DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 1-2, 4, 6-9, 11-13 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Yang et al. (US 2020/0137580 A1) (Yang herein after).
Re Claim 1, Yang discloses an operating method of an intelligent transport systems (ITS)-related apparatus related to a vulnerable road user (VRU) in a wireless communication system, the operating method comprising:
receiving, by the ITS-related apparatus, a report related to a VRU awareness message (VAM) (misbehavior detection engine 215 may both send reports of detected anomalous messages to other systems, as well as receive similar anomalous message reports (or “misbehavior reports”) from nearby roadway systems (e.g., on 110, 115, 160, 165, etc.) using respective misbehavior detection logic. Instances of misbehavior detected by a collection of roadway systems may be tracked at individual roadway systems (e.g., in watchlist data 268) and external, administrative systems (e.g., misbehavior authority system 250). In some implementations, an example misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems [0049]);
determining, by the ITS-related apparatus, whether a VAM transceiver is malfunctioning based on the report (misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems. In some implementations, when the number of misbehavior reports reported by nearby systems identifying anomalous behavior by a particular roadway system exceeds a threshold (e.g., a number or rate of anomalous identifications of a particular object, a number or rate of safety messages sent by a particular roadway system that include anomalous information, etc.) [0049]); and
revoking a certificate of the VAM transceiver based on determination that the VAM transceiver is malfunctioning (trust engine 275 to determine whether trust in a particular certificate should be revoked, for instance, based on repeated misbehaviors reported by various roadway systems through corresponding misbehavior reports 285. In some implementations, a trust engine 275 may be utilized to determined that a particular certificate has been compromised by a malicious actor (based on repeated misbehavior reports) and the certificate manager may revoke or cancel the certificate based on the determined malfeasance. When revoked, the roadway system that holds the certificate may be unable to engage in trusted communications with other roadway systems (without having a valid certificate), thereby causing a compromised roadway system to be isolated and universally ignored [0051]),
wherein the ITS-related apparatus transmits a message for switching the VAM transceiver to a temporarily invalid (TI) state (watchlist data, [0048]) based on a detection feature related to inconsistency of VRU information, satisfying a predetermined detection evidence level (watchlist (embodied in watchlist data 268) may be maintained to track other roadway systems, which the roadway system 205 has detected (e.g., using local misbehavior detection logic (e.g., 220, 222, 224, 226)) as the source of a suspicious message. As not all anomalies may be malicious and anomalies may instead result from outlying errors in the sensors, perception logic, and/or communication channels used by the source roadway system, in some cases, the sending of a single anomalous safety message may not immediately remedial action. However, through watchlist data 268, multiple instances of anomalous data originating from a given source roadway system may result in future messages from this roadway system being untrusted [0048]).
Re Claim 2, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 1, wherein the detection feature related to the inconsistency of the VRU information includes a situation in which the VAM transceiver is located in a dangerous area ([0060]) but a VRU of the VAM transceiver is not adjacent to the VAM transceiver (information reported within an example V2X safety message may place the location of the sending vehicle within an area detected as free by the receiving vehicle's sensors (and recorded in corresponding track data). As a result, the roadway system of the receiving vehicle may determine an anomaly or inconsistency within the content of the received message. The inconsistency (and roadway system responsible for the inconsistency) may then be tracked (e.g., using a watchlist) to determine repeat instances of the same (or different) inconsistencies in messages sent by the sender. Remedial actions may be taken, including messaging a misbehavior authority system, which may potentially revoke the communication privileges of the source system based on misbehavior report messages reporting the inconsistencies [0067]).
Re Claim 4, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 1, wherein, in the TI state, the VAM of the VAM transceiver is excluded from a VRU protection-related procedure of the ITS-related apparatus (watchlist data 268 may include blacklists, which identify specific roadway systems, which through multiple suspicious messages, have been deemed to be compromised and untrustworthy. Accordingly, a roadway system 205 may ignore information in messages detected as originating from such blacklisted sources [0048]).
Re Claim 6, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 1, wherein the predetermined detection evidence level is one of reception of the report, additional reception of the VAM from the same VAM transceiver, reception of the VAM from a neighboring device of the VAM transceiver, reception of the VAM from the neighboring device of the VAM transceiver and reception of sensor information, and reception of the VAM from the neighboring device of the VAM transceiver, reception of the sensor information, and reception of a cooperative perception service (CPS) or a decentralized environmental notification (DENM) (when the number of misbehavior reports reported by nearby systems identifying anomalous behavior by a particular roadway system exceeds a threshold (e.g., a number or rate of anomalous identifications of a particular object, a number or rate of safety messages sent by a particular roadway system that include anomalous information, etc.) [0049]).
