DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
1. This action is responsive to communication filed on 10 October 2025, with acknowledgement of an original application filed on 18 November 2023.
Status of Claims
2. Claims 1, 4-7, 10-13, and 16-19 are pending. Claims 1, 7, 13, and 19 are in independent forms. Claims 1, 7, 13, and 19 has been amended. Claims 2-3, 8-9, 14-15, and 20 has been cancelled.
Information Disclosure Statement
3. The information disclosure statements (IDS's) submitted on 08/25/2025, and 12/11/2025 are in compliance with provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Drawings
4. The drawings filed on 11/18/2023 are accepted by the examiner.
Response to Amendment
5. Applicant’s arguments filed 10 October 2025 have been fully considered however they are moot due to new grounds of rejection below initiated by applicant’s amendment.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
6. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
7. Claims 1, 4-6, 13, and 16-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Huang et al. US Patent Application Publication No. 2020/0267541 (hereinafter Huang) in view of Chitrakar et al. US Patent Application Publication No. 2023/0049552 (hereinafter Chitrakar).
Regarding claim 1, Huang discloses a communication method, comprising:
“generating, by the first multi-link device, message integrity check (MIC) based on the AAD” (see Huang par. 0058, 0159, Step 2 is to generate pairwise transient key (PTK), group temporal key (GTK), and integrity group temporal key (IGTK). This step uses the 4-way handshake utilizing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPOL-key) frame introduced in FIG. 4. Option 2: different IGTKSA/IGTK across links: to enable negotiation of different GTK/GTKSA across links in one exchange, information of different links can be put in the EAPOL-key frame to enable negotiation of different IGTK/IGTKSA.);
“generating, by the first multi-link device, a management frame, wherein the management frame comprises a receiver address, a transmitter address, a first address, and the MIC” (see Huang pars. 0093, 0158, 0098, a station that receives a data or Robust Management Frame from another station can detect whether the received data frame is an unauthorized retransmission. For example, whether the received frame is a replayed transmission or not. This replay protection mechanism is provided for data frames for stations that use the CCMP or TKIP cipher suites. The replay protection mechanism is also provided for robust management frames for stations that use CCMP and the Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol (BIP). For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). An additional element, called management message integrity code information element (MME), with the calculated MIC is included in the management frame as shown in FIG. 6);
Huang does not explicitly discloses constructing, by a first multi-link device, additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3; wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address; sending, by the first multi-link device, the management frame to a second multi-link device on a link on which a station indicated by the receiver address or a station indicated by the transmitter address operates.
However, in analogues art, Chitrakar discloses constructing, by a first multi-link device, additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3 (see Chitrakar Abstract, par. 0075, As a variation, instead of using MLD-TA and MLD-RA, AP may also provide the MAC addresses to use for the A1, A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) during the construction of AAD and Nonce to non-AP STA e.g. during 4-way, group key handshake or using some management frame exchange. This may also be useful for single link STAs that use dynamic MAC addresses (e.g. MAC randomization) wherein the addresses change between an initial transmission and a retransmission. The provided MAC addresses are then used to construct the AAD and Nonce instead of the various address fields of the protected MPDU. If the Aland A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) used in AAD and Nonce are always fixed, even after change of MAC addresses in the retransmitted frames (either A1, A2 or both (and A3 if applicable))); wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address (see Chitrakar pars. 0073-0075, 0051, In accordance with the first embodiment, A1 field 804 and A2 field 806 in AAD 802 are set to the MAC address of the receiving MLD (i.e. MLD-RA) and MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA) respectively. In MPDUs in which A3 is set to BSSID (e.g. Data frames with To/From DS=0; or management frames), if the BSSID of Link 2 is different, A3 (which is set to the BSSID in such frames; the BSSID typically being the same as the AP MLD's MAC address on that link) is also changed to MLD-TA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-TA) if the transmitter is AP MLD and MLD-RA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-RA) if the transmitter is non-AP MLD. Further, A2 field 808 in the Nonce 810 is set to the MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA). The A2 field of the received MPDU is checked before switching to MLD MAC address to verify the identity of the transmitting STA (i.e. A2 field of the received MPDU should indicate the MAC address of the transmitting STA affiliated with the peer MLD). The A1 field of the received MPDU would already have been checked during receive frame filtering. IEEE 802.11be may mandate separate MAC addresses to be used per link or it is also possible that different links are allowed to use the same MAC address); sending, by the first multi-link device, the management frame to a second multi-link device on a link on which a station indicated by the receiver address or a station indicated by the transmitter address operates (see Chitrakar par. 0091, it is also possible that data and management frames transmitted by or transmitted to MLDs may have a different MAC header format that carry information specific to Multi-link transmissions i.e. information such as MAC addresses of transmitting and receiving MLDs).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Chitrakar in to the system of Huang in order to include a circuitry constructs an Additional Authentication Data (AAD) and a Nonce that are used for cryptographical encapsulation of a MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) to form an encapsulated MPDU, wherein the AAD includes an Address 1 (A1) field, an Address 2 (A2) field, an Address 3 (A3) field and a Sequence Control (SC) field, and the Nonce includes an A2 field, wherein the SC field of the (see Chitrakar par. 0006).
