DETAILED ACTION
Response to Amendment
Claims 1-17 are pending. Claim 15-17 have been added.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments filed 01/05/2026 have been fully considered.
Regarding the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Nakagawa (US20150163306A1) in view of Darnell et al. (US20170134382A1), Applicant argues on page 12 that any proper combination of Nakagawa and Darnell fails to disclose the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture, as now recited by amended independent claim 1,
Applicant’s arguments are persuasive. In view of the claim amendment and after further search and consideration, claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Nakagawa in view of Darnell and Drozd et al. (US20220345484A1), wherein Drozd is relied upon to disclose “the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture” as discussed in the rejection below.
As to any argument not specifically addressed, they are the same as those discussed above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-2, 4-7 and 9-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Nakagawa (US20150163306A1) in view of Darnell et al. (US20170134382A1) and Drozd et al. (US20220345484A1).
Regarding claim 1, Nakagawa discloses a vehicle security system provided in a vehicle, the vehicle security system comprising (para [0059] shows vehicle security; para [0051] shows the user makes an access request for door lock and other units, or a request for collecting the charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100):
a primary dynamic authenticator disposed in an electronic control unit (ECU) in the vehicle (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means); and
one or more connection managers (para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle), wherein
when an access request for access to an access destination in the vehicle is made by an access source in the vehicle, the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication of the access request (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means and changes the state of the vehicle to the state according to this command. In the first embodiment, the door lock control ECU 110b controls the vehicle 100 to be locked or unlocked), and
causes a connection manager located on a communication path between the access source and the access destination, among the one or more connection managers, to control a connection between the access source and the access destination, based on a result of the authentication of the access request (para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle.)
Nakagawa fails to teach:
the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication of the access request based on a state of the vehicle, and
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However, Darnell discloses the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication [administrative credentials] of the access request based on a state of the vehicle ([Abstract] shows permitting a user to select locally available vehicles; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like) of a vehicle; para [0099] shows commands that may be accessible to an administrative user in which additional functionality is unlocked by the receipt of administrative credentials include: lock doors, unlock doors, change availability state, disable ignition, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like; para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa with the teaching of Darnell in order to identify and permit a user to select locally available vehicles (Darnell; [Abstract]).
Nakagawa-Darnell as combined fails to teach:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However Drozd, in an analogous art (para [0002] shows autonomous vehicles, vehicle to everything (V2X) networks), discloses:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture (para [0021] shows zero trust (ZT) principles such as real-time evaluating the risk of individual access requests; para [0029] shows making a decision on granting an access. The decision factors may include security state (credentials, software version/patches, location, etc.) and behavioral attributes of the subject and network assets; para [0034] shows an intelligent zero trust architecture (i-ZTA) may include a policy enforcement point (PEP) 34 and policy decision point (PDP) 36; the PDP 36 is configured to provide a risk score associated with an access request; the PDP 36 make the decision on granting or denying access to the requested network resource 44 based on the risk score. The decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34), and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture (para [0034] shows the decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34. The PEP 34 also establishes the connection between the subject 2 and the network resource 44, if the subject 2 is granted access to the network resource 44.)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa-Darnell with the teaching of Drozd in order to real-time evaluate the risk of individual access requests (Drozd; para [0021]).
Regarding claim 2, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses the primary dynamic authenticator (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means):
when determining that the state of the vehicle satisfies a predetermined condition, causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to connect the access source and the access destination; and when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination (Darnell; [Abstract] shows permitting a user to select locally available vehicles; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
Regarding claim 4, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses wherein the one or more connection managers include a connection manager disposed in the ECU in which the primary dynamic authenticator is disposed, and when the ECU in which the primary dynamic authenticator is disposed is located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination, the primary dynamic authenticator causes the connection manager disposed in the ECU in which the primary dynamic authenticator is disposed to control the connection between the access source and the access destination (Nakagawa; para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as access request information acquisition means, remote operation command acquisition means, and authentication means; para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle).
