Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 04/25/2024 has been considered by the examiner.
Specification
Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s specification submitted on 04/25/2024.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-10 and 12-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over LEE et al. (US 20230299955 A1 ---hereinafter –"LEE”) in view of YASUDA et al. (US 20160173275 A1—hereinafter—" YASUDA”).
As per claim 1. LEE discloses a method for processing biometric data,
the method comprising, by a system having circuitry (Figure 3: Computing Device 100):
functionally encrypting ([0036] Functional encryption includes a setup algorithm, a secret key generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm) a test biometric datum using a functional encryption key ([0036] The setup algorithm generates a master key and a public key using a security parameter as an input. The secret key generation algorithm generates a secret key using the master key and a given function as inputs. The encryption algorithm generates a cyphertext by encrypting a plaintext with the public key. In this regard, anyone possessing the public key may generate the cyphertext. The decryption algorithm may generate a function value with the secret key such that the function value corresponds to the plaintext to which the function is applied);
for at least one reference biometric datum ([0104] At least one of the electronic devices 510, 520, 530, and 540 may include a camera and/or a sensor configured to obtain biometric data of a user such as a face, a fingerprint, an iris, and so on; [0180] The input data DI may indicate private information of a user and the input data DI may be biometric information corresponding to iris, fingerprint, DNA, retina, vein, face, voice, unique gait, etc., of the user. [0185] In this case, the registration target personal information may be, for example, biometric information, such as iris, fingerprints, DNA, retina, veins, gait, face, voice, and the like, and may further include various forms of information that can be used in verifying the identity of each individual. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may include various forms of input means, such as a sensor, a camera, and the like, in order to receive the registration target personal information);
obtaining a score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum, by functionally decrypting the encrypted test biometric datum using a functional decryption key ([0186] The registration request apparatus 410 may include a key generation device KGD configured to generate a public key and a secret key based on a parameter vector and a master key. The registration request apparatus 410 may transmit the public key to the authentication request apparatus 420, and transmit the secret key to the authentication server 430. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may calculate an inner product of a parameter vector and an input vector corresponding to the registration target personal information, and may transmit the inner product as a registration value to the authentication server 430);
generating said functional decryption key, from a master key and said reference biometric datum, and generating said functional encryption key from said master key ([0081] The key generation device 11 may determine the master key msk (S12). In some example embodiments, the key generation device 11 may determine the master key msk based on Expression 1. sub.q.sup.n,A [AltContent: rect].sub.q.sup.n×n .sub.T.Math.A=μ.sup.T,|μ| < L msk=u Expression 1: [0082] In Expression 1, with respect to ring of integers [AltContent: rect].sub.q, [AltContent: rect].sub.q.sup.n indicates a set of n×1 matrices, and [AltContent: rect].sub.q.sup.n×n indicates a set of n×n matrices. Accordingly, u is an n×1 vector and A is an n×n matrix. [0083] The key generation device 11 may determine the vector u satisfying u.sup.T.Math.A=μ.sup.T as the master key msk, with respect to an n×1 random vector μ such that the norm of μ is smaller than L, that is, satisfying |μ|<L. Here, A is a random matrix and an invertible matrix, UT and μT indicate transpose matrices of u and μ, and thus UT and μT are 1×n vectors. [0137] Referring to FIGS. 2 and 10, the key generation device 11 may generate the public key pkh and the secret key skh, based on the master key msk and the parameter vector h (S100). The encryption device 12 may generate the encrypted data DE by encrypting the input vector x, based on the public key pkh (S200). The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300)) wherein:
the test biometric datum is a vector having n test components representative of a biometric trait of a candidate individual, where n is a natural number strictly greater than zero, and at least one other non-zero test component representative of a first masking element ([0065] The operation circuit CAL may perform operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and matrix operations. Here the matrix may include the n×1 vector and the 1×n vector. In some example embodiments, the operation circuit CAL may include a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) operator and perform q-ary operation using the CRT operator);
the reference biometric datum is another vector having n reference components representative of a biometric trait of a reference individual and at least one other non-zero reference component representative of a second masking element ( [0185] In this case, the registration target personal information may be, for example, biometric information, such as iris, fingerprints, DNA, retina, veins, gait, face, voice, and the like, and may further include various forms of information that can be used in verifying the identity of each individual. In addition, the registration request apparatus 410 may include various forms of input means, such as a sensor, a camera, and the like, in order to receive the registration target personal information);
the score obtained by functional decryption represents the distance between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum in a form masked by a primary mask ( [0036] The decryption algorithm may generate a function value with the secret key such that the function value corresponds to the plaintext to which the function is applied. [0040] The decryption device 13 may perform the decryption algorithm of the functional encryption. The decryption device 13 may generate decrypted data DD corresponding to an approximation value of an inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh. [0048] The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300). An example embodiment of generating the decrypted data DD will be described below with reference to FIG. 7C. [0099] The decryption device 13 may generate the decrypted data DD by decrypting the first encrypted data C1, the second encrypted data C2, and the third encrypted data C3, which are corresponding to the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S32), as Expression 7).