Regarding claims 4 and 16, Huang in view of Chitrakar discloses the method according to claim 1, the first multi-link device according to claim 13,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, the second address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that sends the management frame; for uplink transmission, the second address carries an MAC address of an AP that receives the management frame; and the AP is affiliated with the AP multi-link device (MLD) (see Huang pars. 0158, and 0163-0164, For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). a device (e.g., the user device(s) 120 and/or the AP 102 of FIG. 1) may determine a multi-link communication with a first multi-link device comprising two or more links associated with two or more station devices (STAs) included in the first multi-link device. the device may determine a first medium access control (MAC) address associated with a first link of the two or more links).
Regarding claims 5 and 17, Huang in view of Chitrakar discloses the method according to claim 1, the first multi-link device according to claim 13,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of a non-access point station (non-AP STA) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of an access point (AP) of a transmit end; or for uplink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of an access point (AP) of the receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of a non-access point station (non-AP STA) of the transmit end; and the transmit end is the first multi-link device, and the receive end is the second multi-link device (see Huang pars. 0158, 0161, and 0163-0164, For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). a Multi-link non-AP device may also have rules to take protected management frame using IGTK in a specific link at one time rather than all the links. This specific link may be changed through an additional mechanism, a device (e.g., the user device(s) 120 and/or the AP 102 of FIG. 1) may determine a multi-link communication with a first multi-link device comprising two or more links associated with two or more station devices (STAs) included in the first multi-link device. the device may determine a first medium access control (MAC) address associated with a first link of the two or more links).
Regarding claims 6 and 18, Huang in view of Chitrakar discloses the method according to claim 1, the first multi-link device according to claim 13,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of a non-access point multi-link device (non-AP MLD) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of an access point multi-link device (AP MLD) of a transmit end; or for uplink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of an access point multi-link device (AP MLD) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of a non-access point multi-link device (non-AP MLD) of a transmit end; and the transmit end is the first multi-link device, and the receive end is the second multi-link device (see Huang pars. 0086-0090, 0158, after an IGTK is generated, an IGTKSA (IGTK security association) is formed, and it includes the following information, Direction vector (whether the IGTK is used for transmit or receive), Key ID, IGTK, Authenticator MAC address. For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device)).
Regarding claim 13, Huang discloses a first multi-link device, comprising:
“a memory storing programming instructions” (Fig. 14, Memory 1408); and one or more processors (Fig. 14 Processing Circuitry 1406) coupled to the memory, wherein the one or more processors are configured to execute the programming instructions stored in the memory, to enable the first multi-link device to perform steps of:
“generating message integrity check MIC based on the AAD” (see Huang par. 0058, 0159, Step 2 is to generate pairwise transient key (PTK), group temporal key (GTK), and integrity group temporal key (IGTK). This step uses the 4-way handshake utilizing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPOL-key) frame introduced in FIG. 4. Option 2: different IGTKSA/IGTK across links: to enable negotiation of different GTK/GTKSA across links in one exchange, information of different links can be put in the EAPOL-key frame to enable negotiation of different IGTK/IGTKSA.);
“generating a management frame, wherein the management frame comprises a receiver address, a transmitter address, a first address, and the MIC” (see Huang pars. 0093, 0158, 0098, a station that receives a data or Robust Management Frame from another station can detect whether the received data frame is an unauthorized retransmission. For example, whether the received frame is a replayed transmission or not. This replay protection mechanism is provided for data frames for stations that use the CCMP or TKIP cipher suites. The replay protection mechanism is also provided for robust management frames for stations that use CCMP and the Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol (BIP). For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). An additional element, called management message integrity code information element (MME), with the calculated MIC is included in the management frame as shown in FIG. 6);
Huang does not explicitly discloses constructing additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3; wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address; sending the management frame to a second multi-link device on a link on which a station indicated by the receiver address or a station indicated by the transmitter address operates.
