DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Applicant’s submission filed on 07/23/2026 has been entered. Claims 1-20 are pending.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-15, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mavureddi Dhanasekaran et al. (US 2024/0276213), hereinafter “Mavureddi”, in view of Rajadurai et al. (WO 2025/136035), hereinafter “Rajadurai”.
Regarding claims 1, 7, Mavureddi teaches:
A user equipment (UE) for wireless communication or a processor for wireless communications, comprising:
at least one memory (see Mavureddi, Fig. 14, par. [0072]: ME 1400 includes a radio interface component 1402, one or more processors 1404, a memory 1406); and
at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the UE (see Mavureddi, Fig. 14, par. [0072]: Processor 1404 may be configured to execute instructions 1440 for software that are loaded into memory 1406) to:
or at least one controller coupled with at least one memory and configured to cause the processor (see Mavureddi, Fig. 14, par. [0072]: Processor 1404 may be configured to execute instructions 1440 for software that are loaded into memory 1406) to:
transmit, to a network function, a registration request message (see Mavureddi, Fig. 3, par. [0043]: UE 106 transmits an N1 message 311 (i.e., an initial Non-Access Stratum (NAS) message) to the serving network 306 (e.g., the AMF 212 of the serving network 306), such as a Registration Request);
receive, from the network function, a registration accept message in plaintext, wherein the registration accept message comprises an authentication token and an access stratum (AS) security command from a satellite (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, and see par. [0051]: The gNB generates the RRC integrity key (KRRCint) and the UP integrity key (KUPint) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS integrity algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The gNB also generates the RRC ciphering key (KRRCenc) and UP ciphering key (KUPenc) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS encryption algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The integrity keys and encryption keys are generally referred to as AS security keys 622. The gNB starts integrity protection for RRC messages. The gNB sends an integrity protected AS Security Mode Command message 614 to UE 106 with the integrity algorithm and ciphering algorithm, and see Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM, and see par. [0050]: UE 106 verifies the NAS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, begins uplink ciphering, downlink deciphering, and integrity protection, and see par. [0052]: UE 106 verifies the AS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, starts the RRC integrity protection and RRC downlink de-ciphering, and see par. [0053]: In FIG. 7A, the NG-RAN 602 is based on a transparent satellite. Thus, NTN satellite 704 implements a transparent payload 722, and NG-RAN 602 includes a base station (referred to as NTN gNB 724 or on-ground NTN gNB 724) that is on-ground; in this case, based on successful authentication (i.e. based on acceptance corresponding to a registration accept message), integrity and encryption algorithms are sent to the UE which receives them, corresponding to an authentication token. Also, AS integrity and encryption information is sent in an AS security mode command, corresponding to the AS security mode command. Based on verifying received messages, the UE starts ciphering and deciphering, meaning that it was not ciphering and deciphering previously, and, therefore, the received message is in plaintext);
determine an authentication result based at least in part on the authentication token (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0046]: The USIM of UE 106 verifies the freshness of the received values by checking whether the authentication token (AUTN) can be accepted. If so, the USIM computes a response (RES), a cipher key (CK), and an integrity key (IK) based on the random challenge (RAND), and returns the response (RES), the CK key, and the IK key to the ME. The ME of UE 106 computes RES* from RES, and calculates the KAUSF key from CKI||IK and the KSEAF key from the KAUSF key; in this case, determining a response based on authentication token corresponds to determining an authentication result);
However, Mavureddi does not teach:
transmit, to the satellite, an AS security mode complete message in response to the AS security command; and
transmit, to the network function, a protected non-access stratum (NAS) request message using an AS security context based at least in part on the AS security command, wherein the protected NAS request message comprises the authentication result and a data packet.
