Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
DETAILED ACTION
This Final Office Action is in response Applicant communication filled on 10/23/2025.
I. Status of Claims
Claims 1,6,10 are independent and have been amended by Applicant.
Claims 5,9,13 are dependent and have been canceled by Applicant.
Claims 18,19,20 are dependent and have been newly added by Applicant.
Claims 1-4, 6-8, 10-12, and 14-20 are currently pending of which:
Claim 3 remains withdrawn from consideration as directed to a non-elected invention.
Claims 1,2,4,6-8,10-12,14-20 are currently under examination and rejected as follows.
Response to Applicant’s amendments / arguments
Applicant’s 10/23/2025 amendment necessitated new grounds of rejection in this action.
II. Response to Applicant’s rebuttal arguments on 35 USC 103 rejection.
Prior art argument #1: Remarks 10/23/2025 p.12 ¶2 -¶3 argues that while Lee et al, US 20230294722 A1 by Applicants Hyundai and Kia teaches at ¶ [0071] "the controller 150 may be configured to capture the exterior and interior of the eco-friendly vehicle with at least one or more cameras disposed in the eco-friendly vehicle, and store the captured image”, it is argued that Lee does not, disclose or suggest the controller detects an act of the service staff turning off camera.
Examiner fully considered the prior art argument #1, but said argument is rendered moot in view of new grounds of rejection as necessitated by the Applicant’s amendment. First, the Examiner follows the broadest reusable interpretation test, per MPEP 2111, and submits that here the above amended and contested limitation of independent Claims 1,6,10, uses conjunction “or”, as in “detecting”, “an act or omission of the service staff”. The act and omission are distinct as corroborated by the non-limiting examples of Original Specification ¶ [0054] 3rd-4th sentences. While the amended independent Claims 1,6,10, further narrow down “the act” to include “turning off the camera”, said Claims 1,6,10 are mute regarding what the distinct “omission” entails. Based on said claim construction and interpretation, the Examiner respectfully submits that the contested limitation can still be met by a prior art teaching or suggesting “omission of the service staff”, regardless of “the act” of “turning off the camera” as claimed by the alternative introduced by the conjunction “or”. Thus, “turning off the camera” does not need to be taught by a prior art that teaches an example of “omission”. Should the Applicant desire a different claim interpretation, Applicant may amend the claims as supported by the Original Disclosure.
Prior art argument #2: Remarks 10/23/2025 p.12 ¶4 further argues that Lee also does not disclose or suggest that “the controller is further configured to: automatically select one of the charging service or the battery replacement service according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location” as amended at independent Claims 1,6,10.
Examiner fully considered the argument which is moot in view of new grounds of rejection as necessitated by the Applicant’s amendment. First, the Examiner also investigates the claim construction of the contested limitation above, and submits that given the lack of grammatical comma [,] between the expression “battery replacement service” and the expression “according to”, the claim interpretation could be argued as selection, in the alternative, [as introduced by conjunction “or”], of “charging service” [regardless of positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location] or “the battery replacement service according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location”. Simply put, given the lack of the grammatical comma, an argument can be made that the prepositional phrase “according to” only applies to “the battery replacement service”, but does not necessarily apply to the select[ion] [of] “one of the charging service”. Thus, an argument can be made that, a prior art that would teach or suggest selection of charging service at any broad level of automation would meet the contested limitation regardless of positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location. Based on such claim construction and ensuing claim interpretation, the Examiner submits that Anand et al, US 20230394389 A1, by Honda Ltd, teaches or suggests “automatically select one of the charging service” at Anand ¶ [0021] 1st sentence: electronic device 102 include logic, circuitry, interfaces, and/or code to manage assignment [or selection]…of tasks related to a service request for a vehicle (vehicle 106). For example, at ¶ [0033] 1st sentence electronic device 102 determine an operation to recharge battery unit of vehicle 106. ¶ [0052] 2nd sentence noting a different example where electronic device 102 determine current SOC [state of charge] is less than a defined threshold level and controls selection of the charging service request
However, in an abundance of caution, the Examiner submits, in the arguendo, without conceding, that even a claim interpretation where the expression “according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location” would also pertain to “select one of the charging service” would still be taught or suggested by Anand as follows: “the controller is further configured to automatically select one of the charging service” (Anand ¶ [0021] 1st sentence: electronic device 102 [or controller] include logic, circuitry, interfaces, and/or code to manage assignment [or selection] … of tasks related to a service request for a vehicle (such as vehicle 106. For example, at ¶ [0033] 1st sentence electronic device 102 determine an operation to recharge battery unit of the vehicle 106. For example, at ¶ [0052] 2nd sentence electronic device 102 determine current SOC [state of charge] is less than a defined threshold level and controls selection of the charging service request. Most importantly per ¶ [0061] 1st-2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. charging mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example, at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to third location from present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. Other examples at ¶ [0062]) “or the battery replacement service”; (Anand ¶ [0021] 1st sentence: electronic device 102 [or controller] include suitable logic, circuitry, interfaces, and/or code to manage assignment [or selection] and fulfilment of tasks related to a service request for a vehicle (such as the vehicle 106). For example, at ¶ [0055] 2nd sentence electronic device 102 determine that a primary task includes an operation to replace first component of vehicle 106 and an operation to procure a second component as a replacement. ¶ [0056] 1st sentence: the first component to be replaced may be a discharged battery unit of vehicle 106 and the second component to replace the first component may be a fully or partially charged battery unit. Most importantly per ¶ [0061] 1st–2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. battery replacement mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the third location from the present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. Other examples, at ¶ [0062]) “according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location” (Anand ¶ [0061] 1st–2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. charging or battery replacement mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the third location from the present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. Other examples at ¶ [0062]).
Thus, the prior art teaches or at least suggests the amended and contested limitation.
Accordingly, the Prior art argument #2 is found unpersuasive.
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III. Response to Applicant’s rebuttal arguments on 35 USC 101 rejection.
A. The Claims Are Not "Directed to" Judicial Exception
SME Argument #1: Remarks 10/23/2025 p.14 last ¶-p.15 ¶1, p.15 ¶4 argues the claims
recite tangible devices and specific operations to solve a technical problem in mobility as service industry, such as vehicle charging/battery replacement for users. In particular, Applicant argues that the amended independent claims recite tangible devices (e.g. camera or a sensor, a vehicle, a battery installed in a user vehicle, mobile device, etc.) and specific operations (e.g. turning off the camera, charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery, transmitting instruction data to a mobile device of the service staff, etc.) performed in a specific order to solve technical problems. Also Remarks 10/23/2025 p.15 last ¶-p.16 ¶1 argue that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because they do not monopolize or "preempt" any abstract idea. Further, Remarks 10/23/2025 p.16 ¶4 argues that the operations in amended independent claims (charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery, transmitting instruction data to a mobile device, etc.) have nothing to do methods of organizing human activities and cannot be performed by people in their minds. Finally, Remarks 10/23/2025 p.17 ¶1 argues that the Office fails to point to specific claim limitation(s) that recites (sets forth or describes) the judicial exception [and] explain why those claim limitations set forth or describe a judicial exception.
Examiner considered the SME#1 argument but respectfully disagrees fining it unpersuasive.
