Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments and amendment have persuasively overcome the objections to the specification and drawings, and many of the 112 rejections.
The remaining issues are addressed below.
112a
Applicant argues:
Here, the specification discloses in detail how the controller 30 identifies triggering events and recognizes features. Specifically: …
Examiner responds:
This is not the correct issue. Applicant is arguing that they have possession of one way of performing the claimed step, however, the rejection is because the claim is so broad as to encompass all methods.
Separately, the disclosure of various “modules” is unpersuasive because these are not terms of art, but rather functional descriptions.
Applicant argues:
Claim 14 recites "the trailer"
Examiner responds:
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The non-final specified that reciting “the” trailer overcomes the rejection, not ‘a’ trailer.
112b
Applicant argues:
Read in light of the specification and prosecution history, "triggering event" has a well-defined meaning: an event detected by the controller that initiates modification of the displayed camera view.
Examiner responds:
Different controllers could have different triggers (and the claim does not even specify what the trigger is a trigger of). Further, a circular definition (the event to be detected is whatever is detected) is confusing. Specifying that the trigger is one of potential collision, trailer curb strike, lane crossing, steering angle threshold overcomes the rejection.
Applicant argues:
The scope of "recognizing a feature" is limited to recognizing a feature that is related to the triggering event, providing sufficient structural context.
Examiner responds:
The examiner believes that this is about the 112a rejection. The issue is that recognizing a feature is claiming a result, not a step, or series of steps to accomplish the result.
Applicant argues:
Applicant respectfully submits that "legally prescribed field of view" is a well- understood term of art in the commercial vehicle CMS industry, referring to fields of view mandated by applicable vehicle safety regulations (e.g., ECE R46 Class II and IV views, SAE J3155)
Examiner responds:
The broadest reasonable interpretation of "legally prescribed field of view" could also include simply being a side view mirror.
Applicant argues:
"Corresponds to" in the context of camera views and display regions has an objective meaning: one view or region maps to (i.e., is derived from or matches) another.
Examiner responds:
The wide angle view and the narrow angle view both correspond to each other because they are both of the same region (i.e., the blind spot).
Applicant argues:
i.e., the triggering event is detected from the captured field of view, and the feature to be recognized is associated with that triggering event
Examiner responds:
Replacing “related to” with “detected from” overcomes the rejection.
Applicant argues:
The specification at [0070] discloses prioritized risk scenarios (e.g., detecting a blind spot object with audio/haptic alert), which teaches that different risk scenarios are ranked.
Examiner responds:
The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation standard does not allow importing limitations from the specification.
Applicant argues:
A more imminent collision from, say a new object, for example, would be of a greater rank than the triggering event.
Examiner responds:
Different people could have different assessments. Someone else may decide that the old object is the greater risk is if is larger, or travelling faster.
101
Applicant argues:
Regardless, the claims require: …
Examiner responds:
Generic hardware is still part of the mental process (see the original 101 rejection)
Applicant argues:
the dynamic, event-triggered zooming of a camera view to show a relevant safety feature (e.g., a potential collision object or trailer proximity hazard) on a display, in a system designed for commercial trucking.
Examiner responds:
The zooming is like the driver deciding where to look, but applied to a computer.
Applicant argues:
The present claims are fundamentally different: they recite a specific, hardware-implemented CMS system
Examiner responds:
The examiner has not identified such a recitation.
Applicant argues:
the claimed controller uses specific image-processing modules (object detection, lane detection, trailer end detection, kinematics)
Examiner responds:
Applicant does not purport to have identified these. They are generic, functional descriptors.
Applicant argues:
This is a concrete, real-world improvement in safety technology
Examiner responds:
Applicant’s background admits that CMS systems already exist. See specification, [0002].
Applicant argues:
The dynamic view modification claimed provides a specific technological solution to this specific technological problem.
Examiner responds:
Applicant Admitted Prior Art also solves this problem – “Operating a commercial vehicle with a CMS provides an operator with improved safety over conventional mirrors, as the cameras can provide visibility in situations that mirrors cannot.” Specification, [0003].
Applicant argues:
“the physical modification of what is displayed by a hardware controller”
Examiner responds:
The examiner believes that this is just showing a zoomed in version (or zoomed out).
Applicant’s arguments over the prior art are addressed below.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1 and 3-20 (all claims) are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over the claims of each of US 12472875 B2, US 12330558 B2, US 12321087 B2, and US 11999299 B2 in view of the prior art as applied below.
