DETAILED ACTION
This Office Action is in response to the Applicants' communication filed on May 14, 2026. Claims 1, 10, 12, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27 are amended. Claims 5, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 25 and 28-38 are cancelled. Claim 22A is New. Claims 1-4, 6-10, 12, 15-16, 18, 20, 22, 22A, 23-24, and 26-27 are currently pending and have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments/remarks made in an amendment filed May 14, 2026, have been fully considered. In view of the amended claims 1, 10, 12, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27 and upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection, necessitated by the amendments is made in view of different interpretation of the previously applied references as presented in this Office action. Applicant’s arguments with respect to claim(s) 1-4, 6-10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 22A, 23, 24, 26 and 27 are therefore moot.
Claim Objections
Claim 22A is objected to because of the following informalities:
Claim listing should only contain numbers no alpha characters. Appropriate correction is required.
For the purpose of this action, an examiners amendment was made to change claim 22A to new claim 39.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-4, 6-10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 20210400490 A1 (WU et al.) (hereinafter WU) in view of US 20210058784 A1 (Kedalagudde et al.) (hereinafter Kedalagudde) and in further view of HUAWEI et al., "Clarification on Key Issue #2", S3-202749, 3GPP TSG WG3 Meeting #100bis-e, e-meeting, 12-16 October 2020, (3p) (hereinafter Huawei).
In re claims 1 and 12, WU discloses a credential transmission method (Fig. 3, [0005], “Embodiments of this application provide a communication method and device, to support collaborative processing on user plane data integrity protection between devices after one or more devices in a 4G network are upgraded”), comprising: sending a first protocol data unit (PDU) session establishment request message to a base station (Fig. 3:S311, [0342], “S311: The UE sends a PDU session establishment request message to the NG-RAN”), wherein the first PDU session establishment request message carries data network name (DNN) information ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)”) used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN); and receiving, by a terminal, first indication information sent by the base station (Fig. 3:S316, [0355], “S316: The NG-RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE”. [0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”); wherein the first indication information is determined by the base station based on security policy information from a second core network device (Fig. 3: S315, [0351], “S314: The SMF network element sends N2 information (message) to the NG-RAN through the AMF, and the NG-RAN receives the N2 information from the SMF network element through the AMF”. [0352], “The N2 information may carry the user plane security policy obtained by the SMF in S33 (equivalent to receiving security policy information sent by the second core network device)”. [0354], “For example, for the user plane security policy received by the NG-RAN, if the user plane data encryption protection is “required” and the user plane data integrity protection is “required”, the NG-RAN may enable the user plane data encryption protection and the user plane data integrity protection, and generate a user plane data encryption key and a user plane data integrity protection key”. [0349], “For example, the SMF may obtain the user plane security policy from a unified data management (UDM) network element, or may obtain the user plane security policy from a local configuration of the SMF”), the security policy information is determined by the second core network device according to a second PDU session establishment request message sent by a first core network device ([0346], “S312: The NG-RAN forwards the PDU session establishment request to an access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, and after receiving the PDU session establishment request, the AMF network element forwards the PDU session establishment request to the SMF”. [0352], “The N2 information may carry the user plane security policy obtained by the SMF in S33”), and the second PDU session establishment request message at least includes the DNN information ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)” used for obtaining the credential for accessing the SNPN; wherein the first indication information is used for indicating that a user plane security protection operation of a data radio bearer (DRB) of the terminal is requested to be activated or not to be activated ([0350], “The user plane security policy may include two types of information: (1) User plane data encryption protection needs to be activated (required), tends to be activated (preferred), or does not need to be activated (not needed)...”). [0358], “The indication herein is the user plane data encryption protection indication or the user plane data integrity protection activation indication carried in the RRC connection reconfiguration message in S316”); and the DRB is at least used for bearing the credential required by the terminal for accessing the SNPN ([0360], “If the UE determines that integrity protection for a data resource bearer (DRB) of the PDU session is to be activated, the UE may activate uplink integrity protection and downlink integrity protection verification”).
WU does not explicitly disclose DNN information is used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN).
