DETAILED ACTION
This Final Office Action is in response to the amendment filed 4/9/2026.
Claims 1-3, 8-10, and 14-16 have been amended.
Claims 1-20 are pending.
Response to Arguments
On page 6 of Remarks filed 4/9/2026, the Applicant contends that the modes of McGill do not form a hierarchical arrangement, nor do they include an emergency state or a testing state (or even further testing sub-states).
The Examiner agrees that the modes of McGill do not include the amended limitation of “an emergency state.” A new reference (i.e. Oba) is applied in combination with McGill to teach this feature in the rejections below.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees that the modes of McGill do not form a hierarchical arrangement including testing sub-states. The limitation of “testing state incorporating testing sub-states” is interpreted under its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Specifically, paragraphs [0049] through [0051] of the specification filed 5/6/2024 describe the testing sub-states, e.g., “in sub-state S2a, the vehicle may operate solely under the control of the RHS component 100,” and “in sub-state S2b1, the vehicle may operate solely under the control autonomous driving software stack 700.” Therefore, McGill may reasonably teach the “testing state incorporating testing sub-states” as primary driver mode, secondary driver mode, and autonomous driving mode, where a “hierarchy” exists in that the secondary driver mode is prioritized over the autonomous driving mode and primary driver mode (see ¶0052), and the autonomous driving mode is prioritized over the primary driver mode (see ¶0055).
On page 7 of Remarks, the Applicant contends that McGill’s intervention switch is controlled automatically by the autonomous controller in response to sensor data, so as to enable autonomous mode rather than suppressing it.
The Examiner agrees that the intervention switch disclosed in McGill no longer teaches the “guardian interrupt mode” due to the amendment filed 4/9/2026, and different features disclosed in McGill are applied in the present rejection below.
On page 7 of Remarks, the Applicant contends that there is no disclosure in McGill of a guardian interrupt mode that (1) suppresses autonomous mode functionality, or (2) is manually activated by a second driver via a dedicated guardian interface. The Applicant further contends that McGill’s secondary-driver inputs simply override via physical controls and do not trigger a distinct guardian interrupt mode that suppresses the autonomous component.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees. As recited by the Applicant on page 7 of the Remarks, with respect to paragraph [0051] of the specification, “when a guardian interrupt mode (described below) is activated then RHS component 1000 may fully or partially override autonomous driving software stack 700, LHS component 900, or both” (emphasis added). The limitation of “guardian interrupt mode” is interpreted under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Applicant’s disclosure; therefore, the limitation of “a guardian interrupt mode suppressing autonomous mode functionality” may be reasonably taught by secondary driver mode in McGill, given that selection gate 222 disables control signals from autonomous controller 230 when selection gate 222 receives control signals from secondary driver system 220 (see ¶0052). There is no claim language that distinguishes the “guardian interrupt mode” from the secondary driver mode of McGill. Further, paragraph [0051] of the specification explains that the “guardian interrupt mode” occurs during a “testing sub-state.” Because the second driver mode of McGill is applied to one of the “testing sub-states” in claim 1, it is reasonable to map McGill’s second driver mode to the claimed “guardian interrupt mode.”
McGill further discloses that the control signals received from secondary driver system 220 include second steering wheel 120, second accelerator pedal 122, and second brake pedal 124 (see ¶0052), and thus, activation of the secondary driver mode is performed “by a guardian interface operable by the second driver.” As recited by the Applicant on page 7 of the Remarks, with respect to paragraph [0057] of the specification, the guardian interface may be “a pedal that may be actuated by a safety driver to take full control of a vehicle.” The limitation of “guardian interface” is interpreted under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Applicant’s disclosure; therefore, the limitation of “a guardian interface” may be reasonably taught by any of the pedals 122, 124 in McGill, given that selection gate 222 disables control signals from autonomous controller 230 when selection gate 222 receives control signals from secondary driver system 220 that includes second accelerator pedal 122 and second brake pedal 124 (see ¶0052).
Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
On pages 7-8 of Remarks, the Applicant contends that Toyoda fails to describe any aspects of the amended claimed, e.g., hierarchical states, guardian interrupt mode suppressing autonomous mode functionality.
The Examiner agrees. These amended features are taught by a combination of McGill and Oba, as discussed in detail below.