Examiner starts from Applicant’s admission at Remarks 10/23/2025 p.14 last ¶ to p.15 ¶ that the claims seek to solve a problem in mobility as a service industry. Also as later admitted by Applicant at Remarks 10/23/2025 p.20 ¶7 and corroborated by Original Specification ¶ [0005]-¶ [0006]: “In a service to charge vehicles on behalf of users, the users are likely to feel uneasy about having other people enter the vehicles. It would be helpful to improve the sense of security in agent-type services such as a service to charge vehicles on behalf of users”. [bolded emphasis added]. Also, Original Specification ¶ [0024] “According to the present embodiment, the user can be notified if the service staff 11 behaves suspiciously or neglects to perform works that should be performed during the provision of the service. Thus, the sense of security in agent-type services is improved”. Based on the Applicant’s own admission, it can be seen that solving an “uneasy”, thus behavioral feeling, of customers, in a “service” oriented business, where workers are contacted and supervised to provide a service, has more to do with the entrepreneurial or abstract organizing of human activities and/or computer-aided mental processes, and nothing to do with an actual improvement in actual technology. At most, such alleged improvement would correspond to an improvement in the abstract exception itself, namely addressing the unease of customers having other users (i.e. agent, valet, contractor, station attendant or any other worker etc.) servicing their vehicle as part of an attempt at improving the organizing of human activities. Yet, MPEP 2106.05(a) II ¶2 is clear that an improvement in the abstract idea is not improvement in actual technology. Similarly, MPEP 2106.04 I cites Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591, 106 USPQ2d at 1979 to stress that even a “groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the §101 inquiry”. Also, the “Myriad” rationale, as cited by MPEP 2106.04 I above, was further corroborated by SAP Am, Inc v InvestPic as also cited by MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) I. C (i). Specifically, in SAP Am Inc v InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 127 U.S.P.Q.2d 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the Federal Circuit clarified that “even if one assumes that the techniques claimed are groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant those features are not enough for eligibility because their innovation is innovation in ineligible subject matter. An advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting”. “no matter how much of an advance in the field the claims [would] recite, the advance [would still] lie entirely in the realm of abstract ideas with no plausibly alleged innovation in non-abstract application realm”. Here too, no matter how much of an advance in the dispatching, monitoring and notification of service workers in the mobility service field, the claims would provide, said advance would still lie entirely in the realm of the abstract organizing human activities [MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II] and/or the observation, evaluation and judgment of computer-aided mental processes [MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C #1,#2,#3] with no plausibly of the Applicant’s alleged innovation entering the non-abstract realm. Based on such case law and MPEP tests, the Examiner submits, in the arguendo, without conceding, that even a groundbreaking, innovative or brilliant system, method and product that allows dispatching, monitoring, and notification of, or about, a mobile worker to provide a service at a vehicle, would similarly not render the claims eligible, no matter if such service is “charging a battery installed in the user vehicle”, akin to refueling, or “replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle”, akin to services performed by a station attendant or worker at a full service gas station, or services performed by contractor or valet at a vehicle valet service business. Said differently, said dispatching, monitoring or detecting, and subsequent notification, would still represent, under MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II A, fundamental practices, with the term fundamental being further explained by MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II A as not used in the sense of necessarily being "old" or "well-known" but rather as building block of modern economy. Here, said “dispatching” and “instruction” of a mobile worker to provide a service at a vehicle and its subsequent best business practice of supervising or monitoring for “omission” of the abstract service or “an act” of “turning off the camera” do constitute such building blocks of modern economy, with the use of “camera or a sensor”, “mobile device”, etc. and the specific instructions of the worker in “turning off the camera, charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery, transmitting instruction data to a mobile device of the service staff” being still associated with the fundamental constituents of dispatching, detecting, and notification, not used in the sense of necessarily being "old" or "well-known", but rather as building blocks of modern economy. At most such “camera or a sensor”, “mobile device” etc. would represent computer-aids [MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C#1,2,3] or additional computer-based elements that would apply the abstract idea [MPEP 2106.05(f)(2)] and/or narrow it to a filed of use or etchnoglical environment [MPEP 2106.05(h)], none of which would render the claims patent eligible. The Examiner’s rationale was also echoed in In re Bilski, where judge Mayer, J. remarked that: “Patents granted in the wake of State Street have ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (method of training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays”. Here, similar to judge Mayer’s remark in In re Bilski, the current independent Claims 1,6,10 and dependent Claims 4,8,12 analogously use “video” to audit how a “service is provided”, with the parent independent Claims 1,6,10 referring to “an act” of turning “off the camera” “or omission of the service staff”, “while the service is provided”, “that is different from” [what is being expected]. This audit practice also bears resemblance to visually monitoring and alerting of a law enforcement on duty to obscure or tamper a body worn surveillance camera. Similar best business practices of monitoring of camera tampering by employees commonly occurs in other industries such as: banking, retail, casino operations etc. Here, detecting the act of “turning off the camera” at independent Claims 1,6,10 constitutes, along with the other aforementioned acts, such a best business practice, as a building block of modern economy tested per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II A ¶2. Additionally or alternatively such monitoring or detecting could be also agued as a computer-aided observation as tested per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C, #1,#2,#3 and MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III ¶2, followed by subsequent evaluation and judgment as also tested per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III ¶2.
With respect to the preemption or monopolizing argument, as raised by Remarks 10/23/2025 p.15 ¶3-p.16 ¶1, the Examiner points to MPEP 2106.04 “Eligibility Step 2: Whether a Claim is Directed to a Judicial Exception I” & “MPEP 2106.07(b) Evaluating Applicant’s Response” and submits that Courts do not use the narrowing argument as stand-alone test for eligibility. This is often referred to as the preemption argument. For example, even though the claims in “Flook” did not wholly preempt mathematical formula, and the claims in “Mayo” were directed to narrow laws that may have limited applications [as argued here at Remarks 10/23/2025 p.15 ¶3-p.16 ¶1], the Supreme Court nonetheless held them ineligible because they failed to amount to significantly more than the recited exceptions (Flook at 589-590; Mayo at 1302 cited at July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility p.8 Section VI, p.11 footnotes 26 to 29). Examiner also submits that the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in rejecting arguments that a lack of total preemption equates with eligibility (buySafe 765 F.3d at 1355; Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. Also “Fairwarning Page IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc. U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit, No. 2015-1985 October 11, 2016, 2016 BL 337879, 120 USPQ2d 1293” citing “Ariosa”. Also “McRO Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit, Nos. 2015-1080-1081,-1082,-1083,-1084,-1086,-1087,-1088,-1089,-1090,-1092,-1093,-1094,-1095,-1096,-1097,-1098,-1099,-1100,-1101, September 13, 2016, 2016 BL 297537, 837 F.3d 1299, 120 USPQ2d 1091” at p.1102 last ¶ 1st sentence, and Synopsys, Inc. v Mentor Graphics Corp, U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit, No 2015-1599, October 17,2016,2016 BL 344522,839 F3d 1138” citing Ariosa.
Instead, the questions of preemption are inherent in the two-part framework from “Alice Corp” and “Mayo” and are resolved by using this framework to distinguish between preemptive claims, and “those that integrate the building blocks into something more. Yet, it is important to note that while a preemptive claim may be ineligible, absence of complete preemption does not guarantee that the claim is eligible. Even arguing that there are other ways to practice not to preempt an abstract idea, does not make the claim “less abstract” and eligible (“OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 115 USPQ2d 1090 at page 1092 2nd to last ¶ citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)” and “Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, 728 F.3dast 1345”), or said differently “the availability of other possible computer-implemented methods […] does not assuage fears of blocking further innovation” (The Money Suite Co. v 21st Century Ins. & Fin. Co. v 21st Century Ins. & Fin again citing OIP Techs, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at *12 N.D. Cal. Sept 11, 2012. Also “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” “Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)”. “OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed Cir. 2015)” further corroborated by “MPEP 2106.05(h)”. Said differently, mere restatement of what was already determined as abstract idea by narrowing or reformulating the abstract idea is not enough to save the claims from ineligibility (“BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, No. 2017-1980, August 15, 2018, 2018 BL 291291, 899 F.3d 1281”, p.1695 citing “SAP Am Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, No. 2017-2081, at*14, Fed. Cir May 15, 2018”). Indeed, limiting or narrowing of the abstract idea does not render the claims any less abstract. For example, MPEP 2106.04 I ¶3 cites Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80, 86-87, 101 USPQ2d at 1968-69, 1971 to state claims directed to "narrow laws that may have limited applications" [were still] held ineligible. Similarly, MPEP 2106.04 I cites “Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90, 198 USPQ at 197” to state that claims that did not "wholly preempt the mathematical formula" held ineligible.
As per Applicant’s criticism at Remarks 10/23/2025 p.16 ¶2 that the Office fails to identify any specific claim element that recites a mathematical algorithm or formula, the Applicant does not appear to have indicated anywhere where the Non-Final Act 10/07/2025 found the claims reciting, describing or setting forth the mathematical algorithm or formula.
As per the Applicant’s criticism at Remarks 10/23/2025 p.17 ¶1 that the Office fails to point to specific claim limitation(s) that recites (sets forth or describes) the judicial exception [and] explain why those claim limitations set forth or describe a judicial exception, the Examiner directs the Applicant to Non-Final Act 10/07/2025 p.3 ¶3-p.6 reincorporated herein that clearly shows
specific claim limitations that recite, describe or set forth the judicial exception along with many explanations of why those claim limitations set forth or describe a judicial exception.
Based on the preponderance of legal evidence demonstrated above, the Examiner submits that the SME Argument #1 is unpersuasive.
SME Argument #2: Remarks 10/23/2025 p.17 ¶3-p.18 argues that since the Office does not argue that the claims recite any other judicial exception and does not identify a tentative abstract idea the claims are therefore eligible under prong one.
Examiner fully considered the SME Argument # 2 but respectfully disagrees reincorporating herein all the findings and rationales at Non-Final Act 10/07/2025 p.3 ¶3-p.6. Thus, the Applicant’s SME Argument # 2 is found unpersuasive.
SME argument #3: Remarks 10/23/2025 p.19 ¶2-p.20 again argues that the above subject matter of amended claim 1 integrates any purported judicial exception into a practical application of improving the sense of security in mobility-as-a-service industry through the recited operations citing Original Specification ¶ [0008], ¶ [0024].
Examiner fully considered the SME argument # 3 but respectfully disagrees reincorporating herein all the findings and rationales at SME argument #1 reincorporated herein.