Kedalagudde discloses DNN information is used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN) (Fig. 1, Fig.3, [0007], “Embodiments herein include for UE onboarding mechanisms based on default manufacturer credentials”. [0009], “how to establish a secure connectivity between the UE and the network entity for provisioning the NPN credentials and other information to enable SNPN access”. [0087], “The procedure 300 shows a high-level flow of the actions needed for a successful onboarding of the UE 502 into an SNPN (e.g., an SO-SNPN 230) for which credentials will be provisioned”. [0088], “The UE 502 is provisioned with default UE credentials that allows for successful UE authentication and a unique UE identifier. If an agreement was in place between the UE 502 and the SNPN 230, the UE 502 might have been provisioned with some initial default configuration, including PLMN ID and NID of the SNPN 230, S-NSSAI, DNN needed to access the PS 220, and a list of ON Group IDs” (DNN is used to obtain credentials to access SNPN)”. [0090], “The O-SNPN 210 authenticates the UE 502 with the DCS 240 and verify whether the UE 502 is allowed to access the O-SNPN 210 for onboarding purposes”. [0092], “The O-SNPN 210 sends the information from the DCS 240 in step B1 and also may send a combination of S-NSSAI and DNN for the PDU Session to the selected PS to the UE. The UE 502 establishes a Configuration PDU session. This PDU Session may be established either to a well-known or pre-configured S-NSSAI or DNN, or a combination of S-NSSAI and DNN sent by the UE 502, which is used for provisioning purposes”. [0095], “the provisioning server (PS) 220 selects the SO-SNPN 230 owning the subscription and contacts the future SO-SNPN 230 owning the subscription to provide the subscription credentials for access to the SNPN owning the subscription, and may retrieve other UE configuration parameters (e.g., PDU session parameters, such as S-NSSAI, DNN, URSPs, QoS rules, and other required parameters to access the SNPN and establish a regular PDU session)”).
It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of WU with Kedalagudde to provide a authentication method in a handover scenario indicating to use a user plane security configuration that is of a data radio bearer and that is the same as that of a data radio bearer of the source access network node. The advantage of doing so is to reduce security risk caused by different security configurations of the data radio bearer when the target access network node and the source access network node transmit a same data packet and improve data transmission security.
WU and Kedalagudde do not explicitly disclose DRB is at least used for bearing the credential required by the terminal for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN).
Huawei discloses DRB is at least used for bearing a credential required by the terminal for accessing the SNPN (Pages 1-3, “the UE can perform the onboarding procedure on onboarding network, and then the UE may be remotely provisioned with the SNPN credentials by Provisioning Server (PS). The SNPN credentials shall be confidentiality protected, integrity protected, and replay protected during remote provisioning”).
It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of WU and Kedalagudde with Huawei to provide a security configuration method in a handover scenario indicating to use a user plane security configuration that is of a data radio bearer and that is the same as that of a data radio bearer of the source access network node. The advantage of doing so is to reduce security risk caused by different security configurations of the data radio bearer when the target access network node and the source access network node transmit a same data packet and improve data transmission security.
In re claim 2, the combination discloses the method according to claim 1, wherein WU discloses wherein the user plane security protection operation comprises at least one of integrity protection or encryption ([0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”).
In re claim 3, the combination discloses the method according to claim 1, wherein WU discloses wherein the receiving the first indication information sent by the base station comprises: receiving a radio resource control (RRC) connection reconfiguration message carrying the first indication information sent by the base station ([0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”. [0360], “If an integrity check for the RRC connection reconfiguration message succeeds, the UE sends the RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the NG-RAN”).
In re claim 4, the combination discloses the method according to claim 3, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: verifying the RRC connection reconfiguration message, and obtaining a result of the verifying; and determining, based on the first indication information in response to the result of the verifying indicating that the verifying is successful, whether to activate the user plane security protection operation of the DRB of the terminal ([0357], “S317: The UE activates user plane security based on an indication”. [0360], “If the UE determines that integrity protection for a data resource bearer (DRB) of the PDU session is to be activated, the UE may activate uplink integrity protection and downlink integrity protection verification” (whether to activate the user plane data integrity protection may be determined by using a bearer as a granularity. Equivalent to the first indication information being used for indicating: a user plane security protection operation of a radio data bearer of the terminal is requested to be activated or deactivated)).
