Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
Claims 1-18 and 27-29 are pending in the instant application.
Claims 19-26 have been canceled.
Information Disclosure Statement
The Information Disclosure Statement received May 28th, 2026 has been fully considered by the examiner, except where marked with a strikethrough.
Withdrawn Objections/Rejections
The objections to the abstract are hereby withdrawn.
Applicant’s amendment is sufficient to overcome the rejection of Claims 6, 17, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). These rejections are hereby withdrawn.
Applicant’s amendment is sufficient to overcome the rejection of Claim 27 under 35 U.S.C. 112(d). This rejection is hereby withdrawn.
Applicant’s amendment is sufficient to overcome the rejection of Claims 1-2, 9-11, 14-18, and 27-28 under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). These rejections are hereby withdrawn.
Applicant’s amendment is sufficient to overcome the rejection of Claims 1, 17-18, and 27-28 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting. This rejection is hereby withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The rejection of Claims 1-16, 18, and 27-28 under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) is maintained.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-16, 18, and 27-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for a compound of formula (I) in which R1 is independently H, C1-3-alkyl, pivaloyloxymethyl, benzyloxymethyl, or a cation selected from Na+ or NH4+ and R2 is substituted phenyl wherein substituted phenyl is 4-thiomethylphenyl, 3-fluorophenyl, 4-fluorophenyl, 4-methylphenyl, 4-trifluromethylphenyl, 3-chlorophenyl, 4-chlorophenyl, 4-methoxyphenyl, 4-t-butylphenyl, 3,5-dichlorophenyl, 3,4-dichlorophenyl, or 1-napthyl, 2-napthyl, or 4-pyridinyl, does not reasonably provide enablement for a compound of formula (I) in which R1 or R2 are otherwise defined. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.
Applicant traverses this rejection, stating in the remarks filed June 3rd, 2026, at Page 12, Fifth Paragraph, “Applicant respectfully asserts one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would have been able to make a compound of formula (I), as broadly recited in claims 1 and 2, without undue experimentation when reviewing the disclosures of the as-filed specification including, for example, reaction schemes 1-4, Tables 1 and 2, and the Examples of the Application.”
The Examiner does not find this argument persuasive.
Applicant has not sufficiently taught synthesis of a breadth of compounds to be enabling for the scope of the Markush group claimed. For example, R1, as recited, can be defined as a plurality of cyclic groups, including cycloalkyl and aryl moieties. No examples have been provided, for example, of any cycloalkyl group in the R1 position. A person having ordinary skill in the art would recognize the synthesis of compounds bearing cyclic systems introduces steric strain, and is not necessarily predictable. In the absence of the teaching or suggestion of a method to make the compounds bearing these moieties, a person having ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably expect success in generating these compounds. For clarity, the Wands factors, as deliberated in the non-final office action mailed January 27th, 2026, are revisited below.
Pursuant to In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988), one considers the following factors to determine whether undue experimentation is required: (1) The breadth of the claims, (2) The nature of the invention, (3) The state of the prior art, (4) The level of one of ordinary skill, (5) The level of predictability in the art, (6) The amount of direction provided by the inventor, (7) The existence of working examples and (8) The quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure.
Nature of the invention:
The invention is drawn to a compound of formula (I), wherein formula (I) is:
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Breadth of the invention:
The scope of the claimed invention is very broad, as it is drawn to any compound of the above formula, allowing for myriad combinations of the variables as defined.
State of the prior art and predictability in the art:
The invention is directed to a genus of compounds, and therefore is chemical in nature. Per MPEP 2164.03, “The “predictability or lack thereof” in the art refers to the ability of one skilled in the art to extrapolate the disclosed or known results to the claimed invention. If one skilled in the art can readily anticipate the effect of a change within the subject matter to which the claimed invention pertains, then there is predictability in the art. On the other hand, if one skilled in the art cannot readily anticipate the effect of a change within the subject matter to which that claimed invention pertains, then there is lack of predictability in the art. Accordingly, what is known in the art provides evidence as to the question of predictability. In particular, the court in In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24, 169 USPQ 367, 369-70 (CCPA 1971), stated:
[I]n the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the well-known unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim. This will especially be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific principles. Most often, additional factors, such as the teachings in pertinent references, will be available to substantiate any doubts that the asserted scope of objective enablement is in fact commensurate with the scope of protection sought and to support any demands based thereon for proof. [Footnote omitted.]
