tNotice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
This Office Action is in response to the communication filed on 7/31/2025.
Claims 1-31 are pending for consideration.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed on 7/31/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues on page 13 of the Remarks that Yang’s use of a “first value,” which the Office Action appears to have also equated with Applicant’s “counter value,” is neither generated nor stored by Yang’s ECUs, but instead is broadcasted by Yang’s manager 12, as noted above.
In response to the above argument, Examiner respectfully disagrees. Yang teaches each sender and receiver that maintain one synchronized counter to help synchronization and verification on a CAN message. Examiner notes, when the synchronized counter value is maintained by the sender meaning the counter value is stored which is equivalent as the Applicant’s “counter value” is stored in the non-volatile memory. Furthermore, Yang teaches the sender that uses that counter value with a shared key to generate an authentication key. Notes, the authentication key recited here is used for encryption and authentication on the CAN message (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120). Therefore, Yang does teach the disputed limitation.
Applicant argues on page 13 that Yang does not disclose the counter value is used to “derive” the “temporary session key in accordance with a cryptographic function.”
In response to the above argument, Examiner respectfully disagrees. Examiner notes, the claim does not specifically define what the cryptographic function is. Yang teaches using an algorithm to generate an authentication key by inputting the two values which are the counter value and a shared key. Since, Yang clearly teaches the algorithm to transform the counter and shared key into the authentication key which is used to encrypt or protect message between the sender and receiver (ANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120). Therefore, Yang does teach the disputed limitation.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by YANG et al. (EP 4080813)(hereinafter YANG).
Regarding claim 1, YANG discloses a transmitting node in a system of interconnected nodes configured to communicate over a bus according to a multi-drop scheme, the transmitting node comprising: a non-volatile memory (YANG: see figures 1-4 and paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120); processing circuitry configured to:
Generate a counter value (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120); derive, from a shared secret and the counter value, a temporary session key in accordance with a cryptographic function, the counter value and the shared secret being stored in the non-volatile memory (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “Determine an authentication key based on a first value and a shared key”), the counter value and the shared secret being stored in non-volatile memory (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “The first value is a value broadcast by a manager based on a time segment, and the shared key is a key shared by all ECUs in a vehicle”); and generate a secured message using the temporary session key, the secured message comprising a plurality of fields, wherein a first one of the plurality of fields comprises a representation of the counter value (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “c.sub.0 is used as the keystream for data encryption, and c.sub.1 is used to randomize the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field. The value LC.sub.i is placed into the local counter field, and the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field is determined based on a bit 1 (or a bit 0) in c.sub.1, to obtain M.sup.∗.”); and communication circuitry configured to transmit the secured message to the bus (YANG: paragraphs 0027 and 0107-0108, “Send the CAN frame to a second ECU through a CAN bus”).
Regarding claim 16, the claim 16 discloses a receiving node claim that is substantially equivalent to the transmitting node of claim 1. Therefore, the arguments set forth above with respect to claim 1 are equally applicable to claim 16 and rejected for the same reasons. YANG further discloses generate a second counter value (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120); determine a validity of the first counter value based upon (i) whether the computed first counter value matches the second counter value that is stored in a non-volatile memory of the receiving node (YANG: paragraph 0144, "If LCi > LCi, the authentication fails."), and/or (ii) whether the secured message is verified based upon a second temporary session key (YANG: paragraph 0120, "c1 is used to randomize the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field."), which is derived from a shared secret stored in the non-volatile memory and the computed first counter value (YANG: paragraph 0144, "If the restored M and the restored CRC meet the CRC algorithm, the authentication succeeds, or otherwise, the authentication fails"); and accept or reject the secured message based upon the determined validity of the first counter value (YANG: paragraph 0144, "If LCi: > LCi, the authentication fails.").
Regarding claim 26, the claim 26 discloses a method claim that is substantially equivalent to the transmitting node of claim 1. Therefore, the arguments set forth above with respect to claim 1 are equally applicable to claim 26 and rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding claim 28, the claim 28 discloses a method claim that is substantially equivalent to the transmitting node of claim 16. Therefore, the arguments set forth above with respect to claim 16 are equally applicable to claim 28 and rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding claim 2, YANG discloses wherein the representation of the counter value in the secured message enables a receiving node to derive the temporary session key from the counter value and the shared secret (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel.”… “For CAN message protection (authentication or encryption), a basic security requirement is to prevent a replay attack. A counter may be used to prevent the replay attack. To be specific, it is assumed that a sending ECU (sender) and a receiving ECU (receiver) each maintain one synchronized counter (to facilitate synchronization and verification on a CAN message, a value of the counter usually needs to be sent together with the CAN message)”).
Regarding claim 3, YANG discloses wherein a second one of the plurality of fields comprises a secure channel indicator (SCI) value that identifies the transmitting node, and wherein the transmitting node is part of a secure zone comprising nodes within the system of interconnected nodes that are intended recipients of the secured message (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel.”).