In summary the alleged improvement in mobility-as-a-service industry would at most represent an improvement in the abstract exception itself but not an improvement in actual technology. For example, as corroborated by the current Original Specification ¶ [0024], as cited by Remarks 10/23/2025 mid-p.20, the user can be notified if service staff 11 behaves suspiciously or neglects to perform works that should be performed during the provision of the service. Thus, the alleged improvement would at best be entrepreneurial and abstract in supervising employees as opposed to an actual improvement in actual technology technological. Based on the preponderance of legal and factual evidence above, it is clear that the alleged improvement remains integral to the abstract exception identified above, and, as such, cannot integrate said abstract exception into a practical appclaition. Thus, the SME argument #3 is unpersuasive.
B. The Claims Amount to "Significantly More" than Any Abstract Idea
Remarks 10/23/2025 p.21 ¶3 argues that claim 1 provides a notification apparatus that performs specific operations that are not well-understood, routine, or conventional.
Examiner fully considered the Applicant’s argument B but respectfully disagrees, because as identified above the claims still recite, describe or set forth the abstract exception, with the recited level of automation possibly representing computer-aids to said abstract exception (MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C#1,#2,#3), or at most, representing additional, computer-based elements invoked as tools or machinery to apply the abstract exception [MPEP 2106.05(f)] and/or representing additional computer-based elements that narrows the abstract exception to a field of use or technological environment [MPEP 2106.05(h)] related to the vehicle, none of which provide significantly more than what was already identified as the abstract exception.
For example, with respect to “using a camera or a sensor” for “detecting”, “an act or omission of the service staff against the user vehicle” at independent Claims 1,6,10, the Examiner points to MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) iii which states that a process for monitoring audit log data executed on a computer represents a mere invocation of computers or machinery as a tool to perform an existing process, which does not provide significantly more according to MPEP 2106.05(f).
Similarly, with respect to the recitation of “via the communication interface” “transmit instruction data to a mobile device of the service staff, the instruction data instructing the service staff to be dispatched to the parking location and provide the selected one of the charging service or the battery replacement service”, the Examiner points to MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) v which states that requiring use of software to tailor information and provide it to the user on a generic computer also represents a mere invocation of computers or machinery as a tool to perform an existing process, which again does not provide significantly more when tested per MPEP 2106.05(f).
As per recitation of “the controller is further configured to: automatically select one of the charging service or the battery replacement service according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location”, it appears that here “the controller” performs what would otherwise be location-aware supervising functions of a manger in cognitively or manually choosing and dispatching field workers according to their proximity to the worksite or parking location. Yet, as stated by MPEP 2106.05(a) I, the automation or acceleration of manual processes, does not represent a technological improvement but rather, as tested per MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) iii., represent attempts to apply the abstract exception which, does not render the claims less abstract and eligible. Therefore, the Applicant’s argument B is found unpersuasive.
In conclusion, Examiner finds that even as amended, the claims still recite, describe or set forth the abstract idea, with their additional, computer-based elements merely applying the abstract idea and/or narrowing it to a field of use or technological environment, thus not integrating it into a practical application or providing significantly more. Thus, the claims are ineligible.
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Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 2,7,11,14-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claims 2,7,11 recite “wherein the act” [singular grammatically] includes opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle, sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle, looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle, or opening a trunk of the user vehicle”.
Yet, independent Claims 1,6,10 have been already amended to recite “the act includes turning off the camera” and the Specification does not provide support for the newly added matter of “an” [single] “act” that comprises both “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle, sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle, looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle, or opening a trunk of the user vehicle” and “turning off the camera” at dependent Claims 2,7,11 that include the subject matter and further narrow parent Claims 1,6,10.
Claims 14-17 are dependent and rejected based on rejected parent dependent Claim 12.
Clarification and/or correction is/are required.
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Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(B) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 2,7,11,14-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
Claims 2,7,11 recite “wherein the act” [singular grammatically] includes opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle, sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle, looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle, or opening a trunk of the user vehicle”.
Yet, independent Claims 1,6,10 have been already amended to recite “the act includes turning off the camera” thus rendering Claims 2,7,11 vague and indefinite because it is unclear how a single “act” comprises both “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle, sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle, looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle, or opening a trunk of the user vehicle” and “turning off the camera” at dependent Claims 2,7,11 that include the subject matter and further narrow parent Claims 1,6,10.
Claims 14-17 are dependent and rejected based on rejected parent dependent Claim 12.
Clarification and/or correction is/are required.
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Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1,2,4,6-8,10-12,14-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea, here abstract idea) without significantly more. The claim(s) recite(s) set forth or describe1 the abstract “instructing the service staff to be dispatched to the parking location and provide” a fundamental or commercial service such as “charging service or the battery replacement service” (independent Claims 1,6,10) akin to services performed by an attendant or worker at a full service gas station, or agent, contractor or valet at a vehicle valet service business. Such “service” “request” represents a “dispatch” [of] “a service staff to a parking location in which a user vehicle used by the user is parked, cause the dispatched service staff to move the user vehicle to another location, and supply an energy source to the user vehicle” as recited at each of independent Claims 1,6,10, in a manner not meaningfully different than optimizing visits by a business representative to a client which is listed as abstract by MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II B citing In re Maucorps 609 F.2d 481,485, 203 USPQ 812,816 (CCPA 1979). Such dispatch, move or visit by the “service staff” as recited at each of independent Claims 1,6,10 refers to a “service” [that] “includes a charging service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, or a battery replacement service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery” as example of fundamental or commercial services exemplified by independent Claims 1,6,10.
Further, dependent Claims 18-20 corroborate such commercial or fundamental economic character by includ[ing] behavioral or desirable “information regarding details of the parking location and data indicating a desired dispatch time and a desired return time, the desired dispatch time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff picks up the user vehicle, and the desired return time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff returns the user vehicle after charging or replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle”.
Next, the claims also recite, set forth or describe the abstract best business practice of “detecting” or auditing an “act or omission” of a dispatch[ed] “a service staff”, associated with a “service” “request[ed] by “a user” recited at each of independent Claims 1,6,10, and narrowed at each of their respective Claims 2,4,14-17, Claims 7,8 and Claims 11,12.
Examiner also points to MPEP 2106.07(a) III citing, among others, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951, 88 USPQ2d 1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010) to submit that identifying whether an exception such as an abstract idea is being claimed remains a question of law. For example, In re Bilski, judge Mayer, J. remarked that: “Patents granted in the wake of State Street have ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (method of training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays”. Here, similar to judge Mayer’s remark in In re Bilski,
the current dependent Claims 4,8,12 analogously use “video” to audit how a “service is provided”, with the parent independent Claims 1,6,10 referring to “an act or omission of the service staff”, “while the service is provided”, “that is different from” [what is being excepted].
Also here, the two parties of service staff and service request[ing] “user of the vehicle” clearly participate in commercial services which are deemed as abstract sub-grouping within the main grouping of Certain Methods of Organizing Human activities [MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II]. This finding is important because per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II B last ¶, section i citation of Dealertrack v. Huber 674 F.3d 1315,1331,101 USPQ2d 1325,1339 (Fed Cir. 2012) and its similar reliance on Alice, the processing of information [akin here to processing of “service” “request” ] where the processed information relates to a relationship between multiple parties [akin here to “service staff”, “user of the vehicle”] does recite, describe or set forth the abstract certain methods of organizing human activities grouping. Here, just because the claims narrow the “service” “request” to “supply an energy source to the user vehicle” and “charging service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, or a battery replacement service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery” at independent Claims 1,6,10 does not necessarily preclude the claims from reciting, describing to setting forth the abstract idea, because the claims still refer to fundamental economic or commercial concepts of supply or replacement service, and because,
as instructed by MPEP 2106.04 I ¶5: The Supreme Court’s decisions ma[de] it clear that judicial exceptions need not be old or long-prevalent, and that even newly discovered or novel judicial exceptions are still exceptions. Thus here, the Examiner submits in the arguendo, that any alleged improvement to the mobile service as read in light of Original Specification ¶ [0002] ¶ [0016], and reflected in independent Claims 1,6,10 as “dispatched service staff to move the user vehicle to another location, and supply an energy source to the user vehicle” would at most represent a newly discovered improvement in the abstract exception, which as tested per MPEP 2106.04 I ¶5 would not preclude the claims from reciting, describing to setting forth the abstract idea.
