DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Applicant’s election without traverse of the following species in the reply filed 14 January 2026 is noted: Cannabis plant matter, Cannabis oil, and a Cannabis terpene. Claims 1-5, 7-15, 17-20 encompass the elected species.
Because applicant did not distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the restriction requirement, the election has been treated as an election without traverse (MPEP § 818.03(a)).
Status of the Claims
Claims 6 and 16 have been cancelled.
Claims 1-5, 7-15 and 17-20 are presented for examination on the merits.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-5 and 7-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
The MPEP states that the purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the invention had possession, as of the filing date of the application, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him or her. The courts have stated:
“To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention.’ Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. 3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Gostelli, 872 F. 2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written description requirement “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, no that which makes it obvious,” and by using “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention.” Lockwood, 107 F. 3d at 1572, 41 USPQ2d at 1966.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 43 USPQ2d 1398.
The MPEP lists factors that can be used to determine if sufficient evidence of possession has been furnished in the disclosure of the Application. These include “level of skill and knowledge in the art, partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics alone or coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between structure and function, and the method of making the claimed invention. Disclosure of any combination of such identifying characteristics that distinguish the claimed invention from other materials would lead one of skill in the art to the conclusion that the applicant was in possession of the claimed species is sufficient” MPEP § 2163.
Level of Skill and Knowledge in the Art:
The MPEP indicates:
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A), above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B), above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C), above). See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.
What constitutes a “representative number” is an inverse function of the skill and knowledge in the art. Satisfactory disclosure of a “representative number” depends on whether one of skill in the art would recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary common attributes or features possessed by the members of the genus in view of the species disclosed. For inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written description of a genus which embraces widely variant species cannot be achieved by disclosing only one species within the genus. See, e.g., Eli Lilly.
Applicant has provided evidence of possession of any and all plants infused with any and all oils. The written description is replete with embodiments and examples for example, cannabis plant and cannabis oil. However, given the vast range of oils and plants in existance, such disclosure is not deemed a representative number of such a vast range of possiblities
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), states that "applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry, whatever is now claimed" (See page 1117). The specification does not "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed" (See Vas-Cath at page 1116).
In Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lily & Co. 598 F ad 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) en banc}, the Federal Circuit noted the importance of an application's disclosure, stating, “the hallmark of written description is disclosure.” A disclosure adequately describes an invention when it “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. at 1354. “A ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not adequate written description.” Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbot Labs, 636 F.3d 1341, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Satisfying the written description requirement “varies with the nature and scape of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F. 3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit explained what is required to meet the written description requirement in Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co:
This inquiry, as we have long held, is a question of fact. Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 575. Thus, we have recognized that determining whether a patent complies with the written description requirement will necessarily vary depending on the context. Capon v Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Specifically, the level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. Id. For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of the disclosure, including “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue." Id. at 1359.
A written description of a genus in biotechnological arts “requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name” of the claimed subject matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 199 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Federal Circuit reflected on Eli Lilly in Ariad while explaining how to sufficiently describe a genus in biotechnological applications:
We held that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species fitting within the scope of the genus of structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus. Id. at 1568-69. We explained that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials. Id. at 1568 (quoting Fiers v. Revel 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993). We have also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001). But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species.
A “representative number of species” must typify the entire claimed genus and account for variation between the species of the genus:
[A] patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictably in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated. Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1508, 1514 (Fed. Or. 2004).
In Ariad, the Court also addressed the presence of a genus within a method claim, in Rochester, we held invalid claims directed to a method of selectively inhibiting the COX-2 enzyme by administering a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits the COX-2 enzyme. Id. at 918. We reasoned that because the specification did not describe any specific compound capable of performing the claimed method and the skilled artisan would not be able to identify any such compound based on the specification’s function description, the specification did not provide an adequate written description of the claimed invention. Id. at 927-28. Ariad, at 1373.
Applicants’ claims are directed toward any composition comprising any botanical plant matter with a mixture of any oil and a terpene. However, Applicants have not disclosed that the method described in the specification would work with any oil and any plant. Thus, the Applicant is deemed not to be in possession of the claimed invention based on the written description as originally filed.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 5 and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 5 is rendered vague and indefinite by the terms “herbal non-tobacco” and “Cannabis species including marijuana and hemp” recited within the group of botanica plant matter. Firstly, it is unclear to what “herbal non-tobacco” is meant to refer. That is – does it mean any herb that is not tobacco?
Secondly, the use of the term “including” is not limiting so it is unclear if the species of cannabis to choose from meant to be limited to marijuana and hemp. Marijuana is the common name used for cannabis, rather than a species thereof. Hemp is a plant in the botanical class of Cannabis sativa cultivars grown specifically for industrial and consumable use.
Claim 7 is rendered vague and indefinite by the terms “butter” and “essential oil” within the list of oil. It is unclear what particular essential oil this is meant to refer, if any. Essential oils can be obtained from any plant material and contain compounds of hydrophobic volatile organic compounds and thus are described as oils. Furthermore, butter is not an oil, but rather an emulsion that contains butter fat. Does Applicant mean that the butter is clarified to obtained the isolated fats from the protein and water?
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-5, 7-15 and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Reillo et al. (US2016/0367479) and Lindsay (US20160296464) and Hartman (WO2016/187156A1).