Both the pending claims and the conflicting patents are all directed to camera systems for vehicles to see blind spots (e.g., clearance or mirrors). Therefore, all of the conflicting patents are directed to the same problem as the present application. Further, any differences between the present claims and the claims in any of the conflicting patents are obvious in view of the prior art as applied below. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date, to combine the below prior art with any of the conflicting patents in for implementation details (especially as the patent claims lack implementation details). Based on the findings herein, this is an example of “(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” MPEP 2143.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1 and 3-20 (all claims) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claims 1 and 20 recite “identify[ing] a triggering event,” but this is unlimited functional claiming because of the variety of possible triggers. MPEP 2173.05(g). Limiting the claim to named triggers is expected to overcome this rejection. Claims 17-19 overcome this rejection by specifying triggers, but claim 14 does not because of the wide variety of objects and ways to predict collisions.
Claims 1 and 20 recite “recogniz[e/ing] a feature in the captured field of view,” but this is unlimited functional claiming because of the variety of recognition techniques. MPEP 2173.05(g). Limiting the claim to the object detection method from US20230117719A1 [0043] (incorporated by reference) is expected to overcome this rejection. In contrast, a cursory review of the text of the current specification did not identify details on how the feature recognition occurs. If Applicant wishes to rely on disclosure from US20230117719A1, Applicant may wish to submit declarations to remove it as prior art.
Claim 14 recites “a trailer.” While the specification has support for “the trailer,” there is not support for the trailer being with a different vehicle than the ego vehicle.
Dependent claims are likewise rejected.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1 and 3-20 (all claims) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 1 and 20 recite “triggering event,” but this is subjective because different people can have different opinions about what should be a trigger. MPEP 2173.05(b)(IV). Limiting the claim to named triggers is expected to overcome this rejection. Claims 17-19 overcome this rejection by specifying triggers, but claim 14 does not because of the wide variety of objects and ways to predict collisions.
Claims 1 and 20 recite “related,” but this is subjective because different people can have different opinions about whether something is related. MPEP 2173.05(b)(IV). One way to overcome this rejection is to specify an objective relationship, such as “is.”
Claim 1 recites “zoomed on” and claim 20 recites “zoomed,” but it is unclear whether these include zooming out. Here, Applicant’s arguments suggest that zooming out is excluded, but https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/zoomed, definition 3a states “to focus a camera or microscope on an object using a zoom lens so that the object's apparent distance from the observer changes —often used with in or out.” Here, the dictionary’s “focusing” includes both getting closer and farther away.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, and 20 recite “legally prescribed,” but what is legal changes by jurisdiction and changes over time as legislative, judicial and other processes unfold. This situation is analogous to that of trademarks, see MPEP 2173.05(u). The same issue arises for the recitations in claims 1 and 7 where the “legally prescribed view” could be one of many views. One way to overcome this rejection is to specify “one of a wide angle vehicle side rear view and a narrow angle vehicle side rear view,” as per claim 3.
Claims 1, 3, 7, 13, and 20 recite “corresponds” or “corresponding,” but these are subjective. MPEP 2173.05(b)(IV). One way to overcome this rejection is to specify an objective relationship, such as “is.”
Claim 6 recites “risk scenario of a greater rank,” but this is a relative term without sufficient guidance from the specification (e.g., how does one rank risk scenarios?). MPEP 2173.05(b).
Claims 7 and 13 recite “to provide,” but it is not clear if this is a required step, or if it instead an intended use. If this is an intended use, it is unclear what properties are required to be met.
Dependent claims are likewise rejected.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1 and 3-20 (all claims) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea (mental process) without significantly more.
Step 1: Claim 1 (and its dependents) recite a method, and processes are eligible subject matter.
Claim 20 recites a system, and machines are eligible subject matter.
Step 2A, prong one: All of the elements of the claims are a mental process because a person can look at a road, determine if there is a potential collision, and recognize where to look. Further, the various models are also mental processes, see example 47, claim 2, element (d) (from the July 2024 AI subject matter eligibility examples). MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C) explains that use of a generic computer or in a computer environment is still a mental process. In particular, this section begins by citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 US 63 (1972). “The Supreme Court recognized this in Benson, determining that a mathematical algorithm for converting binary coded decimal to pure binary within a computer’s shift register was an abstract idea.” In Benson the Supreme Court did not separately analyze the computer hardware at issue; the specifics of what hardware was claimed is only included in an appendix to the decision. Additionally, camera monitoring systems are generic computer equipment, see, e.g., specification [0001]-[0003].
Because there are no additional elements, no further analysis is required for Step 2A, prong two or Step 2B.
Examiner Notes
All of the claim limitations related to what is displayed are interpreted as non-functional descriptive material and thus not entitled to patentable weight. MPEP 2111.05(III). Here, what is displayed is directed to providing meaning to the human (e.g., where to drive), but is not used by the display or camera.