Regarding claim 5, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses the one or more connection managers include a connection manager disposed in a zone ECU in the vehicle, and when the zone ECU is located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination, the primary dynamic authenticator causes the connection manager disposed in the zone ECU to control the connection between the access source and the access destination (Nakagawa; para [0042] shows the vehicle ECUs 110 are connected to CAN (Controller Area Network) communication system such that they can input and output various signals with one another through the CAN communication line 120; para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle).
Regarding claim 6, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses a secondary dynamic authenticator disposed in a zone ECU in the vehicle, wherein when the zone ECU is located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination, the secondary dynamic authenticator, in response to the access request, dynamically performs authentication of the access request based on the state of the vehicle, and causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to control the connection between the access source and the access destination, based on a result of the authentication of the access request dynamically performed by the secondary dynamic authenticator (Nakagawa; para [0042] shows the vehicle ECUs 110 are connected to CAN (Controller Area Network) communication system such that they can input and output various signals with one another through the CAN communication line 120; para [0043] show the door lock control ECU 110b; para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle. Darnell; para [0120] shows the validation of a unique identifier associated with the vehicle computing device may be included as a secondary validation).
Regarding claim 7, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 6 discloses the secondary dynamic authenticator: when determining that the state of the vehicle satisfies a predetermined condition, causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to connect the access source and the access destination; and when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination (Nakagawa; para [0043] shows the door lock control ECU 110b. Darnell; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
Regarding claim 9, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 6 discloses the one or more connection managers include a second connection manager disposed in the zone ECU, and the secondary dynamic authenticator causes the second connection manager disposed in the zone ECU to control the connection between the access source and the access destination (Nakagawa; para [0042] shows the vehicle ECUs 110 are connected to CAN (Controller Area Network) communication system such that they can input and output various signals with one another through the CAN communication line 120; para [0043] shows the door lock control ECU 110b. Darnell; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
Regarding claim 10, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 6 discloses the ECU in which the primary dynamic authenticator is disposed and the zone ECU hold vehicle state information indicating the state of the vehicle (Nakagawa; para [0043] shows one of the vehicle ECUs 110 is provided as authentication means; para [0061] shows the door lock control ECU 110b unlocks the door lock device according to the remote operation, if the door lock device is in a locked state),
the primary dynamic authenticator causes the secondary dynamic authenticator to update, at a predetermined time, the vehicle state information held in the zone ECU with the vehicle state information held in the ECU in which the primary dynamic authenticator is disposed (Nakagawa; para [0051] shows a request for information such as charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100; Darnell; para [0092] shows triggering events can include the passage of a predetermined period of time) and
the secondary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication of the access request based on the state of the vehicle indicated by the vehicle state information held in the zone ECU (Nakagawa; para [0051] shows a request for information such as charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100; para [0061] shows if the door lock device is in an unlocked state. Darnell; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
Regarding claim 11, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses the primary dynamic authenticator obtains vehicle state information indicating the state of the vehicle via any of the one or more connection managers (Nakagawa; para [0051] shows the user firstly makes an access request for collecting the charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100; para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle. Darnell; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
Regarding claim 12, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 1 discloses the state of the vehicle includes at least one of a usage status of the access destination, a driving state of the vehicle, a security status of the access source, a security status of the access destination, a usage status of a service used in the vehicle, or a state of the access destination (Nakagawa; para [0051] shows the user firstly makes an access request for collecting the charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100. Darnell; para [0099] shows read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like).
Regarding claim 13, Nakagawa discloses a vehicle security device provided in a vehicle, the vehicle security device comprising (para [0059] shows vehicle security; para [0051] shows the user makes an access request for operations of an air-conditioning unit and other units, or a request for collecting the charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100):
a primary dynamic authenticator, wherein the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication of an access request made by an access source in the vehicle for access to an access destination in the vehicle (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means), and
causes a connection manager located on a communication path between the access source and the access destination, among one or more connection managers disposed in the vehicle, to control a connection between the access source and the access destination, based on a result of the authentication of the access request (para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle).