However, in analogues art, Chitrakar discloses constructing, by a first multi-link device, additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3 (see Chitrakar Abstract, par. 0075, As a variation, instead of using MLD-TA and MLD-RA, AP may also provide the MAC addresses to use for the A1, A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) during the construction of AAD and Nonce to non-AP STA e.g. during 4-way, group key handshake or using some management frame exchange. This may also be useful for single link STAs that use dynamic MAC addresses (e.g. MAC randomization) wherein the addresses change between an initial transmission and a retransmission. The provided MAC addresses are then used to construct the AAD and Nonce instead of the various address fields of the protected MPDU. If the Aland A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) used in AAD and Nonce are always fixed, even after change of MAC addresses in the retransmitted frames (either A1, A2 or both (and A3 if applicable))); wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address (see Chitrakar pars. 0073-0075, 0051, In accordance with the first embodiment, A1 field 804 and A2 field 806 in AAD 802 are set to the MAC address of the receiving MLD (i.e. MLD-RA) and MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA) respectively. In MPDUs in which A3 is set to BSSID (e.g. Data frames with To/From DS=0; or management frames), if the BSSID of Link 2 is different, A3 (which is set to the BSSID in such frames; the BSSID typically being the same as the AP MLD's MAC address on that link) is also changed to MLD-TA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-TA) if the transmitter is AP MLD and MLD-RA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-RA) if the transmitter is non-AP MLD. Further, A2 field 808 in the Nonce 810 is set to the MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA). The A2 field of the received MPDU is checked before switching to MLD MAC address to verify the identity of the transmitting STA (i.e. A2 field of the received MPDU should indicate the MAC address of the transmitting STA affiliated with the peer MLD). The A1 field of the received MPDU would already have been checked during receive frame filtering. IEEE 802.11be may mandate separate MAC addresses to be used per link or it is also possible that different links are allowed to use the same MAC address); sending, by the first multi-link device, the management frame to a second multi-link device on a link on which a station indicated by the receiver address or a station indicated by the transmitter address operates (see Chitrakar par. 0091, it is also possible that data and management frames transmitted by or transmitted to MLDs may have a different MAC header format that carry information specific to Multi-link transmissions i.e. information such as MAC addresses of transmitting and receiving MLDs).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Chitrakar in to the system of Huang in order to include a circuitry constructs an Additional Authentication Data (AAD) and a Nonce that are used for cryptographical encapsulation of a MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) to form an encapsulated MPDU, wherein the AAD includes an Address 1 (A1) field, an Address 2 (A2) field, an Address 3 (A3) field and a Sequence Control (SC) field, and the Nonce includes an A2 field, wherein the SC field of the (see Chitrakar par. 0006).
8. Claims 7, 10-12 and 16-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Huang et al. US Patent Application Publication No. 2020/0267541 (hereinafter Huang) in view of Chitrakar et al. US Patent Application Publication No. 2023/0049552 (hereinafter Chitrakar) in further view of Huang et al. US Patent Application Publication No. 2021/0050999 (hereinafter Huang2).
Regarding claim 7, Huang discloses a communication method, comprising:
“receiving, by a second multi-link device, a management frame from a first multi-link device on a link on which a station in the second multi-link device operates, wherein the management frame comprises a receiver address, a transmitter address, a first address, and first message integrity check MIC” (see Huang pars. 0024, 0158, Management frame protection introduced a new Key Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) which would provide an integrity check by creating a message integrity code (MIC) and a new algorithm—Broadcast Integrity Protocol (BIP) for protection of Broadcast and Multicast frames. Unicast Management frames would be encrypted using the same pairwise transient keys. For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 (address 2) and receiver device address for A1 (address 1). The BSSID used in A3 (second address) is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device));
“generating, by the second multi-link device, second MIC based on the AAD” (see Huang par. 0058, 0159, Step 2 is to generate pairwise transient key (PTK), group temporal key (GTK), and integrity group temporal key (IGTK). This step uses the 4-way handshake utilizing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPOL-key) frame introduced in FIG. 4. Option 2: different IGTKSA/IGTK across links: to enable negotiation of different GTK/GTKSA across links in one exchange, information of different links can be put in the EAPOL-key frame to enable negotiation of different IGTK/IGTKSA.);
Huang does not explicitly discloses wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address; constructing additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3.
