CTNF 18/573,793 CTNF 75023 DETAILED ACTION Claims 1-15 have been examined. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status 07-03-aia AIA 15-10-aia The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101 07-04-01 AIA 07-04 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The invention, as taught in Claims 1-15, is directed to “ mental steps ” and “ mathematical steps ” without significantly more. The claims recite: • generate a feature vector based at least partially on input data • a feature vector • global model parameters • input data • perform a task based at least partially on the feature vector and on task performing model parameters • perform a first task based at least partially on first task performing model parameters • the first task performing model using the training data • modifying the global model parameters and the first task performing model parameters so that a loss value calculated from a loss function is minimized • reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters • reward modifications of the global model parameters • penalize modifications of the global model parameters Claim 1 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computer system comprising a plurality of edge devices, wherein…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “ mental steps ” and “ mathematical steps ”: • generate a feature vector based at least partially on input data • a feature vector • global model parameters • input data • perform a task based at least partially on the feature vector and on task performing model parameters • perform a first task based at least partially on first task performing model parameters • the first task performing model using the training data • modifying the global model parameters and the first task performing model parameters so that a loss value calculated from a loss function is minimized • reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters • reward modifications of the global model parameters • penalize modifications of the global model parameters Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “computer system”/“plurality of edge devices” (2) A “shared global model”/“shared global model”/“task performing model” (3) A “receive the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the edge device”/“receiving a new set of training data for a first edge device” (4) A “training or a re-training”/“training the shared global model” (1) A “computer system”/“plurality of edge devices” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. This “computer system”/“plurality of edge devices” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “shared global model”/“shared global model”/“task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “shared global model”/“shared global model”/“task performing model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “receive the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the edge device”/“receiving a new set of training data for a first edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim . Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity . This “receive the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the edge device”/“receiving a new set of training data for a first edge device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “training or a re-training”/“training the shared global model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “training or a re-training”/“training the shared global model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “computer system”/“plurality of edge devices” (2) A “shared global model”/“shared global model”/“task performing model” (3) A “receive the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the edge device”/“receiving a new set of training data for a first edge device” (4) A “training or a re-training”/“training the shared global model” (1) A “computer system”/“plurality of edge devices” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M. Note that Applicant's “edge device” is defined in the Specification, as follows: The central server (if present) as well as each edge device is a computing device comprising a processing unit connected to a memory (see in particular Fig. 8 and the parts of this description related thereto). Thus, each “edge device” is a generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional “computer.” Note further that M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer . As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible . Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 ( warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art” ). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “ claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer ” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept . Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “shared global model”/“shared global model”/“task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the models to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Note that Applicant's Specification defines the models to be trained as follows: A machine learning model can e.g. be or comprise an artificial neural network . An artificial neural network (ANN) is a biologically inspired computational model. An ANN usually comprises at least three layers of processing elements: a first layer with input neurons, an Nth layer with at least one output neuron, and N-2 inner layers, where N is a natural number greater than 2. In such a network, the input neurons serve to receive the input data. The output neurons serve to generate an output, e.g. a result. The processing elements of the layers are interconnected in a predetermined pattern with predetermined connection weights therebetween. Each network node can represent a calculation of the weighted sum of inputs from prior nodes and a non-linear output function. The combined calculation of the network nodes relates the inputs to the outputs. Note that the models are well-understood, routine and conventional. Therefore, simply using the models to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “receive the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the edge device”/“receiving a new set of training data for a first edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well ‐ understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network , e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( sending messages over a network ); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ( computer receives and sends information over a network ); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination . For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data , or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “training or a re-training”/“training the shared global model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “training or re-training of the federated learning system” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the training to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Note that Applicant's Specification defines the models to be trained as follows: A machine learning model can e.g. be or comprise an artificial neural network . An artificial neural network (ANN) is a biologically inspired computational model. An ANN usually comprises at least three layers of processing elements: a first layer with input neurons, an Nth layer with at least one output neuron, and N-2 inner layers, where N is a natural number greater than 2. In such a network, the input neurons serve to receive the input data. The output neurons serve to generate an output, e.g. a result. The processing elements of the layers are interconnected in a predetermined pattern with predetermined connection weights therebetween. Each network node can represent a calculation of the weighted sum of inputs from prior nodes and a non-linear output function. The combined calculation of the network nodes relates the inputs to the outputs. Note that the models are generic and training them is well-understood, routine and conventional. Therefore, simply using the training to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 2 Claim 2 recites: 2. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the computer system comprises a central server, wherein a copy of the shared global model is stored on the central server and on each edge device, wherein the central server is configured to update the shared global model on each edge device if an updated version is available. Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches the use of a generic networked server. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 3 Claim 3 recites: 3. The computer system of claim 1, wherein there are at least two edge devices which comprise different task performing models to perform different tasks. Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches two computers performing unspecified tasks/calculations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 4 Claim 4 recites: 4. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the tasks performed by the task performing models are selected from: classification task, regression task, data generation task, image segmentation task, reconstruction task, image quality enhancement task and/or combinations thereof. Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches fields of use. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 5 Claim 5 recites: 5. The computer system of claim 1, wherein each model is or comprises a machine learning model based on an artificial neural network. Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches a generic artificial neural network. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 6 Claim 6 recites: 6. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the shared global model is or comprises an encoder-decoder architecture, the encoder being configured to generate a feature vector from input data and the decoder being configured to reconstruct input data from a feature vector. Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches a generic encoder-decoder. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 7 Claim 7 recites: 7. The computer system claim 1, wherein a consistency data set is stored on each edge device, wherein each consistency data set comprises consistency input data and consistency target data, wherein the training or re-training comprises: computing a first loss value L(1), the first loss value L(1) quantifying the impact of modifications of the global model parameters and of the first task performing model parameters on the performance of the first task; computing a feature generation loss value LGM, the feature generation loss value LGM quantifying the impact of modifications of the global model parameters on the quality of the feature vector generation, wherein the shared global model is set up as an encoder-decoder, wherein the encoder is configured to receive input data and generate, at least partially on the basis of the global model parameters, a feature vector from the input data, and the decoder is configured to reconstruct, at least partially on the basis of the global model parameters, the input data from the feature vector, wherein the quality of the feature vector generation is quantified by computing a reconstruction loss; for each edge device E(j) other than the first edge device: inputting the consistency input data into the shared global model, receiving from the shared global model a feature vector, inputting the feature vector into the task performing model stored on the edge device, receiving a result from the task performing model, and computing, at least partially on the basis of the received result and the consistency target data, a consistency loss L(j), the consistency loss quantifying the impact of modifications of the global model parameters on the deviations between the result and the consistency target; computing a total loss value L from the feature generation loss value LGM, the first loss value L(1) and all consistency losses L(j); and modifying the global model parameters and the first task performing model parameters so that the total loss value L is minimized. Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches 1) computing a first loss value and a feature generation loss value, 2) inputting the consistency input data and receiving a result from the task performing model, 3) computing ..., a consistency loss and a total loss value, 4) modifying the global model parameters and the first task performing model parameters. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 8 Claim 8 recites: 8. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the input data and the training data are medical data of one or more patients. Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches a field of use. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 9 Claim 9 recites: 9. The computer system of claim 1, wherein one or more tasks performed by one or more task performing models of one or more edge devices comprises the detection of signs indicative of one or more diseases. Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches a field of use. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 10 Claim 10 recites: 10. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the one or more diseases is/are: CTEPH, ARDS and/or COPD. Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches various fields of use. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 11 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “11. A computer-implemented method of training or re-training a federated learning system, the method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “computer-implemented method ” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 11 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 11 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “ mental steps ” and “ mathematical steps ”: • generate a feature vector based at least partially on input data provided by the first edge device or the second edge device and global model parameters • perform a first task based at least partially on the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the first edge device and on first task performing model parameters • perform a second task based at least partially on the basis of the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on input data provided by the second edge device and on second task performing model parameters • first input data • first feature vector • first task result • second feature vector • second task result • calculating a loss value by using a loss function • reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters • reward modifications of the global model parameters • penalize modifications of the global model parameters • modifying the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters , based, at least partially, on minimizing the loss value Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “computer”/“at least two edge devices”/“first edge device and a second edge device” (2) A “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” (3) A “training or re-training of the federated learning system” (4) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” (1) A “computer”/“at least two edge devices”/“first edge device and a second edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. Note that Applicant's “edge device” is defined in the Specification, as follows: The central server (if present) as well as each edge device is a computing device comprising a processing unit connected to a memory (see in particular Fig. 8 and the parts of this description related thereto). Thus, each “edge device” is a “computer.” Note further that M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. This “computer”/“at least two edge devices”/“first edge device and a second edge device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “training or re-training of the federated learning system” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “training or re-training of the federated learning system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim . Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity . This “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “computer”/“at least two edge devices”/“first edge device and a second edge device” (2) A “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” (3) A “training or re-training of the federated learning system” (4) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” (1) A “computer”/“at least two edge devices”/“first edge device and a second edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. Note that Applicant's “edge device” is defined in the Specification, as follows: The central server (if present) as well as each edge device is a computing device comprising a processing unit connected to a memory (see in particular Fig. 8 and the parts of this description related thereto). Thus, each “edge device” is a generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional “computer.” Note further that M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer . As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible . Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 ( warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art” ). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “ claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer ” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept . Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “a shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the models to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Note that Applicant's Specification defines the models to be trained as follows: A machine learning model can e.g. be or comprise an artificial neural network . An artificial neural network (ANN) is a biologically inspired computational model. An ANN usually comprises at least three layers of processing elements: a first layer with input neurons, an Nth layer with at least one output neuron, and N-2 inner layers, where N is a natural number greater than 2. In such a network, the input neurons serve to receive the input data. The output neurons serve to generate an output, e.g. a result. The processing elements of the layers are interconnected in a predetermined pattern with predetermined connection weights therebetween. Each network node can represent a calculation of the weighted sum of inputs from prior nodes and a non-linear output function. The combined calculation of the network nodes relates the inputs to the outputs. Note that the models are well-understood, routine and conventional. Therefore, simply using the models to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “training or re-training of the federated learning system” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “training or re-training of the federated learning system” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the training to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Note that Applicant's Specification defines the models to be trained as follows: A machine learning model can e.g. be or comprise an artificial neural network . An artificial neural network (ANN) is a biologically inspired computational model. An ANN usually comprises at least three layers of processing elements: a first layer with input neurons, an Nth layer with at least one output neuron, and N-2 inner layers, where N is a natural number greater than 2. In such a network, the input neurons serve to receive the input data. The output neurons serve to generate an output, e.g. a result. The processing elements of the layers are interconnected in a predetermined pattern with predetermined connection weights therebetween. Each network node can represent a calculation of the weighted sum of inputs from prior nodes and a non-linear output function. The combined calculation of the network nodes relates the inputs to the outputs. Note that the models are generic and training them is well-understood, routine and conventional. Therefore, simply using the training to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well ‐ understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network , e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( sending messages over a network ); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ( computer receives and sends information over a network ); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination . For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data , or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 12 Claim 12 recites: 12. The method of claim 11, wherein the first task performance model is configured to perform a different task than the second task performing model. Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches a different unspecified mathematical or mental step. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 13 Claim 13 recites: 13. The method of claim 11, wherein a consistency data set is stored on the second edge device, the consistency data set comprising consistency input data and consistency target data, wherein the training or re-training comprises: receiving new training data for the first edge device, the new training data comprising first input data and first target data, inputting the first input data into the shared global model, and receiving a first feature vector, inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model and receiving a first task result, calculating a first loss value, the first loss value quantifying the deviations between the first task result and the first target data, inputting the consistency input data into the shared global model, and receiving a second feature vector, inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model and receiving a second task result, calculating a second loss value, the second loss value quantifying the deviations between the second task result and the consistency target data, reconstructing the first input data from the first feature vector using the shared global model, calculating a third loss value, the third loss value quantifying the deviations between the first input data and the reconstructed first input data, calculating a total loss value on the basis of the first loss value, the second loss value and the third loss value, and modifying the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters, based, at least partially, on minimizing the total loss value. Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches the mental and mathematical steps of: 1) receiving training data and a first feature vector, 2) inputting the first input data and the first feature vector, 3) calculating a first loss value, 4) inputting the consistency input data and the second feature vector, 5) calculating a second loss value, 6) reconstructing the first input data ( i.e., mathematical or mental steps ), 7) calculating a third loss value and a total loss value, 8) modifying the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters . It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 14 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “14. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising processor-executable instructions with which to perform an operation for training or re-training a federated learning system, the federated learning system comprising at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device, wherein…” Therefore, it is a “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” (or “product of manufacture”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 14 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 14 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “ mental steps ” and “ mathematical steps ”: • instructions • generate a feature vector based at least partially on input data provided by the first edge device or by the second edge device and on global model parameters • first task based at least partially on the feature vector generated by the shared global model on the basis of the based on input data provided by the first edge device and on first task performing model parameters • second task based at least partially on the basis of the feature vector generated by the shared global model based on the input data provided by the second edge device and on second task performing model parameters • “first feature vector”/“second feature vector” • “first task result”/“second task result” • second feature vector • loss value • loss function • reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters • reward modifications of the global model parameters • penalize modifications of the global model parameters • modifying the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters , based, at least partially, on minimizing the loss value Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “processor”/“at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device” (2) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” (3) A “training or re-training a federated learning system” (4) A “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” (5) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” (1) A “processor”/“at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. This “processor”/“at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim . Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity . This “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “training or re-training a federated learning system” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “training or re-training a federated learning system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process . Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive , store , or transmit data ) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea ( e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity ( i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea . Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. This “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (5) An “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim . Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity . This “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “processor”/“at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device” (2) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” (3) A “training or re-training a federated learning system” (4) A “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” (5) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” (1) A “processor”/“at least two edge devices, a first edge device and a second edge device” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. Note that Applicant's “edge device” is defined in the Specification, as follows: The central server (if present) as well as each edge device is a computing device comprising a processing unit connected to a memory (see in particular Fig. 8 and the parts of this description related thereto). Thus, each “edge device” is a “computer.” M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer . As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible . Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 ( warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art” ). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more . See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “ claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer ” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept . Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim . Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity . Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “training or re-training a federated learning system” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “training or re-training a federated learning system” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the training or re-training to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, simply using the training or re-training to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “shared global model”/“first task performing model”/“second task performing model” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the training or re-training to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) , such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, simply using the models to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (5) A “inputting first input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a first feature vector”/“inputting the first feature vector into the first task performing model”/“receiving a first task result”/“inputting second input data into the shared global model”/“receiving a second feature vector”/“inputting the second feature vector into the second task performing model”/“receiving a second task result” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well ‐ understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network , e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( sending messages over a network ); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ( computer receives and sends information over a network ); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination . For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data , or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 15 Claim 15 recites: 15. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the computer system is configured for medical use, in particular for performing tasks on medical data of patients. Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches the field of use of “medical use.” It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Reasons for Not Rejecting the Claims Under the Art of Record Claims 1-15 are not rejected. Claims 1-15 are not rejected since, when reading the claims in light of the Specification, as per MPEP § 2111.01, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 1. Specifically: Claim 1's "...training the shared global model and the first task performing model..." Claim 1's "...reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters..." Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 11. Specifically: Claim 11's "...training the shared global model and the first task performing model..." Claim 11's "...reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters..." Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 14. Specifically: Claim 14's "...training the shared global model and the first task performing model..." Claim 14's "...reward modifications of the first task performing model parameters and the global model parameters..." Only to the extent that these limitations (specifically as defined above) are not found in the prior art of record is the present case not rejected over the prior art. Conclusion Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov. If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to (571) 273-8300. If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at (571) 272-3719. Hand-delivered responses should be delivered to the Receptionist @ (Customer Service Window Randolph Building 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22313), located on the first floor of the south side of the Randolph Building. Finally, information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Moreover, status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have any questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) toll-free @ 1-866-217-9197. /WILBERT L STARKS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122 WLS 15 JUN 2026 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 2 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 3 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 4 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 5 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 6 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 7 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 8 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 9 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 10 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 11 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 12 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 13 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 14 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 15 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 16 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 17 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 18 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 19 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 20 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 21 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 22 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 23 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 24 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 25 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 26 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 27 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 28 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 29 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 30 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 31 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 32 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 33 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 34 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 35 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 36 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 37 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 38 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 39 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 40 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 41 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 42 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 43 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 44 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 45 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 46 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 47 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 48 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 49 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 50 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 51 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 52 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 53 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 54 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 55 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 56 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 57 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 58 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 59 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 60 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 61 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 62 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 63 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 64 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 65 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 66 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 67 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 68 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 69 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 70 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 71 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 72 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 73 Art Unit: 2122 Application/Control Number: 18/573,793 Page 74 Art Unit: 2122
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