In re claim 6, the combination discloses the method according to claim 4, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: rejecting the RRC connection reconfiguration message in response to the first indication information indicating that the user plane security protection operation of the DRB of the terminal is requested not to be activated; or in response to the first indication information indicating that the user plane security protection operation of the DRB of the terminal is requested to be activated, accepting the RRC connection reconfiguration message, and performing the user plane security protection operation ([0350], “The user plane security policy may include two types of information: (1) User plane data encryption protection needs to be activated (required), tends to be activated (preferred), or does not need to be activated (not needed). (2) User plane data integrity protection is “required”, “preferred”, or “not needed”” (indication may be for user plane security protection operation to be activated or not to be activated). [0353], “S315: The NG-RAN activates user plane security based on the user plane security policy”. [0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”. [0360], “If the UE determines that integrity protection for a data resource bearer (DRB) of the PDU session is to be activated, the UE may activate uplink integrity protection and downlink integrity protection verification” (whether to activate the user plane data integrity protection may be determined by using a bearer as a granularity)).
In re claim 7, the combination discloses the method according to claim 6, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: sending an RRC connection reconfiguration completion message to the base station ([0359], “S318: The UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the NG-RAN, and the NG-RAN receives the RRC connection reconfiguration complete message from the UE”).
In re claim 8, the combination discloses the method according to claim 1, wherein WU discloses wherein the base station is in an onboarding network (ONN), and the method further comprises: sending second indication information to the base station during an RRC connection establishment process (Fig. 5: S514, [0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”), wherein Kedalagudde discloses wherein the second indication information is used for indicating that an RRC connection being established is used for the terminal to log into the ONN ([0076], “The UE 502 indicates in the RRC establishment procedure that the connection is for Restricted Onboarding Services based on which the NG-RAN 514 selects the appropriate AMF 621 in the SNPN 110. The AMF 621 selects a designated SMF which in turn selects a designated PDU Session Anchor (PSA) that provides a restricted data connection to the onboarding server 120”).
In re claim 9, the combination discloses the method according to claim 8, wherein Kedalagudde discloses the method further comprising: sending, in response to the terminal initiating registration to the ONN, a registration request message to the base station; wherein a registration type of the registration request message is set to be a predetermined registration type; and the predetermined registration type is used for indicating that the registration request message is used for logging into the ONN to obtain the credential ([0076], “The UE 502 indicates in the RRC establishment procedure that the connection is for Restricted Onboarding Services based on which the NG-RAN 514 selects the appropriate AMF 621 in the SNPN 110. The AMF 621 selects a designated SMF which in turn selects a designated PDU Session Anchor (PSA) that provides a restricted data connection to the onboarding server 120”).
In re claim 10, the combination discloses the method according to claim 9, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: initiating, in response to the terminal logging into the ONN successfully and requiring to receive the credential via the ONN, a PDU session establishment procedure ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)”).
In re claim 15, the combination discloses the method according to claim 12, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: initiating, in response to sending a radio resource control the (RRC) connection reconfiguration message to the terminal, a user plane security protection operation of a DRB of the base station ([0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”. [0360], “If the UE determines that integrity protection for a data resource bearer (DRB) of the PDU session is to be activated, the UE may activate uplink integrity protection and downlink integrity protection verification” (whether to activate the user plane data integrity protection may be determined by using a bearer as a granularity)).
In re claim 16, the combination discloses the method according to claim 12, wherein WU discloses the method further comprising: receiving second indication information sent by the terminal during an RRC connection establishment process (Fig. 5: S514, [0356], “The RRC connection reconfiguration message may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication”), wherein Kedalagudde discloses wherein the second indication information is used for indicating that an RRC connection being established is used for the terminal to log into an onboarding network (ONN) ([0076], “The UE 502 indicates in the RRC establishment procedure that the connection is for Restricted Onboarding Services based on which the NG-RAN 514 selects the appropriate AMF 621 in the SNPN 110. The AMF 621 selects a designated SMF which in turn selects a designated PDU Session Anchor (PSA) that provides a restricted data connection to the onboarding server 120”); and determining, in response to receiving the second indication information, a first core network device used for supporting the terminal to log into the ONN ([0346], “S312: The NG-RAN forwards the PDU session establishment request to an access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, and after receiving the PDU session establishment request, the AMF network element forwards the PDU session establishment request to the SMF”. [0348], “S313: The SMF obtains a user plane security policy (UP security policy or user plane security enforcement information)”. [0352], “The N2 information may carry the user plane security policy obtained by the SMF in S33” (equivalent to receiving security policy information sent by the second core network device)); wherein the first core network device is configured with access control and mobility management function (AMF) login configuration data ([0351], “S314: The SMF network element sends N2 information (message) to the NG-RAN through the AMF, and the NG-RAN receives the N2 information from the SMF network element through the AMF”.; and the AMF login configuration data comprises at least one of: DNN information used for obtaining the credential, or information restricting the terminal to only be configured to request to obtain the credential ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)”).