The scope of the required enablement varies inversely with the degree of predictability involved, but even in unpredictable arts, a disclosure of every operable species is not required. A single embodiment may provide broad enablement in cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements. In re Vickers, 141 F. 2d 522, 526-27, 61 USPQ 122, 127 (CCPA 1944); In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734, 169 USPQ 298, 301 (CCPA 1971). However, in applications directed to inventions in arts where the results are unpredictable, the disclosure of a single species usually does not provide an adequate basis to support generic claims. In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 624, 38 USPQ 189, 191 (CCPA 1938). In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, more may be required. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970) (contrasting mechanical and electrical elements with chemical reactions and physiological activity). See also In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This is because in art areas having a high degree of uncertainty (i.e. the unpredictable arts) it is not reasonably predictable from the disclosure of one species, what other species will work.”
Level of ordinary skill in the art:
An ordinary artisan in the area of drug development would have experience in synthesizing chemical compounds for particular activities. The synthesis of new drug candidates, while complex, is routine in the art. The process of finding new drugs that have in vitro activity against a particular biological target (i.e., receptor, enzyme, etc.) is well known. Additionally, while high throughput screening assays can be employed, developing a therapeutic method, as claimed, prior to synthesizing and testing compounds is generally not well-known or routine, given the complexity of certain biological systems.
The amount of direction provided and working examples:
The compound core depicted with specific substituents represents a narrow subgenus for which applicant has provided sufficient guidance to make and use; however, the disclosure is not sufficient to allow extrapolation of the limited examples to enable the scope of the compounds instantly claimed. Applicant has provided no working example of any compound of formula (I) in which R1 and R2 were not defined as noted above in the instant application.
Within the specification, “specific operative embodiments or examples of the invention must be set forth. Examples and description should be of sufficient scope as to justify the scope of the claims.”
Markush claims must be provided with support in the disclosure for each member of the Markush group. Where the constitution and formula of a chemical compound is stated only as a probability or speculation, the disclosure is not sufficient to support claims identifying the compound by such composition or formula. See MPEP 608.01(p).
MPEP § 2164.01(a) states, “A conclusion of lack of enablement means that, based on the evidence regarding each of the above factors, the specification, at the time the application was filed, would not have taught one skilled in the art how to make and/or use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993).” That conclusion is clearly justified here that Applicant is not enabled for making these compounds.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
The rejection of Claims 1-2 under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention is maintained.
Claims 1-2 stand rejected due to the recitation of the phrase “e.g.” rendering the claims indefinite because it is unclear whether the limitation(s) following the phrase are part of the claimed invention. See MPEP § 2173.05(d).
In the remarks filed June 3rd, 2026, at Page 13, Second Paragraph, Applicant states “claims 1 and 2 have been amended to no longer recite this phrase.”
This is not true. This phrase appears at Lines 7 and 8 of Claim 1 and at Line 8 of Claim 2. Therefore, this rejection is maintained.
The following rejections are necessitated by amendment:
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-2, 14-16, 18, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
The MPEP states that the purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application, of the specific subject matter later claimed. The courts have stated that, “To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention.” Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1977); In re Gostelli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written description requirement “by describing the claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572, 41 USPQD at 1966.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 43 USPQ2d 1398.
Further, for a broad generic claim, the specification must provide adequate written description to identify the genus of the claim. In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. the court stated that, “A written description of an invention involving a chemical genus, like a description of a chemical species, ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name,’ of the claimed subject matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials.” Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 USPQ2d 1601; In re Smythe, 480 F. 2d 1376, 1383, 178 USPQ 279, 284985 (CCPA 1973) (“In other cases, particularly but not necessarily, chemical cases, where there is unpredictability in performance of a certain species or subcombinations other than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in the art may be found to not have been placed in possession of a genus …”) Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 43 USPQ2d 1398.
The MPEP lists factors that can be used to determine if sufficient evidence of possession has been furnished in the disclosure of the Application. These include level of skill and knowledge in the art partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics alone or coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between structure and function, and the method of making the claimed invention. Disclosure of any combination of such identifying characteristics that distinguish the claimed invention from other materials and would lead one of skill in the art to the conclusion that the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus is sufficient. See MPEP § 2163. While all of the factors have been considered, a sufficient amount for a prima facie case are discussed below.
The amendment to Claims 1 and 2 introduces the proviso that “(i) not more than one R1 is H”. This proviso is not supported in the instant specification with respect to compounds of formula (I), and therefore this limitation introduces new matter. Dependent Claims 14-16, 18, and 27 do not overcome this issue of new matter, and therefore are included in the rejection.
Applicant is required to cancel the new matter in the reply to this office action.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claim 17 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Conclusion
Claims 1-16, 18, and 27-28 are rejected.
Claim 17 is objected to.
No claim is allowed.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
/D.J.B./ Examiner, Art Unit 1624
/JEFFREY H MURRAY/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1624
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