Rajadurai, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
transmit, to the satellite, an AS security mode complete message in response to the AS security command (see Rajadurai, Fig. 7, par. [134]: At step 4b, with the prior knowledge of the indication to perform the NAS SMC, the UE (102) performs the NAS security mode command negotiation and performs the security procedure selection (selects a ciphering procedure 2 and integrity procedure 2, and see par. [146]: At step 5, the UE (102) sends the Authentication response to the AMF and/or the SEAF (104). This message includes the newly calculated RES* to the AMF/SEAF (104) in a NAS message Authentication Response; in this case, based on the indication to perform the security mode command (i.e. in response to the AS security command), security procedure selection is performed and an authentication response is sent (i.e. transmitting an AS security mode complete message)); and
transmit, to the network function, a protected non-access stratum (NAS) request message using an AS security context based at least in part on the AS security command, wherein the protected NAS request message comprises the authentication result and a data packet (see Rajadurai, Fig. 12, pars. [184-185]: Fig. 12 is a sequence diagram that illustrates optimized authentication and NAS procedure when the UE (102) has a NAS security context according to an embodiment as disclosed herein. As shown in the sequence diagram, the UE (102), the SEAF (104), the AUSF (106), and the UDM (108) are in communication with each other. At step 1, upon receiving the Authentication request from the SEAF (104) (in a N1 message), the UE (102) selects an unused SQN/AUTN and corresponding RAND from the stored values. At step 2, the UE (102) derives the RES* from the selected AUTN and RAND, if not derived when storing the received AUTN and RAND. At step 3, the UE (102) derives the MAC-I on the N1 request message, based on the keys derived from the selected AUTN/SQN and RAND and the network indicated integrity procedure. The UE (102) then sends an N1 message request (Periodic/Mobility/PDU session establishment/modification request) to the SEAF. The N1 message request includes the SUCI or 5G-GUTI, RES*, AUTN and/or RAND and/or SQN, NAS MAC-I and other possible parameters; in this case, the UE with a security context transmits an N1 message (i.e. protected non-access stratum request message) with authentication information and other parameters (i.e. data packet). This is done after signaling including security commands, corresponding to based at least in part on the AS security command).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of Mavureddi with the additional transmitting steps of Rajadurai with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of reducing time required for communication in store-and-forward scenarios (see Rajadurai, par. [91]).
Regarding claims 3, 9, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the UE or processor. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE or the controller is configured to cause the processor to:
receive a protected NAS response message from the network function, wherein the protected NAS response message comprises a second authentication token and a second AS security command (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, and see Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM; in this case, the UE receives authentication tokens and security commands from a network function as part of methods, corresponding to the claimed registration accept message);
determine a second authentication result based at least in part on the second authentication token (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0046]: The USIM of UE 106 verifies the freshness of the received values by checking whether the authentication token (AUTN) can be accepted. If so, the USIM computes a response (RES), a cipher key (CK), and an integrity key (IK) based on the random challenge (RAND), and returns the response (RES), the CK key, and the IK key to the ME. The ME of UE 106 computes RES* from RES, and calculates the KAUSF key from CKI||IK and the KSEAF key from the KAUSF key; in this case, determining a response based on authentication token corresponds to determining an authentication result);
Mavureddi does not teach, but Rajadurai teaches:
transmit a second AS security mode complete message in response to the second AS security command (see Rajadurai, Fig. 7, par. [134]: At step 4b, with the prior knowledge of the indication to perform the NAS SMC, the UE (102) performs the NAS security mode command negotiation and performs the security procedure selection (selects a ciphering procedure 2 and integrity procedure 2, and see par. [146]: At step 5, the UE (102) sends the Authentication response to the AMF and/or the SEAF (104). This message includes the newly calculated RES* to the AMF/SEAF (104) in a NAS message Authentication Response; in this case, based on the indication to perform the security mode command (i.e. in response to the AS security command), security procedure selection is performed and an authentication response is sent (i.e. transmitting an AS security mode complete message)).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of Mavureddi with the additional transmitting step of Rajadurai with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of reducing time required for communication in store-and-forward scenarios (see Rajadurai, par. [91]).