Nakagawa fails to teach:
the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs, based on a state of the vehicle, authentication of an access request, and
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However, Darnell discloses the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs, based on a state of the vehicle, authentication [administrative credentials] of an access request ([Abstract] shows permitting a user to select locally available vehicles; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0099] shows commands that may be accessible to an administrative user in which additional functionality is unlocked by the receipt of administrative credentials include: lock doors, unlock doors, change availability state, disable ignition, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like; para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa with the teaching of Darnell in order to identify and permit a user to select locally available vehicles (Darnell; [Abstract]).
Nakagawa-Darnell as combined fails to teach:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However Drozd, in an analogous art (para [0002] shows autonomous vehicles, vehicle to everything (V2X) networks), discloses:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture (para [0021] shows zero trust (ZT) principles such as real-time evaluating the risk of individual access requests; para [0029] shows making a decision on granting an access. The decision factors may include security state (credentials, software version/patches, location, etc.) and behavioral attributes of the subject and network assets; para [0034] shows an intelligent zero trust architecture (i-ZTA) may include a policy enforcement point (PEP) 34 and policy decision point (PDP) 36; the PDP 36 is configured to provide a risk score associated with an access request; the PDP 36 make the decision on granting or denying access to the requested network resource 44 based on the risk score. The decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34), and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture (para [0034] shows the decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34. The PEP 34 also establishes the connection between the subject 2 and the network resource 44, if the subject 2 is granted access to the network resource 44.)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa-Darnell with the teaching of Drozd in order to real-time evaluate the risk of individual access requests (Drozd; para [0021]).
Regarding claim 14, Nakagawa discloses a vehicle security device provided in a vehicle, the vehicle security device comprising (para [0059] shows vehicle security; para [0051] shows the user makes an access request for door lock and other units, or a request for collecting the charged state of a battery mounted on the vehicle 100):
a secondary dynamic authenticator [ECU 110a] (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means), wherein
when the vehicle security device is located on a communication path between an access source in the vehicle [door lock ECU 110b] and an access destination in the vehicle [door lock device] (para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means; the door lock control ECU 110b controls a door lock device provided to a door of the vehicle 100 to be locked or unlocked) and
a primary dynamic authenticator [primary control section 132] disposed in an electronic control unit (ECU) is not located on the communication path (para [0044] shows the DCM 130 includes the primary control section 132 which sends various information pieces from the command administration center 200 to the command acquisition ECU 110a; para [0061] shows the command acquisition ECU 110a supplies the command information to the door lock control ECU 110b. With this process, the door lock control ECU 110b unlocks the door lock device if the door lock device is in a locked state, and locks the door lock device if the door lock device is in an unlocked state, based on the supplied command information (e.g., primary control section 132 is not located on the lock/unlock communication path between ECU 110b and the door lock device); para [0102] shows the ECU 110a and the DCM 130 can be integrally provided),
the secondary dynamic authenticator [ECU 110a] dynamically performs authentication of an access request made by the access source for access to the access destination, and causes a connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination, among one or more connection managers disposed in the vehicle, to control a connection between the access source and the access destination, based on a result of the authentication of the access request (para [0029] shows when the access request information includes the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to this connection destination, and when the access request information does not include the connection destination, the remote operation command acquisition means can access to the connection destination predetermined to the vehicle; para [0043] shows ECU 110a is provided as authentication means; para [0061] shows the command acquisition ECU 110a supplies the command information to the door lock control ECU 110b. With this process, the door lock control ECU 110b unlocks the door lock device if the door lock device is in a locked state, and locks the door lock device if the door lock device is in an unlocked state, based on the supplied command information (e.g., ECU 110a is not located on the lock/unlock communication path between ECU 110b and the door lock device.)
Nakagawa fails to teach:
the secondary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs authentication of an access request based on a state of the vehicle, and
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) m a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However, Darnell discloses the primary dynamic authenticator dynamically performs, based on a state of the vehicle, authentication [administrative credentials] of an access request ([Abstract] shows permitting a user to select locally available vehicles; para [0087] shows vehicle management module 366 is generally configured to perform functions related to identifying, filtering, and/or connecting/disconnecting local point-to-point communications with vehicles (e.g., vehicle computing modules 112 a) according to availability status of a vehicle and/or other characteristics (e.g., proximity, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like); para [0099] shows commands that may be accessible to an administrative user in which additional functionality is unlocked by the receipt of administrative credentials include: lock doors, unlock doors, change availability state, disable ignition, read fuel level, read battery voltage or charge level, and/or the like; para [0106] shows the smartphone determines whether any of the identified vehicles are available (e.g., availability is a characteristic used to filter).)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa with the teaching of Darnell in order to identify and permit a user to select locally available vehicles (Darnell; [Abstract]).