In fact, MPEP 2106.04 I stresses that even a “groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the 101 inquiry” citing Myriad,569 U.S at 591, 106 USPQ2d at 1979. The “Myriad” rationale was corroborated by “SAP Am Inc v InvestPic” which is also cited by MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) I.C(i). Digging deeper into the Court’s rationale in SAP supra, the Examiner finds that the Court ruled that, “even if one assumes that the techniques claimed are groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant those features are not enough for eligibility because their innovation is innovation in ineligible subject matter. An advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting”. That is, “no matter how much of an advance in the field the claims” [would] “recite the advance” [would still] “lie entirely in the realm of abstract ideas” with no plausibly alleged innovation in non-abstract application realm. Here, as in the rationale of SAP Am Inc v. InvestPic, LLC 890 F.3d 1016,126 USPQ.2d 1638 (Fed. Cir. 2018), no matter how much improvement or advance to the service the claims would provide, said advance in the service would still lie entirely within the abstract realm of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities, with no plausibly of the alleged innovation entering the non-abstract realm. The “SAP” findings were corroborated by Versata Dev Grp Inc v SAP Am, Inc 115 USPQ2d 1681 Fed Cir 2015 again undelaying the difference between improvement to entrepreneurial goal objective and actual improvement to actual technology. MPEP 2106.04. Examiner also stresses that building blocks of the modern economy remain ineligible, with the term “fundamental” not used in the sense of necessarily being "old" or "well-known" citing a OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364, 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1090, 1092 (Fed Cir. 2015) from MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II A ¶2. Thus here, any alleged
improvement or advance to the service would remain entrepreneurial, abstract and thus ineligible even if it would not be old or well-known.
Here, the Examiner follows the MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) II A ¶2 test and submits that no matter its field in which it is being use, such fundamental economic practices or principles of “service” “request” to supply of a commodity, audited or detect[ed] for “omission” or “an act” “of the service staff” “that is different from boarding the user vehicle in order to drive the user vehicle” are abstract as recited at independent Claims 1,6,10, with the “act” exemplified to include “turning off the camera” (independent Claims 1,6,10), “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle”(dependent Claims 2,7,11,14), “sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,15), “looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,16), or “opening a trunk of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,17”, as apparent improper or risky behaviors or business practices, representative of behaviors and/or activities associated with building blocks of modern economy2. Additionally or alternatively to their fundamental or commercial character, their detect[ion] can also be argued as a form of computer-aided observation of cognitive capabilities of a supervisor or observer which according to MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III ¶2 and MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C #3,#1 and/or #2 would represent a tool, generic computer and/or computer environment equivalent to the “controller” of Claims 1,4, and the “processor” of Claims 6,10, which, as tested per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III #3,#1, and/or #2 would not preclude the claims from reciting, describing or setting forth the abstract exception. The same tool, generic computer and/or computer environment test of the computer aided mental processes of MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III C #3,#1 and/or #2 applies to notification of observations or display of certain results3 of collection and analysis [MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) III A, 5th bullet point] which are set forth there by recitation of “upon receiving demand data demanding to view a video of an inside of or an area around the user vehicle that is captured while the service is provided from the terminal apparatus via the communication interface, transmit the video to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface” at dependent Claim 4. Similarly, the use of “communication interface” to allow communicat[ion] of the service request from “a user” to “to” [a] dispatch[ed] “service staff” [informed] or cause[d] “to move the user vehicle to another location, and supply an energy source to the user vehicle” at independent Claim 1, does not preclude the claims from reciting, describing or setting forth the abstract idea because, per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) ¶6, even considering interactions between multiple entities [akin here to requesting user and “service staff”] and requiring that said interactions between such entities be done with respective computer [“terminal apparatus” at Claims 1,4,6,8,10,12, “communication interface to communicate with a terminal apparatus used by a user” at Claims 1,4) do not preclude the claims from reciting, describing or setting forth the abstract idea. Examiner follows the same MPEP 2106.04 I ¶5 guidelines to reason that no matter of its computerized implementation, the claims’ character as a whole remains undeniably abstract as represented by commercial and/or fundamental economic practices or principles of “service” “request” to supply a commodity, audited or detect[ed] for “omission” or “act” “of the service staff” “that is different from boarding the user vehicle in order to drive the user vehicle” as recited at independent Claims 1,6,10, with such auditing further exemplified to include[.] “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,14), “sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,15), “looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,16), or “opening a trunk of the user vehicle” (dependent Claims 2,7,11,17), observed by commuter-aids, as apparent risky or improper behaviors or business practices, associated with business practices or building blocks of the modern economy4.
Next, in an abundance of caution, the computerized implementation, as identified above as relating to “service” “request”, will be more granularly investigated at the subsequent steps.
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This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because per Step 2A prong two, any asserted individual or combination of additional, computer-based elements would at most merely apply the above abstract exception and/or narrow it to a field of use or technological environment. Examiner first notes that “communication interface” and “controller” of Claims 1,4, and similarly the “processor” of Claims 6,19, and “terminal apparatus” of Claims 1,4,6, 8,10,12, “camera or sensor” and “mobile device” of Claims 1,6,10 can be argued as computer aids as part of the abstract exception identified above.
Yet, even if now considered as additional computer-based elements, they would still merely apply the abstract processes identified above, which as tested per MPEP 2106.05(f) ¶15 do not render the abstract exception less abstract and eligible. Also, according to MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) ¶1, even claiming an alleged improved speed or an efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application6.
It then follows that here any alleged benefit that the abstract auditing of omission or act of the “service staff” would provide, it would be the result of applying the above abstract idea on a “communication interface”, “controller” (Claims 1,4), “processor” of (Claims 6,19), and “terminal apparatus” (Claims 1,4,6, 8,10,12), “camera or sensor” (Claims 1,6,10) that would not integrate said abstract exception into a practical application. For example MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) ¶1 states that use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (to receive, store, or transmit data) does not integrate the abstract exception into a practical application, with MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) ¶1 exemplifying the combination of a computer server and telephone unit in TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) representing such an example of applying the abstract idea. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to …operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information
[akin here to using a camera or a sensor for detecting an act or omission] from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Also here, pertinent to the examples of MPEP 2106.05(f), the currently recited “processor” (independent Claims 6,10) / “controller” (independent Claim 1) “configured to, upon detecting, using a camera or a sensor an act or omission of the service staff against the user vehicle, while the service is provided, that is different from boarding the user vehicle in order to drive the user vehicle, transmit notification data notifying the user of the detected act or omission to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface” (independent Claims 1,6,10) represent a form of monitoring (akin here to detecting) audit log data (akin here to act or omission) executed on a general-purpose computer, as tested per MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) iii7, and requiring use of software [akin here to “communication interface”] to tailor information [here service request and associated notification as well as “data instructing the service staff to be dispatched to the parking location and provide the selected one of the charging service or the battery replacement service”] and provide it to user on a generic computer [akin here to “terminal device”] as tested per MPEP 2106.05(f)(2)v8]. This is corroborated by the fact that MPEP 2106.05(f)(2)(i) clearly states that applying a business process idea, on computer9 and using a computer to perform economic tasks and other tasks to transmit / receive data10 [as identified above] does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
As per, the recitations of “wherein the service includes a charging service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by charging a battery installed in the user vehicle, or a battery replacement service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery” at independent Claims 1,6,10, and use of “video” at dependent Claims 4,8,12 in said service auditing or detecting, could be argued as attempts at narrowing the abstract exception to a field of use or etchnoglical environment which, as tested per MPEP 2106.05(h), would also not integrate the abstract exception into a practical application. For example, MPEP 2106.05(h)(vi)11 finds that limiting to a field of use or technological environment the combination of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, does not integrate the abstract exception into a practical application.
As per recitation of “the controller is further configured to: automatically select one of the charging service or the battery replacement service according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location”, at independent Claims 1,6,10, it appears that “the controller” performs what would otherwise be location-aware supervising functions of a manger in manually choosing and dispatching field workers according to their proximity to the worksite or parking location. Yet, as stated by MPEP 2106.05(a) I, the automation or acceleration of manual processes, does not represent a technological improvement but rather, as tested per MPEP 2106.05(f)(2) iii., an attempt to apply the abstract exception which, which does not render the claims less abstract and eligible.
Thus, the Examiner has provided a preponderance of legal evidence to show that the level of computerization as identified above, even when more granularly tested at step 2A prong two of the analysis fails to integrate the aforementioned abstract exception into a practical application.
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The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because per above, the additional computer-based elements merely apply the already recited abstract idea and link use of abstract idea to a field of use or technological environment. see MPEP 2106.05(f) and/or (h). Specifically, Examiner follows the guidelines of MPEP 2106.05(d) II 2nd bullet point and caries over the analysis and conclusions reached on the MPEP 2106.05(f), and/or (h) tests to Step 2B, and submits that for the same reasons as articulated above, said computer-based additional elements also do not provide significantly when considering MPEP 2106.05(f) and/or (h) as sufficient option(s) of evidence, without the need to rely on the well-understood, routine and conventional test. Yet assuming arguendo, further evidence would be required to demonstrate conventionality of the additional, computer-based elements, the Examiner would further rely on MPEP 2106.05(d) guidelines to demonstrate that said additional elements are also well-understood, routine, conventional. In such case, Examiner would rely as evidence on Applicant’s own Specification:
- Original Specification ¶ [0025] 7th-11th sentences reciting at high level of generality: “The suspicious behavior and work negligence are both detected using in-vehicle cameras, such as interior cameras, surround view cameras, or driving recorders, or in-vehicle sensors, such as open/close sensors or load sensors. In-vehicle cameras may normally be used to detect a driver falling asleep or looking away, and may be used to detect the suspicious behavior or the work negligence only when the charging service is in use. Instead of an in-vehicle camera, a camera on a mobile device held by the worker may be used. In such cases, the camera being off may also be detected as suspicious behavior. A partition may be provided in the car that allows the workers only access to the driver seat”.