LEE does not explicitly disclose the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum; and the generated said functional decryption key is for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum. YASUDA, in analogous art however, discloses the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum ([0028] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter σ. Next, a polynomial a1 of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. [0040] Further, a cryptographic processing device of Patent Document 1 permits a great improvement in processing time and a size of cryptographic data by performing a polynomial transformation to represent the vector data as one polynomial and encrypting the polynomial by a homomorphic encryption. [0041] In this cryptographic processing device, for example, the following two d-dimensional vectors are used as input data: A=(a.sub.0, a.sub.2, . . . , a.sub.n−1) (41) B=(b.sub.0, b.sub.2, . . . , b.sub.n−1) 42) [0042] The following two types of polynomial transformation, for example, an ascending-order transformation and a descending-order transformation, are used to calculate an inner product or a distance of two vectors at a high speed in a state in which those two vectors remain encrypted. [0050] When registering biometric information, the terminal 101 obtains biometric information on a user who is a registrant using a sensor, transforms the feature information extracted from the biometric information into a vector A as described in Formula (41), and performs encryption processing 111-1. As biometric information obtained by a sensor, image information such as a fingerprint, a face, a vein, and an iris, or phonetic information such as a voice can be used. [0056] For example, a distance between the vector A and the vector B (such as a Hamming distance) is used as the result of the operation of the vector A and the vector B. In this case, the cryptographic processing device 102 can calculate the distance between the vector A and the vector B in a state in which the two vectors remain encrypted, and the authentication device 103 can determine whether authentication has been successful by comparing the distance to a threshold. It is determined that the authentication of the target to be authenticated has been successful when the distance is less than the threshold, and it is determined that the authentication has been unsuccessful when the distance is not less than the threshold. [0057] According to such a biometric system, the terminal 101 only transmits encrypted information to the cryptographic processing device 102, and the cryptographic processing device 102 does not have a secret key, so the cryptographic processing device 102 never knows the vectors that represent biometric information of a user. Further, the cryptographic processing device 102 only transmits a result of a cryptographic operation to the authentication device 103, and the authentication device 103 only generates a result of an operation of a vector A and a vector B by description, so the authentication device 103, too, never knows the vectors that represent the biometric information of the user); and
the generated said functional decryption key is for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum ([0028] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter σ. Next, a polynomial a1 of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. Then, the following formula for a polynomial a0 is calculated, and a pair of polynomials (a0,a1) is defined as a public key pk. a0=−(a1*sk+t*e) (11) [0029] However, in a calculation of the polynomial a0, a polynomial whose degree is lower than n is always calculated by using “x.sup.n=−1, x.sup.n+1=−x, . . . ” with respect to a polynomial whose degree is higher than or equal to n. Further, as a coefficient in each term included in a polynomial, a remainder obtained by dividing the coefficient by a prime q is used. A space in which such a polynomial operation is performed is often technically represented as R.sub.q:=F.sub.q[x]/(x.sup.n+1). [0030] Next, for plaintext data m that is represented by a polynomial of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than t and a public key pk, three polynomials u, f, and g of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random, and cryptographic data Enc(m,pk) of the plaintext data m is defined by the following formulas: [0040] Further, a cryptographic processing device of Patent Document 1 permits a great improvement in processing time and a size of cryptographic data by performing a polynomial transformation to represent the vector data as one polynomial and encrypting the polynomial by a homomorphic encryption. [0053] In the encryption processing 111-2, the terminal 101 transforms the vector B into a polynomial pm2(B) as described in Formula (44), and encrypts the polynomial pm2(B) using a homomorphic encryption so as to generate an encrypted polynomial E(pm2(B)). Then, the terminal 101 transmits cryptographic information that represents the encrypted polynomial E(pm2(B)) to the cryptographic processing device 102).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the claimed limitations of the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum disclosed by LEE to include the obtained score between the test biometric datum and the reference biometric datum is representing a distance for a 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum; and the generated said functional decryption key is for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum. This modification would have been obvious because a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the desire to provide an encrypted polynomial that includes a result of an operation of the first vector and the second vector by use of the first cryptographic information, the third cryptographic information, and information that represents the monomial and output interface that represents the encrypted polynomial generated by the generator as suggested by YASUDA ([0016-0018]).