Examiner’s Note
To enhance clarity, claim language is underlined throughout this Office Action.
Citations to the prior art are provided in parentheses following each claim limitation, along with any necessary supplemental explanations.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-6 and 8-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGill et al. (US 2019/0092389 A1), hereinafter McGill, in view of Oba (US 2020/0231182 A1), hereinafter Oba.
Claim 1
McGill discloses the claimed system (see Figure 2, depicting vehicle system 200), comprising a processor (i.e. processors 204) and a memory (i.e. memory modules 206) communicably coupled to the processor and storing machine-readable instructions (see ¶0031-0033) that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to provide a testbench capable of receiving a first input set from a first device set operable by a first driver (see ¶0034, regarding primary driver system 210 includes first steering wheel 110, first accelerator pedal 114, and first brake pedal 116, where signals are received from the steering wheel interface module 112, the accelerator pedal interface unit 214, and the brake pedal interface unit 214, as described in ¶0036-0047), a second input set from a second device set operable by a second driver (see ¶0052, regarding secondary driver system 220 includes second steering wheel 120, second accelerator pedal 122, and second brake pedal 124, where signals are received from the secondary driving system 220), and a third input set from an autonomous driving component (see ¶0038-0039, regarding control signals are received from autonomous controller 230). A “testbench” is known in the art as a combination of hardware and software that applies inputs, monitors outputs, and checks results against unexpected behavior; therefore, McGill teaches a “testbench” associated with vehicle system 200 in Figure 2 in which inputs from multiple systems are evaluated with respect to an optimal path (see ¶0072).
McGill further discloses that the claimed system is configured to generate states of operations comprising a hierarchy that includes a testing state incorporating testing sub-states, wherein each state of operation determines how the first, second, and third input set are able to control a vehicle (see ¶0029, regarding that vehicle 100 is operational in three operational modes that define operation by the primary driver 102, secondary driver 104, and/or autonomous controller; ¶0052, regarding secondary driver has priority over operation by primary driver 102 or operation in autonomous driving mode, where particular take-over events are identified to switch from primary driver mode to autonomous driving mode or secondary driver mode, as described in ¶0053-0058, with respect to Figure 3). The limitation of “testing state incorporating testing sub-states” is interpreted under its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Specifically, paragraphs [0049] through [0051] of the specification filed 5/6/2024 describes the sub-states, e.g., “in sub-state S2a, the vehicle may operate solely under the control of the RHS component 100,” and “in sub-state S2b1, the vehicle may operate solely under the control autonomous driving software stack 700.” Therefore, McGill may reasonably teach the “testing state incorporating testing sub-states” as primary driver mode, secondary driver mode, and autonomous driving mode, where a “hierarchy” exists in that secondary driver mode is prioritized over the autonomous driving mode and primary driver mode (see ¶0052), and the autonomous driving mode is prioritized over the primary driver mode (see ¶0055).
McGill does not disclose that the “states of operations comprising a hierarchy” further includes an emergency state. The limitation of “emergency state” is interpreted under its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Specifically, the limitation of “emergency state” is interpreted as a state that overrides all modes, in light of paragraph [0052] of the specification filed 5/6/2024. Thus, when interpreting the limitations of “emergency state” in light of the Applicant’s disclosure, this type of state is well-known in the art and would be obvious to incorporate into the “states of operations comprising a hierarchy” of McGill, in light of Oba.
Specifically, Oba teaches a state transition diagram in Figure 9 that depicts switching between manual and automatic driving modes (similar to the states of operations comprising a hierarchy that includes a testing state incorporating testing sub-states of McGill) and an emergency state (i.e. emergency evacuation mode) (see ¶0251-0252, with respect to Figure 9, regarding that in an urgent situation, driving mode is shifted to emergency evacuation mode when in any of the modes that include automatic driving mode, automatic driving mode with attention, and manual driving mode, such that the vehicle travels to a safe location; ¶0232, regarding automatic level 4 or automatic driving mode is defined as the system performing all driving tasks; ¶0227, regarding automatic level 0 or manual driving mode is defined as the driver performing all driving tasks). As is evident from ¶0251-0252 of Oba, the “emergency state” is prioritized over the manual and automatic driving modes and thus may be reasonably interpreted as part of a “hierarchy” of modes.