Regarding claims 4, 10, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the UE or processor. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the protected NAS response message further comprises an algorithm selection for an integrity algorithm and a ciphering algorithm to protect one or more subsequent NAS messages (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI).
Regarding claim 6, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the UE or processor. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the satellite comprises a store-and-forward satellite (see Mavureddi, par. [0054]: FIG. 8 illustrates different satellite operation modes, which include a “normal/default satellite operation” mode 810 and a “store and forward satellite operation” mode 820), wherein the network function comprises an access and mobility management function (AMF) (see Mavureddi, par. [0040]: The control plane of the 5GC 104 includes an Authentication Server Function (AUSF) 210, an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) 212), and wherein the registration accept message indicates a provisional registration of the UE (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI; in this case, the message with current configuration parameters that are then changed in the future corresponds to a provisional registration).
Regarding claims 11, 19, Mavureddi teaches:
An apparatus comprising an access and mobility management function (AMF), or a method performed by an access and mobility management function (AMF), the apparatus or the method comprising:
at least one memory (see Mavureddi, Fig. 12, par. [0067]: One or more of the subsystems of AMF 212 may be implemented on one or more processors 1230 that execute instructions 1234 (i.e., computer readable code) for software that are loaded into memory 1232); and
at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the AMF (see Mavureddi, Fig. 12, par. [0067]: One or more of the subsystems of AMF 212 may be implemented on one or more processors 1230 that execute instructions 1234 (i.e., computer readable code) for software that are loaded into memory 1232) to:
receive, from a user equipment (UE), a registration request message, wherein the registration request message is received via a link comprising a satellite (see Mavureddi, Fig. 3, par. [0043]: UE 106 transmits an N1 message 311 (i.e., an initial Non-Access Stratum (NAS) message) to the serving network 306 (e.g., the AMF 212 of the serving network 306), such as a Registration Request, and see Fig. 8, par. [0054]: FIG. 8 illustrates different satellite operation modes, which include a “normal/default satellite operation” mode 810 and a “store and forward satellite operation” mode 820. In the normal/default satellite operation mode 810, signaling and data traffic exchange between a UE 106 with satellite access (i.e., direct connectivity) and the remote ground network requires the service link 708 and the feeder link 706 be active simultaneously);
receive, from a network function, an authentication token for the UE (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0045]: AUSF 210 sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message 412 to SEAF 302 that includes the 5G SE AV);
select security algorithms based on security capabilities of the UE and the satellite, the security algorithms comprising an integrity algorithm and a ciphering algorithm (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages, and see Fig. 21, par. [0097]: When the UE 106 supports the store and forward service, AMF 212 may invoke an S&F satellite operation mode 820. To provide encryption protection for the packet 904, AMF 212 ciphers or encrypts the packet 904 using the NAS encryption key 2124 (e.g., KNASenc) to generate a secured packet. To provide integrity protection for the secured packet, AMF 212 generates or derives an NTN MAC (also referred to MAC-ISAT-SN) based on the secured packet and the NAS integrity key 2125 (e.g., KNASint); in this case, algorithms are selected based on UE authentication and satellite operation mode, corresponding to security capabilities of the UE and the satellite);
transmit, to the UE via the satellite, a response message comprising an indication of the security algorithms and a registration accept message in plaintext, wherein the registration accept message comprises the authentication token (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, and see par. [0051]: The gNB generates the RRC integrity key (KRRCint) and the UP integrity key (KUPint) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS integrity algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The gNB also generates the RRC ciphering key (KRRCenc) and UP ciphering key (KUPenc) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS encryption algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The integrity keys and encryption keys are generally referred to as AS security keys 622. The gNB starts integrity protection for RRC messages. The gNB sends an integrity protected AS Security Mode Command message 614 to UE 106 with the integrity algorithm and ciphering algorithm, and see Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM, and see par. [0050]: UE 106 verifies the NAS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, begins uplink ciphering, downlink deciphering, and integrity protection, and see par. [0052]: UE 106 verifies the AS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, starts the RRC integrity protection and RRC downlink de-ciphering; in this case, based on successful authentication (i.e. based on acceptance corresponding to a registration accept message), integrity and encryption algorithms are sent to the UE which receives them, corresponding to an authentication token. Based on verifying received messages, the UE starts ciphering and deciphering, meaning that it was not ciphering and deciphering previously, and, therefore, the transmitted message is in plaintext);
However, Mavureddi does not teach:
receive, from the UE, a protected non-access stratum (NAS) request message comprising an authentication result and a data packet .