As per claim 2. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein a value of the primary mask is a result of an application, to the at least one other test component, of the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with the at least one other reference component (LEE [0043] By way of reference, a general functional encryption using discrete logarithm (DL) problem may obtain a decrypted data corresponding to a value (e.g., g<h, x>) of an inter product <h, x> to which a specific function is applied, where <h, x> indicates the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x. However, the functional encryption using DL problem may not provide the inner product itself, and thus functional encryption using the DL problem may be applicable only to restricted scenarios. In contrast, a general functional encryption using learning with error (LWE) problem may provide the inner product itself but the functional encryption using LWE problem is vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers).
As per claim 3. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising determining, by way of a random or pseudorandom draw, a value of at least one other component from the at least one other reference component and the at least one other test component (LEE [0064] The random number generator RNG may provide random numbers to the controller CON, and the controller CON may generate the random numbers and the random vectors for the functional encryption as will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A, 7B, and 7C.)
As per claim 4. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum (YASUDA [0028] In the process of the encryption key generation, first, a polynomial sk of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small is generated as a secret key at random. The value of each coefficient is restricted by a certain parameter σ. Next, a polynomial a1 of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is less than q and a polynomial e of degree n−1 in which each coefficient is very small are generated at random. Then, the following formula for a polynomial a0 is calculated, and a pair of polynomials (a0,a1) is defined as a public key pk a0=−(a1*sk+t*e)).
As per claim 5. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (LEE [0087] The key generation device 11 may perform a matrix operation of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 and an amplified parameter vector Nh where the amplified parameter vector Nh is a multiplication of an error factor value N and the parameter vector h, and determine the encrypted parameter vector v using the random vector s and the vector u corresponding to the master key msk).
As per claim 6. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0180] The input data DI may indicate private information of a user and the input data DI may be biometric information corresponding to iris, fingerprint, DNA, retina, vein, face, voice, unique gait, etc., of the user).
As per claim 7. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function is a scalar product (YASUDA [0051] In the encryption processing 111-1, the terminal 101 transforms the vector A into a polynomial pm1(A) as described in Formula (43), and encrypts the polynomial pm1(A) using a homomorphic encryption so as to generate an encrypted polynomial E(pm1(A)). Then, the terminal 101 transmits cryptographic information that represents the encrypted polynomial E(pm1(A)) to the cryptographic processing device 102. The cryptographic processing device 102 registers the cryptographic information received from the terminal 101 in a database as a template 112 that represents registered biometric information).
As per claim 8. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising, for values of i equal to 1 and 2, and by way of a device of index i of the system: generating a partial result of index i from the score and an unmasking datum of index i associated with the primary mask, wherein: the devices of respective indices 1 and 2 are distinct, and partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 make it possible to compute a check result indicating whether or not the test biometric datum corresponds to the reference biometric datum (LEE [0090] The key generation device 11 may generate the encrypted parameter vector v by performing a matrix multiplication of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 of the random matrix A and the amplified parameter vector Nh as represented by Expression 3, and generate the public key, that is, the third public key by performing a matrix multiplication of the random matrix A and the encrypted parameter vector v as represented by Expression 4).
