DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claims 1-39 are pending in the instant patent application.
Claims 1-39 are under examination.
Claim Objections
Claim 1-15 are objected to because of the following informalities:
The claims recite acronyms without first providing the full name of the terms. It is suggested that the terms be spelled out at their first use and in all independent claims so that it is clearly understood what they stand for. Appropriate correction is suggested.
3. Claim 2 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim contains a period within the text of the claim. MPEP 608.01(m), Form of Claims, states,
Each claim begins with a capital letter and ends with a period. Periods may not be used elsewhere in the claims except for abbreviations. See Fressola v. Manbeck, 36 USPQ2d 1211 (D.D.C. 1995).
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
4. Claims 1-39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
5. The term “increasing” or “increases” in claim 1 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “to increase” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Providing a point of reference or comparison within the claim would obviate this ground of rejection.
6. Further, claim 1 recites limitation “by bridging across an empty critical gap,” and it is not obvious whether the bridging is an active step of the method. This renders the claim indefinite.
7. Finally, the meets and bounds of the term “critical gap” cannot be ascertained from the claim or the specification as filed. Briefly, the prior art does not recognize the term, and the specification does not define what stands for a critical gap, as opposed to, for instance, a gap. This renders the claim indefinite.
8. Claim 2 is indefinite insofar as it employs the term “neuroprotective peptide” as a limitation. This term is not known in the pertinent art of record as being associated with a particular group of peptides. Moreover, because the instant specification does not identify that property or combination of properties which is unique to and, therefore, definitive of a “neuroprotective peptide”, an artisan cannot determine if a peptide, which meets all of the other limitations of a claim, would then be included or excluded from the claimed subject matter by the presence of this limitation.
9. Claim 3 recites the limitation "surgical procedure" in claim 1. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim.
10. Claim 16 is vague and indefinite insofar as it employs the term a “peripheral nervous system deficit” as a limitation. This term is not known in the pertinent art of record as being associated with a particular group of pathological conditions. Moreover, because the instant specification does not identify that property or combination of properties which is unique to and, therefore, definitive of a “peripheral nervous system deficit”, an artisan cannot determine if a deficit, which meets all of the other limitations of a claim, would then be included or excluded from the claimed subject matter by the presence of this limitation.
11. Similar to claim 16, claim 21 is vague and indefinite insofar as it employs the term a “central nervous system deficit” as a limitation.
12. Claim 32 recites the limitation “nerve deficit therapy.” This term is not known in the relevant prior art of record, and it is not defined within the disclosure as originally filed. Thus, the claimed subject matter is vague and ambiguous, as presented.
13. Applicant is advised that one of the purposes of the 112, second paragraph is to provide a clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent (see, e.g., Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379, 55 USPQ2d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F .2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
In precedential decision Ex parte Kenichi Miyazaki, Appeal 2007-330, BPAI stated “In particular, rather than requiring that the claims are insolubly ambiguous, we hold that if a claim is amendable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.”
Further, the federal Circuit stated in Halliburton Energy Servs.:
When a claim limitation is defined in purely functional terms, the task of determining whether that limitation is sufficiently definite is a difficult one that is highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area). We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiner demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.
Halliburton Energy Servs. V. M-ILLC 514 F .3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
14. Claims 33 and 36 are indefinite wherein they recite functional language. MPEP 2173.05(g) states: “the use of functional language in a claim may fail ‘to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim' and thus be indefinite.” It further states: “Examiners should consider the following factors when examining claims that contain functional language to determine whether the language is ambiguous: (1) whether there is a clear cut indication of the scope of the subject matter covered by the claim; (2) whether the language sets forth well-defined boundaries of the invention or only states a problem solved or a result obtained; and (3) whether one of ordinary skill in the art would know from the claim terms what structure or steps are encompassed by the claim.” In the instant case, the claims recite the method of claim of 1 but then define it —method results in— by functional language. While a functional limitation can provide a patentable distinction (limit the claim scope) by imposing limits on the function of a structure, material or action, in the instant case it is unclear what material/structural or manipulative differences are encompassed by recitation of intended result of the treatment. Since the claims fail to meet the criteria set forth in MPEP 2173.05(g), then the claims are rejected as being indefinite.