Regarding claim 4, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to compute an integrity check value (ICV) based upon at least the counter value, and generate the secured message having a second one of the plurality of fields comprising the ICV (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “The CRC code is used to check an error in data transmission, but has no key function. Therefore, extra information generated by performing authentication on the CAN message needs to be carried in the DATA field. For example, in the conventional technology, an ECU in an in-vehicle system performs authentication on a CAN message by using a fixed key. For example, the CAN Auth performs authentication on the message through HMAC. In this authentication manner, the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel”).
Regarding claim 5, YANG discloses wherein: the processing circuitry is configured to derive, from the shared secret and the counter value, a further temporary session key in accordance with the cryptographic function, the further shared secret being stored in the non-volatile memory, the temporary session key enables a receiving node to decrypt the secured message, and the further temporary key enables a receiving node to authenticate the secured message (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “c.sub.0 is used as the keystream for data encryption, and c.sub.1 is used to randomize the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field. The value LC.sub.i is placed into the local counter field, and the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field is determined based on a bit 1 (or a bit 0) in c.sub.1, to obtain M.sup.∗.”).
Regarding claim 6, YANG discloses wherein the system of interconnected nodes comprises a plurality of secure zones, each one of the plurality of secure zones comprising a respective group of nodes, and wherein the processing circuitry is configured to generate the secured message having a second one of the plurality of fields comprising a secure channel indicator (SCI) value that indicates which one of the plurality of secure zones for which the secured message is intended (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel.”).
Regarding claim 7, YANG discloses wherein the non-volatile memory stores, for each one of the plurality of secure zones, a respective shared secret and a respective counter value (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel.”).
Regarding claim 8, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: generate, for each one of a plurality of secure zones comprising a respective group of nodes, a respective temporary session key using a respective shared secret and a respective counter value in accordance with a respective cryptographic function, and generate, for a transmission to each respective group of nodes, a respective secured message comprising a plurality of fields, with a first one of the plurality of fields comprising a representation of the respective counter value, and wherein the communication circuitry is configured to transmit each respective secured message to each respective group of nodes from among the plurality of secure zones (YANG: paragraphs 0149-0151, “the first ECU is communicatively connected to a second ECU through a bus, the first ECU may send a CAN message to the second ECU, and the second ECU performs authentication on the received CAN message. The first value is a value broadcast by a manager based on a time segment, and the shared key is a key shared by all ECUs in a vehicle.”).
Regarding claims 9 and 21, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is configured to increment the counter value in response to one or more predefined conditions being satisfied, and to generate, from the shared secret and the incremented counter value, an updated temporary session key in accordance with the cryptographic function (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “the first value broadcast by the manager to all the ECUs functions as a timestamp, and the first value is determined by a clock or a counter of the manager”).
Regarding claim 10, YANG discloses wherein the one or more predefined conditions comprise a number of secured messages being transmitted with the temporary session key in excess of a predetermined number of messages and/or an expiration of a predetermined time period (YANG: paragraph 0105, “Because a length of a data field of the CAN frame is limited, the value of the counter cannot be very large. Therefore, a time may be divided into time segments (each time segment is one session), and a manager (for example, a gateway) broadcasts different values (Global Sessional Number, GSN) to all ECUs at the beginning of the time segments. The ECU may generate, by using the value and a shared key, an authentication key used to perform encryption and authentication on the CAN message. In this encryption and authentication manner, encryption and authentication may be performed on the CAN message without causing extra load, so that information transmission security of the in-vehicle system is improved.”).
Regarding claim 11, YANG discloses wherein the non-volatile memory is configured to store a priority flag for a predetermined time period, and wherein the processing circuitry is configured to increment the counter value in response to the one or more predefined conditions being satisfied further conditioned upon a presence of the priority flag stored in the non-volatile memory (YANG: paragraph 0105, “Because a length of a data field of the CAN frame is limited, the value of the counter cannot be very large. Therefore, a time may be divided into time segments (each time segment is one session), and a manager (for example, a gateway) broadcasts different values (Global Sessional Number, GSN) to all ECUs at the beginning of the time segments. The ECU may generate, by using the value and a shared key, an authentication key used to perform encryption and authentication on the CAN message. In this encryption and authentication manner, encryption and authentication may be performed on the CAN message without causing extra load, so that information transmission security of the in-vehicle system is improved.”).
Regarding claim 12, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is configured to increment the counter value as part of an atomic storage algorithm (YANG: paragraph 0105, “Because a length of a data field of the CAN frame is limited, the value of the counter cannot be very large. Therefore, a time may be divided into time segments (each time segment is one session), and a manager (for example, a gateway) broadcasts different values (Global Sessional Number, GSN) to all ECUs at the beginning of the time segments. The ECU may generate, by using the value and a shared key, an authentication key used to perform encryption and authentication on the CAN message. In this encryption and authentication manner, encryption and authentication may be performed on the CAN message without causing extra load, so that information transmission security of the in-vehicle system is improved.”).