As per claim 9. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 8, wherein the check result is equal to a sum of the partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 (LEE [0100] As a result, as shown in Expression 7, the decrypted data DD may be represented by a sum of the inner product h.sup.T.Math.x of the parameter vector h and the input vector x and an inner product error value E. The inner product error value is calculated as Expression 8).
As per claim 10. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 9, wherein the functional encryption of the test biometric datum is implemented by a device of the system, distinct from the devices of indices 1 and 2, and/or the check result is computed from the partial results of respective indices 1 and 2 by an output device of the system, distinct from the devices of indices 1 and 2 (LEE [0087] The key generation device 11 may perform a matrix operation of an inverse matrix (A).sup.−1 and an amplified parameter vector Nh where the amplified parameter vector Nh is a multiplication of an error factor value N and the parameter vector h, and determine the encrypted parameter vector v using the random vector s and the vector u corresponding to the master key msk. As such, the encrypted parameter vector v may include the amplified parameter vector Nh).
As per claim 12. Claim 12 is directed to a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having stored there on a computer program including code instructions for executing the method as claimed in claim 1, claim 12 having substantially similar corresponding limitations of claim 1 and therefore claim 12 is rejected with the same rationale given above to rejected claim 1.
As per claim 13 is directed to a system for processing biometric data, comprising: circuitry configured to perform function having substantially similar corresponding limitations of claim 1 and therefore claim 13 is rejected with the same rationale given above to rejected claim 1.
As per claim 14. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, further comprising determining, by way of a random or pseudorandom draw, a value of at least one other component from the at least one other reference component and the at least one other test component (LEE [0089] As represented by Expression 4, the secret key skh may be the random vector s, the public key pkh may include a first key pk1 corresponding to a vector As+e, a second key pk2 corresponding to the random matrix A, and a third key pk3 corresponding to a vector Av+f. As described above, the encrypted parameter vector v includes the amplified parameter vector Nh corresponding to the multiplication of the parameter vector h and the error factor value N. In other words, the third public key pk3 in Expression 4 may correspond to the main public key that is generated based on the parameter vector has described with reference to FIG. 6).
As per claim 15. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum ([0068] Referring to FIGS. 1 and 5, the key generation device 11 may generate an encrypted parameter vector v including an amplified parameter vector Nh corresponding to a multiplication of the parameter vector h and an error factor value N (S111), and generate the public key pkh based on the encrypted parameter vector v (S112). In addition, the key generation device 11 may generate a secret key skh based on random vectors (S113)).
As per claim 16. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum is generated by applying said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function between said master key and said reference biometric datum (YASUDA [0029] in a calculation of the polynomial a0, a polynomial whose degree is lower than n is always calculated by using “x.sup.n=−1, x.sup.n+1=−x, . . . ” with respect to a polynomial whose degree is higher than or equal to n. Further, as a coefficient in each term included in a polynomial, a remainder obtained by dividing the coefficient by a prime q is used. A space in which such a polynomial operation is performed is often technically represented as R.sub.q:=F.sub.q[x]/(x.sup.n+1).
As per claim 17. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (YASUDA [0053] In the encryption processing 111-2, the terminal 101 transforms the vector B into a polynomial pm2(B) as described in Formula (44), and encrypts the polynomial pm2(B) using a homomorphic encryption so as to generate an encrypted polynomial E(pm2(B)). Then, the terminal 101 transmits cryptographic information that represents the encrypted polynomial E(pm2(B)) to the cryptographic processing device 102).
As per claim 18. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (LEE [0137] Referring to FIGS. 2 and 10, the key generation device 11 may generate the public key pkh and the secret key skh, based on the master key msk and the parameter vector h (S100). The encryption device 12 may generate the encrypted data DE by encrypting the input vector x, based on the public key pkh (S200). The decryption device 12 may generate the decrypted data DD corresponding to the approximation value of the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x by decrypting the encrypted data DE based on the secret key skh (S300)).