- Original Specification ¶ [0031] 1st-2nd sentences: “The controller 21 includes at least one processor, at least one programmable circuit, at least one dedicated circuit, or any combination thereof. The processor is a general purpose processor such as a CPU or a GPU, or a dedicated processor that is dedicated to specific processing”. Similarly, ¶ [0040] 1st-2nd sentences.
- Original Specification ¶ [0033] reciting at high level: “communication interface 23 includes at least one communication module. The communication module is, for example, a module compatible with a wired LAN communication standard such as Ethernet® (Ethernet is a registered trademark in Japan, other countries, or both) or a wireless LAN communication standard such as IEEE802.11. The name "IEEE" is an abbreviation of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The communication interface 23 communicates with the terminal apparatus 30. The communication interface 23 also communicates with the mobile device held by the service staff 11. The communication interface 23 receives data to be used for the operations of the server apparatus 20, and transmits data obtained by the operations of the server apparatus 20”.
- Original Specification ¶ [0039] recting at high level of generality: “The terminal apparatus 30 includes a controller 31, a memory 32, a communication interface 33, an input interface 34, an output interface 35, and a positioner 36”.
In conclusion, Claims 1,2,4,6-8,10-12 and 14-20 although directed to statutory categories (“apparatus” or machine at Claims 1,2,4,14-18), process or “method” at independent Claims 6-8, 19 and “non-transitory medium” or article of manufacture at Claims 10-12,20), they still recite or set forth the abstract idea (Step 2A prong one), with their additional, computer-based elements not integrating the abstract idea into a practical application (Step 2A prong two) or providing significantly more than the abstract idea itself (Step 2B).
Thus, the Claims 1,2,4,6-8,10-12, and 14-20 are patent ineligible.
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Rejections under 35 § U.S.C. 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1,6,10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over:
Anand et al, US 20230394389 A1, by Honda Ltd, hereinafter Anand in view of
Christensen et al, US 8836489 B2, General Motors LLC hereinafter Christensen.
Claims 1,6,10 Anand teaches or suggests: “A notification apparatus comprising: / A method, by a processor of a notification apparatus, for improving travel mobility as a service (MaaS), comprising / A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a program causing a processor of a notification apparatus to perform operations, the operations comprising a communication interface configured to” (Anand ¶ [0027], ¶ [0031], ¶ [0043], ¶ [0046])
- “communicate with a terminal apparatus used by a user and configured to request” / “receiving from a terminal apparatus used by a user request data requesting” / “a service to dispatch a service staff to a parking location in which a user vehicle used by the user is parked, cause the dispatched service staff to move the user vehicle to another location, and supply an energy source to the user vehicle at the another location”; (Anand ¶ [0021] 2nd sentence: service request initiated by electronic device 102 or by user device 104. ¶ [0029] 1st-2nd sentences: Each worker device of worker devices 108 include logic, circuitry, and interfaces configured to receive task alerts associated with the primary task of the service request from the electronic device 102. For example, first worker device 108A receive a task alert that specifies a task to move the vehicle 106 from an initial location or first location (current location of the vehicle 106) to a second location where the primary task of the service request is executable. ¶ [0033] electronic device 102 may determine an operation to recharge battery unit of vehicle 106, as indicated in the service request. The electronic device 102 may also determine a location of a charging station where the battery unit of the vehicle 106 may be charged. The location of the charging station may be referred to as the first location. The determination of the first location may be based on an initial location of the vehicle 106 or a distance between the initial location of the vehicle 106 and the first location. Details pertaining to the determination of the location are further provided, for example, in Fig.4.
Anand ¶ [0034] Along with primary task, the electronic device 102 determine a secondary task that includes operations to be performed for fulfillment of the service request. For example, vehicle 106 may be in a second location (e.g. initial location of vehicle 106) which is different from first location (i.e., a location where the primary task is executable). the vehicle 106 may be parked at a garage of user 114 at second location. The battery charging operation (i.e., primary task) may have to be performed at a charging station (located at first location). The secondary task may include an operation to move vehicle 106 to the determined first location from the second location, and operation to return the vehicle to second location (garage of user 114) once the battery unit of the vehicle 106 is fully charged or is charged up to a level set by the user of the vehicle 106.
Anand ¶ [0036] The electronic device 102 may assign first worker 116A, from the identified pool of workers, to move vehicle 106 from initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 to the determined location (i.e. first location) for execution of the primary task. the first worker 116A may be identified based on the location of first worker 116A, the first location, the second location, and/or availability for a job or a task. Details pertaining to the assignment of first worker 116A to move the vehicle 106 are provided in Fig.4. ¶ [0037] The electronic device 102 may further assign second worker 116B from the identified pool of workers to execute the primary task while vehicle 106 is at determined location (i.e. first location). In accordance with an embodiment, prior to the assignment of the second worker 116B to execute the primary task, the second worker 116B may be identified based on a location of the second worker 116B. Once the second worker 116B is identified, the electronic device 102 may assign the second worker 116B to execute the primary task. For example, the electronic device 102 may assign the second worker 116B to execute the primary task of charging the battery unit of the vehicle 106 while the vehicle 106 is at the first location. Details pertaining to the assignment of the second worker 116B to execute the primary task are further provided, for example, in Fig.4. ¶ [0017] 6th-8th sentences: The worker may go to a location to find the vehicle that the owner has requested to be charged. The worker may pick up the vehicle from the location and may drive the vehicle to a charging location. In each step of the way, the owner may be able to track the progress of the work through a user interface)
- “
- “the service includes a charging service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by charging a battery installed in the user vehicle” (Anand ¶ [0017] 3rd sentence: digital platform allocate workers related to Electric Vehicle, which per ¶ [0001] 2nd sentence: provide services of vehicle charging. ¶ [0079] 1st sentence, ¶ [0081] 2nd sentence: The service request may indicate a request to charge the battery unit of the vehicle 502. ¶ [0084] 4th sentence: the primary task may include the operations to connect the electric vehicle charger 506 to the charging unit 508 of the vehicle 502 and disconnect the electric vehicle charger 506 from the charging unit 508 of the vehicle 502), “and a battery replacement service to supply the energy source to the user vehicle by replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle with another battery” (Anand ¶ [0017] 3rd sentence: digital platform allocate workers related to Electric Vehicle, which per ¶ [0001] 2nd sentence: provide services of battery replacement. ¶ [0074] 5th sentence, ¶ [0090] 2nd,4th sentences, ¶ [0093] 3rd-4th sentences: primary task include operation to replace the discharged battery unit of vehicle 602. The service request status 618 indicate that the discharged battery unit has been replaced (for example, Vehicle Battery Replaced) via removal of the discharged battery unit and insertion of a fully charged battery unit obtained from the battery rack 606.), and
“the controller is further configured to”:
- “automatically select one of the charging service” (Anand ¶ [0021] 1st sentence: electronic device 102 [or controller] include logic, circuitry, interfaces, and/or code to manage assignment [or selection] … of tasks related to a service request for a vehicle (such as vehicle 106. For example, at ¶ [0033] 1st sentence electronic device 102 determine an operation to recharge battery unit of the vehicle 106. For example, at ¶ [0052] 2nd sentence electronic device 102 determine current SOC [state of charge] is less than a defined threshold level and controls selection of the charging service request. ¶ [0061] 1st-2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. charging mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to third location from present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. Other examples at ¶ [0062]) “or the battery replacement service”; (Anand ¶ [0021] 1st sentence: electronic device 102 [or controller] include suitable logic, circuitry, interfaces, and/or code to manage assignment [or selection] and fulfilment of tasks related to a service request for a vehicle (such as the vehicle 106). For example, at ¶ [0055] 2nd sentence electronic device 102 determine that a primary task includes an operation to replace first component of vehicle 106 and an operation to procure a second component as a replacement. ¶ [0056] 1st sentence: the first component to be replaced may be a discharged battery unit of vehicle 106 and the second component to replace the first component may be a fully or partially charged battery unit. ¶ [0061] 1st–2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. battery replacement mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the third location from the present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. Other examples at ¶ [0062]) “according to a positional relationship between the service staff and the parking location” (Anand ¶ [0061] 1st–2nd sentences: Throughout a duration of the fulfilment of service request [i.e. charging or battery replacement mapped above], availability and location of workers may change with time. Therefore, electronic device 102 may update the pool of workers dynamically within the duration of the fulfilment of the service request, based on the availability of workers in locations that are within a defined distance from the initial location (i.e. second location) of the vehicle 106 or the determined location (i.e., first location) for the primary task. For example at ¶ [0059] 5th sentence: The selection of the store within the threshold distance may minimize at least one of: time required for a worker to reach the third location from a present location of the worker, a time required for the worker to reach the first location from the third location, a charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the third location from the present location, and charge/fuel required for the worker to travel to the first location from the third location. For other examples see ¶ [0062])
- “transmit instruction data via the communication interface to a mobile device of the service staff, the instruction data instructing the service staff to be dispatched to the parking location and provide the selected one of the charging service or the battery replacement service
