt analyte data for transmission to a display device, and Loh shows that Bluetooth communications employ a protocol stack in which higher-level software applications reside in an application layer above L2CAP and transmit and receive data via that stack, such that implementing Mandapaka’s application-level encryption within the application-layer software of the sensor electronics module’s Bluetooth protocol stack would have been a feasible modification to the modified Burnette system. The benefit of the combination would have been implementing analyte-data encryption at the application layer for improved flexibility and updatability of security functions while maintaining interoperability with the underlying Bluetooth communication stack
Regarding claim 11, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette (as modified for claim 9 and claim 10) teaches participating in a cryptographic key exchange with a display device over one or more primary invitation channels, but does not teach that the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm specifically at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Keenan teaches executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key, specifically disclosing that a “shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519” (Keenan, p. 3-4, Sec. 2.1.1, “shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519”).
Loh does not teach executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm; rather, Loh is relied upon solely to establish that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes a software-implemented application layer above L2CAP, within which higher-level applications may be executed (Loh, ¶[0050]: “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29”) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]).
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan and Loh to have participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprise executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already relies on invitation-channel communications between the sensor electronics module and a display device (as modified for claim 9 and claim 10), Keenan provides an explicit Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique for generating a shared secret key between devices, and Loh establishes that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack in which higher-level software functionality resides in an application layer that interacts with L2CAP for transmitting and receiving data, such that the sensor electronics module could execute Keenan’s key exchange algorithm within the application-layer software of its Bluetooth protocol stack while using the existing invitation-channel messaging path to exchange the key material. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling the sensor electronics module to implement the key exchange as application-layer software within the protocol stack (rather than as a lower-layer function), improving design flexibility for security updates while maintaining Bluetooth stack interoperability and secure communications.
Regarding claim 12, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the analyte data is encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches encrypting analyte data for broadcast and transmission, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values” (Burnette, ¶[0151]), but does not teach that the encryption of the analyte data is performed specifically at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Loh teaches that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes an application layer implemented in software above lower protocol layers, disclosing that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21–24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]).
Mandapaka teaches encrypting analyte data using an application-level key shared between an analyte sensor system and a display device, disclosing that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0354]). In context, Mandapaka teaches that encryption of analyte data is performed by application-level functionality of the analyte sensor system rather than by lower-layer radio hardware.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Loh to have the analyte data encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already encrypts analyte data for broadcast, Mandapaka teaches performing analyte-data encryption using an application key at the system level, and Loh establishes that Bluetooth protocol stacks implement higher-level processing, including data handling and security functions, in an application layer above L2CAP. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that implementing Mandapaka’s analyte-data encryption within the application-layer software of the modified Burnette’s Bluetooth protocol stack would have been a routine design choice. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling flexible, software-based encryption of analyte data at the application layer while maintaining compatibility with the underlying Bluetooth communication stack and improving maintainability and upgradability of security functions.
Regarding claim 18, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the data is encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the display device. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches using advertising beacons to communicate encrypted analyte data without establishing a two-way communication protocol, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). However, the modified Burnette does not expressly teach that the display device encrypts the data at an application layer of a communication protocol stack.
Mandapaka teaches application-level encryption at a display device, including that “the application key may be generated at a software/application level of analyte sensor system 708 and/or display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0355]) and that “Such an encryption method may be run on display device 710, including in some cases on an application (e.g., application 330 ) running on display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0359]). In context, Mandapaka’s disclosure that the encryption method may be run on an application running on the display device indicates that the display device performs the encryption as part of application-level processing, rather than as a lower-layer communication function.
Loh teaches that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes a software-implemented application layer above L2CAP, including that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” showing that higher-level applications in the application layer interact with L2CAP to transmit and receive data (Loh, ¶[0051]).
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Loh to have the data encrypted at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the display device. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already uses invitation-channel communications between the sensor electronics module and a display device and already uses cryptography to protect analyte information and other data communicated using those invitation channels, Mandapaka teaches that encryption methods using the application key may be run on the display device, including on an application running on the display device, and Loh shows that Bluetooth communications employ a protocol stack in which higher-level software applications reside in an application layer above L2CAP and transmit and receive data via that stack, such that implementing Mandapaka’s display-device encryption within the application-layer software of the display device’s Bluetooth protocol stack would have been a feasible modification to the modified Burnette system. The benefit of the combination would have been implementing data encryption at the application layer of the display device for improved flexibility and updatability of security functions while maintaining interoperability with the underlying Bluetooth communication stack.