However, in analogues art, Chitrakar discloses wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address (see Chitrakar pars. 0073-0075, 0051, In accordance with the first embodiment, A1 field 804 and A2 field 806 in AAD 802 are set to the MAC address of the receiving MLD (i.e. MLD-RA) and MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA) respectively. In MPDUs in which A3 is set to BSSID (e.g. Data frames with To/From DS=0; or management frames), if the BSSID of Link 2 is different, A3 (which is set to the BSSID in such frames; the BSSID typically being the same as the AP MLD's MAC address on that link) is also changed to MLD-TA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-TA) if the transmitter is AP MLD and MLD-RA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-RA) if the transmitter is non-AP MLD. Further, A2 field 808 in the Nonce 810 is set to the MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA). The A2 field of the received MPDU is checked before switching to MLD MAC address to verify the identity of the transmitting STA (i.e. A2 field of the received MPDU should indicate the MAC address of the transmitting STA affiliated with the peer MLD). The A1 field of the received MPDU would already have been checked during receive frame filtering. IEEE 802.11be may mandate separate MAC addresses to be used per link or it is also possible that different links are allowed to use the same MAC address); constructing additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3 (see Chitrakar Abstract, par. 0075, As a variation, instead of using MLD-TA and MLD-RA, AP may also provide the MAC addresses to use for the A1, A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) during the construction of AAD and Nonce to non-AP STA e.g. during 4-way, group key handshake or using some management frame exchange. This may also be useful for single link STAs that use dynamic MAC addresses (e.g. MAC randomization) wherein the addresses change between an initial transmission and a retransmission. The provided MAC addresses are then used to construct the AAD and Nonce instead of the various address fields of the protected MPDU. If the Aland A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) used in AAD and Nonce are always fixed, even after change of MAC addresses in the retransmitted frames (either A1, A2 or both (and A3 if applicable))).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Chitrakar in to the system of Huang in order to include a circuitry constructs an Additional Authentication Data (AAD) and a Nonce that are used for cryptographical encapsulation of a MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) to form an encapsulated MPDU, wherein the AAD includes an Address 1 (A1) field, an Address 2 (A2) field, an Address 3 (A3) field and a Sequence Control (SC) field, and the Nonce includes an A2 field, wherein the SC field of the (see Chitrakar par. 0006).
Huang in view of Chitrakar does not explicitly discloses performing, by the second multi-link device, security verification on the management frame based on the second MIC and the first MIC in the received management frame.
However, in analogues art, Huang2 discloses performing, by the second multi-link device, security verification on the management frame based on the second MIC and the first MIC in the received management frame (see Huang2 pars. 0149-0156, The receiver updates each replay counter to corresponding value in the received AP Trigger frame if MIC verification passes. i) Based on corresponding transmitter address of the AP Trigger frame under multiple replay counter method. ii) Update under one replay counter method. AAD includes the following: Frame control; A1; A2; The following field are masked to 0: i) Retry subfield (bit 11) masked to 0; 2) Power Management subfield (bit 12) masked to 0; c)More Data subfield (bit 13) masked to 0. Initialization vector (IV) includes the following: A2; MPN. Include the following fields in AP Trigger frame: MPN; Key ID; MIC. i) MIC is calculated over the concatenation of AAD and all fields in front of the MIC field. A method may include or not include the above fields and signal to the receiver. Replay detection: Identify the transmitter address of the Trigger frame if needed; Find corresponding stored MPN and MIGTK; Drop the frame if: i) MPN in the AP Trigger frame is smaller than equal to the stored MPN; Maintain replay attack statistics counter for each MPN. i) Increase the counter by 1 if replay is detected. MIC verification: Maintain MIC error statistics counter for each MPN; i) Increase the counter by 1 if MIC verification fails).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Huang2 in to the system of Huang and Chitrakar in order to include for receiver initializes each replay counter to corresponding value distributed by the associated AP. The receiver updates each replay counter to corresponding value in the received AP Trigger frame if MIC verification passes (see Huang2 pars. 0148-0149).
