DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
Claims 1-6 filed on 09/26/2025 are presently examined. Claims 1 and 2 are amended.
Response to Arguments
Regarding 112(f), control unit has been amended to recite “controller” and thus does not invoke 112(f) interpretation. The amendment of “external information acquisition unit” to “vehicle-mounted device” still invokes 112(f). See Claim Interpretation for more details.
Regarding 35 USC 103, Applicant's arguments filed 09/26/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argues the prior art of record does not disclose or suggest a start time of shift control for changing the torque. Examiner disagrees. Start time is broad, and is interpreted under broadest reasonable interpretation. The prior art starts shift control immediately after the torque calculations are finished. The start time is therefore after calculations are complete. It does not adjust the torque until then. The start time is “immediate.”
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. The following is a list of non-structural generic placeholders that may invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f): "mechanism for," "module for," "device for," "unit for," "component for," "element for," "member for," "apparatus for," "machine for," or "system for," see MPEP 2181(I)(A).
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are:
“a vehicle-mounted device that acquires” in claim 2 is described in the specification as [0016] “The vehicle external information acquisition unit 5 is a vehicle-mounted device such as a sensor or a camera, and acquires vehicle external information.”
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. Examiner kindly suggests using the specification-supported term “sensor.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1, 2, and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Osugi (JP2018033290A), in view of Koebler et al. (US 10882416 B2) and Yamamoto (US 11942884 B2), hereinafter referred to as Osugi, Koebler, and Yamamoto, respectively.
Regarding Claim 1, Osugi discloses A vehicle system comprising:
a plurality of drive sources that generate torque for braking and driving a drive wheel of a vehicle ([0012] “The front wheel motor 5 and the rear wheel motor 6 of this embodiment are motor/generators capable of generating driving force for running and also capable of performing regenerative braking.”); and
a controller that controls the torque, wherein at least one of the drive sources is an electric motor ([0014] “The front wheel inverter 7 and the rear wheel inverter 8 are controlled by the ECU 1” [0010] “The electric vehicle of this embodiment can run using a motor driven by an on-board battery”), and
Osugi discloses determining whether the rotation speed of the motors are within predetermined ranges that correspond to their respective resonant frequencies ([0021] “ECU 1 determines whether the current rotation speed of the front wheel motor 5 is within a predetermined range (front wheel resonant rotation speed range) that includes the rotation speed corresponding to the resonant frequency of the front wheel motor 5 [0022] “ECU 1 then determines whether the current rotation speed of the rear wheel motor 6 is within another predetermined range (rear wheel resonant rotation speed range) that includes the rotation speed corresponding to the resonant frequency of the rear wheel motor 6”)
Osugi fails to disclose the controller predicts a rotation speed of the electric motor after a current rotation speed.
However, Koebler teaches the controller predicts a rotation speed of the electric motor after a current rotation speed ([see FIG. 4B] step 425 “predict motor rpm and torque”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to modify Osugi with Kobler’s teaching of predicting motor RPM. One would be motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to predict motor RPM in order to optimize power to the engine ([column 2, lines 6-7] “the overall fuel efficiency (regardless of the type of fuel), can be improved by optimizing the power supplied to the engine.”).
Osugi discloses determines, based on the rotation speed, a start time of shift control for changing the torque to a predetermined torque limit value ([see at least 0025] this paragraphs describes how vibration may occur during regenerative braking and how the torques of the motor(s) may be adjusted to suppress any vibration or resonance. [Also see FIG. 3].).
Osugi fails to explicitly disclose determines, based on the predicted rotation speed, a start time of shift control for changing the torque to a predetermined torque limit value.
However, Yamamoto teaches determine, based on the predicted rotation speed, a start time of shift control for changing the torque to a predetermined torque limit value ([column 5, lines 16-19] “determine an estimated motor rotational speed by a vehicle model to which an output torque command is inputted” [column 5, lines 22-36] disturbance torque is determined based on deviation of measured rotational speed and estimated rotational speed. Torque command is sent through a vibration suppression filter using the estimated motor-accelerating torque value, and determines the output torque command based on subtracting the compensation torque from the torque command.).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to modify Osugi with Yamamoto’s teaching of cyclically adjusting the torque which would have caused vibration by subtracting it from a torque value sent through a vibration suppression filter based on the estimated motor rotational speed determined from an estimated motor-accelerating torque value. One would be motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to limit the torque of a motor in order to suppress vibration thereby improving ride comfort ([column 3, lines 26-34] “provide a vibration suppression control device for a vehicle system … using motor speed information, suppressing vibrations due to resonance and thereby improving ride comfort of the vehicle.”).
