Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see pages 9-11, filed on 04/1020264, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-10 and 12-21 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over LEE et al. (US 20230299955 A1 ---hereinafter –"LEE”) in view of YASUDA et al. (US 20160173275 A1—hereinafter—" YASUDA”).have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Morikawa et al. (US 20160352510 A1 –hereinafter—Morikawa).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-10 and 12-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over LEE et al. (US 20230299955 A1 ---hereinafter –"LEE”) in view of Morikawa et al. (US 20160352510 A1 –hereinafter—Morikawa).
As per claim 1. LEE discloses a method for processing biometric data,
the method comprising, by a system having circuitry (Figure 3: Computing Device 100):
functionally encrypting a test biometric datum using a functional encryption key ([0036] Functional encryption includes a setup algorithm, a secret key generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm) a test biometric datum using a functional encryption key ([0036] The setup algorithm generates a master key and a public key using a security parameter as an input. The secret key generation algorithm generates a secret key using the master key and a given function as inputs. The encryption algorithm generates a cyphertext by encrypting a plaintext with the public key. In this regard, anyone possessing the public key may generate the cyphertext. The decryption algorithm may generate a function value with the secret key such that the function value corresponds to the plaintext to which the function is applied); [0180] The functional encryption using the LWE problem and the lattice problem may be used in security of data for authentication. The parameter vector h may indicate parameters to extract features of the input data DI, and the decrypted data DD may indicate an approximation value of the inner product <h, x> of the parameter vector h and the input vector x. The inner product <h, x> may correspond to node operations of the first hidden layer. The input data DI may indicate private information of a user and the input data DI may be biometric information corresponding to iris, fingerprint, DNA, retina, vein, face, voice, unique gait, etc., of the user. [0185] the registration target personal information may be, for example, biometric information, such as iris, fingerprints, DNA, retina, veins, gait, face, voice, and the like, and may further include various forms of information that can be used in verifying the identity of each individual).
generating a functional decryption for a reference biometric datum ([0104] At least one of the electronic devices 510, 520, 530, and 540 may include a camera and/or a sensor configured to obtain biometric data of a user such as a face, a fingerprint, an iris, and so on; [0180] The input data DI may indicate private information of a user and the input data DI may be biometric information corresponding to iris, fingerprint, DNA, retina, vein, face, voice, unique gait, etc., of the user. [0185] In this case, the registration target personal information may be, for example, biometric information, such as iris, fingerprints, DNA, retina, veins, gait, face, voice, and the like, and may further include various forms of information that can be used in verifying the identity of each individual. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may include various forms of input means, such as a sensor, a camera, and the like, in order to receive the registration target personal information);
generating the functional decryption key from a master key and said reference biometric datum, and generating said functional encryption key from said master key ([0081] The key generation device 11 may determine the master key msk (S12). In some example embodiments, the key generation device 11 may determine the master key msk based on Expression 1. sub.q.sup.n,A .sub.q.sup.n×n .sub.T.Math.A=μ.sup.T,|μ| < L msk=u Expression 1: [0082] In Expression 1, with respect to ring of integers .sub.q, .sub.q.sup.n indicates a set of n×1 matrices, and .sub.q.sup.n×n indicates a set of n×n matrices. Accordingly, u is an n×1 vector and A is an n×n matrix. [0083] The key generation device 11 may determine the vector u satisfying u.sup.T.Math.A=μ.sup.T as the master key msk, with respect to an n×1 random vector μ such that the norm of μ is smaller than L, that is, satisfying |μ|<L. Here, A is a random matrix and an invertible matrix, UT and μT indicate transpose matrices of u and μ, and thus UT and μT are 1×n vectors. [0137] Referring to FIGS. 2 and 10, the key generation device 11 may generate the public key pkh and the secret key skh, based on the master key msk and the parameter vector h (S100). The encryption device 12 may generate the encrypted data DE by encrypting the input vector x, based on the public key pkh (S200). The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300)) wherein:
obtaining a score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum, by functionally decrypting the encrypted test biometric datum using a functional decryption key ([0186] The registration request apparatus 410 may include a key generation device KGD configured to generate a public key and a secret key based on a parameter vector and a master key. The registration request apparatus 410 may transmit the public key to the authentication request apparatus 420, and transmit the secret key to the authentication server 430. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may calculate an inner product of a parameter vector and an input vector corresponding to the registration target personal information, and may transmit the inner product as a registration value to the authentication server 430);