Re Claim 7, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 6, wherein the sensor information is one or more of information related to inertia, atmospheric pressure, a path, and a location acquired through a sensor included in the VAM transceiver (wherein the predetermined detection evidence level is one of reception of the report, the receiving roadway system compares the calculated divergence, or value d with a predefined threshold T. For instance, if d>T, and this is the first time the BSM deviates from the MT, the receiver computes a time tolerance δt, corresponding to the amount of time (or number of subsequent messages) a given sender's BSMs may remain “anomalous” (e.g., outside the acceptable statistical distance from the ground truth determined using sensors and perception logic of the roadway system) [0075]).
Re Claim 8, Yang discloses an intelligent transport systems (ITS)-related apparatus related to a vulnerable road user (VRU) in a wireless communication system, the ITS-related apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and at least one computer memory operably connected to the at least one processor and storing instructions that, when executed, cause the at least one processor to perform operations (processor, [0095]), wherein the operations comprise:
receiving a report related to a VRU awareness message (VAM) (misbehavior detection engine 215 may both send reports of detected anomalous messages to other systems, as well as receive similar anomalous message reports (or “misbehavior reports”) from nearby roadway systems (e.g., on 110, 115, 160, 165, etc.) using respective misbehavior detection logic. Instances of misbehavior detected by a collection of roadway systems may be tracked at individual roadway systems (e.g., in watchlist data 268) and external, administrative systems (e.g., misbehavior authority system 250). In some implementations, an example misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems [0049]);
determining whether a VAM transceiver is malfunctioning based on the report (misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems. In some implementations, when the number of misbehavior reports reported by nearby systems identifying anomalous behavior by a particular roadway system exceeds a threshold (e.g., a number or rate of anomalous identifications of a particular object, a number or rate of safety messages sent by a particular roadway system that include anomalous information, etc.) [0049]); and
revoking a certificate of the VAM transceiver based on determination that the VAM transceiver is malfunctioning (trust engine 275 to determine whether trust in a particular certificate should be revoked, for instance, based on repeated misbehaviors reported by various roadway systems through corresponding misbehavior reports 285. In some implementations, a trust engine 275 may be utilized to determined that a particular certificate has been compromised by a malicious actor (based on repeated misbehavior reports) and the certificate manager may revoke or cancel the certificate based on the determined malfeasance. When revoked, the roadway system that holds the certificate may be unable to engage in trusted communications with other roadway systems (without having a valid certificate), thereby causing a compromised roadway system to be isolated and universally ignored [0051]),
wherein the ITS-related apparatus transmits a message for switching the VAM transceiver to a temporarily invalid (TI) state (watchlist data, [0048]) based on a detection feature related to inconsistency of VRU information, satisfying a predetermined detection evidence level (watchlist (embodied in watchlist data 268) may be maintained to track other roadway systems, which the roadway system 205 has detected (e.g., using local misbehavior detection logic (e.g., 220, 222, 224, 226)) as the source of a suspicious message. As not all anomalies may be malicious and anomalies may instead result from outlying errors in the sensors, perception logic, and/or communication channels used by the source roadway system, in some cases, the sending of a single anomalous safety message may not immediately remedial action. However, through watchlist data 268, multiple instances of anomalous data originating from a given source roadway system may result in future messages from this roadway system being untrusted [0048]).
Re Claim 9, Yang discloses the ITS-related apparatus of claim 8, wherein the detection feature related to the inconsistency of the VRU information includes a situation in which the VAM transceiver is located in a dangerous area but a VRU of the VAM transceiver is not adjacent to the VAM transceiver ([0060]) but a VRU of the VAM transceiver is not adjacent to the VAM transceiver (information reported within an example V2X safety message may place the location of the sending vehicle within an area detected as free by the receiving vehicle's sensors (and recorded in corresponding track data). As a result, the roadway system of the receiving vehicle may determine an anomaly or inconsistency within the content of the received message. The inconsistency (and roadway system responsible for the inconsistency) may then be tracked (e.g., using a watchlist) to determine repeat instances of the same (or different) inconsistencies in messages sent by the sender. Remedial actions may be taken, including messaging a misbehavior authority system, which may potentially revoke the communication privileges of the source system based on misbehavior report messages reporting the inconsistencies [0067]).