Regarding claim 10, Huang in view of Chitrakar in further view of Huang2 discloses the method according to claim 7,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, the second address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that sends the management frame; for uplink transmission, the second address carries an MAC address of an AP that receives the management frame; and the AP is affiliated with the AP multi-link device (MLD) (see Huang pars. 0158, and 0163-0164, For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). a device (e.g., the user device(s) 120 and/or the AP 102 of FIG. 1) may determine a multi-link communication with a first multi-link device comprising two or more links associated with two or more station devices (STAs) included in the first multi-link device. the device may determine a first medium access control (MAC) address associated with a first link of the two or more links).
Regarding claim 11, Huang in view of Chitrakar in further view of Huang2 discloses the method according to claim 7,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of a non-access point station (non-AP STA) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of an access point (AP) of a transmit end; or for uplink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of an access point (AP) of the receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of a non-access point station (non-AP STA) of the transmit end; and the transmit end is the first multi-link device, and the receive end is the second multi-link device (see Huang pars. 0158, 0161, and 0163-0164, For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device). a Multi-link non-AP device may also have rules to take protected management frame using IGTK in a specific link at one time rather than all the links. This specific link may be changed through an additional mechanism, a device (e.g., the user device(s) 120 and/or the AP 102 of FIG. 1) may determine a multi-link communication with a first multi-link device comprising two or more links associated with two or more station devices (STAs) included in the first multi-link device. the device may determine a first medium access control (MAC) address associated with a first link of the two or more links).
Regarding claim 12, Huang in view of Chitrakar in further view of Huang2 discloses the method according to claim 7,
Huang further discloses wherein for downlink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of a non-access point multi-link device (non-AP MLD) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of an access point multi-link device (AP MLD) of a transmit end; or for uplink transmission, an address carried in the address 1 is an MAC address of an access point multi-link device (AP MLD) of a receive end, and an address carried in the address 2 is an MAC address of a non-access point multi-link device (non-AP MLD) of a transmit end; and the transmit end is the first multi-link device, and the receive end is the second multi-link device (see Huang pars. 0086-0090, 0158, after an IGTK is generated, an IGTKSA (IGTK security association) is formed, and it includes the following information, Direction vector (whether the IGTK is used for transmit or receive), Key ID, IGTK, Authenticator MAC address. For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 and receiver device address for A1. The BSSID used in A3 is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device)).
Regarding claim 19, Huang discloses a second multi-link device, comprising:
“a memory storing programming instructions” (Fig. 14, Memory 1408); and
one or more processors (Fig. 14 Processing Circuitry 1406) coupled to the memory, wherein the one or more processors are configured to execute the programming instructions stored in the memory, to enable the second multi-link device to perform steps of:
“receiving a management frame from a first multi-link device on a link on which a station in the second multi-link device operates, wherein the management frame comprises a receiver address, a transmitter address, a first address, and first message integrity check MIC” (see Huang pars. 0024, 0158, Management frame protection introduced a new Key Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) which would provide an integrity check by creating a message integrity code (MIC) and a new algorithm—Broadcast Integrity Protocol (BIP) for protection of Broadcast and Multicast frames. Unicast Management frames would be encrypted using the same pairwise transient keys. For different MAC addresses on WM, the definition of AAD may be changed by using transmitter device address for A2 (address 2) and receiver device address for A1 (address 1). The BSSID used in A3 (second address) is also replaced with the device address of the multi-link device 1 with STAs as AP (multi-link AP device));
“generating second MIC based on the AAD” (see Huang par. 0058, 0159, Step 2 is to generate pairwise transient key (PTK), group temporal key (GTK), and integrity group temporal key (IGTK). This step uses the 4-way handshake utilizing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPOL-key) frame introduced in FIG. 4. Option 2: different IGTKSA/IGTK across links: to enable negotiation of different GTK/GTKSA across links in one exchange, information of different links can be put in the EAPOL-key frame to enable negotiation of different IGTK/IGTKSA.);
Huang does not explicitly discloses wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address; constructing additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3.