In McGill, a dual cockpit system is provided, such that inputs from two drivers and an autonomous driving component are used to operate a vehicle. In Oba, a single cockpit system is provided, such that inputs from a single driver and an autonomous driving component are used to operate a vehicle. However, it is the technique of including an emergency state into the hierarchal states of operations that is modified by Oba; therefore, the number of drivers that provide input for operating the vehicle does not influence this combination. The “emergency state” is interpreted in light of the Applicant’s specification, which describes the emergency state as not being influenced by driver inputs, as discussed above.
Since the systems of McGill and Oba are directed to the same purpose, i.e. transitioning between manual and autonomous driving modes, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the states of operations comprising a hierarchy that includes a testing state incorporating testing sub-states of McGill to further include an emergency state, in the same manner that an emergency evacuation mode of Oba is prioritized with respect to automatic and manual driving modes, with the predictable result of improving safety during an urgent situation (¶0251-0252 of Oba).
McGill further discloses that the claimed system is configured to:
determine a current state of operation for the vehicle (see ¶0039, regarding the determination of whether the vehicle system 200 needs to operate in an autonomous driving mode during primary driver mode, where the current drive mode of the vehicle 100 is provided, as described in ¶0050-0051); and
configure vehicle control by the first input set, the second input set, and third input set based on the current state of operation (see ¶0029, regarding the operation modes of the vehicle 100 represent particular “inputs” from the primary driver, secondary driver, and/or autonomous controller that are used to control the vehicle 100; ¶0039-0040, regarding that when controller 202 determines that vehicle system 200 needs to operate in autonomous driving mode, autonomous controller 230 and primary driver system 210 may provide control signals to steering ECU 240, brake ECU 250, and/or acceleration ECU 260, where secondary driver system 220 has priority over the operation by primary driver and autonomous controller, as discussed in ¶0052).
Claims 2, 9, and 15
McGill further discloses that to determine the current state of operation for the vehicle includes evaluating whether a guardian interrupt mode suppressing autonomous mode functionality is active (see ¶0052, regarding that when selection gate 222 receives control signals from secondary driver system 220, selection gate 222 disables control signals from autonomous controller 230; ¶0050-0051, regarding a current drive mode, e.g., primary driver mode, autonomous driving mode, secondary driver mode, is indicated on a display). Paragraph [0051] of the specification filed 5/6/2024 recites “when a guardian interrupt mode (described below) is activated then RHS component 1000 may fully or partially override autonomous driving software stack 700, LHS component 900, or both” (emphasis added). The limitation of “guardian interrupt mode” is interpreted under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Applicant’s disclosure; therefore, the limitation of “a guardian interrupt mode suppressing autonomous mode functionality” may be reasonably taught by secondary driver mode in McGill, given that selection gate 222 disables control signals from autonomous controller 230 when selection gate 222 receives control signals from secondary driver system 220 (see ¶0052).
Further, paragraph [0051] of the specification explains that the “guardian interrupt mode” occurs during a “testing sub-state.” Because the second driver mode of McGill is applied to one of the “testing sub-states” in claim 1, it is reasonable to map McGill’s second driver mode to the claimed “guardian interrupt mode.”
Claims 3, 10, and 16
McGill further discloses that the guardian interrupt mode is activated by a guardian interface operable by the second driver (see ¶0052, regarding that control signals from secondary driver system 220 include second steering wheel 120, second accelerator pedal 122, and second brake pedal 124). Paragraph [0057] of the specification recites “guardian interrupt component 820, e.g., a pedal that may be actuated by a safety driver to take full control of a vehicle.” The limitation of “guardian interface” is interpreted under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Applicant’s disclosure; therefore, the limitation of “a guardian interface” may be reasonably taught by any of the pedals 122, 124 in McGill, given that selection gate 222 disables control signals from autonomous controller 230 when selection gate 222 receives control signals from secondary driver system 220 that includes second accelerator pedal 122 and second brake pedal 124 (see ¶0052).
Claims 4, 11, and 17
McGill further discloses that the guardian interrupt mode is one of a set of guardian interrupt modes (see ¶0053-0058, with respect to Figure 3, regarding the secondary driver mode and autonomous driving mode are initiated in response to take-over signals/events). The “set of guardian interrupt modes” is not defined in the claim and may be reasonably taught by any combination of driving modes in McGill.