In re claim 18, the combination discloses the method according to claim 16, wherein Kedalagudde discloses the method further comprising: receiving a registration request message sent by the terminal, wherein a registration type of the registration request message is set to be a predetermined registration type; and the predetermined registration type is used for indicating that the registration request message is used for logging into the ONN to obtain the credential ([0076], “The UE 502 indicates in the RRC establishment procedure that the connection is for Restricted Onboarding Services based on which the NG-RAN 514 selects the appropriate AMF 621 in the SNPN 110. The AMF 621 selects a designated SMF which in turn selects a designated PDU Session Anchor (PSA) that provides a restricted data connection to the onboarding server 120”); and sending the registration request message to the first core network device ([0054], “The AMF 621 may update the UE 502 using either the UE 502 Configuration Update procedure after registration procedure is completed, or by including the new CAG information in the Registration Accept or in the Registration Reject”. [0089], “During the registration procedure, the UE 502 provides an RRC indication that can be used by the NG-RAN 514 to select an AMF 621 for onboarding and an indication in the Registration Request indicating that the registration is for restricted onboarding service only”).
In re claim 20, the combination discloses the method according to claim 18, wherein WU discloses sending the first PDU session establishment request message to the first core network device ([0346], “S312: The NG-RAN forwards the PDU session establishment request to an access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, and after receiving the PDU session establishment request, the AMF network element forwards the PDU session establishment request to the SMF”).
In re claim 22, WU discloses a credential transmission method (Fig. 3, [0005], “Embodiments of this application provide a communication method and device, to support collaborative processing on user plane data integrity protection between devices after one or more devices in a 4G network are upgraded”), comprising: receiving, by a first core network device, a first protocol data unit (PDU) session establishment request message sent by a base station ([0344], “The UE may transparently transmit the PDU session establishment request message to the SMF through the NG-RAN”), wherein the first PDU session establishment request message comprises data network name (DNN) information used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN) ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)”); and sending, by the first core network device, a second PDU session establishment request message to a second core network device ([0346], “S312: The NG-RAN forwards the PDU session establishment request to an access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, and after receiving the PDU session establishment request, the AMF network element forwards the PDU session establishment request to the SMF”), wherein the second PDU session establishment request message at least includes the DNN information used for obtaining the credential, the second PDU session establishment request message is used for the second core network device to determine security policy information ([0348], “S313: The SMF obtains a user plane security policy (UP security policy or user plane security enforcement information)”. [0349], “For example, the SMF may obtain the user plane security policy from a unified data management (UDM) network element, or may obtain the user plane security policy from a local configuration of the SMF”), and the security policy information is used for the base station to determine first indication information (Fig. 3: S315, [0351], “S314: The SMF network element sends N2 information (message) to the NG-RAN through the AMF, and the NG-RAN receives the N2 information from the SMF network element through the AMF”. [0352], “The N2 information may carry the user plane security policy obtained by the SMF in S33 (equivalent to receiving security policy information sent by the second core network device)”. [0354], “For example, for the user plane security policy received by the NG-RAN, if the user plane data encryption protection is “required” and the user plane data integrity protection is “required”, the NG-RAN may enable the user plane data encryption protection and the user plane data integrity protection, and generate a user plane data encryption key and a user plane data integrity protection key”), wherein the first indication information is used for indicating that a user plane security protection operation of a data radio bearer (DRB) of a terminal is requested to be activated or not to be activated ([0350], “The user plane security policy may include two types of information: (1) User plane data encryption protection needs to be activated (required), tends to be activated (preferred), or does not need to be activated (not needed)...”). [0358], “The indication herein is the user plane data encryption protection indication or the user plane data integrity protection activation indication carried in the RRC connection reconfiguration message in S316”); and the DRB is at least used for bearing the credential required by the terminal for accessing the SNPN.
WU does not explicitly disclose DNN information is used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN).