Nakagawa-Darnell as combined fails to teach:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture, and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture.
However Drozd, in an analogous art (para [0002] shows autonomous vehicles, vehicle to everything (V2X) networks), discloses:
the primary dynamic authenticator is a policy decision point (PDP) in a zero trust architecture (para [0021] shows zero trust (ZT) principles such as real-time evaluating the risk of individual access requests; para [0029] shows making a decision on granting an access. The decision factors may include security state (credentials, software version/patches, location, etc.) and behavioral attributes of the subject and network assets; para [0034] shows an intelligent zero trust architecture (i-ZTA) may include a policy enforcement point (PEP) 34 and policy decision point (PDP) 36; the PDP 36 is configured to provide a risk score associated with an access request; the PDP 36 make the decision on granting or denying access to the requested network resource 44 based on the risk score. The decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34), and
the one or more connection managers are policy enforcement points (PEPs) in the zero trust architecture (para [0034] shows the decision on granting or denying access to the network resource 44 is sent to the PEP 34. The PEP 34 also establishes the connection between the subject 2 and the network resource 44, if the subject 2 is granted access to the network resource 44.)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa-Darnell with the teaching of Drozd in order to real-time evaluate the risk of individual access requests (Drozd; para [0021]).
Regarding claim 15, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd discloses the vehicle security system according to claim 1, wherein the primary dynamic authenticator and the one or more connection managers are implemented by at least one processor which executes at least one program stored in at least one memory (Nakagawa; para [0027]).
Regarding claim 16, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd discloses vehicle security device according to claim 13, wherein the primary dynamic authenticator is implemented by a processor which executes a program stored in a memory (Nakagawa; para [0027]).
Regarding claim 17, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd discloses vehicle security device according to claim 14, wherein the primary dynamic authenticator, the secondary dynamic authenticator, and the one or more connection managers are implemented by processors which execute programs stored in memories (Nakagawa; para [0027]).
Claims 3 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Nakagawa in view of Darnell, further in view of CN110366139A.
Regarding claim 3, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 2 fails to teach when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, the primary dynamic authenticator once again performs authentication of the access request, and causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination in response to the authentication of the access request once again performed failing.
However, CN110366139A discloses when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, the primary dynamic authenticator once again performs authentication of the access request, and causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination in response to the authentication of the access request once again performed failing ([Abstract] shows when the life signal for monitoring a certain In-vehicle networking equipment interrupts, then judge the equipment off-line, it must re-authentication when the equipment accesses motor-car network control system again; [page 5] shows whether the communication connection of server has disconnected or ground-based server is in authentication failure state.)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd with the teaching of CN110366139A in order to guarantee the network and traffic safety of motor-car (CN110366139A; [Abstract]).
Regarding claim 8, Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd as applied to claim 7 fails to teach when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, the primary dynamic authenticator once again performs authentication of the access request, and causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination in response to the authentication of the access request once again performed fails by the secondary dynamic authenticator failing.
However, CN110366139A discloses when determining that the state of the vehicle no longer satisfies the predetermined condition, the primary dynamic authenticator once again performs authentication of the access request, and causes the connection manager located on the communication path between the access source and the access destination to disconnect the connection between the access source and the access destination in response to the authentication of the access request once again performed fails by the secondary dynamic authenticator failing ([Abstract] shows when the life signal for monitoring a certain In-vehicle networking equipment interrupts, then judge the equipment off-line, it must re-authentication when the equipment accesses motor-car network control system again; [page 5] shows whether the communication connection of server has disconnected or ground-based server is in authentication failure state.)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the system of Nakagawa-Darnell-Drozd with the teaching of CN110366139A in order to guarantee the network and traffic safety of motor-car (CN110366139A; [Abstract]).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/TAN DOAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2445