Regarding Claim 2, Osugi fails to explicitly disclose The vehicle system according to claim 1, further comprising a vehicle-mounted device that acquires external information of the vehicle, wherein the controller predicts the rotation speed of the electric motor based on the external information.
However, Koebler teaches a vehicle external information acquisition unit that acquires external information of the vehicle, wherein the control unit predicts the rotation speed of the electric motor based on the external information ([column 3 lines 45-65] external information is used in the applied power for the motor determinations, which includes the predicted RPM.).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to modify Osugi with Koebler’s teaching of using external information to predict future motor power and RPM. One would be motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to predict the future RPM in order to optimize power supplied to the engine ([column 2, lines 6-7] “the overall fuel efficiency (regardless of the type of fuel), can be improved by optimizing the power supplied to the engine.”).
Regarding Claim 5, Osugi discloses The vehicle system according to claim 1, wherein the drive sources brake and drive a front wheel and a rear wheel of the vehicle ([0024] “the front wheel motor 5 and … the rear wheel motor 6”).
Claims 3-4, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Osugi in view of Koebler and Yamamoto, further in view of Koga et al. (JP 2020058156 A), hereinafter referred to as Koga.
Regarding Claim 3, Osugi discloses The vehicle system according to claim 1, wherein the shift control is started when the rotation speed of the electric motor reaches a predetermined resonance region ([0021] “When the current rotation speed of the front wheel motor 5 falls within the front wheel resonant rotation speed range (S17: YES), the ECU 1 distributes the required regenerative amount to the front wheel regenerative braking amount RBf and the rear wheel regenerative braking amount RBr at a second distribution ratio” [0007] “This reduces the amplitude of the target motor when it resonates, making it possible to reduce noise caused by the resonance of the target motor.”).
Osugi fails to explicitly disclose the shift control is started before the rotation speed of the electric motor reaches a predetermined resonance region.
However, Koga teaches the shift control is started before the rotation speed of the electric motor reaches a predetermined resonance region ([0007] “reduces torque vibrations of the left shaft and the right shaft based on the difference between a first rotational speed of the left motor and a second rotational speed of the right motor” [0053] “the feedback correction amount is calculated so that the differential value of the difference between the first rotation speed and the second rotation speed becomes small” differential value being the derivative of both motor rotation speeds [0009] “models resonance characteristics of the left shaft and the right shaft and the required left shaft torque and the required right shaft torque.” [0027] “predicting the vibration state of the left shaft 3 and the right shaft 4 using a torque transmission model prepared in advance, vibration caused by the torque difference can be suppressed before it occurs,”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to modify Osugi with Koga’s teaching of adjusting torque using a prediction of the vibration state. One would be motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to adjust torque using a prediction of the vibration state in order to suppress vibration before it occurs ([0027] “vibration caused by the torque difference can be suppressed before it occurs”).
Regarding Claim 4, Osugi discloses The vehicle system according to claim 3, wherein the drive sources include a first electric motor and a second electric motor that brake and drive different drive wheels of the vehicle, and the resonance region for the first electric motor and the resonance region for the second electric motor are set so as not to overlap each other ([0024] “The resonant frequency of the front wheel motor 5 and the resonant frequency of the rear wheel motor 6 are different, and the front wheel resonant speed range and the rear wheel resonant speed range do not have an overlapping region.”).
Regarding Claim 6, Osugi fails to explicitly disclose The vehicle system according to claim 1, wherein the drive sources brake and drive a left wheel and a right wheel of the vehicle.
However, Koga teaches the drive sources brake and drive a left wheel and a right wheel of the vehicle ([0063] “a left motor 6 that transmits driving force to the left wheel 1 via the left axle 3, and a right motor 7 that transmits driving force to the right wheel 2 via the right axle 4”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to modify Osugi with Koga’s teaching of two electric drive sources on the left and right wheels. One would be motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to include drive sources on the left and right wheels in order to prevent a predicted vibration before it occurs between the left and right shafts (Koga [0027] “by predicting the vibration state of the left shaft 3 and the right shaft 4 using a torque transmission model prepared in advance, vibration caused by the torque difference can be suppressed before it occurs”).
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MARK R HEIM whose telephone number is (571)270-0120. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9-6 EST.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Fadey Jabr can be reached at 571-272-1516. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/M.R.H./Examiner, Art Unit 3668
/Fadey S. Jabr/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3668
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