Prosecution Insights
Last updated: July 17, 2026
Application No. 18/611,243

METHODS, DEVICES AND SYSTEMS FOR SECURING WIRELESS SYSTEMS FROM INSIDER INFORMATION ATTACKS

Final Rejection §103
Filed
Mar 20, 2024
Priority
Oct 10, 2023 — provisional 63/543,399
Examiner
NIPA, WASIKA
Art Unit
2433
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Infineon Technologies AG
OA Round
2 (Final)
75%
Grant Probability
Favorable
3-4
OA Rounds
6m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 75% — above average
75%
Career Allowance Rate
233 granted / 309 resolved
+17.4% vs TC avg
Strong +29% interview lift
Without
With
+29.1%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
2y 10m
Avg Prosecution
19 currently pending
Career history
325
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
1.2%
-38.8% vs TC avg
§103
94.5%
+54.5% vs TC avg
§102
2.2%
-37.8% vs TC avg
§112
1.1%
-38.9% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 309 resolved cases

Office Action

§103
Detailed Action The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Amendment filed on 02/19/2026 has been acknowledged. Claims 1-20 are currently pending and have been considered below. Claim 1, 10 and 17 are independent claim. No claim is added new. Priority This application has PRO 63/543,399 filed on 10/10/2023. Remarks and Response Applicant’s arguments filed in the amendments on 02/19/2026 have been fully considered but are they are not persuasive. The reasons set forth below. On pages 10-11 of the argument, filed on 02/19/2026, applicant argued that there is no discussion of wireless request protocol data unit in Das. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Das, Fig-1 discusses a wireless communication system and an access network. Fig-4, Das shows wireless communication between wireless devices. Das, ¶[0048], certain UEs 104 may communicate with each other using device-to-device communication link. Das, ¶[0049], the wireless communication system may further include a Wi-Fi AP 150 in communication with UEs 104. Das, ¶[006], the UE 104 may also be refereed to as a station, mobile station, mobile unit, wireless unit, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, wireless terminal etc. Das, ¶[0059], Fig. 2A-2D illustrate a frame structure and the aspects of the present disclosure that may be applicable to wireless communication. Das, ¶[0076], Fig-4 illustrates an example of wireless communication between wireless devices. Ordinary skill in the art understands that protocol data unit (PDU) includes both user information and protocol specific control information, used for communication in network. Each layer of the OSI model defines its own PDU format. In physical layer PDU is bits, in data link layer PDU is a frame, in network layer PDU is a packet, in transport layer PDU is segment, in application layer PDU is message or data. Claim 1 of instant application recites that “determining if an MAC address of the request PDU matching a stored MAC address”. Das, ¶[0084], Fig-6, teaches MAC cloning attack where an attacking device may copy source ID of the TX UE to communicate with Rx UE. Das, ¶[0086], attacking device clones a source L2 address of a victim device and uses the cloned source L2 address of the victim device. Das, ¶[0103], the Rx UE may transmit the application layer message to the Tx UE to notify the Tx UE of a MAC cloning attack performed on the Tx UE based on the Rx UE detecting the MAC cloning attack performed on the Tx UE. Das, ¶[0104], the victim UE may not be able to detect that the cloning has occurred. The victim UE may receive the IUC message or application layer message in order to be notified of the cloning. From the above discussion, Examiner concludes that various sections of Das clearly discusses the protocol data unit wireless communication. Thus the 103 rejection is maintained. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim 1-3, 6-11, and 14-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Das (US Patent Application Publication No 2024/0380782 A1) in view of Raman (US Patent Application Publication No 2017/0013449 A1). Regarding Claim 1, Das discloses a method, comprising: by operation of a first wireless device (Das, Fig-1): receiving a wireless request protocol data unit (PDU) via wireless communication circuits (Das, ¶[0066], RLC layer functionality associated with the transfer of upper layer packet data units (PDUs). ¶[0084], Fig-6, the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may use the copied L2 source ID of the Tx UE to communicate with the Rx UE), by operation of controller circuits of the first wireless device (Das, Fig-1), determining if the MAC address of the request PDU matches a stored MAC address (Das, ¶[0086]-¶[0087], a V2X device obtains a message including a MAC header, an L1 source ID, and an L1 destination ID. ¶[0089], the Tx UE may receive a message. The Tx UE may determine whether an L1 destination ID in the message matches the 16 least significant bit of an L2 source ID of the Tx UE), and in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching a stored MAC address, ignoring the request PDU or not transmitting buffered data corresponding to the matching MAC address of the request PDU (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]). Das does not explicitly discuss the following limitation that Raman teaches: storing media access control (MAC) addresses for devices associated with a wireless network in first memory circuits of the first wireless device (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device), Das in view of Raman are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor” and are from the same “problem solving area”. Namely, they pertain to the field of “managing addressing of wireless clients connected to wireless networks”. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Das in view of Raman to include the idea of using the true MAC address in network communications, because this address does not change and is intended to be unique, devices can be uniquely and repeatedly identified by other network device based only on their true MAC address. (Raman, ¶[0005]). Regarding Claim 2, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 1, wherein the request PDU is compatible with at least one IEEE 802.11 wireless standard (Das, ¶[0048], certain UEs may communicate with each other using device-to-device (D2D) communication link. D2D communication may be through a variety of wireless D2D communications systems, such as for example, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard. Also Raman, ¶[0053]). Regarding claim 3, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 1, further including: storing first additional information corresponding to each stored MAC address of each associated device (Das, ¶[0096], the message may include a MAC header, a message L1 source ID and a message L1 destination ID. The message may also include data); in response to a disassociation of one of the associated devices, deleting the MAC address and first additional information corresponding to the disassociated device (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries); by operation of the controller circuits (Raman, ¶[0065]) determining a MAC address and second additional information for buffered data for transmission from the first wireless device (Das, ¶[0065], the PUSCH carries data and may additionally be used to carry a buffer status report. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries), and in response to the second additional information of the buffered data not matching the first information corresponding to the matching MAC addresses, not transmitting buffered data (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries), wherein the first and second additional information are fields corresponding to a higher level network layer than the MAC address (Das, ¶[0066], the controller implements layer 3 functionality. ¶[0103], the Rx UE may transmit the application layer message to/for the Tx UE to notify the Tx UE of a MAC cloning attack performed on the Tx UE based on the Rx UE detecting the MAC cloning attack performed on the Tx UE. ¶[0104], in a multicast or broadcast scenario, an L2 source ID of a victim UE may be cloned and used for a PSID to which the victim UE is not subscribed). Regarding Claim 6, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 1, further including: the request PDU comprises an association request (Raman, ¶[0054], as the identification and communication of the designated MAC address may occur prior to association, pre-association data exchanges may be required); in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching a stored MAC address (Raman, ¶[0057], association table denial of service attacks are minimized by requiring additional data exchange before an entry in the association table), returning a response to a device issuing the request PDU to retry association at a later time (Raman, ¶[0055], receiving the association request at the network device causes the network device to confirm that the designated MAC address included in the association request is authorized for use), issuing a probe request with a destination MAC address corresponding to the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0059], association table has finite size. Association table entries may expire after a fixed amount of time, but it is possible for malfunctioning or malicious device to fill up an association table in a shorter amount of time than the expiry time), in response to receiving an acknowledgement to the probe request, ignoring further association requests for the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0060], network device may require an associated device to exchange additional data with the network device shortly after association in order to maintain or create an association table entry. Network device may track characteristics of a client device that is transmitting multiple probe or association requests using different MAC addresses and may refuse or fail to acknowledge requests that are identified as being associated with the client device), and in response to not receiving an acknowledgement to the probe request, processing a future association request for the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0064], the response to the association query includes an acknowledge packets). Regarding Claim 7, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 1, further including, in response to the MAC address of request PDU not matching any of the stored MAC addresses, processing the request PDU (Raman, ¶[0064], the response to the association query includes an acknowledge packets). Regarding Claim 8, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 1, further including: the first wireless device is part of distributed system having at least a second wireless device (Das, Fig-1); in response to the MAC address of request PDU not matching any of the stored MAC addresses (Das, ¶[0086]-¶[0087], a V2X device obtains a message including a MAC header, an L1 source ID, and an L1 destination ID. ¶[0089], the Tx UE may receive a message. The Tx UE may determine whether an L1 destination ID in the message matches the 16 least significant bit of an L2 source ID of the Tx UE), transmitting a request to at least the second wireless device to check for other devices associated with the second wireless device having a MAC address that matches that of the request PDU (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]), and in response to determining that one of the other associated devices has a matching MAC address, ignoring further association requests for the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device), and in response to determining that none of the other associated devices has a matching MAC address, processing future association requests for the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0064], the response to the association query includes an acknowledge packets). Regarding Claim 9, Das in view of Raman discloses the method of claim 8, further including: by operation of at least the second wireless device (Das, Fig-1), storing MAC addresses for the other devices associated with the second wireless device (Das, ¶[0066], RLC layer functionality associated with the transfer of upper layer packet data units (PDUs). ¶[0084], Fig-6, the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may use the copied L2 source ID of the Tx UE to communicate with the Rx UE), receiving the request to check for other devices associated with the second wireless device (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]), in response to the MAC address of the request PDU matching a MAC address of at least one of the other associated devices, returning a response to the first wireless device indicating that one of the other associated devices has a matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device). Regarding Claim 10, Das discloses a device, comprising: wireless circuits configured to receive and transmit wireless messages according to at least one wireless standard, including receiving a request protocol data unit (PDU) (Das, ¶[0066], RLC layer functionality associated with the transfer of upper layer packet data units (PDUs). ¶[0084], Fig-6, the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may use the copied L2 source ID of the Tx UE to communicate with the Rx UE); and controller circuits configured to determine if a MAC address of the request PDU matches the MAC address stored in the memory circuits (Das, ¶[0086]-¶[0087], a V2X device obtains a message including a MAC header, an L1 source ID, and an L1 destination ID. ¶[0089], the Tx UE may receive a message. The Tx UE may determine whether an L1 destination ID in the message matches the 16 least significant bit of an L2 source ID of the Tx UE), and in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching a stored MAC address, ignoring the request PDU or not transmitting buffered data having a destination of the matching MAC address (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]). Das does not explicitly discuss the following limitation that Raman teaches: memory circuits configured to store at least media access control (MAC) addresses for associated devices (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device). Das in view of Raman are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor” and are from the same “problem solving area”. Namely, they pertain to the field of “managing addressing of wireless clients connected to wireless networks”. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Das in view of Raman to include the idea of using the true MAC address in network communications, because this address does not change and is intended to be unique, devices can be uniquely and repeatedly identified by other network device based only on their true MAC address. (Raman, ¶[0005]). Regarding Claim 11, Das in view of Raman discloses the device of claim 10, wherein: the memory circuits are further configured to store additional information corresponding to the MAC address of each associated device, and include at least one buffer configured to store download data for transmission from the device (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries); and the controller circuits are further configured to scan the download data in the at least one buffer for MAC address values and additional information (Das, ¶[0065], the PUSCH carries data and may additionally be used to carry a buffer status report. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries), and in response to determining that stored download data includes the MAC address of an associated device, but not the corresponding additional information, not transmitting the download data from the buffer (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries). Regarding Claim 14, Das in view of Raman discloses the device of claim 10, wherein: the controller circuits are configured to, in response to the disassociation of one of the associated devices, delete the MAC address for the disassociated device from the memory circuits (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries). Regarding Claim 15, Das in view of Raman discloses the device of claim 10, wherein: the request PDU comprises an association request (Raman, ¶[0054], as the identification and communication of the designated MAC address may occur prior to association, pre-association data exchanges may be required); the controller circuits are configured to, in response to the association request having a MAC address that matches that of an associated device, generate an association response requesting that the association request be re-transmitted at a later time (Raman, ¶[0055], receiving the association