Regarding claims 13 and 23, YANG discloses further comprising: a volatile memory configured to store the temporary session key (paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0207, “The first value is a value broadcast by a manager based on a time segment, and the shared key is a key shared by all ECUs in a vehicle” …“The foregoing storage medium includes any medium that can store program code, such as a read-only memory (a random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM)...”).
Regarding claims 14, 24, 27 and 29, YANG discloses wherein the communication circuitry is configured to transmit the secured message in accordance with a communication protocol comprising one of a Controller Area Network (CAN) communication protocol, a Controller Area Network Flexible Data- Rate (CAN FD) communication protocol, a Controller Area Network Extra Long (CAN XL) communication protocol, or a multi-drop Ethernet communication protocol (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “an embodiment of this application provides a communication method, including: determining an authentication key based on a first value and a shared key; splitting the authentication key to obtain a first key and a second key; assembling a CAN frame by using the first key and the second key, where the first key is used to encrypt a valid data payload, and the second key is used to randomize a location of a CRC bit in a data payload field; and sending the CAN frame to a second ECU through a CAN bus, where the first value is a value broadcast by a manager based on a time segment, and the shared key is a key shared by all ECUs in a vehicle”).
Regarding claims 15 and 25, YANG discloses wherein the plurality of fields form at least part of a communication protocol frame, and wherein the communication protocol frame comprises one of a Controller Area Network (CAN) communication protocol frame, a Controller Area Network Flexible Data-Rate (CAN FD) communication protocol frame, a Controller Area Network Extra Long (CAN XL) communication protocol frame, or an Ethernet communication protocol frame (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “assembling a CAN frame by using the first key and the second key, where the first key is used to encrypt a valid data payload, and the second key is used to randomize a location of a CRC bit in a data payload field; and sending the CAN frame to a second ECU through a CAN bus, where the first value is a value broadcast by a manager based on a time segment, and the shared key is a key shared by all ECUs in a vehicle”).
Regarding claim 17, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is configured to accept the secured message when the first counter value is valid as a result of the computed first counter value matching the second counter value (YANG: paragraph 0144, "If LCi > LCi, the authentication fails.").
Regarding claim 18, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is configured to determine that the first counter is invalid and to conditionally reject the secured message when the computed first counter value is less than the second counter value (YANG: paragraph 0144, "If the restored M and the restored CRC meet the CRC algorithm, the authentication succeeds, or otherwise, the authentication fails")
Regarding claim 19, YANG discloses wherein the secured message includes a second one of the plurality of fields comprising an integrity check value (ICV), and wherein the processing circuitry is configured to: decrypt a payload of the secured message using the second temporary session key (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “The CRC code is used to check an error in data transmission, but has no key function. Therefore, extra information generated by performing authentication on the CAN message needs to be carried in the DATA field. For example, in the conventional technology, an ECU in an in-vehicle system performs authentication on a CAN message by using a fixed key. For example, the CAN Auth performs authentication on the message through HMAC. In this authentication manner, the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel”); compute an ICV value from the decrypted payload, and authenticate the representation of the first counter value contained in the secured message when the computed ICV value matches the ICV value contained in the secured message (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120).
Regarding claim 20, YANG discloses wherein a second one of the plurality of fields of the secured message comprises a secure channel indicator (SCI) value that identifies a secure zone comprising nodes within the system of interconnected nodes that are intended recipients of the secured message (YANG: paragraphs 0103, 0105 and 0120, “the ECU needs to derive an authentication key from a fixed key, a counter, and a random number sent through a CAN+ channel.”).
Regarding claim 22, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: selectively update, based upon the determined validity of the first counter value, the second temporary session key to match the first temporary session key (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120); and decrypt a payload of the secured message using the second temporary session key that matches the first temporary session key (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0105, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “the first value broadcast by the manager to all the ECUs functions as a timestamp, and the first value is determined by a clock or a counter of the manager).
Regarding claim 30, YANG discloses wherein the first one of the plurality of fields comprises the representation of the counter value as at least a portion of bits of the counter value (YANG: paragraphs 0007-0012, “a CAN frame by using the first key and the second key includes: generating a keystream based on the first key; performing an exclusive OR operation on the keystream and data corresponding to the valid data payload, to obtain encrypted data; determining the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field based on values of bits in the second key; placing each CRC bit into a corresponding payload bit based on the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field; and placing the encrypted data into the remaining payload bits in the data payload field, to obtain the assembled CAN frame.”).
Regarding claim 31, YANG discloses wherein the processing circuitry is configured to directly generate the one or more of the plurality of fields of the secured message using the temporary session key (YANG: paragraphs 0007, 0108, 0110, 0117 and 0120, “c.sub.0 is used as the keystream for data encryption, and c.sub.1 is used to randomize the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field. The value LC.sub.i is placed into the local counter field, and the location of the CRC bit in the data payload field is determined based on a bit 1 (or a bit 0) in c.sub.1, to obtain M.sup.∗.”).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to TRANG T DOAN whose telephone number is (571)272-0740. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 7-4 ET.
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/TRANG T DOAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2431
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