Kedalagudde discloses DNN information is used for obtaining a credential for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN) (Fig. 1, Fig.3, [0007], “Embodiments herein include for UE onboarding mechanisms based on default manufacturer credentials”. [0009], “how to establish a secure connectivity between the UE and the network entity for provisioning the NPN credentials and other information to enable SNPN access”. [0087], “The procedure 300 shows a high-level flow of the actions needed for a successful onboarding of the UE 502 into an SNPN (e.g., an SO-SNPN 230) for which credentials will be provisioned”. [0088], “The UE 502 is provisioned with default UE credentials that allows for successful UE authentication and a unique UE identifier. If an agreement was in place between the UE 502 and the SNPN 230, the UE 502 might have been provisioned with some initial default configuration, including PLMN ID and NID of the SNPN 230, S-NSSAI, DNN needed to access the PS 220, and a list of ON Group IDs” (DNN is used to obtain credentials to access SNPN)”. [0090], “The O-SNPN 210 authenticates the UE 502 with the DCS 240 and verify whether the UE 502 is allowed to access the O-SNPN 210 for onboarding purposes”. [0092], “The O-SNPN 210 sends the information from the DCS 240 in step B1 and also may send a combination of S-NSSAI and DNN for the PDU Session to the selected PS to the UE. The UE 502 establishes a Configuration PDU session. This PDU Session may be established either to a well-known or pre-configured S-NSSAI or DNN, or a combination of S-NSSAI and DNN sent by the UE 502, which is used for provisioning purposes”. [0095], “the provisioning server (PS) 220 selects the SO-SNPN 230 owning the subscription and contacts the future SO-SNPN 230 owning the subscription to provide the subscription credentials for access to the SNPN owning the subscription, and may retrieve other UE configuration parameters (e.g., PDU session parameters, such as S-NSSAI, DNN, URSPs, QoS rules, and other required parameters to access the SNPN and establish a regular PDU session)”).
It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of WU with Kedalagudde to provide a authentication method in a handover scenario indicating to use a user plane security configuration that is of a data radio bearer and that is the same as that of a data radio bearer of the source access network node. The advantage of doing so is to reduce security risk caused by different security configurations of the data radio bearer when the target access network node and the source access network node transmit a same data packet and improve data transmission security.
WU and Kedalagudde do not explicitly disclose DRB is at least used for bearing the credential required by the terminal for accessing a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN).
Huawei discloses DRB is at least used for bearing a credential required by the terminal for accessing the SNPN (Pages 1-3, “the UE can perform the onboarding procedure on onboarding network, and then the UE may be remotely provisioned with the SNPN credentials by Provisioning Server (PS). The SNPN credentials shall be confidentiality protected, integrity protected, and replay protected during remote provisioning”).
It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of WU and Kedalagudde with Huawei to provide a security configuration method in a handover scenario indicating to use a user plane security configuration that is of a data radio bearer and that is the same as that of a data radio bearer of the source access network node. The advantage of doing so is to reduce security risk caused by different security configurations of the data radio bearer when the target access network node and the source access network node transmit a same data packet and improve data transmission security.
In re claim 39, the combination discloses the method according to claim 22, wherein Kedalagudde discloses the method further comprising: receiving, by the first core network device, a registration request message sent by the base station; wherein a registration type of the registration request message is set to be a predetermined registration type; and the predetermined registration type is used for indicating that the registration request message is used for the terminal to log into an onboarding network (ONN) to obtain the credential required by the terminal for accessing the SNPN ([0076], “The UE 502 indicates in the RRC establishment procedure that the connection is for Restricted Onboarding Services based on which the NG-RAN 514 selects the appropriate AMF 621 in the SNPN 110. The AMF 621 selects a designated SMF which in turn selects a designated PDU Session Anchor (PSA) that provides a restricted data connection to the onboarding server 120”).
In re claim 23, the combination discloses the method according to claim 39, wherein Kedalagudde discloses the method further comprising: initiating, in response to receiving the registration request message, a procedure for authenticating the terminal to an authentication service function (AUSF) in the ONN ([0090], “If the DCS 240 is outside of the O-SNPN 210, this authentication is anchored in AUSF 622 inside the O-SNPN 210 in order to achieve isolation from 3rd party owned DCS 240”. [0146], “The AUSF 622 stores data for authentication of UE 601 and handle authentication-related functionality”).