Rajadurai, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
receive, from the UE, a protected non-access stratum (NAS) request message comprising an authentication result and a data packet (see Rajadurai, Fig. 12, pars. [184-185]: Fig. 12 is a sequence diagram that illustrates optimized authentication and NAS procedure when the UE (102) has a NAS security context according to an embodiment as disclosed herein. As shown in the sequence diagram, the UE (102), the SEAF (104), the AUSF (106), and the UDM (108) are in communication with each other. At step 1, upon receiving the Authentication request from the SEAF (104) (in a N1 message), the UE (102) selects an unused SQN/AUTN and corresponding RAND from the stored values. At step 2, the UE (102) derives the RES* from the selected AUTN and RAND, if not derived when storing the received AUTN and RAND. At step 3, the UE (102) derives the MAC-I on the N1 request message, based on the keys derived from the selected AUTN/SQN and RAND and the network indicated integrity procedure. The UE (102) then sends an N1 message request (Periodic/Mobility/PDU session establishment/modification request) to the SEAF. The N1 message request includes the SUCI or 5G-GUTI, RES*, AUTN and/or RAND and/or SQN, NAS MAC-I and other possible parameters; in this case, the SEAF (i.e. AMF) receives an N1 message (i.e. protected non-access stratum request message) with authentication information and other parameters (i.e. data packet) from the UE).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the apparatus or method of Mavureddi with the additional receiving step of Rajadurai with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of reducing time required for communication in store-and-forward scenarios (see Rajadurai, par. [91]).
Regarding claims 12, 20, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to:
transmit, to the network function, an authentication request message comprising the authentication result (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0047]: SEAF 302 sends RES*, as received from UE 106, in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message 415 to AUSF 210);
receive an authentication response message comprising a verification result (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0047]: AUSF 210 also sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message 416 to SEAF 302 indicating whether or not the authentication was successful from the home network point of view); and
forward the data packet to a second network function based on the verification result (see Mavureddi, Fig. 21, par. [0097]: AMF 212 then sends a SN message request 2113 to NTN gateway 702 with the secured packet and the NTN MAC contained in a NAS container 2128, and see Fig. 4, par. [0047]: AUSF 210 also sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message 416 to SEAF 302 indicating whether or not the authentication was successful from the home network point of view).
Regarding claim 13, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the authentication response message further comprises a second authentication token (see Mavureddi, Fig. 4, par. [0045]: AUSF 210 sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message 412 to SEAF 302 that includes the 5G SE AV), and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to transmit a NAS response message comprising the second authentication token and an acknowledgement for the data packet (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, and see Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM, and see Fig. 8, par. [0054]: FIG. 8 illustrates different satellite operation modes, which include a “normal/default satellite operation” mode 810 and a “store and forward satellite operation” mode 820. In the normal/default satellite operation mode 810, signaling and data traffic exchange between a UE 106 with satellite access (i.e., direct connectivity) and the remote ground network requires the service link 708 and the feeder link 706 be active simultaneously; in this case, the AMF transmits authentication tokens and security commands to the UE as part of methods, corresponding to the claimed registration accept message).
Regarding claim 14, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the registration accept message indicates a provisional registration of the UE, wherein the NAS request message is protected with a provisional NAS key associated with the provisional registration, and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to protect the NAS response message using the provisional NAS key (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI; in this case, the message with current configuration parameters that are then changed in the future corresponds to a provisional registration).