(Anand ¶ [0030] 1st sentence: communication network 110 through which electronic device102, user device 104, vehicle106, worker devices 108, communicate with each other. For example, at ¶ [0029] 2nd sentence: worker device 108A receive a task alert that specifies a task to move vehicle 106 from initial or first location (current location of vehicle 106) to second location where the primary task of service request is executable. Similarly, ¶ [0068] 4th sentence noting another example of a task alert transmitted to worker device 108C specify an operation to procure the second component as a replacement of the first product. ¶ [0022] 5th sentence: Examples of user devices include a smartphone, a cellular phone, a mobile phone)
* However *
Anand does not teach “a controller configured to”
- “upon detecting, using a camera or a sensor, an act or omission of the service staff against the user vehicle, while the service is provided, that is different from boarding the user vehicle in order to drive the user vehicle, transmit notification data notifying the user of the detected act or omission to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface wherein the act includes turning off the camera”
* Nevertheless *
Christensen in analogous vehicle monitoring teaches/suggest “a controller configured to”,
- “upon detecting, using a camera or a sensor, an act or omission of the service staff against the user vehicle, while the service is provided, that is different from boarding the user vehicle in order to drive the user vehicle” (Christensen Fig.1 element 30, column 8 lines 10-18: at step 240, a change in resting angle is detected based on the monitoring. When the comparison of the resting angle and present angle do not match or deviate more than predetermined amount, telematics unit 30 detect this discrepancy. column 8 lines 37-57: At step 250, a check is made to determine whether the detected change in resting angle is authorized or not. In one embodiment, a time period can be used for this determination. For example, it is helpful to determine that the vehicle 12 is not merely being serviced by a vehicle owner using a garage jack, since such a use would be considered authorized. As a result, the method 200 can include one or more steps to help ensure that the detected change in the resting angle is the result of unauthorized movement [omission of authorized service]. In one example, the telematics unit 30 can set a timer that would measure the amount of time the detected change in the resting angle is present. If the change in the resting angle is still present after the expiration of the timer, then the telematics unit 30 can determine that the vehicle 12 is being moved without authorization. For instance, it can be determined that changing a tire may involve 20 minutes of work. As a result, the timer can be set to expire after 20 minutes have passed. Otherwise, if the vehicle 12 returns to its resting angle or returns to an angle within the threshold described in step 240 before the expiration of the timer, the telematics unit 30 can determine that the vehicle 12 is not being moved), “transmit notification data notifying the user of the detected act or omission to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface” (Christensen column 9 lines 19-35: if the movement is determined to have not been authorized, the method 200 proceeds to step 260 where an alert message is sent based on the determination in step 260. If the telematics unit 30 determines that the vehicle is moving without authorization, the unit 30 can send the alert message to the appropriate recipient(s). For example, the alert message can be sent to the call center 20, the vehicle owner, and/or a public safety access point (PSAP). The alert message can contain a notification that it has detected a change in the vehicle angle and/or that the vehicle has been moved. The alert message can be generated by the telematics unit 30 and sent via the dual antenna 56 over the wireless carrier system 14. The alert message can include vehicle data that represents the present condition of the vehicle, such as the present location of the vehicle 12. In addition, the alert message can direct a call center to monitor the future movement and use of the vehicle 12. The method 200 then ends) “wherein the act includes turning off the camera”.
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have modified Anand’s “apparatus”, “method” and “non-transitory medium” to have included Christensen’s teachings in order to have detected unauthorized use with increased accuracy using resting angler analysis and/or GPS information (Christensen column 6 line 66- column 7 line 27, column 9 lines 7-16 in view of MPEP 2143 G and/or C,D) and to have helped increase the chance of recovery of stolen vehicles and alerting proper authorities of the theft (Christensen column 2 lines 21-23 in view of MPEP 2143 G and/or F) and thus enhancing the sense of security of the owner of the vehicle. The predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one or ordinary skills in the art as evidenced by at least Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48.
Additionally, or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar vehicle servicing and monitoring field of endeavor. In such combination each element would have merely performed same monitoring, analytical and notifying function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements per Anand in view Christensen, the to be combined elements would have fitted together, like puzzle pieces, in logical, complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
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Claims 2,7,11,14,15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over:
Anand / Christensen as applied to claims 1,6,10 above, and in further view of
Lee et al, US 20230294722 A1 by Applicants Hyundai and Kia hereinafter Lee.
Claims 2,7,11 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claims 1,6,10 above.
Anand / Christensen does not explicitly recite: “wherein the act includes”
- “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle”,
- “sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle”,
- “looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle”, “or”
- “opening a trunk of the user vehicle”.
* However *
Lee in analogous vehicle condition notification teaches “wherein the act includes”
- “opening a door other than a door of a driver seat of the user vehicle”,
(Lee ¶ [0096] door opening and closing info may be provided using door sensors. For example, door sensors disposed in driver’s seat door, a passenger seat door, and rear seat doors, respectively, and when opening and closing of these doors may be detected, the door sensors provide door opening and closing info to the valet control unit 300. ¶ [0114] noting a different example where: when a door other than the door of the driver’s seat may be opened, a Blue Link notification may be activated)
- “sitting in a seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle”,
(Lee ¶ [0098] 1st-2nd sentences: sitting sensor info provided using sitting sensors each installed on a corresponding one of seats. For example, the sitting sensors may be disposed in driver’s seat, a passenger seat, rear seats, and when weight may be sensed, the sitting sensors provide sitting sensor info for the weight to valet control unit 300. For example, at ¶ [0137] When an item weight on one seat has reduced and an item weight substantially the same as the item weight on the one seat has increased on another seat, it may be determined that the item has been moved between seats. ¶ [0138] The weight immediately after entering the valet mode, the weight at the end of valet mode, the weight moved between seats, the estimated weight of the vehicle, etc. may be compared to determine whether an item has been stolen. Another example at ¶ [0144] When the driver’s door may be opened and the weight on the driver’s seat has reduced, and then another door may be opened within a predetermined period of time and the weight of the seat corresponding to the other door changes, it may not be determined that a person has entered the vehicle (e.g. when the driver returns to driver seat within a predetermined period of time, it may be determined that the driver has touched the item on the other seat)
- “looking into a rear seat of the user vehicle”, “or”
- “opening a trunk of the user vehicle”.
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have further modified Anand/Christensen apparatus/method/non-transitory medium to have included Lee’s teachings in order to have further enhanced the valet mode of users other than the owner for even more enhanced security (Lee ¶ [0003]-¶ [0005], ¶ [0013], ¶ [0023]-¶ [0027] in view of MPEP 2143 G). The predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one of ordinary skilled in the art as articulated by Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48 in further view of Lee ¶ [0008], ¶ [0041].
Additionally, or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar field of endeavor dealing with the notification of a vehicle condition to which a service is being performed. In such combination each element merely would have performed the same analytical, service related, and notification function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements as evidenced by Anand / Christensen in further view of Lee, the to be combined elements would have fitted together like puzzle pieces in a logical, complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
Claim 14 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claim 2 above.
Anand / Christensen does not explicitly recite: “wherein the act includes opening the door other than the door of the driver seat of the user vehicle” as claimed. However,
Lee in analogous vehicle condition notification teaches /suggests: “wherein the act includes opening the door other than the door of the driver seat of the user vehicle”
(Lee ¶ [0096] door opening and closing info may be provided using door sensors. For example, door sensors disposed in driver’s seat door, a passenger seat door, and rear seat doors, respectively, and when opening and closing of these doors may be detected, the door sensors provide door opening and closing info to the valet control unit 300. ¶ [0114] noting a different example where: when a door other than the door of the driver’s seat may be opened, a Blue Link notification may be activated).
Rationales to have modified/combined Anand / Christensen with/and Lee are above and reincorporated, with dependent claim 14 merely narrowing the act of parent claim 2.
Claim 15 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claim 2 above.
Anand / Christensen does not explicitly recite: “wherein the act includes sitting in the seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle” as claimed. However,
Lee in analogous vehicle condition notification teaches/suggests: “wherein the act includes sitting in the seat other than the driver seat of the user vehicle”
(Lee ¶ [0098] 1st-2nd sentences: sitting sensor info provided using sitting sensors each installed on a corresponding one of seats. For example, the sitting sensors may be disposed in driver’s seat, a passenger seat, rear seats, and when weight may be sensed, the sitting sensors provide sitting sensor info for the weight to valet control unit 300. For example, at ¶ [0137] When an item weight on one seat has reduced and an item weight substantially the same as the item weight on the one seat has increased on another seat, it may be determined that the item has been moved between seats. ¶ [0138] The weight immediately after entering the valet mode, the weight at the end of valet mode, the weight moved between seats, the estimated weight of the vehicle, etc. may be compared to determine whether an item has been stolen. Another example at ¶ [0144] When the driver’s door may be opened and the weight on the driver’s seat has reduced, and then another door may be opened within a predetermined period of time and the weight of the seat corresponding to the other door changes, it may not be determined that a person has entered the vehicle (e.g. when driver returns to driver seat within predetermined period of time, it may be determined that the driver has touched the item on the other seat).