In re claim 24, the combination discloses the method according to claim 23, wherein WU discloses receiving a first protocol data unit (PDU) session establishment request message sent by the base station ([0346], “S312: The NG-RAN forwards the PDU session establishment request to an access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, and after receiving the PDU session establishment request, the AMF network element forwards the PDU session establishment request to the SMF”), wherein the first PDU session establishment request message comprises digital data network (DNN) information used for obtaining the credential ([0345], “The PDU session establishment request message may include information such as a PDU session ID, a data network name (DNN), and network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI)”) and determining, based on a DNN determined according to the DNN information in the first PDU session establishment request message and a DNN determined according to DNN information in access control and mobility management function (AMF) login configuration data, whether the terminal requests an establishment of a PDU session for obtaining the credential ([0340]-[0360], “In the 5G system, activation of a user plane data integrity protection function is completed in a PDU session establishment process. The UE sends a PDU session establishment request message to the NG-RAN (equivalent to the base station), the NG-RAN forwards the request to an AMF (equivalent to the first core network device), and after receiving the request, the AMF forwards the request to the SMF (equivalent to the second core network device). The PDU session establishment request message may include a DNN. The SMF obtains a user plane security policy. The SMF sends an N2 message to the NG-RAN through the AMF, the NG-RAN receives the N2 message, and the N2 message carries the user plane security policy (equivalent to receiving security policy information sent by the second core network device). The user plane security policy includes: user plane data encryption protection needs to be activated (required), tends to be activated (preferred), or does not need to be activated (not needed); and integrity protection is required, preferred, or not needed. The NGRAN activates user plane security on the basis of the user plane security policy. The NG-RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE, and the UE receives the message, which may carry a user plane data encryption protection indication and/or a user plane data integrity protection activation indication. Whether to activate the user plane data integrity protection may be determined by using a bearer as a granularity (equivalent to the first indication information being used for indicating: a user plane security protection operation of a radio data bearer (ORB) of the terminal is requested to be activated or deactivated). The UE activates the user plane security on the basis of the indication”).
In re claim 26, the combination discloses the method according to claim 24, wherein WU discloses wherein the determining, whether the terminal requests the establishment of the PDU session for obtaining the credential comprises: rejecting, in response to the DNN determined according to the DNN information in the first PDU session establishment request message not matching with the DNN determined according to the DNN information in the AMF login configuration data, the first PDU session establishment request message; or determining, in response to the DNN determined according to the DNN information in the first PDU session establishment request message matching with the DNN determined according to the DNN information in the AMF login configuration data, a second core network device connected to the DNN (Fig. 13, [0340], “Instead, the integrity protection function is completed in a PDU session establishment process. Currently, in the 5G system, activation of an RRC integrity protection function and activation of uplink and downlink encryption and decryption of the user plane data are still implemented by using the AS SMC procedure in the registration procedure”. [0382], “For example, the first information includes one bit. In this case, the two types of values included in the first information are “1” and “0”. If a value of the bit is “1”, it may indicate that the first information indicates “activated”, “required”, “true”, or the like, and it also indicates that the first information indicates to activate the user plane data integrity protection function. However, if a value of the bit is “0”, it may indicate that the first information indicates “deactivated (deactivated)”, “not needed”, or “false”, and it also indicates that the first information indicates not to activate the user plane data integrity protection function”. [0630], “S1214: The PGW performs policy and charging enforcement function (PCEF) initiated internet protocol connectivity access network (IP-CAN) session modification with a policy and charging rules function (PCRF) network element”. [0683], “S1413: The UE and the MME perform mutual authentication”. [0763], “S1812: The UE performs RRC integrity protection verification on the AS SMC message, and if the verification succeeds, the UE determines whether to activate a user plane data integrity protection function”. [0305], “If the authentication is synchronized (matches), the MME notifies the SGW to initiate default bearer setup” (when authentication is done by core network, it checks if the DNN information in the PDU session establishment matches the DNN credentials in the MF login for connection or rejection)).
In re claim 27, the combination discloses the method according to claim 26, wherein WU discloses wherein further comprising: sending, in response to determining the second core network device, a second PDU session establishment request message to the second core network device, wherein the second PDU session establishment request message carries information of the DNN, and creation indication information for creating the PDU session used for obtaining the credential; or sending, in response to determining the second core network device, a third PDU session establishment request message to the second core network device, wherein the third PDU session establishment request message carries information of the DNN, and does not carry creation indication information for creating the PDU session used for obtaining the credential (Please refer to claim 26. “All features are included in claim 26”. Based on authentication, if DNN credentials matches a third PDU session establishment is made with the second core network and so on...)).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
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/SWATI JAIN/Examiner, Art Unit 2649
/YUWEN PAN/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2649
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