Regarding claim 15, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the NAS response message further indicates a second integrity algorithm and a second ciphering algorithm to protect one or more subsequent NAS messages (see Mavureddi, Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI).
Claims 2, 8, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai, as applied to claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-15, 19, and 20 above, and further in view of Watfa et al. (US 2023/0136118), hereinafter “Watfa”.
Regarding claims 2, 8, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the UE or processor.
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai does not teach:
wherein the registration accept message further comprises an indication for using a null integrity algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message.
Watfa, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
wherein the registration accept message further comprises an indication for using a null integrity algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message (see Watfa, par. [0066]: the AMF may provide the IE to the UE even if the UE is registered for disaster roaming service. However, the AMF may set the IE to EIA0 and EEA0 (i.e., the NULL algorithms for integrity and/or ciphering), because the UE is registered for disaster roaming).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the registration accept message of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai with the null algorithms of Watfa with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of enabling roaming between networks (see Watfa, par. [0035]).
Regarding claim 17, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method.
Mavureddi does not teach, but Rajadurai teaches:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to:
determine that the satellite lacks support for an AS security context (see Rajadurai, Fig. 11, par. [168]: Fig. 11 is a sequence diagram that illustrates optimized authentication and NAS procedure when the UE (102) does not have NAS security context according to an embodiment as disclosed herein. As shown in the sequence diagram, the UE (102), the SEAF (104), the AUSF (106), and the UDM (108) are in communication with each other. In a N1 message to the UE (102), the SEAF (104) may include the authentication request indication and/or the ciphering and/or the integrity procedure, and see Fig. 7, par. [131]: Fig. 7 is a sequence diagram that illustrates a procedure for optimizing the NAS SMC for NR satellite access in case of S&F according to an embodiment as disclosed herein. As shown in the sequence diagram, the UE (102), the satellite (202), the AUSF (106), and the UDM (108) are in communication with each other. The UE (102) is in roaming in the visited PLMN and/or requesting for a satellite access);
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the apparatus or method of Mavureddi with the determining support for security context of Rajadurai with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of reducing time required for communication in store-and-forward scenarios (see Rajadurai, par. [91]).
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai does not teach:
select a null integrity algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm as the security algorithms, based on the indication.
Watfa, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
select a null integrity algorithm and a null ciphering algorithm as the security algorithms, based on the indication (see Watfa, par. [0066]: the AMF may provide the IE to the UE even if the UE is registered for disaster roaming service. However, the AMF may set the IE to EIA0 and EEA0 (i.e., the NULL algorithms for integrity and/or ciphering), because the UE is registered for disaster roaming).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the registration accept message of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai with the null algorithms of Watfa with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of enabling roaming between networks (see Watfa, par. [0035]).
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai as applied to claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-15, 19, and 20 above, and further in view of Edge (WO 2025/034293), hereinafter “Edge”, and further in view of Ben Henda et al. (WO 2019/020161), hereinafter “Ben”.
Regarding claim 5, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the UE or processor.
Mavureddi does not teach, but Rajadurai teaches:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to:
enter a connected mode prior to transmitting the protected NAS request message (see Rajadurai, Fig. 7, par. [133]: the satellite (202) is in S&F mode and it is assumed that currently the service link is available. The UE (102) performs the state transition from ideal to connected mode. At step 4a, when the UE (102) decides to connect the satellite for the second time, the UE derives a new RES* using a new AUTN (2) and RAND (2) which are preconfigured earlier);
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of Mavureddi with the entering connected mode of Rajadurai with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of reducing time required for communication in store-and-forward scenarios (see Rajadurai, par. [91]).
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai does not teach:
transition to an inactive mode after transmitting the AS security mode complete message; and
applying a default integrity algorithm and a default ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message in response to determining that the UE is connected to a different satellite after entering the connected mode.