As per claim 19. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the generating further comprises: generating said master key; obtaining at least one reference biometric datum; and for each reference biometric datum that is obtained, generating the functional decryption key for said 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with said reference biometric datum, to compile a functional decryption key base (YASUDA [0029] in a calculation of the polynomial a0, a polynomial whose degree is lower than n is always calculated by using “x.sup.n=−1, x.sup.n+1=−x, . . . ” with respect to a polynomial whose degree is higher than or equal to n. Further, as a coefficient in each term included in a polynomial, a remainder obtained by dividing the coefficient by a prime q is used. A space in which such a polynomial operation is performed is often technically represented as R.sub.q:=F.sub.q[x]/(x.sup.n+1)).
As per claim 20. LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0043] By way of reference, a general functional encryption using discrete logarithm (DL) problem may obtain a decrypted data corresponding to a value (e.g., g<h, x>) of an inter product <h, x> to which a specific function is applied, where <h, x> indicates the inner product of the parameter vector h and the input vector x).
As per claim 21: LEE in view of YASUDA discloses the method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the functional encrypting further comprises obtaining said test biometric datum from the biometric trait of the candidate individual using biometric acquisition means of the system (LEE [0064] The random number generator RNG may provide random numbers to the controller CON, and the controller CON may generate the random numbers and the random vectors for the functional encryption as will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A, 7B, and 7C.)
BRI (Broadest Reasonable Interpretation) Considerations
The above claims under examination have been given to them their BRI considerations consistent with the applicant’s disclosure as they would be interpreted by ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of filing of the invention. In order to construe, appraise boundary and scope of the claimed limitations, the following claim words or terms or phrases or languages have been given to them their BRI considerations and context in view of the applicant’s disclosure. For record clarity, BRI for the following claim words or terms or phrases or languages, the examiner recites descriptions from the applicant’s disclosure as follows:
A Test Biometric Datum and Reference Biometric Data [Applicant’s Disclosure: 0002] There are already identification or authentication schemes in which a user, also referred to as a candidate individual, presents, to a trustworthy processing unit, for example to a unit belonging to a customs office, an airport, etc., a biometric datum freshly acquired from the user, which the unit compares against one or more reference biometric data recorded in a reference database to which it has access. [0003] This reference database groups together the reference biometric data of author-ized individuals, also referred to as reference individuals, such as passengers on a flight prior to boarding. 0066] Each memory 34 stores a reference database, which is a functional decryption key base, each functional decryption key in said base being associated with a reference biometric datum relating to a previously enrolled individual, also referred to as reference individual. The reference biometric data are not stored in the reference database. A functional decryption key does not make it possible to trace the associated reference biometric datum. The reference biometric data are thus confidentiality-protected. [0051] In one embodiment, the system 1 implements authentication of a candidate individual, that is to say compares the biometric datum, referred to as a test biometric datum (freshly acquired from the candidate individual), with a single reference biometric datum, supposed to originate from the same individual, in order to verify that the individual from which the two data were obtained is in-deed the same individual.
[Applicant’s Disclosure: 0052-0053] In another embodiment, the system 1 implements identification of the candidate individual, that is to say compares the test biometric datum with all of the reference biometric data in a base, in order to determine the identity of the candidate individual. Typically, both the test biometric datum and each reference biometric datum are vectors in one and the same vector space. The test biometric datum comprises n test components representative of a biometric trait of a candidate individual, with n being a natural number strictly greater than zero. Each reference biometric datum comprises n reference components representative of a bio-metric trait of a reference individual.
Score [Applicant’s Disclosure: [0078] The results of the functional decryption of a cipher of the input datum, also referred to hereinafter as score, is thus directly the result of the application, to this input datum, of the 1st-degree or 2nd-degree polynomial function parameterized with the reference biometric datum, that is to say the distance of this in-put datum from said reference biometric datum in a form masked by a primary mask r.
Conclusion
The prior arts made of record and not relied upon are considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See the notice of reference cited in form PTO-892 for additional prior arts.
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/TECHANE GERGISO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2408