DETAILED ACTION
Status of Claims
Claims 1-10 are cancelled.
Claims 11-25, 28, and 29 have been amended.
Claims 11-30 are pending.
Claims 11-30 are rejected.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 28 is objected to because of the following informalities:
The phrase “determining a probability” at line 12 of the claim should recite “determine a probability.”
The “and” at the end of line 14 should be moved to the end of line 17.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 26 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 26 and 27 recite the limitation "the recorded maximum speed." There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claims.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 11-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Step 1:
Claim 11 is a method claim. Claim 28 is a system claim. Claim 30 is directed to a passenger car. Therefore, claims 1-30 are directed to either a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.
With respect to claim 11:
Step 2A, Prong 1:
Regarding Prong I of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether they recite subject matter that falls within one of the follow groups of abstract ideas: a) mathematical concepts, b) certain methods of organizing human activity, and/or c) mental processes.
Independent claim 11 includes limitations that recite an abstract idea (emphasized below) and will be used as a representative claim for the remainder of the 101 rejection. Claim 11 recites:
A method for operating a driver assistance system of a vehicle, the method comprising:
detecting a maximum permissible speed for a road on which the vehicle is moving during a current trip or will move in the future;
automatically activating a speed warning for warning a user if a vehicle speed exceeds the maximum permissible speed during the current trip;
defining a driving situation for the current trip based on a behavior of the user during the current trip or previous trips with the vehicle or based on the behavior of other road users;
determining a probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning;
determining, based on the defined driving situation, whether the speed warning should be deactivated;
issuing a suggestion to the user to deactivate the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated; and
controlling the vehicle speed of the vehicle based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system.
The examiner submits that the foregoing bolded limitation(s) constitute a “mental process” because under its broadest reasonable interpretation, the claim covers performance of the limitation in the human mind. For example, “detecting…” in the context of this claim encompasses a person (driver) looking at a speed limit sign, i.e. making a simple observation. “Defining…” in the context of this claim encompasses a person (driver) observing how they are driving and the conditions in which they are driving (weather, traffic, etc.) and making a simple judgment. “Determining…” in the context of this claim encompasses a person (driver) taking into account their observations and making a decision. Accordingly, the claim recites at least one abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong 2:
Regarding Prong II of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether the claim, as a whole, integrates the abstract into a practical application. As noted in the 2019 PEG, it must be determined whether any additional elements in the claim beyond the abstract idea integrate the exception into a practical application in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception. The courts have indicated that additional elements merely using a computer to implement an abstract idea, adding insignificant extra solution activity, or generally linking use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use do not integrate a judicial exception into a “practical application.”
In the present case, the additional limitations beyond the above-noted abstract idea are as follows (where the underlined portions are the “additional limitations,” while the bolded portions continue to represent the “abstract idea”):
A method for operating a driver assistance system of a vehicle, the method comprising:
detecting a maximum permissible speed for a road on which the vehicle is moving during a current trip or will move in the future;
automatically activating a speed warning for warning a user if a vehicle speed exceeds the maximum permissible speed during the current trip;
defining a driving situation for the trip based on a behavior of the user during the current trip or previous trips with the vehicle or based on the behavior of other road users;
determining a probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning;
determining, based on the defined driving situation, whether the speed warning should be deactivated; and
issuing a suggestion to the user to deactivate the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated; and
controlling the vehicle speed of the vehicle based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system.
For the following reasons, the examiner submits that the above identified additional limitations do not integrate the above-noted abstract idea into a practical application.
Regarding the additional limitations of “automatically activating …” and “issuing…,” the examiner submits that these limitations are insignificant extra-solution activities. The activating a warning and issuing a suggestion to the user are recited at a high level of generality (i.e. as a general means of activating a warning as a result of the detecting step and as a general means of providing an output to the user as a result of the determining steps, respectively), and amount to mere data outputting, which is a form of insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP 2106.05(g)). The limitation of “controlling” amounts to mere instructions to apply the abstract idea on a computer (see MPEP 2106.05(f)) and does not integrate the abstract idea into practical application.
Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Further, looking at the additional limitations as an ordered combination or as a whole, the limitations add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. For instance, there is no indication that the additional elements, when considered as a whole, reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field, apply or use the above-noted judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implement/use the above-noted judicial exception with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is not more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05). Accordingly, the additional limitations do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
Step 2B:
Regarding Step 2B of the 2019 PEG, representative independent claim 1 does not include additional elements (considered both individually and as an ordered combination) that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the same reasons to those discussed above with respect to determining that the claim does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional limitations of “automatically activating …” and “issuing…,” the examiner submits are insignificant extra-solution activities. The limitation of “controlling” amounts to mere instructions to apply the abstract idea.
Further, a conclusion that an additional element is insignificant extra-solution activity in Step 2A should be re-evaluated in Step 2B to determine if they are more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field. The additional limitations of “automatically activating …” and “issuing…,” are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities because MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) indicates that merely “receiving or transmitting data over a network” is a well‐understood, routine, conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner (as it is in the present claim). Thereby, a conclusion that the claimed limitations are well-understood, routine, conventional activities is supported under Berkheimer.