Regarding claim 22, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the display device. Rather, the modified Burnette, as modified for claim 21, teaches participating in a cryptographic key exchange with the sensor electronics module over the one or more primary invitation channels, but does not teach that the cryptographic key exchange comprises executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm specifically at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the display device.
Keenan teaches executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key, disclosing that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 3-4, Sec. 2.1.1).
Loh teaches that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack that includes a software-implemented application layer above L2CAP, disclosing that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]).
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Keenan and Loh to have participating in the cryptographic key exchange comprise executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the display device. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already relies on invitation-channel communications between the display device and the sensor electronics module and has been modified to participate in a cryptographic key exchange over those invitation channels, Keenan provides an explicit Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique for generating a shared secret key between devices, and Loh establishes that Bluetooth communications are implemented using a protocol stack in which higher-level software functionality resides in an application layer that interacts with L2CAP for transmitting and receiving data, such that the display device could execute Keenan’s key exchange algorithm within the application-layer software of its Bluetooth protocol stack while using the existing invitation-channel messaging path to exchange the key material. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling the display device to implement the key exchange as application-layer software within the protocol stack, improving design flexibility for security updates while maintaining Bluetooth stack interoperability and secure communications.
Regarding claim 35, Burnette teaches that a computer-implemented method for communicating analyte data performed by a sensor electronics module of an analyte sensor system (Burnette, ¶[0098], “CGM processor 506 may then transmit raw sensor data 504 from AFE 500, apply one or more algorithms to create/calculate an EGV value, and store that EGV value in memory, e.g., flash database”, Burnette describes processor-executed operations performed by the CGM electronics/module in an analyte sensor system, which is conceptually and functionally consistent with a computer-implemented method performed by the sensor electronics module) comprises: obtaining analyte data from an analyte sensor electrically coupled to the sensor electronics module (Burnette, ¶[0029], “a sensor electronics module physically connected to the continuous analyte sensor to receive the analyte concentration measurements and communicate them to display devices”, Burnette expressly teaches the sensor electronics module receiving analyte concentration measurements from a continuous analyte sensor that is physically connected to the module; Burnette, ¶[0084], “CGM processor 506… can take a measurement(s) of one or more analyte values… using implantable continuous analyte sensor 312 and sensor measurement circuitry 310 or AFE 500”, Burnette further explains that the sensor electronics module takes analyte measurements via the coupled analyte sensor and associated measurement circuitry).
Also regarding claim 35, Burnette does not fully teach establishing a secret key with a display device, based on executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module and encrypting the analyte data using the secret key; and transmitting the encrypted analyte data. Rather, Burnette teaches encrypted analyte data transmission to a display device using advertising beacons, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). Burnette further teaches a bonding exchange context with a display device, stating that the whitelist may be populated with “a Generic Access Profile (GAP) Address or an Identity Resolving Key (IRK) entry upon a display device … sending its configuration during a bonding exchange when a wireless connection is being established” (Burnette, ¶[0097]). However, Burnette does not expressly teach that a secret key is established with the display device based on executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module, nor does Burnette expressly teach encrypting analyte data using such a secret key for transmission.
Mandapaka teaches a shared key with a display device at a software or application level and using that key to encrypt analyte data for transmission. Mandapaka discloses that “the application key may effectively be shared between analyte sensor system 708 and display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0354]) and that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710 , and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0354]). Mandapaka further discloses that “the application key may be generated at a software / application level of analyte sensor system 708 and / or display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0355]). In context, Mandapaka teaches a software or application level key that is shared between the analyte sensor system and the display device and used to encrypt analyte data for transmission
Keenan teaches executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key using Bluetooth advertisements. Keenan discloses that “This shared secret key was generated by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve 25519 [12–13]” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1) and that “Each device then broadcast its 32 byte public key using the Bluetooth advertisements” (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1). In context, Keenan teaches that the devices participate in a cryptographic key exchange by broadcasting the public keys using Bluetooth advertisements, and that the result of that key exchange is a shared secret key.
Loh teaches that an application layer is part of a communication protocol stack and interacts with lower layers to transmit and receive data, disclosing that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]).
In context, Mandapaka supplies the shared key used to encrypt analyte data for transmission, Keenan supplies the cryptographic key exchange algorithm that establishes the shared secret key, and Loh supplies that these operations are executed at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Burnette in view of Mandapaka, Keenan, and Loh to establish a secret key with a display device, based on executing a cryptographic key exchange algorithm at an application layer of a communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module, to encrypt the analyte data using the secret key, and to transmit the encrypted analyte data. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because Burnette already transmits encrypted analyte data to display devices via advertising beacons (Burnette, ¶[0151]) and discloses a bonding exchange context with a display device (Burnette, ¶[0097]), Mandapaka teaches a key that may effectively be shared between an analyte sensor system and a display device and used to encrypt analyte data for transmission and may be generated at a software or application level (Mandapaka, ¶[0354]; Mandapaka, ¶[0355]), Keenan teaches executing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate a shared secret key (Keenan, p. 4, Sec. 2.1.1), and Loh teaches an application layer of a protocol stack that interacts with lower layers to transmit and receive data (Loh, ¶[0050]; Loh, ¶[0051]). One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Keenan’s Diffie-Hellman key exchange could be executed within the application layer of the sensor electronics module’s protocol stack as taught by Loh to establish the shared key described by Mandapaka with the display device, and that Mandapaka’s shared key could then be used to encrypt analyte data for transmission consistent with Burnette’s encrypted analyte-beacon communications. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling application-layer establishment of a shared secret key for encrypting transmitted analyte data, improving privacy and security of analyte communications while remaining compatible with the communication protocol stack and advertisement-based transmission approach.
Regarding claim 36, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the analyte data is encrypted at the application layer of the communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette as modified for claim 35 teaches transmitting encrypted analyte data to a display device using advertising beacons, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). However, the modified Burnette does not expressly teach that the analyte data is encrypted at the application layer of the communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module.
Mandapaka teaches that encryption of analyte data is performed at a software or application level of the analyte sensor system, disclosing that “the application key may be generated at a software / application level of analyte sensor system 708 and / or display device 710” (Mandapaka, ¶[0355]) and that “the application key may be used for example by analyte sensor system 708 to encrypt analyte data for transmission to display device 710 , and display device 710 may use the application key to decrypt the received analyte data” (Mandapaka, ¶[0354]). Thus, Mandapaka expressly places the encryption operation at the software or application level of the analyte sensor system.
Loh teaches that the application layer is a defined layer of a communication protocol stack implemented in software and positioned above lower communication layers, disclosing that “A L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) layer 25 provides a logical interface between the lower mainly hardware implemented layers 21-24, and higher typically Software implemented layers including an application layer 29” (Loh, ¶[0050]) and that “The application layer 29 contains one or more higher-level applications 291, which interact with the L2CAP layer 25 to transmit and receive data over the Bluetooth wireless communication network” (Loh, ¶[0051]). In context, Loh defines the application layer as a software-implemented layer of the communication protocol stack that performs higher-level processing and interacts with lower protocol layers to transmit and receive data.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Mandapaka and Loh to encrypt the analyte data at the application layer of the communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because Mandapaka expressly teaches performing encryption of analyte data at a software or application level of the analyte sensor system, Loh expressly teaches that the application layer is the software-implemented layer of the communication protocol stack responsible for higher-level processing and for interacting with lower layers to transmit data, and Burnette already transmits encrypted analyte data to display devices. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that implementing Mandapaka’s software-level encryption within Loh’s defined application layer of the communication protocol stack at the sensor electronics module is a straightforward and technically consistent implementation, as encryption of payload data logically occurs before the data is passed to lower protocol layers for transmission. The benefit of the combination would have been providing encryption at the application layer of the protocol stack, improving modularity, security, and separation of concerns within the communication architecture while maintaining compatibility with advertisement-based transmission of analyte data.
Claims 5-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Burnette et al. (US-20170181628-A1), hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Mandapaka et al. (US-20180027104-A1), hereto referred as Mandapaka, hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Keenan et al. (Keenan, Kathryn E et al. “Development and Evaluation of Bluetooth Low-Energy Device for Electronic Encounter Metrics.” Journal of research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 126 (2021)), hereto referred as Keenan, and further in view of Hyun et al. (KR-20180081308-A), hereto referred as Hyun.
The modified Burnette teaches claim 1 as described above.
Regarding claim 5, the modified Burnette does not fully teach receiving encrypted data from the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels and decrypting the encrypted data using the secret key. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches broadcasting encrypted analyte data in advertising beacons over invitation signaling, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). However, the modified Burnette does not teach receiving encrypted data from the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels and decrypting the encrypted data using the secret key.
Hyun teaches encrypted data being broadcast over a BLE advertising channel, received by another device, and decrypted using the same encryption key used for encryption, including that a BLE advertising device “encrypts authentication data to be transmitted through the BLE advertising channel using the same encryption key stored in the BLE scanning device” (Hyun, ¶[0034]) and that the BLE advertising device “broadcasts the encrypted authentication data” through the BLE advertising channel (Hyun, ¶[0037]). Hyun further teaches that the receiving device “receives encrypted authentication data … through a BLE advertising channel” (Hyun, ¶[0038]) and “stores the same encryption key used for encryption … and uses it to decrypt the encrypted authentication data received through the BLE advertising channel” (Hyun, ¶[0041]). In context, Hyun provides an explicit teaching of receiving encrypted data over an advertising channel and decrypting it using a secret key shared between the communicating devices, which is conceptually the same as receiving encrypted data over the primary invitation channels and decrypting using the secret key.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the modified Burnette in view of Hyun to receive encrypted data from the display device over the one or more primary invitation channels and decrypt the encrypted data using the secret key. It would have been possible to combine the teachings because the modified Burnette already uses advertising-based invitation signaling for communications between the sensor electronics module and display devices and already contemplates encrypted data being carried in advertising beacons, and Hyun provides a directly compatible BLE advertising-channel technique in which encrypted data is broadcast, received via the advertising channel, and decrypted using the same encryption key used for encryption, such that the display device in the modified Burnette system could transmit encrypted data via the same advertising-based invitation channels and the sensor electronics module could decrypt that encrypted data using the established secret key. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure downstream control or messaging from a display device to the sensor electronics module over the same invitation channels while maintaining confidentiality of the transmitted data.
Regarding claim 6, the modified Burnette does not teach that the decrypted data comprises an opcode. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches exchanging command payloads between a display device and a sensor electronics module, including that “a CGM receive command is triggered when the display devices sends a connection request on the wireless communications protocol API” and that the command “takes the payload and sends it to CGM processor 506” (Burnette, ¶[0088]). The modified Burnette further teaches command types used to control operations, such as “The start communication command is the first command radio 508 sees” and that “A stop communication command may be used to ensure radio 508 does not exceed a predefined “communication window,”” (Burnette, ¶[0086]). However, it does not expressly teach that decrypted data comprises an opcode.
Hyun teaches that decrypted data may be used to determine whether to permit or deny an operation, stating that “If the results of the judgment in step (S16) are not the same, the BLE scanning device (20) terminates the security process using BLE-based advertising, and conversely, if they are the same, it performs a preset operation to release security (S17)” (Hyun, ¶[0043]). Hyun further teaches operation triggering based on a decrypted value, stating that “The BLE scanning device (20) can open the door if the decrypted data is “HELLO”” (Hyun, ¶[0048]). In this context, the decrypted data value functions as an operation-selecting control value that determines which operation is executed or whether an operation is permitted, which is conceptually and functionally equivalent to an opcode that specifies an operation to be performed.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Hyun to have the decrypted data comprise an opcode by structuring the encrypted command payload exchanged in the modified Burnette such that, upon decryption, the decrypted data includes an operation-controlling value that determines whether a corresponding operation is permitted or performed, consistent with Hyun’s teaching that a decrypted value can be used to decide whether to terminate a security process or perform a preset operation and that a particular decrypted value can trigger a specific operation (Hyun, ¶[0043]; Hyun, ¶[0048]). Such a modification would have been possible because the modified Burnette already discloses command-and-payload messaging between the display device and the sensor electronics module processor (Burnette, ¶[0088]) and already discloses distinct commands that control operations (Burnette, ¶[0086]; Burnette, ¶[0150]), such that embedding an opcode-like operation indicator in the decrypted payload is a routine, feasible message-formatting and command-processing design choice. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure command and control signaling where the decrypted command value deterministically controls whether an operation is executed, improving reliability and security of device operations.
Regarding claim 7, the modified Burnette teaches that a value of the opcode triggers the broadcasting of the encrypted analyte data over the one or more primary invitation channels (Burnette, ¶[0085], “CGM processor 506 may signal radio 508 to “start communication””; Burnette, ¶[0087], “Radio 508 may begin advertising”; Burnette, ¶[0151], “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol”, Burnette shows that a command value provided to the radio to “start communication” causes the radio to begin advertising, and Burnette further shows that the advertising beacons can contain encrypted analyte data for direct communication, such that the opcode value corresponding to the “start communication” command triggers broadcasting of the encrypted analyte data over the advertising channels as the primary invitation channels).
Claims 19-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Burnette et al. (US-20170181628-A1), hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Mandapaka et al. (US-20180027104-A1), hereto referred as Mandapaka, hereto referred as Burnette, and further in view of Keenan et al. (Keenan, Kathryn E et al. “Development and Evaluation of Bluetooth Low-Energy Device for Electronic Encounter Metrics.” Journal of research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 126 (2021)), hereto referred as Keenan, and further in view of Wang et al. (US-20220070971-A1), hereto referred as Wang.
The modified Burnette teaches claim 14 as described above.
Regarding claim 19, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the encrypted data is broadcast in response to receiving the encrypted analyte data from the sensor electronics module. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches that advertising beacons are used for communication between the sensor electronics module and display devices, including that “first advertising beacons 700 (also referred as advertisement signals 412 in FIG. 4)” are transmitted (Burnette, ¶[0099]) and that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]). The modified Burnette further teaches that a display device may “receive an advertising beacon 700 and send a connection request back to radio 508” (Burnette, ¶[0100]). However, the modified Burnette does not expressly teach that the display device broadcasts encrypted data specifically in response to receiving encrypted analyte data from the sensor electronics module.
Wang teaches broadcasting encrypted data in response to receiving data over an advertising channel, including that “After receiving the status information advertising packet, the electronic device 102 may send, to the electronic device 101 through an advertising channel, a content message advertising packet encrypted by using the public key” (Wang, ¶[0186]). Wang is relied upon for the responsive advertising-channel trigger relationship, not for the specific key type used for encryption.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Wang to have the display device broadcast encrypted data over the primary invitation channels in response to receiving encrypted analyte data from the sensor electronics module. In the modified Burnette system, the encrypted data broadcast by the display device would remain encrypted using the shared secret key already established in the claim chain, and Wang is applied only for its received-packet trigger teaching. The modified Burnette already uses advertising beacons as primary invitation channels to transmit encrypted analyte data to display devices and describes responsive behavior by the display device after receiving an advertising beacon. Wang teaches that, after receiving an advertising packet, a device may send an encrypted advertising packet through an advertising channel. One of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious and feasible to apply Wang’s received-packet trigger for sending an encrypted advertising packet to the modified Burnette system such that, after the display device receives encrypted analyte data via the invitation-channel advertising beacons, the display device broadcasts encrypted data using the same invitation-channel advertising mechanism. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure bidirectional exchange over the invitation channels using a received-data trigger while maintaining low power advertisement-based communications.
Regarding claim 20, the modified Burnette does not fully teach that the encrypted analyte data is received in response to the encrypted data being broadcast over the one or more primary invitation channels. Rather, the modified Burnette teaches that advertising beacons are used as primary invitation channels to transmit encrypted analyte data, including that “advertising beacons containing encrypted analyte data can be used to directly communicate those measured analyte values, e.g., glucose values, without establishing a two-way communication protocol” (Burnette, ¶[0151]) and that a display device may “receive an advertising beacon 700 and send a connection request back to radio 508” (Burnette, ¶[0100]). However, the modified Burnette does not expressly teach that the encrypted analyte data is received specifically in response to encrypted data being broadcast by the display device over the primary invitation channels.
Wang teaches that after receiving an advertising packet, a device may send an encrypted advertising packet through an advertising channel (Wang, ¶[0186]: “After receiving the status information advertising packet, the electronic device 102 may send, to the electronic device 101 through an advertising channel, a content message advertising packet encrypted by using the public key”). Wang is relied upon for the responsive advertising-channel trigger relationship, not for the specific key type used for encryption. In context, Wang shows that one device broadcasts encrypted data over an advertising channel, and that receipt of that broadcast causes the other device to transmit or receive corresponding encrypted data over the same advertising channel, establishing a responsive advertising-based exchange pattern.
It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have further modified the modified Burnette in view of Wang to have the encrypted analyte data be received in response to the encrypted data being broadcast over the one or more primary invitation channels. The modified Burnette already uses advertising beacons as the primary invitation channels for transmitting encrypted analyte data between the sensor electronics module and the display device. Wang teaches that encrypted advertising packets may be sent over an advertising channel after receipt of an advertising packet, thereby establishing a responsive advertising-based exchange. One of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious and feasible to implement a reciprocal trigger relationship in the modified Burnette system such that broadcast of encrypted data by the display device over the invitation channels results in responsive transmission and receipt of encrypted analyte data over the same channels. The benefit of the combination would have been enabling secure, bidirectional, advertising-channel communication in which broadcast by one device predictably results in responsive encrypted data exchange while preserving low power operation and avoiding connection establishment.
Conclusion
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/AARON MERRIAM/Examiner, Art Unit 3791
/MATTHEW KREMER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3791