Reillo et al. beneficially teaches a method for making a plant-based product (a cannabinoid oil infused food product such as tea leaves; paragraphs [0010]. [0027]). comprising: obtaining dried botanical matter (the tea leaves; paragraphs (0010], [0027]); obtaining a Cannabis oil derived from a plant of the Cannabis genus (lipophilic active agent such as cannabinoid (cannabis oil); paragraph [0010]); obtaining a container (a food dehydrator (container); figure 4; paragraphs [0027], [0107]); applying said dried botanical matter with said oil to create an oil coated botanical matter (the cannabinoid oil saturates the tea leaves; paragraph [0010]); placing said oil coated botanical matter into said container; dosing said container (dehydrating the food product contacted with the cannabinoid oil in the food dehydrator (container); figure 4; paragraphs [0010], [0027], [0107]); heating said container to a predetermined temperature (dehydrating the tea leaves contacted with the cannabinoid oil in the food dehydrator (container) and heating to a temperature that is equal to human body temperature; figure 4; paragraphs [0010], [0019], [0027], [0107]); leaving said dried botanical matter and said oil in said container at said predetermined temperature for a development time period to create a Cannabis oil-infused botanical product (dehydrating the cannabis oil infused tea leaves in the food dehydrator (container) and heating to a temperature that is equal to human body temperature for 0-24 hours; figure 4; paragraphs [0010], [0019], [0027], [0107], [0132]),
Lindsay beneficially discloses a method for making a plant-based product (a wrapper comprises plant material such as a hemp (plant-based product) for wrapping cannabis plant; paragraphs [0181], [0207], [0209]), comprising: obtaining dried botanical matter (the wrapper comprising plant material such as a hemp; paragraphs [0181], [0207]) obtaining an oil (coating the wrapper with an oil; paragraphs [0207], [0210]); coating said dried botanical matter with said oil to create an oil coated botanical matter (coating the wrapper comprising plant material such as hemp with an oil; paragraphs [0181], [0207], [0209)-(0010]).
Hartman discloses a method for making a plant-based product (a smoking product comprising tobacco or cannabis (plant-based product); paragraphs (0083), [0114]). obtaining botanical matter (tobacco or cannabis; paragraph [0114]); obtaining a Cannabis oil derived from a plant of the Cannabis genus (cannabis oil; paragraphs [00831, 0114); spraying said dried botanical matter with said oil/ alcohol mixture to create an oil/alcohol coated botanical matter (cannabis oi! is sprayed from a canister and distributed onto the tobacco or cannabis smoking product; paragraphs [Q079J, [0083], [0114]).
The cited references do not explicitly disclose the specific steps with the specific variables/conditions of the instant invention. However, such modification of standard variables would be well within the purview of the skilled practitioner in optimizing the conditions to produce the best product, e.g., THC infused paper. The adjustment of these and/or other particular conventional working conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, etc.) is deemed merely a matter of judicious selection, design choice, and routine optimization which is well within the purview of the skilled artisan.
See e.g., MPEP 2144.05
II. ROUTINE OPTIMIZATION
A. Optimization Within Prior Art Conditions or Through Routine Experimentation
Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. "[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation." In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 ("The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages."); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree "will not sustain a patent"); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438 (CCPA 1929) ("It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions."). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (identifying "the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.").
B. There Must Be an Articulated Rationale Supporting the Rejection
In order to properly support a rejection on the basis that an invention is the result of "routine optimization", the examiner must make findings of relevant facts, and present the underpinning reasoning in sufficient detail. The articulated rationale must include an explanation of why it would have been routine optimization to arrive at the claimed invention and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to formulate the claimed range. See In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346, 123 USPQ2d 1838, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359,1361,121 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2017 ("Absent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’"); Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ … cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support … .").
The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because "obvious to try" is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Supreme Court held that "obvious to try" was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a "design need" or "market demand" and there are a "finite number" of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421 ("The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’ ... When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103."). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.
III. REBUTTAL OF PRIMA FACIE CASE OF OBVIOUSNESS
A. Showing That the Range Is Critical
Applicants can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness by showing the criticality of the range. "The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims. . . . In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range." In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) ("Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies."); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) ("Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys."); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) ("It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree."); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675 (CCPA 1932) ("Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations . . . in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes."); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)("[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in agree from the results of the prior art." (citing Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955).
See MPEP § 716.02 - § 716.02(g) for a discussion of criticality and unexpected results.
From the teachings of the references, it is apparent that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in producing the claimed invention. Therefore, the invention as a whole was prima facie obvious to one of skill in the art at the time the invention was made, as evidence by the references, especially in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidance/eTD-info-I.jsp.
Claims 1-5, 7-15 and 17-20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-13 of U.S. Patent No. 10,874,703 and claims 1-13 of U.S. Patent No. 11,950,623. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both are drawn to methods for making a oil-infused botanicals, by mixing an oil/alcohol mixture and applying said oil/alcohol mixture onto dried botanical matter and pressurizing and heating to create an oil-infused botanical product. In addition, please note that the instant claims encompass and/or are encompassed by the "703 and ‘623 claims.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
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/RUSSELL G FIEBIG/Examiner, Art Unit 1655