Claezon’s teaching that zooming in “may confuse or disorientate the driver” is technically not a teaching away. While Claezon provides a reason not to use zoom, the question of teaching away is focused on whether or not the modification results in what is intended. MPEP 2145(X)(D). Claezon does not teach that magnification does not result in zooming in, rather, Claezon explains why magnifying is a less preferred alternative. In particular, the MPEP cites Gurley for the proposition “and applicant asserted no discovery beyond what was known to the art.” Here, Applicant’s zoom leads to the same concerns as Claezon’s zoom.
American Axle & Manufacturing v. Neapco Holdings, 967 F. 3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020) discusses how unlimited functional claiming (as above) can raise concerns under subject matter eligibility. See section B at 1295.
US 20200401818 is a good enough reference that it bears special mention in the interest of compact prosecution. See, e.g., [0081] “Thus, a smaller part of the captured image is selected as image region (210, 211), and then an enlarged image is displayed when over speed is detected by the ECU (500).”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 3-16 and 20 (all but 17-19) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and/or (a)(2) as being anticipated by US20190191107A1 (“Claezon”)
1. A method of displaying camera views in a camera monitor system for a tractor and a trailer, the method comprising: (Claezon, [0003] “The problems with visibility is in particular substantial in heavy vehicles such as trucks, and in particular for trucks with trailers.”)
capturing with a camera a field of view that includes a legally prescribed field of view; (Claezon, [0062] “Each such display 320-1, 320-2 is associated with a respective camera 110-1, 110-2.” Side views are legally prescribed, see, e.g., specification [0006] or 49 C.F.R. 571.111, such as S5.2 “Outside rearview mirror—driver's side.” See also, Claezon, [0020] “while still being able to see the standard view along the side of the vehicle.”)
displaying information on a display to a driver of the tractor, wherein the information corresponds to the legally prescribed field of view; (Claezon, Fig. 3, right side display 320-1 and [0062] “a right side display 320-1 intended to display objects 200 outside a driver's direct field of vision.”)
identifying a triggering event related to the captured field of view; (Claezon, Fig. 4, step 401 and [0077] “Step 401 comprises detecting the object 200, situated outside the default view α of the display 320-1, 320-2, intended to display objects 200 outside a driver's direct field of vision, by a sensor 120-1, 120-2.”)
recognizing a feature in the captured field of view related to the triggering event; and (Claezon, Fig. 4, step 402 and [0083] “Step 402, which only may be comprised in some embodiments, comprises determining the relative speed of the object 200 in relation to the vehicle 100, based on signals received from the sensor 120-1, 120-2.” Claezon’s recognition that the object is a vehicle teaches the claimed recognizing a feature.)
modifying the displayed information to include displaying at least a portion of the captured field of view including the feature, (Claezon, Fig. 4, step 403 and [0084] “Step 403 comprises adjusting the field of view of a subset 340 of the display 320-1, 320-2 by widening the viewing angle so that the object 200 becomes visible for the driver in the subset 340 of the display 320-1, 320-2”)
and the least the portion of the captured field of view is zoomed on the display compared to a displaying of the legally prescribed field of view. (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” See also, [0006] “Thereby objects situated close to the wide-angle mirror seems bigger/closer than they are in reality.” Alternatively, zoomed in is a known substitute. MPEP 2144.06(II) and Claezon, [0006].)
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the legally prescribed field of view corresponds to one of a wide angle vehicle side rear view and a narrow angle vehicle side rear view. (Claezon, [0020] “while still being able to see the standard view along the side of the vehicle.”)
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the modifying step includes at least temporarily replacing the legally prescribed view. (Claezon, [0043] “By not widening the field of view of the camera 110/display, but instead keeping a normal viewing angle and instead follow the detected and identified object” Claezon’s “not widening” teaches the claimed replacing.)
5. The method of claim 4, comprising a step of moving the displayed at least the portion of the captured field of view from the display to another display after a predetermined criterion. (Claezon, [0067] “However, when no object 200 is detected situated outside the default view α, the default view α of the respective camera 110-1, 110-2 may be outputted at both the main portion 330 and the subset 340 of the displays 320-1, 320-2.” Claezon’s “no object” teaches the claimed criterion.)
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the predetermined criterion is a risk scenario of a greater rank than the triggering event. (Claezon, [0070] “In some embodiments, when the object 200 is detected in the blind spot of the driver, the driver's attention may be caught, besides tracking the object 200 with said devices 320-1, 320-2/cameras 110-1, 110-2, by an audio signal, light signal, haptic signal etc.” Claezon’s blind spot teaches the claimed greater rank risk scenario. Claezon’s tracking the object with displays teaches parent claim 5’s moving the displayed portion.)
7. The method of claim 1, comprising a step of cropping the captured field of view to provide a first region of interest corresponding to a legally prescribed field of view, and (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” Claezon’s normal field teaches the claimed legally prescribed side view as per the mapping of claim 3.)
a step of cropping the captured field of view to provide a second region of interest corresponding to the at least the portion of the captured field of view, and (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” Claezon’s extended field β teaches the claimed second region of interest.)
the least the portion of the captured field of view is enlarged on the display compared to a displaying of the legally prescribed field of view. (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” Fig. 3, element 340 teaches the claimed enlarged.)
8. The method of claim 7, wherein at least a portion of the first and second regions of interest overlap one another. (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” The claimed regions are chosen such that the claim is met)
9. The method of claim 7, wherein at least a portion of the second region of interest is outside the legally prescribed field of view. (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” The claimed regions are chosen such that the claim is met)
10. The method of claim 7, wherein the first and second regions of interest are displayed on different displays than one another. (Claezon, Fig. 3, displays 330 and 340)
11. The method of claim 7, wherein the first and second regions of interest are displayed on a same display as one another. (Claezon, Fig. 3, display 320-1)
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the second region of interest is displayed in a window arranged over the display of the legally prescribed field of view. (Claezon, Fig. 3, displays 330 and 340. “Arranged over” is understood as “displayed on.”)
13. The method of claim 7, comprising a step of cropping the captured field of view to provide a third region of interest corresponding to another legally prescribed view, both legally prescribed views being illustrated on a common display. (Claezon, [0051] “as the normal field of view α of the camera 110-2 is outputted on a main section of the display while a subset of the display outputs the extended field of view β of the camera 110-2.” Claim 3 specifies two legally prescribed views that are of the same space.)
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the triggering event is a potential collision with an object, and the feature includes at least one of the object and a portion of a trailer in closest proximity to the object. (Claezon, Fig. 4, step 401 and [0077] “Step 401 comprises detecting the object 200, situated outside the default view α of the display 320-1, 320-2, intended to display objects 200 outside a driver's direct field of vision, by a sensor 120-1, 120-2.” Claezon’s outside the field of view teaches the claimed potential collision with a trailer, see [0071] “the risk of an accident … is reduced,” see also Fig. 2D showing the claimed trailer in proximity)
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the object is an overtaking vehicle, and the portion of the trailer includes a trailer end. (Claezon, Fig. 2D)
16. The method of claim 14, wherein the object is a vulnerable road user. (Claezon, Fig. 2D)
Claim 20 is rejected as per claim 7. See also, Claezon, claim 4 teaching the claimed system.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 17-19 (the claims not rejected for 102 above) are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US20190191107A1 (“Claezon”) and WO2023092065A1 (“Ahamed”)
17. Claezon teaches the method of claim 1, but is not relied on for the below claim language.
However, Ahamed teaches wherein the triggering event is a potential trailer curb strike, and the feature includes at least one of a curb and a trailer wheel. (Ahamed, [0026] “For example, when the vehicle 102 takes a sharp turn around a curb, the curb is constantly shown in the display 142 by changing the camera view.”)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to apply the teachings of Ahamed to the teachings of Claezon such that Ahamed’s turn assist system are used with Claezon’s digital mirror for the purpose of assisting with turns and implementation details (e.g., Ahamed’s tracking turns is valuable for Claezon’s blind spot monitoring, and Ahamed’s concern with driving over a curbs aligns Claezon’s concern about accidents (e.g., Claezon, [0006]).
Based on the above, this is an example of “combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” MPEP 2143.
18. The method of claim 1, wherein the triggering event is a potential trailer lane crossing, and the feature includes at least one of a trailer end and a lane marking. (Ahamed, [0026] “For example, when the vehicle 102 takes a sharp turn around a curb, the curb is constantly shown in the display 142 by changing the camera view.” Fig. 4B shows a lane marking by the curb.)
Ahamed and Claezon are combined as per claim 17.
19. The method of claim 1, wherein the triggering event is a steering angle above a threshold, and the feature is a region between a tractor and a trailer. (Ahamed, Fig. 6, step 912 “Select camera view of object relative to vehicle, trailer.” See also, [0031] “The vehicle dynamics sensor data may include … the angle of the steering wheel of the tow vehicle 102.”)
Ahamed and Claezon are combined as per claim 17.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
US20220309802A1 – abstract, “A camera system for a first vehicle includes first and second exterior cameras that are configured to capture images outside of the first vehicle corresponding to legally prescribed views.”
US20230125045A1 – title “Trailer end tracking in a camera monitoring system”
US20200401818A1 – see the above examiner note
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DAVID ORANGE whose telephone number is (571)270-1799. The examiner can normally be reached Mon-Fri, 9-5.
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/DAVID ORANGE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2663
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