Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claims 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18, 25, 34-42 are now pending in this application.
Election/Restrictions
Applicant’s election of the compound of Example 377 in the reply filed on June 15, 2026 is acknowledged. Because applicant did not distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the restriction requirement, the election has been treated as an election without traverse (MPEP § 818.01(a)).
The elected species has the following structural formula
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The compound of claim 1 is represented by ULM-L-PTM. In the elected species compound ULM is the first option i) and PTM is PTM-IIa and L is the fragment phenylene-piperidine-methylene-.
The elected compound is free from prior art rejections and is free from prior art. However, the elected species is present in the parent application. The search was expanded to embrace compounds of ULM-L-PTM wherein “ULM” represents any one of the first two groups at i) as presented in claim 1, “PTM” represents “PTM-IIa” or “PTM-IIb” as presented in claim 1 wherein no optional additional ring fusions are present at any of the RPTM, along with the full scope of L.
Claims 5, 7, 9 and 18, along with subject matter not included in the group indicated above as having been searched is withdrawn from consideration as being drawn to non-elected subject matter.
Applicants are advised of MPEP 803.02 Restriction - Markush Claims [R - 2], fourth and fifth paragraph, where is stated:
“As an example, in the case of an application with a Markush - type claim drawn to the compound C - R, wherein R is a radical selected from the group consisting of A, B, C, D, and E, the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species, CA, CB, CC, CD, or CE. The Markush - type claim would then be examined fully with respect to the elected species and any species considered to be clearly unpatentable over the elected species. If on examination the elected species is found to be anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art, the Markush - type claim and claims to the elected species shall be rejected, and claims to the non-elected species would be held withdrawn from further consideration. As in the prevailing practice, a second action on the rejected claims would be made final.” (Emphasis added).
On the other hand, should no prior art be found that anticipates or renders obvious the elected species, the search of the Markush-type claim will be extended. If prior art is found that anticipates or renders obvious the Markush-type claim with respect to a non-elected species, the Markush-type claim shall be rejected and claims to the nonelected species held withdrawn from further consideration. The prior art search, however, will not be extended unnecessarily to cover all nonelected species. Should applicant, in response to this rejection of the Markush-type claim, overcome the rejection, as by amending the Markush-type claim to exclude the species anticipated or rendered obvious by the prior art, the amended Markush-type claim will be reexamined. The prior art search will be extended to the extent necessary to determine patentability of the Markush-type claim. In the event prior art is found during the reexamination that anticipates or renders obvious the amended Markush-type claim, the claim will be rejected and the action made final. Amendments submitted after the final rejection further restricting the scope of the claim may be denied entry.
Improper Markush Rejection
Claims 1, 11-12, 14, 25 and 34-42 are rejected under a judicially created doctrine as being drawn to an improper Markush group, that is, the claims lack unity of invention. The variables, ULM, L and PTM are defined in such a way that they keep changing the core of the compound that determines the classification. By changing these values, several patentably distinct and independent compounds are claimed. In order to have unity of invention the compounds must have “a community of chemical or physical characteristics” which justify their inclusion in a common group, and that such inclusion is not repugnant to principles of scientific classification” In re JONES (CCPA) 74 USPQ 149 (see footnote 2). The structural formula ULM-L-PTM does not have a significant structural feature that is shared by all of its alternatives which is inventive. The structure has no structural feature as common. Compounds embraced by claim 1 are so diverse in nature that a prior art anticipating a claim with respect to one member under 35 USC 102 would not render obvious the same claim under 35 USC 103. This is evidentiary of patentably distinct and independent inventions.
Limiting the claims to the subject matter indicated above as having been searched would overcome this rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 34 and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
i) Claim 34 refers to “Table 1A through Table 1C.” Claims need to be complete and cannot refer to the specification. Also, the claim is in improper form. MPEP 2173.05(s) states, “Reference to Figures or Tables. Where possible, claims are to be complete within themselves. Incorporation by reference to a specific figure or table “is permitted only in exceptional circumstances where there is no practical way to define the invention in words …’ ” This condition is not met here, since it is practical to define the invention in words, simply by putting the structures into the claim. See Ex parte Fressola, 27 USPQ2d 1608, 1609.
ii) Claim 35 states “wherein the compound includes at least one polyethylene glycol chain.” It is unclear whether this is an additional limitation or where this chain is present in the compound. Appropriate clarification is required. Claim 1 as presented does not have this limitation.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 39-42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to use the invention.
In claims 39 and 40 the how to use portion of the statute has not been met. This means that Applicants must teach the skilled practitioner, in this case a physician, how to treat a given subject. The physician clearly must know what diseases and what symptoms are to be treated. In this case, Applicants have not provided what is being treated by claim 39, who the subject is, how one can identify said subject (i.e. how one can identify a subject in need), given no specific dose, given no specific dosing regimen, given no specific route of administration, and do not specify what diseases or symptom they intend to treat.
Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable. Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure. Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk 42 USPQ2d 1001.
As the Supreme Court said in Brenner v. Manson, 148 USPQ at 696: “a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” As U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated In re Diedrich 138 USPQ at 130, quoting with approval from the decision of the board: “We do not believe that it was the intention of the statutes to require the Patent Office, the courts, or the public to play the sort of guessing game that might be involved if an applicant could satisfy the requirements of the statutes by indicating the usefulness of a claimed compound in terms of possible use so general as to be meaningless and then, after his research or that of his competitors has definitely ascertained an actual use for the compound, adducing evidence intended to show that a particular specific use would have been obvious to men skilled in the particular art to which this use relates.”
Regarding claim 40, one skilled in the art cannot say for sure which disease or disorder is somehow associated with BRaf accumulation and aggregation.
Regarding claims 41-42, the treatment of cancer generally or the disparate disorders cited in claim 41 cannot possibly be considered enabled.
As a general rule, enablement must be commensurate with the scope of claim language. MPEP 2164.08 states, “The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “the specification must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation’.” In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993)” (emphasis added). The “make and use the full scope of the invention without undue experimentation” language was repeated in 2005 in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 75 USPQ2d 1865, and Scripps Research Institute v. Nemerson, 78 USPQ2d 1019 asserts: “A lack of enablement for the full scope of a claim, however, is a legitimate rejection.” The principle was explicitly affirmed most recently in Auto. