DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
THE PREVIOUS ACTION IS WITHDRAWN/SUPERSEDED
As per the attached Interview Summary, the election requirement dated 8/27/2026 was not informed by the preliminary amendment dated 10/26/2023. Upon review of the preliminary amendment, the species election requirement is vacated in favor of the following action on the merits:
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 34-43 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
The rejected claims cover antibody conjugates comprising mass units, chemical linkers and probe reactive moieties.
To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. Vas-Cath, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”).
With regard to the recited genus of conjugates comprising mass units, chemical linkers and probe reactive moieties, the following applies:
Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) states that “...a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds...the question may still remain whether the specification, including the original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus”. See page 1171.
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice, reduction to drawings, or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.
See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1571, 39 USPQ2d 1895, 1905 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (a “laundry list” disclosure of every possible moiety does not constitute a written description of every species in a genus because it would not “reasonably lead” those skilled in the art to any particular species.
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) states that “it is well established in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it”.
A description of a genus may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus, so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus (Emphasis added). Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F3d 1559, 1569, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
A “representative number of species” means that the species which are adequately described are representative of the entire genus. Thus, when there is substantial variation within the genus, one must describe a sufficient variety of species to reflect the variation within the genus. The disclosure of only one species encompassed within a genus adequately describes a claim directed to that genus only if the disclosure “indicates that the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the gen[us].” See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966, 63 USPQ2d at 1615; Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1508, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Fed. Cir. 2004)(“[A] patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated.”). “A patentee will not be deemed to have invented species sufficient to constitute the genus by virtue of having disclosed a single species when ... the evidence indicates ordinary artisans could not predict the operability in the invention of any species other than the one disclosed.” In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1358, 69 USPQ2d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly (43 USPQ2d 1398-1412), the court held that a generic statement which defines a genus of nucleic acids by only their functional activity does not provide an adequate written description of the genus. The court indicated that, while applicants are not required to disclose every species encompassed by a genus, the description of the genus is achieved by the recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the claimed genus. At section B(i), the court states, "An adequate written description of a DNA ... requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention."
Courts have stated that “[i]n claims involving [non-genetic] chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1089 (1998). (emphasis added).
There is no such specificity here, nor could one skilled in the art identify particular conjugates encompassed by the claims. Specifically, Applicant fails to disclose any other mass units, linkers or probe reactive moieties, besides those identified in the specification, and in relation to the above, these disclosed species or subgenre do not represent the substantial variety covered by the genus of conjugates recited in the claims.
With regard to the functional definition of mass units, linkers or probe reactive moieties, the specification does not clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed (see Vas-Cath at page 1116) because the specification contains almost no information by which a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the inventors possessed the all of the recited conjugates comprising these groups. At best, it simply indicates that one should test an inordinate number of molecular moieties to see if these groups can perform the required function. In this connection, the specification contains no generic structural characteristics of those groups that satisfy the functional requirements, besides those instantly disclosed. See In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]t the end of the day, the specification, even read in light of the knowledge of those skilled in the art, does no more than state a hypothesis and propose testing to determine the accuracy of that hypothesis. That is not sufficient.”).
The Examiner acknowledges that a working example or exemplified embodiment is not necessarily a requirement for description. However, where a generic claim term is present in a claim, as in the present application, and defined only by functional characteristics, the specification must convey enough information, e.g., via sufficient representative examples, to indicate invention of species sufficient to constitute the genus. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 967 2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The written description requirement “requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A patent...‘is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’ ... For that reason, the written description requirement prohibits a patentee from ‘leaving it to the ... industry to complete an unfinished invention.’” (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, the specification lacks adequate written description for the recited antibody conjugates comprising mass units, chemical linkers and probe reactive moieties.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 34-43 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
The structural criteria of a mass unit or “probe reactive moiety” are not defined.
It is unclear how the recited methods detect biomarkers present in a sample since the methods do not recite a step of removing unbound conjugates from the sample.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 34-43 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over U.S. Publication No. 20110172115 based on an application by Thompson (Thompson) in view of U.S. Publication No. 20050085630 based on an application by Olejnik et al., (Olejnik).
Thompson teaches a multiplex method for co-detecting 3 or more different biomarkers in a tissue sample (abstract, claim 8), said method comprising:
a. providing a tissue sample (tissue section) (par [0072]);
b. contacting said tissue sample with plurality of different probes to create a probed tissue sample (par [0068]), each of said probes conjugated to a unique photocleavable mass-tag (mass tag-photocleavable linker) (par [0069]) and plurality of said probes each binding to a different biomarker in said tissue sample (claim 8);
c. illuminating said photocleavable mass-tags with light so as to photocleave at least a portion of said mass-tags before step d) (par [0069]); and
d. detecting, using mass spectrometric imaging of said probed tissue sample, said unique mass-tags, or fragments thereof, from the plurality of said bound probes, wherein said mass-tags are detected as molecular ions (par [0069] [0070]).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to optimize the number of probes by routine experimentation.
Thompson teaches that wherein said tissue sample is a thin tissue section (par [0073]).
Thompson teaches that where said tissue sample was formalin-fixed and thin sectioned before step b) (par [0072] [0073]).
Thompson does not specifically teach that wherein said tissue sample is mounted on a slide before step b). However, it is conventional to mount a tissue sample on a slide for imaging.
Thompson teaches that wherein said plurality of probes are in a mixture and said tissue sample in step b) is contacted with said mixture to create said probed tissue sample (par [0068], claim 8).