the test biometric datum is a vector having n test components representative of a biometric trait of a candidate individual, where n is a natural number strictly greater than zero, and at least one other non-zero test component representative of a first masking element ([0065] The operation circuit CAL may perform operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and matrix operations. Here the matrix may include the n×1 vector and the 1×n vector. In some example embodiments, the operation circuit CAL may include a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) operator and perform operation using the CRT operator);
the reference biometric datum is another vector having n reference components representative of a biometric trait of a reference individual and at least one other non-zero reference component representative of a second masking element ([0185] In this case, the registration target personal information may be, for example, biometric information, such as iris, fingerprints, DNA, retina, veins, gait, face, voice, and the like, and may further include various forms of information that can be used in verifying the identity of each individual. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may include various forms of input means, such as a sensor, a camera, and the like, in order to receive the registration target personal information);
the score obtained by functional decryption represents the distance between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum in a form masked by a primary mask ([0036] The decryption algorithm may generate a function value with the secret key such that the function value corresponds to the plaintext to which the function is applied. [0040] The decryption device 13 may perform the decryption algorithm of the functional encryption. The decryption device 13 may generate decrypted data DD corresponding to an approximation value of an inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh. [0048] The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300). An example embodiment of generating the decrypted data DD will be described below with reference to FIG. 7C. [0099] The decryption device 13 may generate the decrypted data DD by decrypting the first encrypted data C1, the second encrypted data C2, and the third encrypted data C3, which are corresponding to the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S32), as Expression 7).
LEE does not explicitly disclose the generated functional decryption key is for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum and the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum. Morikawa, in analogous art however, discloses the generated functional decryption key is for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum ([0035] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter a. Next, a polynomial al of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. Then, the following formula for a polynomial a0 is calculated, and a pair of polynomials (a0,a1) is defined as a public key pk. a0=−(a1*sk+t*e)(1). [0036] However, in a calculation of the polynomial a0, a polynomial whose degree is lower than n is always calculated by using “x.sup.n=−1, x.sup.n+1=−x, . . . ” with respect to a polynomial whose degree is higher than or equal to n. Further, as a coefficient in each term included in a polynomial, a remainder obtained by dividing the coefficient by a prime q is used. A space in which such a polynomial operation is performed is often technically represented as R.sub.q:=F.sub.q[x]/(x.sup.n+1). [0037] Next, for plaintext data m that is represented by a polynomial of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than t and a public key pk, three polynomials u, f, and g of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random, and cryptographic data Enc(m,pk) of the plaintext data m is defined by the following formulas: [0087] The polynomial pm1(A) is a polynomial of degree d−1 and the polynomial pm2(B) is a polynomial of degree d, so the degree of the polynomial L is at most 2d−1. Further, when n is less than 2d, the degree of the polynomial L is at most n−1 if x.sup.n=−1 is used);
the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum ([0084] The result of the operation of the vector A and the vector B includes an inner product of the vector A and the vector B. This result of the operation may be the inner product of the vector A and the vector B, may be a sum of the inner product and another value, or may be a Hamming distance HD. A polynomial L that corresponds to the result of the cryptographic operation E(L) may be a polynomial D that corresponds to E(D) in Formula (27), or may be a polynomial D.sub.H that corresponds to E(D.sub.H) in Formula. [0123] When the polynomial L corresponds to a polynomial D of an inner product, the generator 112 of the cryptographic processing device 101 generates a result of the cryptographic operation E(D) by using Formula (27). On the other hand, when the polynomial L corresponds to a polynomial D.sub.H of a Hamming distance, the generator 112 generates a polynomial pm2′(C) by multiplying a polynomial pm2(C) by x.sup.k);
the generated functional decryption key is for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum ([0087] The polynomial pm1(A) is a polynomial of degree d−1 and the polynomial pm2(B) is a polynomial of degree d, so the degree of the polynomial L is at most 2d−1. Further, when n is less than 2d, the degree of the polynomial L is at most n−1 if x.sup.n=−1 is used. The obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum. [0087] The polynomial pm1(A) is a polynomial of degree d−1 and the polynomial pm2(B) is a polynomial of degree d, so the degree of the polynomial L is at most 2d−1. Further, when n is less than 2d, the degree of the polynomial L is at most n−1 if x.sup.n=−1 is used. [0035] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter a. Next, a polynomial al of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. Then, the following formula for a polynomial a0 is calculated, and a pair of polynomials (a0,a1) is defined as a public key pk);