Claims 5, 12, and 18
McGill further discloses to configure the vehicle control utilizes a concurrency rule (see ¶0068, with respect to Figure 8D, regarding that vehicle system 200 rotates first steering wheel 110 to align with front wheels, where the actual orientation of the front wheels 106 had been adjusted to the target orientation 820 by vehicle system 200 while first steering wheel 110 is disengaged from the front wheels 106, as described in ¶0061-0069, with respect to Figures 8A-8E). The limitation of “concurrency rule” is interpreted under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, in which control of one component causes the same positional change in another.
Claims 6, 13, and 19
McGill further discloses to configure the vehicle control further utilizes a transition rule (see ¶0044-0048, regarding particular “transition rules” for transitioning from a primary driver mode to an autonomous driving mode, such as when the actual path has deviated from the optimal trajectory, when an obstacle has been identified proximate to the vehicle, when outputs are received from a fog detector sensor, when the vehicle deviates from a target speed, or when the vehicle is following a heavy-traffic route).
Claim 8
The combination of McGill and Oba discloses the claimed non-transitory computer-readable medium including instructions (see ¶0031-0033 of McGill) that when executed by one or more processors (i.e. processors 204) cause the one or more processors to perform the method discussed in the rejection of claim 1.
Claim 14
The combination of McGill and Oba discloses the claimed method, as discussed in the rejection of claim 1.
Claims 7 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over McGill in view of Oba, and in further view of Toyoda et al. (US 2019/0009794 A1), hereinafter Toyoda.
Claims 7 and 20
While McGill teaches the use of control signals from both of the autonomous controller and primary driver system (see ¶0040), McGill does not further disclose that to configure the vehicle control utilizes a weighting function to generate a blended control signal. However, the “blended control signal” does not reference any particular combination of inputs; therefore, prior art may be reasonably combined to teach this known technique of generating a blended control signal.
Specifically, Toyoda teaches a system that receives manual inputs (similar to the first input set and the second input set of McGill) and autonomous inputs (similar to the third input set of McGill) for controlling a vehicle (similar to the vehicle control taught by McGill) (see ¶0030-0031), which utilizes a weighting function to generate a blended control signal (see ¶0033, regarding control module 220 blends manual inputs with autonomous inputs according to a weighted value in order to generate the collaborative controls for operating the vehicle). The “blended control signal” is not defined with respect to particular “inputs” and may be reasonably interpreted as a control signal associated with at least two inputs.
In McGill, a dual cockpit system is provided, such that inputs from two drivers and an autonomous driving component are used to operate a vehicle. In Toyoda, a single cockpit system is provided, such that inputs from a single driver and an autonomous driving component are used to operate a vehicle. However, it is the technique of using a weighting function to generate a blended control signal that is modified by Toyoda; therefore, the number of drivers that provide input for operating the vehicle does not influence this combination.
Since the systems of McGill and Toyoda are directed to the same purpose, i.e. controlling a vehicle using inputs from a driver and an autonomous system, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the system of McGill to further to configure the vehicle control utilizes a weighting function to generate a blended control signal, in light of Toyoda, with the predictable result of preventing erratic maneuvers and provide for a more robust mechanism for controlling the vehicle (¶0032 of Toyoda).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Specifically, Kim (US 2021/0061313 A1) teaches weighting inputs provided by a driver and an autonomous driving control unit over a blending cycle (see ¶0072), Pabst et al. (translation of DE 102017202347 A1) teaches validating vehicle functions by changing the signal between a first control unit and a second control unit while the vehicle is driving (see ¶0039), Sprang et al. (US 2023/0242161 A1) teaches a vehicle controller that assumes a number of states, including an E-stop state that is activated by pressing “E-Stop,” which deactivates the autonomy system (see ¶0030-0038, with respect to Table 1), and Fujimoto (US 2025/0296601 A1) teaches a mode control block 150 that includes sub-blocks of a stop block 151 that executes a stop mode, autonomous travel block 152 that executes an autonomous travel mode, and a user operation block 153 that executes a user operation mode (see ¶0104).
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/SARA J LEWANDROSKI/Examiner, Art Unit 3661
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