Re Claim 11, Yang discloses the ITS-related apparatus of claim 8, wherein, in the TI state, the VAM of the VAM transceiver is excluded from a VRU protection-related procedure of the ITS-related apparatus (watchlist data 268 may include blacklists, which identify specific roadway systems, which through multiple suspicious messages, have been deemed to be compromised and untrustworthy. Accordingly, a roadway system 205 may ignore information in messages detected as originating from such blacklisted sources [0048]).
Re Claim 12, Yang discloses an operating method of a vulnerable road user (VRU) awareness message (VAM) transceiver related to a VRU in a wireless communication system, the operating method comprising:
transmitting, by the VAM transceiver, a report related to a VAM (misbehavior detection engine 215 may both send reports of detected anomalous messages to other systems, as well as receive similar anomalous message reports (or “misbehavior reports”) from nearby roadway systems (e.g., on 110, 115, 160, 165, etc.) using respective misbehavior detection logic. Instances of misbehavior detected by a collection of roadway systems may be tracked at individual roadway systems (e.g., in watchlist data 268) and external, administrative systems (e.g., misbehavior authority system 250). In some implementations, an example misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems [0049]); and
receiving, by the VAM transceiver, information related to revocation of a certificate from an intelligent transport systems (ITS)-related apparatus determining that the VAM transceiver is malfunctioning based on the report (trust engine 275 to determine whether trust in a particular certificate should be revoked, for instance, based on repeated misbehaviors reported by various roadway systems through corresponding misbehavior reports 285. In some implementations, a trust engine 275 may be utilized to determined that a particular certificate has been compromised by a malicious actor (based on repeated misbehavior reports) and the certificate manager may revoke or cancel the certificate based on the determined malfeasance. When revoked, the roadway system that holds the certificate may be unable to engage in trusted communications with other roadway systems (without having a valid certificate), thereby causing a compromised roadway system to be isolated and universally ignored [0051]; the revocation may be carried out using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) including the target vehicle ID in it, among other example revocation techniques [0090]),
wherein the VAM transceiver is switched to a temporarily invalid (TI) state based on a detection feature related to inconsistency of VRU information, satisfying a predetermined detection evidence level (watchlist (embodied in watchlist data 268) may be maintained to track other roadway systems, which the roadway system 205 has detected (e.g., using local misbehavior detection logic (e.g., 220, 222, 224, 226)) as the source of a suspicious message. As not all anomalies may be malicious and anomalies may instead result from outlying errors in the sensors, perception logic, and/or communication channels used by the source roadway system, in some cases, the sending of a single anomalous safety message may not immediately remedial action. However, through watchlist data 268, multiple instances of anomalous data originating from a given source roadway system may result in future messages from this roadway system being untrusted [0048]).
Re Claim 13, Yang discloses a vulnerable road user (VRU) awareness message (VAM) transceiver related to a VRU in a wireless communication system, the VAM transceiver comprising: at least one processor; and at least one computer memory operably connected to the at least one processor and storing instructions that, when executed, cause the at least one processor to perform operations (processor, [0095]), wherein the operations comprise:
transmitting a report related to a VAM (misbehavior detection engine 215 may both send reports of detected anomalous messages to other systems, as well as receive similar anomalous message reports (or “misbehavior reports”) from nearby roadway systems (e.g., on 110, 115, 160, 165, etc.) using respective misbehavior detection logic. Instances of misbehavior detected by a collection of roadway systems may be tracked at individual roadway systems (e.g., in watchlist data 268) and external, administrative systems (e.g., misbehavior authority system 250). In some implementations, an example misbehavior detection engine 215 may include a collaborative anomaly detection engine 230, which may facilitate sharing of misbehavior reports between systems [0049]); and
receiving information related to revocation of a certificate from an intelligent transport systems (ITS)-related apparatus determining that the VAM transceiver is malfunctioning based on the report (trust engine 275 to determine whether trust in a particular certificate should be revoked, for instance, based on repeated misbehaviors reported by various roadway systems through corresponding misbehavior reports 285. In some implementations, a trust engine 275 may be utilized to determined that a particular certificate has been compromised by a malicious actor (based on repeated misbehavior reports) and the certificate manager may revoke or cancel the certificate based on the determined malfeasance. When revoked, the roadway system that holds the certificate may be unable to engage in trusted communications with other roadway systems (without having a valid certificate), thereby causing a compromised roadway system to be isolated and universally ignored [0051]; the revocation may be carried out using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) including the target vehicle ID in it, among other example revocation techniques [0090]), and
wherein the VAM transceiver is switched to a temporarily invalid (TI) state based on a detection feature related to inconsistency of VRU information, satisfying a predetermined detection evidence level (watchlist (embodied in watchlist data 268) may be maintained to track other roadway systems, which the roadway system 205 has detected (e.g., using local misbehavior detection logic (e.g., 220, 222, 224, 226)) as the source of a suspicious message. As not all anomalies may be malicious and anomalies may instead result from outlying errors in the sensors, perception logic, and/or communication channels used by the source roadway system, in some cases, the sending of a single anomalous safety message may not immediately remedial action. However, through watchlist data 268, multiple instances of anomalous data originating from a given source roadway system may result in future messages from this roadway system being untrusted [0048]).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 3, 10 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yang et al. (US 2020/0137580 A1) (Yang herein after) in view of Arzelier et al. (US 2021/0144003 A1) (Arzelier herein after).