Thompson teaches that wherein said probes conjugated to a mass-tag have the following general structure: Mass Unit-Core Structure-Probe (mass-tag-cleavable linker as the core structure- probe) (par [0012]).
Thompson teaches that wherein at least 1 of said probes comprises a fluorescent moiety in addition to said mass-tag (par [0058]).
Thompson teaches that wherein said probes are selected from the group consisting of proteins (antibody) and nucleic acids (pr [0140]).
Thompson teaches that wherein at least 1 of said probes is an antibody (par [0140]).
Thompson teaches that wherein said mass-tags comprise a plurality of amino acids (peptide mass tag) (par [0157]).
Thompson may not teach the instant antibody probes conjugated to to photocleavable mass-tags.
A person skilled in the art would have recognized that the mass spectrometric imaging on said tissue sample can be used as a background image for removing the background noise.
Thompson teaches that wherein a matrix compound is applied to said probed tissue sample before step d) (par [0014]).
Thompson teaches that wherein said matrix compound is selected from the group consisting of alpha-cyano-4-hydroxycinnamic acid (CHCA), 2,5-Dihydroxybenzoic acid (DHB) and 3,5-Dimethoxy-4-hydroxycinnamic acid (sinapinic acid) (par [0049]).
Thompson may not teach the recited antibody conjugated photocleavable mass-tags. However, these conjugates used to detect and isolate target components from complex mixtures such as proteins were known in the art. It is for that proposition that the rejection joins Olejnik. Specifically, Olejnik teaches the following water-soluble PC-Biotin-lysine-maleimide conjugate:
PNG
media_image1.png
236
928
media_image1.png
Greyscale
See Fig. 14A. See also Figs 14B, 14C and 14D.
Sulfhydryl attachment is taught [0242].
[0263] 2) Derivatization of SH groups with an affinity tag. Free SH groups are derivatized with the PC-Biotin-lysine-maleimide biotinylating reagent the synthesis of which is described below.
Olejnik teaches that “[0225] In some embodiments, additional types of coupling agents include antibodies, antibody fragments and antigens. Antibodies have the advantage that they can bind to their respective antigen with great specificity. Substrates which are antigens can be detected by their ability to specifically bind to available antibodies or to antibodies which can be easily created. Useful antibodies or antibody fragments may be monoclonal or polyclonal and are preferable of the class IgG, but may also be IgM, IgA, IgD or IgE. Other preferred detectable groups include nucleic acids. Short sequences of RNA or DNA or oligonucleotides, preferably less than about thirty nucleotides in length and as short as four to ten nucleotides, can be detected by their ability to specifically hybridize with a complementary nucleic acid and detected directly or indirectly using PCR which greatly amplifies a specific sequence that is subsequently detected. In a similar fashion, binding proteins and receptor-ligand combinations are also useful as detectable labels.”
Olejnik teaches that the methods of the invention to cell surface proteins, once the tagged proteins are fragmented, the tagged peptides behave no differently from the peptides generated from more soluble samples. FIGS. 10 and 11 show diagrammatically the isolation, quantification and characterization of selected samples utilizing the compounds of the present invention. Specifically, FIGS. 10 and 11 show a diagram of protein quantitation procedure using Photocleavable Bioreactive Agents with Variable Mass Linkers. A protein mixture obtained from two different cellular states is labeled with light and heavy versions of Photocleavable Bioreactive Agent. Then the mixtures were combined, proteins digested using, for example, trypsin and captured on an affinity support, for example, streptavidin. In the next step, the unbound proteolytic fragments were removed by washing the affinity support and bound fragments were photoreleased by irradiation. After the photocleavage, part of the reagent containing light or heavy variable mass linker remains on the peptide and serves as a mass tag. The mixture of photoreleased peptides was then analyzed using mass spectrometry and the relative abundance of peptides labeled with light and heavy reagent determined [0298].
In this way, those of ordinary skill could have applied the instant photocleavable conjugates in the manner required and in a predictable fashion for the purposes of detecting biomarkers in a tissue sample. As outlined above, Thompson teaches the instant steps of detecting different biomarkers in a tissue sample. Olejnik is added for the proposition that the instant photocleavable conjugates are applicable to this process biomarker detection. Specifically, Olejnik Bento teaches that the particular known technique of using the instant conjugates in methods of biomarker detection was recognized as part of the ordinary capabilities of one skilled in the art. In this manner, those of ordinary skill would have recognized that applying the known technique to methods of detecting biomarkers, such as that taught by Thompson, would have yielded predictable results. Accordingly, using the instant photocleavable conjugates for the purposes of detecting biomarkers in a tissue sample would have been prima facie obvious.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims of 1-31 U.S. Patent No. 11906527.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 12181481 in view of Olejnik.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Olejnik is combined for the proposition that the recited photocleavable conjugates were within the purview of those of ordinary skill, as outlined above.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 12618852.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-4 of U.S. Patent No. 11789027.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
The rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 11940447.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-23 of U.S. Patent No. 12078639.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 34-43 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-33 of U.S. Application No. 19369929 in view of Olejnik.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the methods covered in the conflicting claims and those covered in the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Also, the rejected claims include method claims in place of conjugates as recited by the conflicting claims. However, the specification of the conflicting patent or application discloses the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Olejnik is combined for the proposition that the recited photocleavable conjugates were within the purview of those of ordinary skill, as outlined above.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KARL J PUTTLITZ whose telephone number is (571)272-0645. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday to Friday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gregory Emch, can be reached at telephone number 571-272-8149. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).
/KARL J PUTTLITZ/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1646
Prosecution Insights