Edge, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
transition to an inactive mode after transmitting the message (see Edge, par. [0092]: When MO media and service data transfer is complete, the UE proxy 340 may remain in a CM CONNECTED state permanently (or at least until S&F support for UE 102 is no longer needed) to avoid later paging (e.g. by AMF 414 or gNB 406), though transition to IDLE state could also be allowed);
Rajadurai further teaches the claimed transmitting the AS security mode complete message (see Rajadurai Fig. 7, par. [134]: At step 4b, with the prior knowledge of the indication to perform the NAS SMC, the UE (102) performs the NAS security mode command negotiation and performs the security procedure selection (selects a ciphering procedure 2 and integrity procedure 2, and see par. [146]: At step 5, the UE (102) sends the Authentication response to the AMF and/or the SEAF (104). This message includes the newly calculated RES* to the AMF/SEAF (104) in a NAS message Authentication Response)
Therefore, since Edge teaches transitioning to idle (i.e. inactive) state after communication, then it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai with the transitioning to an inactive mode of Edge with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of improving communication efficiency and user experience (see Edge, par. [0056]).
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai, and further in view of Edge, does not teach:
applying a default integrity algorithm and a default ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message in response to determining that the UE is connected to a different satellite after entering the connected mode
Ben, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
applying a default integrity algorithm and a default ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message in response to determining that the UE is connected to a different satellite after entering the connected mode (see Ben, Fig. 19, page 30: Operation 1902. The UE determines to register over another type of access network (e.g., non-3GPP). Therefore, the UE allocates a new CID value (e.g., cid_2) and a fresh pair of NAS COUNT values, and see page 31: Operation 1906. The AMF may send an SMC message including the newly allocated CID value, and the AMF may use that CID value to integrity protect the SMC message. Operation 1907. If the Security Mode Command message includes a new CID value (e.g., cid_3), the UE checks the integrity of the SMC message using the included CID value in the SMC message, and if successful, the UE discards its own CID value (cid_2) and allocates the new CID value (cid_3) for the new NAS connection, and see page 26: the same procedure is used to derive a NAS integrity protection key or a NAS ciphering key. Since the NAS CONN ID is used in the derivation function, those keys would be then NAS connection specific, and see page 9: a first NAS connection may be provided through a 3GPP access node (e.g., a base station, eNB, eNodeB, gNB, gNodeB), a second NAS connection may be provided through a first non-3GPP access node (e.g., a WiFi access node), and a third NAS connection may be provided through a second non-3GPP access node (e.g., a satellite node); in this case, ciphering and integrity keys are changed based on the UE changing connection).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai, and further in view of Edge, with the applying default algorithms of Ben with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of improving management of parallel NAS connections (see Ben, page 6).
Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai as applied to claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-15, 19, and 20 above, and further in view of Edge.
Regarding claim 16, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method.
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai does not teach:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to:
receive an indication that the satellite supports an AS security context; and
derive a security key for generating AS keys, based on the indication, wherein the response message comprises the security key.
Edge, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the AMF to:
receive an indication that the satellite supports an AS security context (see Edge, Fig. 14B, par. [0305]: At stage 2, the UE proxy 340 registers the UE 102 in the ground based PLMN 108 by sending a NAS registration request message to the AMF 414 in the ground based PLMN 108 and includes the SUPI for the UE 102, or a SUCI containing a ciphered value of the SUPI, and the key identity Kid. The SUCI may be the SUPI ciphered using the public key Kph if received at stage 1); and
derive a security key for generating AS keys, based on the indication, wherein the response message comprises the security key (see Edge, Fig. 14B, par. [0309]: At stage 7, the UDM 1422 determines the SUPI for the UE 102 from the SUCI, if received at stage 6, using a private key for the HPLMN 1408 corresponding to the public key Kph for the HPLMN 1408, and assuming the UE proxy 340 ciphered the SUPI into the SUCI using the public key Kph for the HPLMN 1408. Also, as part of stage 7 and based on the receipt of the key identity Kid at stage 6, the UDM 222 determines the substitute primary key K* from the key identity Kid and the primary key K for the UE 102 known to (i.e. configured in) the UDM 1422 (e.g. using equation 1), and see par. [0311]: At stage 9, the AUSF 1412 sends a UE authentication authenticate response to the AMF 414 in the ground based PLMN 108 and includes authentication challenge data determined by the AUSF 1412 based on the AV received at stage 8).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the UE or processor of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai with the security context and key of Edge with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of improving communication efficiency and user experience (see Edge, par. [0056]).
Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai as applied to claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-15, 19, and 20 above, and further in view of Ben.
Regarding claim 18, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai teaches the apparatus or method. Mavureddi further teaches:
wherein the satellite comprises a store-and-forward satellite (see Mavureddi, par. [0054]: FIG. 8 illustrates different satellite operation modes, which include a “normal/default satellite operation” mode 810 and a “store and forward satellite operation” mode 820),
However, the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai does not teach:
wherein the response message further indicates a default integrity algorithm and a default ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message when a communication path to the UE comprises a different satellite.
Ben, in the same field of endeavor, teaches:
wherein the response message further indicates a default integrity algorithm and a default ciphering algorithm to protect the NAS request message when a communication path to the UE comprises a different satellite (see Ben, Fig. 19, page 30: Operation 1903. The 1902. The UE determines to register over another type of access network (e.g., non-3GPP). Therefore, the UE allocates a new CID value (e.g., cid_2) and a fresh pair of NAS COUNT values, and see page 31: Operation 1906. The AMF may send an SMC message including the newly allocated CID value, and the AMF may use that CID value to integrity protect the SMC message. Operation 1907. If the Security Mode Command message includes a new CID value (e.g., cid_3), the UE checks the integrity of the SMC message using the included CID value in the SMC message, and if successful, the UE discards its own CID value (cid_2) and allocates the new CID value (cid_3) for the new NAS connection, and see page 26: the same procedure is used to derive a NAS integrity protection key or a NAS ciphering key. Since the NAS CONN ID is used in the derivation function, those keys would be then NAS connection specific, and see page 9: a first NAS connection may be provided through a 3GPP access node (e.g., a base station, eNB, eNodeB, gNB, gNodeB), a second NAS connection may be provided through a first non-3GPP access node (e.g., a WiFi access node), and a third NAS connection may be provided through a second non-3GPP access node (e.g., a satellite node); in this case, ciphering and integrity keys are changed based on the UE changing connection).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to have modified the apparatus or method of the combination of Mavureddi in view of Rajadurai, and further in view of Edge, with the applying default algorithms of Ben with a reasonable expectation of success. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification for the benefit of improving management of parallel NAS connections (see Ben, page 6).
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 07/23/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues “none of the cited references teach or suggest receiving a registration accept message in plaintext, wherein the registration accept message comprises an authentication token – as recited in independent claims 1 and 7 – or transmitting a response message comprising a registration accept message in plaintext, wherein the registration accept message comprises the authentication token – as recited in independent claims 11 and 19” (see Applicant’s remarks, pages 10-12).
Examiner respectfully disagrees and points to Mavureddi in Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, par. [0051]: The gNB generates the RRC integrity key (KRRCint) and the UP integrity key (KUPint) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS integrity algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The gNB also generates the RRC ciphering key (KRRCenc) and UP ciphering key (KUPenc) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS encryption algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The integrity keys and encryption keys are generally referred to as AS security keys 622. The gNB starts integrity protection for RRC messages. The gNB sends an integrity protected AS Security Mode Command message 614 to UE 106 with the integrity algorithm and ciphering algorithm, Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM, par. [0050]: UE 106 verifies the NAS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, begins uplink ciphering, downlink deciphering, and integrity protection, par. [0052]: UE 106 verifies the AS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, starts the RRC integrity protection and RRC downlink de-ciphering, and par. [0053]: In FIG. 7A, the NG-RAN 602 is based on a transparent satellite. Thus, NTN satellite 704 implements a transparent payload 722, and NG-RAN 602 includes a base station (referred to as NTN gNB 724 or on-ground NTN gNB 724) that is on-ground.