Re Claim 3, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 1, except wherein, in the TI state, transmission of the VAM of the VAM transceiver is stopped.
However, Arzelier discloses a misbehavior warning in intelligent transportation systems wherein in response to transmitting the second misbehavior warning message and determining that the second ITS station is no longer misbehaving (e.g., stops sending out erroneous messages, or stops abstaining to send messages when it should), the network server removes the information of the second ITS station from the MWL, and the second ITS station is not placed on the CRL ([0021]).
Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Yang, by making use of the technique taught by Arzelier, in order to improve the transportation efficiency.
Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of intelligent transportation system, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Yang, nor does Yang teach away from the modification (Yang merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the method and system taught by Arzelier is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein, in the TI state, transmission of the VAM of the VAM transceiver is stopped.
Re Claim 10, Yang discloses the ITS-related apparatus of claim 8, except wherein, in the TI state, transmission of the VAM of the VAM transceiver is stopped.
However, Arzelier discloses a misbehavior warning in intelligent transportation systems wherein in response to transmitting the second misbehavior warning message and determining that the second ITS station is no longer misbehaving (e.g., stops sending out erroneous messages, or stops abstaining to send messages when it should), the network server removes the information of the second ITS station from the MWL, and the second ITS station is not placed on the CRL ([0021]).
Therefore, it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify method and system of Yang, by making use of the technique taught by Arzelier, in order to improve the transportation efficiency.
Both references are within the same field of telecommunication, and in particular of intelligent transportation system, the modification does not change a fundamental operating principle of Yang, nor does Yang teach away from the modification (Yang merely discloses a preferred embodiment). The combination has a reasonable expectation of success in that the modifications can be made using conventional and well known engineering and/or programming techniques, the method and system taught by Arzelier is not altered and continues to perform the same function as separately, and the resultant combination produces the highly predictable result of wherein, in the TI state, transmission of the VAM of the VAM transceiver is stopped.
Claim(s) 5 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yang et al. (US 2020/0137580 A1) (Yang herein after).
Re Claim 5, Yang discloses the operating method of claim 2, except wherein the TI state of the VAM transceiver is released based on the VAM transceiver leaving the dangerous area and a location of a user of the VAM transceiver being adjacent to the VAM transceiver.
However, Yang discloses if a suspect roadway system has been added to a watchlist based on a previous anomalous message, but subsequent messages do not contain inconsistencies or anomalies (e.g., where the initial anomaly was an outlier (e.g., due to a temporary inaccuracy of its localization algorithm), the suspect roadway system may be removed from the watchlist, and its BSM data may be fused with related MT track data ([0077]).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed to utilize the teaching taught by Yang to achieve the same expected result of wherein the TI state of the VAM transceiver is released based on the VAM transceiver leaving the dangerous area and a location of a user of the VAM transceiver being adjacent to the VAM transceiver due to normal design procedure for one skilled in the art to further improve system efficiency.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Yang et al. (US 2024/0323657 A1) – misbehavior detection using data consistency checks for collective perception message
Russell et al. (US 2021/0344513 A1) – method and system handling dynamic cybersecurity posture of a V2X entity
Zhu et al. (US 2021/0281986 A1) – vehicle-to-everything abnormal behavior detection method and system
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KENNETH T LAM whose telephone number is (571)270-1862. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8:30-5:00 PM.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hannah S. Wang can be reached at (571) 272-9018. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/KENNETH T LAM/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2631