Rationales to have modified/combined Anand / Christensen with/and Lee are above and reincorporated, with dependent claim 15 merely narrowing the act of parent claim 2.
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Claims 4,8,12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over:
Anand / Christensen as applied to claims 1,6,10, in further view of
Qiahe et al, US 20090066488 A1 hereinafter Qiahe. As per,
Claims 4,8,12 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claims 1,6,10 above.
Anand/Christensen does not explicitly recite “the controller is configured to
- “upon receiving demand data demanding to view a video of an inside of or an area around the user vehicle that is captured while the service is provided from the terminal apparatus via the communication interface, transmit the video to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface” as claimed.
* However *
Qiahe in analogous vehicle condition notification to improve security, teaches/suggests:
- “upon receiving demand data demanding to view a video of an inside of or an area around the user vehicle that is captured while the service is provided from the terminal apparatus via the communication interface, transmit the video to the terminal apparatus via the communication interface” (Qiahe ¶ [0052] 5th sentence: from communications submenu 31, or similar submenu, the owner also obtain additional info on the ongoing intrusion, including …photographs and/or video, to the extent wireless transmission of such data is supported by the GSM service provider.
Qiahe ¶ [0016] 2nd-3rd sentences: The system sends a wireless intrusion warning message to the owner, who then call the system and activate cameras to send him/her photographic or video images of vehicle interior and exterior. After remotely viewing these images, the owner can activate responses such as disabling the engine. For example, at ¶ [0053] After obtaining as much info as possible from listening/speaking to the intruder and receiving… photographic and/or video data, the owner could return to main menu 29 from communication menu 31 and next access the vehicle control submenu 33. An exemplary format of the vehicle control submenu 33 is shown as submenu four in Fig.3. ¶ [0056] When A/V sensors 35 and/or GPS sensor 34 are installed in the vehicle 11, base unit 12 optionally transmit photo/video…data to a website maintained by a web server and accessible to towner, provided that wireless network 13 supports such transmissions. This feature will enable the owner to view …photo/video images even if the owner's communication device does not support viewing of such mapping and/or images).
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have further modified Anand / Christensen apparatus/method/non-transitory medium to have included Qiahe’s teachings in order to have more promptly: (a) informed the owner of the specific conditions that have triggered the system, (b) enabled the owner to initiate a variety of anti-theft measures, including voice communication with the thief, in response to the specific conditions reported, (c) integrated with the existing or factory-installed vehicle alarm system and utilizes its sensor apparatus, and/or (d) used a GSM module to enable enhanced reporting features, such as digital photography/video and GPS coordinates data (Qiahe ¶ [0017]-¶ [0024 in view of MPEP 2143 G]). The predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one of ordinary skilled in the art as further articulated by Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48, in further view of Qiahe ¶ [0058].
Additionally or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar field of endeavor dealing with notification of vehicle condition. In such combination each element would have merely performed same analytical, service-based and notification function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements as evidenced by Anand / Christensen in view of Qiahe, the to be combined elements would have fitted together, like pieces of a puzzle in a logical, complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
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Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over
Anand / Christensen as applied to claim 2, in further view of
Glazman et al, US 20210179117 A1 hereinafter Glazman. As per,
Claim 16. Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claim 2 above.
Anand / Christensen does not explicitly recite:
- “wherein the act includes looking into the rear seat of the user vehicle” as claimed.
Glazman however in analogous adjustment of vehicle sub-systems based on monitoring of vehicle occupant(s) teaches or suggests:
- “wherein the act includes looking into the rear seat of the user vehicle”
(Glazman ¶ [0180] At 308, when the driver and/or passenger is identified as prohibited from driving the vehicle and/or not matched to an entry associated with a user allowed to drive the vehicle, an indication of unauthorized attempt at driving the vehicle and/or unauthorized passenger is created. ¶ [0242] At 510, malicious behavior of the driver and/or passenger(s) is identified. The term malicious behavior refers to dangerous behavior and/or illegal behavior and/or abnormal behavior indicative of a problem. ¶ [0245] Exemplary malicious behavior includes:
¶ [0251] Driver turning around during driving to look at the back seat. ¶ [0181] The indication may trigger one or more of: ¶ [0184] A message to a monitoring server (e.g., third party server 116) indicative of an unauthorized attempt at driving the car. For example, a message is transmitted to a security company that then sends a patrol car to investigate possible theft of the vehicle).
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have modified Anand / Christensen “apparatus” to have included Glazman’s teachings to have better mitigated malicious behavior by having provided enhanced safety measures (Glazman ¶ [0013] last two sentences, ¶ [0099] last two sentences in view of MPEP 2143 G), while at the same time having improved in computational efficiency of computational resources that compute the six degrees of freedom for the occupants and/or increased efficiency in use of depth sensors and/or image sensors (Glazman ¶ [0011] 2nd sentence in view of MPEP 2143 G). The predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48, and in further view of Glazman ¶ [0070], ¶ [0071], ¶ [0411]
Additionally and/or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar field of endeavor dealing with monitoring user actions or behavior with respect to a vehicle. In such combination each element merely would have performed same analytical, service-based and notification function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements as evidenced by Anand / Christensen in further view of Glazman, the to be combined elements would have fitted together, like pieces of a puzzle, in a logical complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
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Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over
Anand / Christensen as applied to claim 2 in further view of
Qiahe et al, US 20090066488 A1 hereinafter Qiahe. As per,
Claim 17 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations in claim 2 above.
Anand / Christensen as a combination does not explicitly recite:
- “wherein the act includes opening the trunk of the user vehicle”.
* However*
Qiahe in analogous vehicle condition notification to improve security, teaches/suggests
- “wherein the act includes opening the trunk of the user vehicle”.
(Qiahe ¶ [0004] 4th sentence: the owner, will usually not be close enough to the vehicle to hear the alarm sound. ¶ [0005] 1st sentence: It is desirable to have a vehicle security system that notifies the owner when his/her vehicle is being tampered with. To this end at ¶ [0020] the invention provides a vehicle security system which enables the owner, upon receiving notification of the specific ongoing intrusive activity, to initiate remotely by telephone responsive actions to counteract the intrusion… Specifically per, ¶ [0026] Intrusion sensors include, without limitation, a door sensor, for sensing close-open status of doors and/or lighting of interior dome light in response to door opening; a trunk sensor, for sensing close-open status of trunk; a bonnet sensor, for sensing close-open status of engine bonnet;… a motion sensor, for sensing intrusive movement within or in the vicinity of the vehicle;… a seat sensor, for sensing the weight of an intruder on the driver's seat…photographic and/or video data of the car interior and/or exterior…).
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have further modified Anand / Christensen’s “apparatus” to have included Qiahe’s teachings in order to have more promptly (a) informed the owner of the specific conditions that have triggered the system, (b) enabled the owner to initiate a variety of anti-theft measures, including voice communication with the thief, in response to the specific conditions reported, (c) integrated with the existing or factory-installed vehicle alarm system and utilizes its sensor apparatus, and/or (d) used a GSM module to enable enhanced reporting features, such as digital photography/video and GPS coordinates data (Qiahe ¶ [0017]-¶ [0024 in view of MPEP 2143 G]). The predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one of ordinary skilled in the art as further articulated by Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48, and in further view of Qiahe ¶ [0058].