Hence, the claim is not patent eligible.
With respect to claims 12-30:
Dependent claims 12-27 do not recite any further limitations that cause the claim(s) to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception. Claims 12-27 provide further observations and considerations to be taken into account when defining a driving situation, which constitute mental processes as they can reasonably be performed in the human mind. Therefore, dependent claims 12-27 are not patent eligible under the same rationale as provided for in the rejection of claim 11.
Claims 28 and 30 are rejected for the same rationale as claim 11. The recited camera is simply a generic computer component performing generic functions at a high level of generality.
Claim 29 is rejected for the same rationale as claim 12.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 11-13, 22-24, and 28-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over in view of Knoll et al. (US 2007/0013498, hereinafter “Knoll”) in view of Prakah-Asante et al. (US 2017/0341654, hereinafter “Prakah-Asante”).
In regards to claim 11, Knoll teaches a method for operating a driver assistance system of a vehicle, the method comprising:
detecting a maximum permissible speed for a road on which the vehicle is moving during a current trip or will move in the future (Knoll; pars [0005], [0019] – monitoring maximum permissible speed);
automatically activating a speed warning for warning a user if a vehicle speed exceeds the maximum permissible speed during the current trip (Knoll; par [0005] – issuing warning for exceeding maximum permissible speed);
defining a driving situation for the current trip based on a behavior of the user during the current trip or previous trips with the vehicle or based on the behavior of other road users (Knoll; par [0005] – sporty driving situation);
determining a probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning (Knoll; par [0005] – “If it is determined during this evaluation period that the limit value in question has already been exceeded several times, possibly in spite of a warning issued, then the limit value for a safety-critical condition above which a warning will be issued is increased such that no more warning is issued”);
determining, based on the defined driving situation, whether the speed warning should be deactivated (Knoll; par [0005] – warning omitted if sporty driving detected); and
deactivating the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated (Knoll; par [0005] – warning omitted if sporty driving detected, which is a defined driving situation and also determined to be a probable instance that the user would prefer to deactivate the speed warning).
While Knoll teaches a driver interacting with a control element to deactivate a warning that was just issued (Knoll; par [0008]), Knoll does not explicitly teach issuing a suggestion to the user to deactivate the warning. Knoll also does not explicitly teach controlling the vehicle speed of the vehicle based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system.
Prakah-Asante teaches issuing a suggestion to a driver to perform a recommended action via a user interface (Prakah-Asante; Fig. 4, par [0062]) and controlling the vehicle speed of the vehicle based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system (Prakah-Asante; pars [0018]-[0021], [0062]).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to implement the driver warning device of Knoll utilizing a display to issue a suggestion based on the current driving situation, as taught by Prakah-Asante, in order to provide the user an interactive interface by which to control the changes to the operation of the warning system and to incorporate the adaptive cruise control feature of Prakah-Asante to provide assistance during driving.
In regards to claim 12, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 11, wherein a location, a route or a route guidance is assigned to the current trip and the driving situation is defined depending on the assigned location, the assigned route or the assigned route guidance (Knoll; pars [0019], [0024] – monitoring the condition of the road and the determination of a mountainous road are both location information that are used in determining the driving situation).
In regards to claim 13, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 12, wherein the driving situation is defined based on the behavior of the user during the current trip or previous trips at a same location or a same route (Knoll; pars [0006]).
In regards to claim 22, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 11, wherein the behavior of the user describes whether the user has specified an adjustment value for speed limiting or cruise control for the current trip or previous trips (Knoll; pars [0003], [0027], [0037] – adjustment for speed limiting).
Claims 23 and 24 is rejected with the same rationale as claim 22.
Claim 28 is rejected with the same rationale as claim 11 as well as Knoll pars [0005], [0019] (monitoring traffic signs relating to maximum permissible speed), [0022], [0024] (use of cameras to monitor vehicle surroundings) and [0035] (visual, audible, tactile warnings).
Claim 29 is rejected with the same rationale as claim 12.
In regards to claim 30, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches a passenger car containing a driver assistance system according to claim 28 (Knoll; pars [0011], [0018]).
Claims 14-21 and 25-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over in view of Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante, further in view of Machine Translation of DE 10 2006 057 153 A1 (Robert Bosch GmbH, “hereinafter “Bosch”).
In regards to claim 14, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 12.
Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante does not explicitly teach wherein the driving situation is defined based on the behavior of other road users at a same location or a same route.
Bosch teaches wherein the driving situation is defined based on the behavior of other road users at a similar location or a same location or a similar route or a same route (Bosch; par [0016] – behavior of other drivers, other vehicles).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to implement the driver warning device of Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante by incorporating data on other driving conditions, including the behavior of other drivers and vehicles, as taught by Bosch, in order to better adapt the system to the needs of a particular driver in a particular driving situation (Bosch; par [0010]).
Claim 15 is rejected with the same rationale as claim 14.
In regards to claim 16, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 11.
Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante further teaches manual deactivation of a warning by a user (Knoll; par [0008] - a driver interacting with a control element to deactivate a warning).
However, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante does not explicitly teach wherein the behavior of the user describes whether a manual deactivation of the speed warning has been carried out by the user during the current trip or previous trips.
Bosch teaches wherein the behavior of the user describes whether a warning has been ignored by the user during the current trip or previous trips (Bosch; par [0016] – “if the information, in particular the warning message and/or the driving suggestion, was ignored by the user, in particular by the driver, the last time or times”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to implement the driver warning device of Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante by incorporating data on driver behavior, including the behavior of the driver with respect to previous warnings, as taught by Bosch, in order to better adapt the system to the needs of a particular driver in a particular driving situation (Bosch; par [0010]). It would have been obvious that the manual deactivation of the warnings in Knoll are functionally equivalent to ignoring the warnings in Bosch and would be a beneficial consideration in adapting a warning system.
Claims 17 and 18 are rejected with the same rationale as claim 16.
In regards to claim 19, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 11.
Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante does not explicitly teach wherein the behavior of the user describes whether the user has ignored the speed warnings during the current trip or previous trips.
Bosch teaches wherein the behavior of the user describes whether the user has ignored the speed warnings during the current trip or previous trips (Bosch; par [0016] – “if the information, in particular the warning message and/or the driving suggestion, was ignored by the user, in particular by the driver, the last time or times”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to implement the driver warning device of Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante by incorporating data on driver behavior, including the behavior of the driver with respect to previous warnings, as taught by Bosch, in order to better adapt the system to the needs of a particular driver in a particular driving situation (Bosch; par [0010]).
Claims 20 and 21 are rejected with the same rationale as claim 19.
In regards to claim 25, Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante teaches the method according to claim 11.
Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante does not explicitly teach wherein the behavior of other road users describes whether the other road users are moving at a speed higher than a recorded maximum speed.
Bosch teaches wherein the behavior wherein the behavior of other road users describes whether the other road users are moving at a speed higher than a recorded maximum speed (Bosch; par [0016] – behavior of other drivers including “an abnormality in acceleration, speed or the like,” “such as other vehicles, traffic density, congestion information or the like”; par [0060] – “behavior of drivers of vehicles driving alongside him”; par [0070] – “Due to traffic congestion, the average speed is low.” – these are all indicative of whether other drivers are moving at a speed higher than a recorded maximum speed; specifically, if the average speed is low due to congestion, then clearly other road users are not moving at a speed higher than a maximum speed).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to implement the driver warning device of Knoll in view of Prakah-Asante by incorporating data on other driving conditions, including the behavior of other drivers and vehicles, as taught by Bosch, in order to better adapt the system to the needs of a particular driver in a particular driving situation (Bosch; par [0010]).
Claims 26 and 27 are rejected with the same rationale as claim 25.
Response to Arguments
The objections to claims 11-13 and 16-24 have been withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendments. However, a new objection has been raised in view of applicant’s amendments.
The 35 USC 112(b) rejections of claims 13-15, 18, 21, and 24-25 have been withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendments. However, the rejections of claims 26 and 27 are maintained, as they have not been addressed by applicant’s amendments or arguments.
The 35 USC 101 rejections of claims 28 and 29 as being directed to software per se have been withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendments.
Applicant's arguments filed 9/4/25 with respect to the 35 USC 101 rejection of claims 11-30 as being directed to an abstract idea without significantly more have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues at p.8 of applicant’s remarks that “By controlling the speed at which the vehicle moves, the method and system according to amended claims 11 ands 28, respectively, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.” The examiner respectfully disagrees. The examiner first notes that the added limitation of "controlling the vehicle speed of the vehicle based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system" is not tied to the recited abstract idea in the claim at all, much less in a meaningful way. Rather, the limitation of amounts to mere instructions to apply the abstract idea on a computer (see MPEP 2106.05(f)). The limitation does not provide any specifics of how the claimed result is accomplished and there is no description of the mechanism for accomplishing the result aside from the generally stated “based on a cruise control setting of the driver assistance system.” Therefore, the claimed limitation, taken alone or in combination with the other claimed limitations, does not integrate the abstract idea into practical application.
Applicant's arguments filed 9/4/25 with respect to the 35 USC 103 Rejections have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues at p.9 of applicant’s remarks that the cited references do not teach “determining a probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning” and “issuing a suggestion to the user to deactivate the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated.” The examiner respectfully disagrees. As set forth in the rejections above, the cited combination of references does indeed teach determining a probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning (Knoll; par [0005] – “If it is determined during this evaluation period that the limit value in question has already been exceeded several times, possibly in spite of a warning issued, then the limit value for a safety-critical condition above which a warning will be issued is increased such that no more warning is issued”). Furthermore, Knoll teaches and deactivating the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated (Knoll; par [0005] – warning omitted if sporty driving detected, which is a defined driving situation and also determined to be a probable instance that the user would prefer to deactivate the speed warning). This in combination with Prakah-Asante (Prakah-Asante; Fig. 4, par [0062]) renders obvious the limitation of issuing a suggestion to the user to deactivate the speed warning based on the probability that the user prefers to deactivate the speed warning and based on a determination that the speed warning should be deactivated, as explained above.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/KAVITA STANLEY/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2153