These sections teach based on successful authentication (i.e. based on acceptance corresponding to a registration accept message), integrity and encryption algorithms are sent to the UE which receives them, corresponding to an authentication token. Also, AS integrity and encryption information is sent in an AS security mode command, corresponding to the AS security mode command. Based on verifying received messages, the UE starts ciphering and deciphering, meaning that it was not ciphering and deciphering previously, and, therefore, the received message is in plaintext.
Applicant argues “none of the cited references teach or suggest receiving an AS security command from the satellite – as recited in independent claims 1 and 7” (see Applicant’s remarks, pages 12-13).
Examiner respectfully disagrees and points to Mavureddi in Fig. 6, par. [0049]: If authentication of UE 106 is successful, such as in FIG. 4, AMF 212 selects the NAS integrity protection and ciphering algorithms. Using the key derivative function, with selected algorithms and algorithm type distinguisher and received KAMF key, AMF 212 generates the NAS integrity key and the NAS encryption key (e.g., KNASint and KNASenc), which are generally referred to as NAS security keys 620. The AMF 212 starts integrity protection for downlink NAS messages. AMF 212 sends a NAS Security Mode Command message 611 to UE 106 with integrity protection and containing the selected ciphering algorithm, integrity algorithm, and ngKSI, par. [0051]: The gNB generates the RRC integrity key (KRRCint) and the UP integrity key (KUPint) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS integrity algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The gNB also generates the RRC ciphering key (KRRCenc) and UP ciphering key (KUPenc) from inputs of the KgNB key, selected AS encryption algorithm, and algorithm type distinguisher. The integrity keys and encryption keys are generally referred to as AS security keys 622. The gNB starts integrity protection for RRC messages. The gNB sends an integrity protected AS Security Mode Command message 614 to UE 106 with the integrity algorithm and ciphering algorithm, Fig. 4, par. [0046]: UE 106 includes Mobile Equipment (ME) and a USIM. The ME receives the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) in the NAS message Authentication Request message 413, and forwards the authentication token (AUTN) and the random challenge (RAND) to the USIM, par. [0050]: UE 106 verifies the NAS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, begins uplink ciphering, downlink deciphering, and integrity protection, par. [0052]: UE 106 verifies the AS Security Mode Command integrity and, if successful, starts the RRC integrity protection and RRC downlink de-ciphering, and par. [0053]: In FIG. 7A, the NG-RAN 602 is based on a transparent satellite. Thus, NTN satellite 704 implements a transparent payload 722, and NG-RAN 602 includes a base station (referred to as NTN gNB 724 or on-ground NTN gNB 724) that is on-ground.
These sections teach AS integrity and encryption information is sent in an AS security mode command, corresponding to the AS security mode command. This command is sent by the RAN which includes an NTN node (i.e. a satellite).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure:
Chandrashekar et al. (US 2025/0247808) teaches an apparatus comprising means for performing: receiving a registration or service request for a user equipment: creating an association between the apparatus and a network function, wherein the association is specific to the user equipment: forwarding the registration or service request to the network function: using the association to receive from the network function or send to the network function at least one of: Non Access Stratum control messages for the user equipment: Access Network control messages for the user equipment.
Nakarmi et al. (US 2025/0063437) teaches core network equipment is configured for use in a core network of a wireless communication system.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CALEB J BALLOWE whose telephone number is (571)270-0410. The examiner can normally be reached MON-FRI 7:30-5.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Nishant B. Divecha can be reached at (571) 270-3125. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/C.J.B./Examiner, Art Unit 2419
/Nishant Divecha/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2419
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