the distance corresponding to how different the test biometric datum us from the reference biometric datum ([0049] The following two types of polynomial transformation, an ascending-order transformation and a descending-order transformation, are used to calculate a distance between two vectors at a high speed in a state in which those two vectors remain encrypted. [0055] For example, when the vector A and the vector B are binary vectors, all the elements a.sub.1 to a.sub.d of the vector A are 0 or 1, and all the elements b.sub.1 to b.sub.d of the vector B are 0 or 1. In this case, using characteristics of the cryptographic multiplication performed in Formula (27), a Hamming distance between the vector A and the vector B can be calculated by the following formula in a state in which E1(A) and E2(B) remain homomorphically encrypted: [0057] A polynomial D.sub.H obtained by decrypting the encrypted Hamming distance E (D.sub.H) is equivalent to a polynomial obtained by calculating the following formula: [0060] According to these cryptographic operations, a secured calculation to obtain an inner product or a Hamming distance between two vectors can be performed at a higher speed and at a smaller data size. These cryptographic operations are used in, for example, a biometric system for comparing pieces of data acquired from living individuals or a tag-search system for searching from many tags a tag that has certain characteristics. [0061] When it is not a problem if a decryptor who has a secret key is aware of all the elements of the vector A and the vector B, the decryptor may calculate an inner product or a Hamming distance directly using the vector A and the vector B instead of performing a cryptographic operation. However, a security requirement is often imposed such that it is not preferable for a decryptor to know the elements themselves of the vector A and the vector B even though he or she may be aware of the inner product or the Hamming distance of the vector A and the vector B. [0062] Using the cryptographic processing device of Patent Document 1, a decryptor is able to know, by decrypting an encrypted secured distance, not only a secured distance between two vectors but also the information on the elements of each of the vectors that are input data. As a result, the elements of the vectors may be leaked to the decryptor.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the claimed limitations of the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum disclosed by LEE to include the generated functional decryption key is for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum and the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum. This modification would have been obvious because a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the desire to provide encrypted polynomial that corresponds to a result of encrypting a third polynomial by use of a result of multiplying a first encrypted polynomial by a second encrypted polynomial, and outputs cryptographic information that represents the third encrypted polynomial as suggested by Morikawa ([0015-0018]).
As per claim 2. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein a value of the primary mask is a result of an application, to the at least one other test component, of the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with the at least one other reference component (LEE [0043] By way of reference, a general functional encryption using discrete logarithm (DL) problem may obtain a decrypted data corresponding to a value (e.g., g<h, x>) of an inter product <h, x> to which a specific function is applied, where <h, x> indicates the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x. However, the functional encryption using DL problem may not provide the inner product itself, and thus functional encryption using the DL problem may be applicable only to restricted scenarios. In contrast, a general functional encryption using learning with error (LWE) problem may provide the inner product itself but the functional encryption using LWE problem is vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers).
As per claim 3. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising determining, by way of a random or pseudorandom draw, a value of at least one other component from the at least one other reference component and the at least one other test component (LEE [0064] The random number generator RNG may provide random numbers to the controller CON, and the controller CON may generate the random numbers and the random vectors for the functional encryption as will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A, 7B, and 7C.)
As per claim 4. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum (Morikawa [0035] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter a. Next, a polynomial al of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. Then, the following formula for a polynomial a0 is calculated, and a pair of polynomials (a0,a1) is defined as a public key pk).
As per claim 5. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (LEE [0087] The key generation device 11 may perform a matrix operation of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 and an amplified parameter vector Nh where the amplified parameter vector Nh is a multiplication of an error factor value N and the parameter vector h, and determine the encrypted parameter vector v using the random vector s and the vector u corresponding to the master key msk).
As per claim 6. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0180] The input data DI may indicate private information of a user and the input data DI may be biometric information corresponding to iris, fingerprint, DNA, retina, vein, face, voice, unique gait, etc., of the user).
As per claim 7. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function is a scalar product (Morikawa [0038] The polynomial operation in the space R.sub.q is also used for a calculation of the polynomial c0 and the polynomial c1. In this case, a cryptographic addition for cryptographic data Enc(m1,pk)=(c0,c1) and cryptographic data Enc(m2,pk)=(d0,d1) is performed by the following formula:).