request at the network device causes the network device to confirm that the designated MAC address included in the association request is authorized for use), generate a message addressed to the associated device having the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0059], association table has finite size. Association table entries may expire after a fixed amount of time, but it is possible for malfunctioning or malicious device to fill up an association table in a shorter amount of time than the expiry time), and in response to receiving a response to the message from the associated device, ignoring a subsequent association request having the matching MAC address (Raman, ¶[0060], network device may require an associated device to exchange additional data with the network device shortly after association in order to maintain or create an association table entry. Network device may track characteristics of a client device that is transmitting multiple probe or association requests using different MAC addresses and may refuse or fail to acknowledge requests that are identified as being associated with the client device); and the wireless circuits are configured to transmit the association response and message and receive the response to the message (Raman, ¶[0064], the response to the association query includes an acknowledge packets). Regarding Claim 16, Das in view of Raman discloses the device of claim 15, wherein: the controller circuits are configured to in response to the message being transmitted by the wireless circuits, starting a timer (Raman, ¶[0031], failure to associate using a designated MAC address within a specified time period results in the designated MAC address automatically being released or otherwise designated as unreserved), and in response to the timer exceeding a predetermined value, indicating a subsequent association request can be processed (ailure to associate using a designated MAC address within a specified time period results in the designated MAC address automatically being released or otherwise designated as unreserved). Regarding Claim 17, Das discloses a system, comprising: a wireless device configured to (Das, Fig-1) receive and transmit wireless messages according to at least one wireless communication standard, including receiving a request protocol data unit (PDU) (Das, ¶[0066], RLC layer functionality associated with the transfer of upper layer packet data units (PDUs). ¶[0084], Fig-6, the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may copy an L2 source ID of the Tx UE and the attacking device may use the copied L2 source ID of the Tx UE to communicate with the Rx UE); determine if a MAC address of the request PDU matches the MAC address of an associated device (Das, ¶[0086]-¶[0087], a V2X device obtains a message including a MAC header, an L1 source ID, and an L1 destination ID. ¶[0089], the Tx UE may receive a message. The Tx UE may determine whether an L1 destination ID in the message matches the 16 least significant bit of an L2 source ID of the Tx UE), and in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching a stored MAC address, ignoring the request PDU or not transmitting buffered data having a destination of the matching MAC address (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]); and a first antenna system compatible with the at least one wireless communication standard (Das, Fig-1). Das does not explicitly discuss the following limitation that Raman teaches: store at least media access control (MAC) addresses for devices associated with the wireless device (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device); Das in view of Raman are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor” and are from the same “problem solving area”. Namely, they pertain to the field of “managing addressing of wireless clients connected to wireless networks”. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Das in view of Raman to include the idea of using the true MAC address in network communications, because this address does not change and is intended to be unique, devices can be uniquely and repeatedly identified by other network device based only on their true MAC address. (Raman, ¶[0005]). Regarding Claim 18, Das in view of Raman discloses the system of claim 17, wherein: the wireless device is further configured to store additional information corresponding to the MAC address of each associated device and to store download data for transmission from the wireless device (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries), scan the download data for MAC address values and additional information (Das, ¶[0065], the PUSCH carries data and may additionally be used to carry a buffer status report. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries), and in response to determining that stored download data includes the MAC address of an associated device, but not the corresponding additional information, not transmitting the download data (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0144], if authentication remains incomplete, such as upon a timer elapsing or the wireless client device begins using a different MAC address from the designated MAC address after authentication, the association table entry corresponding to wireless client device may be deleted or removed from the association table. Raman, ¶[0167], only devices which pass the association reply requirement are given association table entries). Regarding Claim 19, Das in view of Raman discloses the system of claim 17, further including: the request PDU comprises an association request (Raman, ¶[0054], as the identification and communication of the designated MAC address may occur prior to association, pre-association data exchanges may be required); and the wireless device comprises a first access point device (AP) compatible with at least one IEEE 802.11 wireless standard, and is configured to (Das, ¶[0048], certain UEs may communicate with each other using device-to-device (D2D) communication link. D2D communication may be through a variety of wireless D2D communications systems, such as for example, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard. Also Raman, ¶[0053]), in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching the stored MAC address, transmit a MAC check request to a second AP, the check request including the MAC address of the request PDU (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]), in response to receiving a first type response from the second AP, transmit a response requesting retransmission of the association request at a later time (Raman, ¶[0055], receiving the association request at the network device causes the network device to confirm that the designated MAC address included in the association request is authorized for use), and in response to receiving a second type response from the second AP and the MAC address of the request PDU not matching a stored MAC address, processing the association request (Raman, ¶[0060], network device may require an associated device to exchange additional data with the network device shortly after association in order to maintain or create an association table entry. Network device may track characteristics of a client device that is transmitting multiple probe or association requests using different MAC addresses and may refuse or fail to acknowledge requests that are identified as being associated with the client device). Regarding Claim 20, Das in view of Raman discloses the system of claim 19, further including: the second AP is configured to (Das, Fig-1) in response to receiving the check request, determine if the MAC address of the request PDU matches the MAC address of another device associated with the second AP (Das, ¶[0093], Tx UE may transmit for the Rx UE and other UEs an indication that the MAC cloning attack has occurred. ¶[0094], the Tx UE may discard a received message when an L1 destination ID of the received message does not match the 16 LSBs of the source address of the Tx UE. As the Tx UE discards the received message without decoding a MAC header of the message, the Tx may not be able to identify an L2 source ID of the message. ¶[0100], If the message L2 source ID matches the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a potential cloning attack has occurred. If the message L2 source ID does not match the Tx UE L2 source ID of the Tx UE, the Tx UE may detect that a cloning attack has not occurred. ¶[0129]), in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU matching another device associated with the second AP, transmitting the first type response (Raman, ¶[0125], wireless client device may have a hardware MAC address, also known as manufacturer assigned or true MAC address. Wireless client device may use another MAC address for pre-association data communication such as a random MAC address. ¶[0127]-¶[0128], probe response includes a destination MAC address that matches the source MAC address included in probe request, namely the random MAC address transmitted by wireless client device), and in response to at least the MAC address of the request PDU not matching a device associated with the second AP, transmitting the second type response (Raman, ¶[0064], the response to the association query includes an acknowledge packets). Claim 4-5, 12-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Das (US Patent Application Publication No 2024/0380782 A1) in view of Raman (US Patent Application Publication No 2017/0013449 A1) and further in view of Johnsen (US Patent Application Publication No 2023/0121096 A1). Regarding claim 4, Das in view of Raman does not disclose the following limitation that Johnsen teaches: the method of claim 3, wherein: the first additional information comprises a layer four source port value (Johnsen, ¶[0084], payload comprises application data contained within a transport layer data unit ( a TCP segment or UDP datagram)); and the second additional information comprises a layer four destination port value (Johnsen, ¶[0081], the destination address indicates the destination network interface device to which the frame is to be delivered over the network. Johnsen, ¶[0088], the header comprises a plurality of fields, including a destination ID field, identifying the destination device to which the respective packet is to be routed over the network). Das in view of Raman and Johnsen are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor” and are from the same “problem solving area”. Namely, they pertain to the field of “data processing to support the transmission of frames over the network”. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the invention of Das in view of Raman and Johnsen to include the idea of providing the address resolution function and a first of the physical position identifiers or logical identifiers corresponding to a destination data processing device to which a first of the frames is to be provided over the network (Johnsen, ¶[0009]). Regarding Claim 5, Das in view of Raman and Johnsen discloses the method of claim 3, further including: maintaining a context for each associated device, each context comprising (Johnsen, ¶[0134], the address resolution function provides the MAC addresses for the construction of frames comprising the datagrams. The network protocol stack obtains the MAC address of the destination that is determined by the address resolution function in dependence upon the provided physical location identifier or logical identifier. Johnsen, ¶[0143], when application has data to send, the application stores the data in a buffer accessible to the network stack that performs protocol processing of the data including obtaining the destination and source MAC addresses for the frame in which the data is to be dispatched): a MAC address (Johnsen, ¶[0134], the address resolution function provides the MAC addresses for the construction of frames comprising the datagrams. The network protocol stack obtains the MAC address of the destination that is determined by the address resolution function in dependence upon the provided physical location identifier or logical identifier), first additional information, a timer (Johnsen, ¶[0026], one or more bits of the destination media access control address indicate a number of times a reset event has occurred), and a buffer location for buffered data (Johnsen, ¶[0098], ELink data packets comprise writes of data to a buffer. Johnsen, ¶[0105], payload data to be written to the datagram TX buffer); and in response to a disassociation of a device, deleting the context for the disassociated device from the first memory circuits (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of the sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0066], if initial association completes but authentication does not complete successfully, an association table entry may be withheld or deleted and the client device may be de-associated). Regarding Claim 12, Das in view of Raman and Johnsen discloses the device of claim 11, wherein: the additional information corresponding to the MAC address of each associated device comprises a source port address according to a layer four protocol (Johnsen, ¶[0084], payload comprises application data contained within a transport layer data unit ( a TCP segment or UDP datagram)); and the additional information for the download data comprises a destination port address according to the layer four protocol (Johnsen, ¶[0081], the destination address indicates the destination network interface device to which the frame is to be delivered over the network. Johnsen, ¶[0088], the header comprises a plurality of fields, including a destination ID field, identifying the destination device to which the respective packet is to be routed over the network). Regarding Claim 13, Das in view of Raman and Johnsen discloses the device of claim 10, wherein: the controller circuits are configured to maintain a context for each associated device, the context for each associated device comprising (Johnsen, ¶[0134], the address resolution function provides the MAC addresses for the construction of frames comprising the datagrams. The network protocol stack obtains the MAC address of the destination that is determined by the address resolution function in dependence upon the provided physical location identifier or logical identifier. Johnsen, ¶[0143], when application has data to send, the application stores the data in a buffer accessible to the network stack that performs protocol processing of the data including obtaining the destination and source MAC addresses for the frame in which the data is to be dispatched), the MAC address for the associated device (Johnsen, ¶[0134], the address resolution function provides the MAC addresses for the construction of frames comprising the datagrams. The network protocol stack obtains the MAC address of the destination that is determined by the address resolution function in dependence upon the provided physical location identifier or logical identifier), at least one source port address (Raman, ¶[0065], a client device that may initially request or respond but that later stops responding before the end of the series of the sub-queries can have its association table entry withheld or deleted. Raman, ¶[0066], if initial association completes but authentication does not complete successfully, an association table entry may be withheld or deleted and the client device may be de-associated), a timer (Johnsen, ¶[0026], one or more bits of the destination media access control address indicate a number of times a reset event has occurred), and an address for a buffer in the memory circuits (Johnsen, ¶[0098], ELink data packets comprise writes of data to a buffer. Johnsen, ¶[0105], payload data to be written to the datagram TX buffer). Conclusion THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to WASIKA NIPA whose telephone number is (571)272-8923. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F (7:30 - 5:00). If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, JEFFRY PWU can be reached on 571-272-6798. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /WASIKA NIPA/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2433
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Prosecution Timeline

Mar 20, 2024
Application Filed
Nov 19, 2025
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103
Feb 19, 2026
Response Filed
Jun 10, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §103 (current)

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Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
75%
Grant Probability
99%
With Interview (+29.1%)
2y 10m (~6m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
Moderate
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