15. Claims 4-15, 17-20, 22-31, 34, 35 and 37-39 are indefinite for being dependent from indefinite claim(s).
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
16. Claims 1-39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claim 1, and dependent claims 3-39, specifically require possession of molecular compounds defined within the claim as CXCR4 antagonists, STAT3 activators and agents that increase nitric oxide content which, upon clinical administration, provide for increase in peripheral nerve growth, regrowth and regeneration. Claim 2 encompasses a genus of sodium salts as agents that increase NO content. The claims do not require that these antagonists, activators and agents possess any particular conserved structure or other disclosed distinguishing feature. Thus, the claims are drawn to a genus of molecular compounds that is defined only by reference to their desired effect. However, the instant specification fails to describe the entire genus of molecules, which are encompassed by these claims.
MPEP §2163(I)(A) states:
“The claimed invention as a whole may not be adequately described if the claims require an essential or critical feature which is not adequately described in the specification and which is not conventional or known in the art. Consider the claim "A gene comprising SEQ ID NO:1." The claim may be construed to include specific structures in addition to SEQ ID NO:1, such as a promoter, a coding region, or other elements. Although SEQ ID NO:1 is fully disclosed, there may be insufficient description of other structures embraced by the claim (e.g., promoters, enhancers, coding regions, and other regulatory elements).”
“An invention described solely in terms of a method of making and/or its function may lack written descriptive support where there is no described or art-recognized correlation between the disclosed function and the structure(s) responsible for the function. For example, the amino acid sequence of a protein along with knowledge of the genetic code might put an inventor in possession of the genus of nucleic acids capable of encoding the protein, but the same information would not place the inventor in possession of the naturally-occurring DNA or mRNA encoding the protein. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 26 USPQ2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 34 USPQ2d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a process could not render the product of that process obvious under 35 U.S.C 103).”
In making a determination of whether the application complies with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, it is necessary to understand what Applicant has possession of and what Applicant is claiming. From the specification, it is clear that Applicant has possession of selected compounds enumerated within claim 2. Claims 1 and 3-39, however, are drawn to CXCR4 antagonists, STAT3 activators and agents that increase nitric oxide content, and claim 2 encompasses sodium salts as agents that increase NO content, wherein all antagonists, activators and agents provide for increase in peripheral nerve growth, regrowth and regeneration. The specification only describes selected representative compounds and fails to describe the entire genus of molecules recited within claim 1.
To provide adequate written description and evidence of possession of a claimed genus, the specification must provide sufficient distinguishing identifying characteristics of the genus. The factors to be considered include disclosure of complete or partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics, structure/function correlation, methods of making the claimed product, or any combination thereof. In this case, the only factor present in the claims is a reference to the function of the compounds. There is not even identification of any particular portion of the structure that must be conserved. The specification does not provide a complete structure of those CXCR4 antagonists, STAT3 activators and agents that increase nitric oxide content, and fails to provide a representative number of species for the recited genus. Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient recitation of distinguishing identifying characteristics, the specification does not provide adequate written description of the recited genus.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 19USPQ2d 1111, clearly states “applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.” (See page 1117.) The specification does not “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.” (See Vas-Cath at page 1116). As discussed above, the skilled artisan cannot envision the detailed chemical structure of the encompassed genus of antagonists, activators and agents, and therefore conception is not achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, regardless of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation. Adequate written description requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method of isolating it. The compound itself is required. See Fiers v. Revel, 25 USPQ2d 1601 at 1606 (CAFC 1993) and Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 18 USPQ2d 1016.
One cannot describe what one has not conceived. See Fiddes v. Baird, 30 USPQ2d 1481 at 1483. In Fiddes, claims directed to mammalian FGF’s were found to be unpatentable due to lack of written description for that broad class. The specification provided only the bovine sequence.
Applicant is reminded that Vas-Cath makes clear that the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112 is severable from its enablement provision (see page 1115).
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
17. Claims 1-39 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-21 of U.S. Patent No. 11,969,522. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the instant claims encompass the same methods to treat the same pathology by administering the same products and following the same protocols as in claims for which patent protection has been already granted.
Conclusion
18. No claim is allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OLGA N CHERNYSHEV whose telephone number is (571)272-0870. The examiner can normally be reached 9AM to 5:30PM, Monday to Friday.
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/OLGA N CHERNYSHEV/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1675
August 26, 2026
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