As per claim 8. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising, for values of i equal to 1 and 2, and by way of a device of index i of the system: generating a partial result of index i from the score and an unmasking datum of index i associated with the primary mask, wherein: the devices of respective indices 1 and 2 are distinct, and partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 make it possible to compute a check result indicating whether or not the test biometric datum corresponds to the reference biometric datum (LEE [0090] The key generation device 11 may generate the encrypted parameter vector v by performing a matrix multiplication of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 of the random matrix A and the amplified parameter vector Nh as represented by Expression 3, and generate the public key, that is, the third public key by performing a matrix multiplication of the random matrix A and the encrypted parameter vector v as represented by Expression 4).
As per claim 9. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 8, wherein the check result is equal to a sum of the partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 (LEE [0100] As a result, as shown in Expression 7, the decrypted data DD may be represented by a sum of the inner product h.sup.T.Math.x of the parameter vector h and the input vector x and an inner product error value E. The inner product error value is calculated as Expression 8).
As per claim 10. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 9, wherein the functional encryption of the test biometric datum is implemented by a device of the system, distinct from the devices of indices 1 and 2, and/or the check result is computed from the partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 by an output device of the system, distinct from the devices of indices 1 and 2 (LEE [0087] The key generation device 11 may perform a matrix operation of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 and an amplified parameter vector Nh where the amplified parameter vector Nh is a multiplication of an error factor value N and the parameter vector h, and determine the encrypted parameter vector v using the random vector s and the vector u corresponding to the master key msk. As such, the encrypted parameter vector v may include the amplified parameter vector Nh).
As per claim 12. Claim 12 is directed to a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having stored there on a computer program including code instructions for executing the method as claimed in claim 1, claim 12 having substantially similar corresponding limitations of claim 1 and therefore claim 12 is rejected with the same rationale given above to rejected claim 1.
As per claim 13 is directed to a system for processing biometric data, comprising: circuitry configured to perform function having substantially similar corresponding limitations of claim 1 and therefore claim 13 is rejected with the same rationale given above to rejected claim 1.
As per claim 14. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, further comprising determining, by way of a random or pseudorandom draw, a value of at least one other component from the at least one other reference component and the at least one other test component (LEE [0089] As represented by Expression 4, the secret key skh may be the random vector s, the public key pkh may include a first key pk1 corresponding to a vector As+e, a second key pk2 corresponding to the random matrix A, and a third key pk3 corresponding to a vector Av+f. As described above, the encrypted parameter vector v includes the amplified parameter vector Nh corresponding to the multiplication of the parameter vector h and the error factor value N. In other words, the third public key pk3 in Expression 4 may correspond to the main public key that is generated based on the parameter vector has described with reference to FIG. 6).
As per claim 15. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum (Morikawa [0054] A polynomial D which a decryptor having a secret key can obtain by decrypting a multiplication result E (D) of the cryptographic multiplication is equivalent to a polynomial obtained by the multiplication pm1(A)*pm2(B). Thus, an inner product of the vector A and the vector B, a.sub.1b.sub.1+a.sub.2b.sub.2+ . . . +a.sub.db.sub.d, is obtained from the coefficient in the term x.sup.d included in the polynomial D.).
As per claim 16. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum (Morikawa [0055] For example, when the vector A and the vector B are binary vectors, all the elements a.sub.1 to a.sub.d of the vector A are 0 or 1, and all the elements b.sub.1 to b.sub.d of the vector B are 0 or 1. In this case, using characteristics of the cryptographic multiplication performed in Formula (27), a Hamming distance between the vector A and the vector B can be calculated by the following formula in a state in which E1(A) and E2(B) remain homomorphically encrypted).
As per claim 17. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (Morikawa [0077] In an authentication mode, the terminal 301-2 obtains biometric information on a target to be authenticated, transforms characteristic information extracted from the biometric information into a vector B as described in Formula (22), and performs encryption 401-2. In the encryption 401-2, the terminal 301-2 transforms the vector B into a polynomial pm2(B) as described in Formula (24), and encrypts the polynomial pm2(B) using a homomorphic encryption so as to generate an encrypted polynomial E2(B). Then, the terminal 301-2 sends cryptographic information that represents the encrypted polynomial E2(B) to the cryptographic processing device 101).
As per claim 18. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (LEE [0137] Referring to FIGS. 2 and 10, the key generation device 11 may generate the public key pkh and the secret key skh, based on the master key msk and the parameter vector h (S100). The encryption device 12 may generate the encrypted data DE by encrypting the input vector x, based on the public key pkh (S200). The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300)).