Additionally, or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar field of endeavor dealing with notification of vehicle condition. In such combination each element would have merely performed same analytical, service-based and notification function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements as evidenced by Anand / Christensen in further view of Qiahe, the to be combined elements would have fitted together, like pieces of a puzzle in a logical, complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
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Claims 18,19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over
Anand / Christensen as applied to claims 1,6,10 in further view of
Tremblay; Martin US 20150149221 A1 hereinafter Tremblay. As per,
Claims 18,19,20 Anand / Christensen teaches all the limitations at claims 1,6,10. Furthermore,
Anand / Christensen does not explicitly recite:
- “wherein the instruction data includes information regarding details of the parking location and data indicating a desired dispatch time and a desired return time, the desired dispatch time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff picks up the user vehicle, and the desired return time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff returns the user vehicle after charging or replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle” as claimed
* However *
Tremblay in analogous vehicle service managing and notification teaches/suggest:
- “wherein the instruction data includes information regarding details of the parking location and data indicating a desired dispatch time and a desired return time, the desired dispatch time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff picks up the user vehicle, and the desired return time corresponding to a desired time when the service staff returns the user vehicle after charging or replacing the battery installed in the user vehicle”
(Tremblay Annotated Fig. 21A from original Fig.21A below and ¶ [0303] 3rd sentence noting: GUI objects are provided allowing the user to enter reservation criteria for an automobile rental, such as city, pickup date/time and return date/time, so at ¶ [0245] 4th sentence: the electric vehicle 100 can be charged by employee 230 who is tasked [or dispatched] with charging of electric vehicles using charge source 110 at predetermined facility 800. This employee 230, who will be referred to as a valet, picks up the electric vehicle 100 at the predetermined facility 800 or at a location remote from the predetermined facility 800 and charges electric vehicle 100 using charge source 110 at predetermined facility 800. ¶ [0247] 1st sentence: charging command 1200 can be output to be communicated to valet 230 over communications network 1310, such as to a communication device 380 associated with the valet 230. ¶ [0250] 1st-2nd sentences: Upon receiving and interpreting the charging command 1200, or upon having been contacted by the customer service representative, the valet 230 can take actions to charge the electric vehicle 100 using the charge source 110 at the predetermined facility 800. In some cases, this may include retrieving the electric vehicle 100 from its current location (e.g., which may be remote from the predetermined facility 800) and moving it to another location that is within the predetermined facility 800 where it can be charged by the charge source 110).
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Tremblay Annotated Fig.21A from original Fig.21A in support of rejection arguments
It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art, before the effective filling date of the claimed invention, to have further modified Anand/Christensen’s apparatus/method/non-transitory medium to have further included Tremblay’s teachings in order to have provided an enhanced service booking system which the ser may connect to (Tremblay ¶ [0298], ¶ [0310]- ¶ [0312] in view of MPEP 2143 G and/or F). Predictability of such modification would have been corroborated by the broad level of skill of one of ordinary skilled in the art as articulated by Anand’s ¶ [0099] in view of Christensen column 9 lines 45-48, in further view of Tremblay ¶ [0081], [0321]-[0322].
Additionally, and/or alternatively, the claimed invention could have also been viewed as a mere combination of old elements in a similar field of endeavor dealing with vehicle service managing and notification. In such combination each element merely would have merely performed the same monitoring, analytical, and notification function as it did separately. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that, given existing technical ability to combine the elements as evidenced by Anand / Christensen in further view of Tremblay, the to be combined elements would have fitted together, like puzzle pieces, in a logical, complementary, technologically feasible and/or economically desirable manner. Thus, it would have been reasoned that the results of the combination would have been predictable (MPEP 2143 A).
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Conclusion
Following art is made of record and considered pertinent to Applicant’s disclosure:
- EP 4502975 A1 ¶ [0040] More sophisticated kinds of fraud are possible. For example, in the kind of fraud known as "skimming", the employee first puts some fuel into the company's vehicle and then fills a canister with fuel for the employee's private use. Similarly, the employee may correctly fill the company's vehicle during the filling operation, but later siphons off some of the fuel out of the tank for the employee's private use. As long as the employee does this with moderation, it may be difficult to discover that the total amount of fuel for which the company paid is less than the amount of fuel used for the company's intended purposes, especially if the employee further over-reports the number of kilometers or miles driven by the company vehicle (a practice known as "mileage creep") to compensate for the fuel that has been paid for by the company but used for other purposes.
- US 20180137441 A1 ¶ [0047] The followings are described with only particular embodiments in the field of electric cars as examples, so that the technical scheme of the application may be described more clearly, whereas the technical scheme of the application may further be applied to other fields, such as valet fueling, valet car washing, valet laundry, etc. The technical scheme of the application for resource allocation may be adopted, as long as it relates to handing over a service object (a direct object of action, such as cars, electric bicycles, clothes, etc.) at an appointed location of an order, and sending this service object to a specific resource for service (such as charging, fueling, laundry, etc.). Moreover, the term “valet charging” refers to a service, in which the valet helps user handle the recharging issue of their electric vehicle.
- US 8854465 B1 column 5 lines 3-10: In the "on" position, the vehicle security surveillance system 1 will monitor all activity inside of the vehicle with at least one camera 10 located in the vehicle's interior to record the contents left behind, snooping, theft, and driving habits of the valet or service attendant. The vehicle security surveillance system 1 will deactivate once the vehicle ignition has been turned off and the valet or service attendant has exited the vehicle's interior and shut the door
- US 20180251122 A1 [0081] Examples of vehicle operations may include… opening or closing a door,…, opening or closing a trunk,
- US 20080165251 A1 ¶ [0033] 1st sentence: Camera 410 is mounted in the trunk of the motor vehicle to obtain images of a person opening the trunk.
- US 10836309 B1 column 9 line 52-column 1 line 2: A local vehicle/driver model 134 can describe a driver 104 and the driver's movements with respect to the vehicle 106 (e.g., a fine model). A local vehicle/driver model 134 can be used to track a driver 104 and a driver's position and/or actions with respect to an interior of the vehicle 106 (e.g., using image data from one or more surveillance cameras 114 monitoring the intersection 108) in which the driver 104 is driving. For example, the local vehicle/driver model 134 can describe one or more positions and/or actions that a driver 104 can have with respect to the vehicle 106 when the driver 104 of the vehicle 106 is attentive (e.g., hands on the steering wheel, eye gaze on the intersection 108). In another example, the local vehicle/driver model 134 can describe one or more positions and/or actions that a driver 104 can have with respect to the vehicle 106 when the driver 104 of the vehicle 106 is distracted (e.g., looking down at a mobile phone, turned around to check back seat, hands off of the steering wheel, etc.)
- US 20240057913 A1 ¶ [0087] 7th sentence: the eye sensor 30 is designed to detect if the driver's head… turned around to observe the passengers on the rear bench seat, or the passenger seated next to them, in which case they are not looking at the field of driving or at an element associated with driving.
- US 20240331410 A1 mid-¶ [0060] If, for example, the classification information of the pose of the driver indicates that the upper part of the body of the driver is turned away from the operating element (e.g., the driver is looking in the direction of the backseats of the vehicle), the driver may possibly not be able to operate the operating element
- US 20140015971 A1 ¶ [0002] 1st-4th sentences: Traditionally in order to monitor a rear view setting, such as the back seat of a car, the driver must continuously turn around to look behind themselves. This involves the driver taking their eyes off the road and not being attentive for some period of time. To this extent, it only takes a split second for a fatality to occur while the driver is not paying attention to the road. Thus, the continuous action of turning around while operating a motor vehicle can serve to be both dangerous to the driver, other passengers in the car, and other vehicles on the road
- US 11292342 B1, claim 14: determining, by the backseat occupancy alert system and based on the direction of gaze of the driver, a failure by the driver to look towards the back seat of the vehicle after turning off the engine of the vehicle
- US 20230278491 A1 ¶ [0031] According to the present invention, the indoor light can be turned on automatically when the driver turns his/her face to look at a front passenger seat or a rear seat. Therefore, the indoor light can be turned on conveniently without a separate process of operating the indoor light.
- US 20180257604 A1 ¶ [0103] the description above relates to a case where the trunk opener switch 31A is pressed by a valet parking staff (unauthorized user) or the like while the authorized user of the vehicle 2 is shopping with the vehicle 2 and the electronic key 10 being left for valet parking in a department store, the operation screen for inquiring whether to open the trunk lid or not is displayed on the smart phone 3 of the authorized user, and the permission command is generated with the authorized user operating the GUI button 3C1 representing “YES”. Since the permission command is a command to permit opening of the trunk lid, the body ECU 31 receiving the permission command opens the trunk lid. ¶ [0109] This case is, for example, a case where the trunk opener switch 31A is pressed by the valet parking staff or the like while the authorized user of the vehicle 2 is shopping with the vehicle 2 and the electronic key 10 being left for valet parking in the department store, the operation screen for inquiring whether to open the trunk lid or not is displayed on the smart phone 3 of the authorized user, and the permission command is generated with the authorized user operating the GUI button 3C2 representing “NO”. In this case, since the specific operation is not permitted, the flow ends
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OCTAVIAN ROTARU whose telephone number is (571)270-7950. The examiner can normally be reached on 571.270.7950 from 9AM to 6PM. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, PATRICIA H MUNSON, can be reached at telephone number (571)270-5396. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from Patent Center. Status information for published applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Patent Center for authorized users only. Should you have questions about access to Patent Center, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) Form at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/uspto-automated- interview-request-air-form.
/Octavian Rotaru/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3624 A
December 12th, 2025
1 MPEP 2106.04(a): “examiners should identify at least one abstract idea grouping, but preferably identify all groupings to the extent possible”.
2 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219-20, 110 USPQ2d 1981-82 (2014)
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
3 Electric Power Group v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1741-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
4 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219-20, 110 USPQ2d 1981-82 (2014)
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
5 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983, 1984
6 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
7 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095, 120 USPQ2d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
8 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370-71, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1642 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
9 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1983 (2014);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 175 USPQ 673, 674 (1972);
Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
10 Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
11 Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
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