However, in analogues art, Chitrakar discloses wherein the first address of the management frame is carried in an address 3 field of the management frame, the first address carries a media access control (MAC) address of an access point (AP) that transmits the management frame, and the AP is affiliated with an AP multi-link device (MLD), and wherein the first address is the same as the second address (see Chitrakar pars. 0073-0075, 0051, In accordance with the first embodiment, A1 field 804 and A2 field 806 in AAD 802 are set to the MAC address of the receiving MLD (i.e. MLD-RA) and MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA) respectively. In MPDUs in which A3 is set to BSSID (e.g. Data frames with To/From DS=0; or management frames), if the BSSID of Link 2 is different, A3 (which is set to the BSSID in such frames; the BSSID typically being the same as the AP MLD's MAC address on that link) is also changed to MLD-TA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-TA) if the transmitter is AP MLD and MLD-RA (or the BSSID for that link if it is different from MLD-RA) if the transmitter is non-AP MLD. Further, A2 field 808 in the Nonce 810 is set to the MAC address of the transmitting MLD (i.e. MLD-TA). The A2 field of the received MPDU is checked before switching to MLD MAC address to verify the identity of the transmitting STA (i.e. A2 field of the received MPDU should indicate the MAC address of the transmitting STA affiliated with the peer MLD). The A1 field of the received MPDU would already have been checked during receive frame filtering. IEEE 802.11be may mandate separate MAC addresses to be used per link or it is also possible that different links are allowed to use the same MAC address); constructing additional authentication data (AAD), wherein the AAD comprises an address 1, an address 2, and a second address carried in an address 3 (see Chitrakar Abstract, par. 0075, As a variation, instead of using MLD-TA and MLD-RA, AP may also provide the MAC addresses to use for the A1, A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) during the construction of AAD and Nonce to non-AP STA e.g. during 4-way, group key handshake or using some management frame exchange. This may also be useful for single link STAs that use dynamic MAC addresses (e.g. MAC randomization) wherein the addresses change between an initial transmission and a retransmission. The provided MAC addresses are then used to construct the AAD and Nonce instead of the various address fields of the protected MPDU. If the Aland A2 fields (and A3 field if applicable) used in AAD and Nonce are always fixed, even after change of MAC addresses in the retransmitted frames (either A1, A2 or both (and A3 if applicable))).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Chitrakar in to the system of Huang in order to include a circuitry constructs an Additional Authentication Data (AAD) and a Nonce that are used for cryptographical encapsulation of a MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) to form an encapsulated MPDU, wherein the AAD includes an Address 1 (A1) field, an Address 2 (A2) field, an Address 3 (A3) field and a Sequence Control (SC) field, and the Nonce includes an A2 field, wherein the SC field of the (see Chitrakar par. 0006).
Huang in view of Chitrakar does not explicitly discloses performing security verification on the management frame based on the second MIC and the first MIC in the received management frame.
However, in analogues art, Huang2 discloses performing security verification on the management frame based on the second MIC and the first MIC in the received management frame (see Huang2 pars. 0149-0156, The receiver updates each replay counter to corresponding value in the received AP Trigger frame if MIC verification passes. i) Based on corresponding transmitter address of the AP Trigger frame under multiple replay counter method. ii) Update under one replay counter method. AAD includes the following: Frame control; A1; A2; The following field are masked to 0: i) Retry subfield (bit 11) masked to 0; 2) Power Management subfield (bit 12) masked to 0; c)More Data subfield (bit 13) masked to 0. Initialization vector (IV) includes the following: A2; MPN. Include the following fields in AP Trigger frame: MPN; Key ID; MIC. i) MIC is calculated over the concatenation of AAD and all fields in front of the MIC field. A method may include or not include the above fields and signal to the receiver. Replay detection: Identify the transmitter address of the Trigger frame if needed; Find corresponding stored MPN and MIGTK; Drop the frame if: i) MPN in the AP Trigger frame is smaller than equal to the stored MPN; Maintain replay attack statistics counter for each MPN. i) Increase the counter by 1 if replay is detected. MIC verification: Maintain MIC error statistics counter for each MPN; i) Increase the counter by 1 if MIC verification fails).
Therefore it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the application to incorporate the teachings of Huang2 in to the system of Huang and Chitrakar in order to include for receiver initializes each replay counter to corresponding value distributed by the associated AP. The receiver updates each replay counter to corresponding value in the received AP Trigger frame if MIC verification passes (see Huang2 pars. 0148-0149).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/SAMUEL AMBAYE/Examiner, Art Unit 2433
/JEFFREY C PWU/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2433