As per claim 19. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (Morikawa [0061] if a decryptor who has a secret key is aware of all the elements of the vector A and the vector B, the decryptor may calculate an inner product or a Hamming distance directly using the vector A and the vector B instead of performing a cryptographic operation. However, a security requirement is often imposed such that it is not preferable for a decryptor to know the elements themselves of the vector A and the vector B even though he or she may be aware of the inner product or the Hamming distance of the vector A and the vector B).
As per claim 20. LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0043] By way of reference, a general functional encryption using discrete logarithm (DL) problem may obtain a decrypted data corresponding to a value (e.g., g<h, x>) of an inter product <h, x> to which a specific function is applied, where <h, x> indicates the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x).
As per claim 21: LEE in view of Morikawa discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0064] The random number generator RNG may provide random numbers to the controller CON, and the controller CON may generate the random numbers and the random vectors for the functional encryption as will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A, 7B, and 7C.)
BRI (Broadest Reasonable Interpretation) Considerations
The above claims under examination have been given to them their BRI considerations consistent with the applicant’s disclosure as they would be interpreted by ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of filing of the invention. In order to construe, appraise boundary and scope of the claimed limitations, the following claim words or terms or phrases or languages have been given to them their BRI considerations and context in view of the applicant’s disclosure. For record clarity, BRI for the following claim words or terms or phrases or languages, the examiner recites descriptions from the applicant’s disclosure as follows:
A Test Biometric Datum and Reference Biometric Data [Applicant’s Disclosure: 0002] There are already identification or authentication schemes in which a user, also referred to as a candidate individual, presents, to a trustworthy processing unit, for example to a unit belonging to a customs office, an airport, etc., a biometric datum freshly acquired from the user, which the unit compares against one or more reference biometric data recorded in a reference database to which it has access. [0003] This reference database groups together the reference biometric data of author-ized individuals, also referred to as reference individuals, such as passengers on a flight prior to boarding. 0066] Each memory 34 stores a reference database, which is a functional decryption key base, each functional decryption key in said base being associated with a reference biometric datum relating to a previously enrolled individual, also referred to as reference individual. The reference biometric data are not stored in the reference database. A functional decryption key does not make it possible to trace the associated reference biometric datum. The reference biometric data are thus confidentiality-protected. [0051] In one embodiment, the system 1 implements authentication of a candidate individual, that is to say compares the biometric datum, referred to as a test biometric datum (freshly acquired from the candidate individual), with a single reference biometric datum, supposed to originate from the same individual, in order to verify that the individual from which the two data were obtained is in-deed the same individual.
[Applicant’s Disclosure: 0052-0053] In another embodiment, the system 1 implements identification of the candidate individual, that is to say compares the test biometric datum with all of the reference biometric data in a base, in order to determine the identity of the candidate individual. Typically, both the test biometric datum and each reference biometric datum are vectors in one and the same vector space. The test biometric datum comprises n test components representative of a biometric trait of a candidate individual, with n being a natural number strictly greater than zero. Each reference biometric datum comprises n reference components representative of a bio-metric trait of a reference individual.
Score [Applicant’s Disclosure: [0078] The results of the functional decryption of a cipher of the input datum, also referred to hereinafter as score, is thus directly the result of the application, to this input datum, of the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with the reference biometric datum, that is to say the distance of this in-put datum from said reference biometric datum in a form masked by a primary mask r.
Conclusion
The prior arts made of record and not relied upon are considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See the notice of reference cited in form PTO-892 for additional prior arts.
Angel et al. US 20210174243 A1 uses a two-phase non-interactive secure aggregation workflow built on hybrid functional encryption. Participants encrypt local model updates with feature-dimension keys and local datasets with sample-dimension keys, then send both to the coordinator in one direction only. A trusted third party verifies the coordinator’s requested weight vectors before issuing functional secret keys, so the coordinator can compute only allowed aggregate outputs, not raw plaintext data. This supports scalable vertical federated learning with reduced communication and better resistance to inference attacks
TAKENAKA US 20150381348 A1 adds a user-controlled random number mask to the biometric vector before homomorphic encryption, then stores encrypted versions of both the biometric data and the mask. During later collation, the server can remove the old mask homomorphically and compare the masked biometric data. If the user wants to cancel prior registration, the user changes the random number to a new value, which changes the stored encrypted template without changing the system key. In the additive-mask version, the terminal sends encrypted biometric data plus an encrypted random number; in the multiplicative-mask version, it sends masked products and reciprocals. This lets the system invalidate or replace the stored template by re-registering only the new mask-related values.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/TECHANE GERGISO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2408
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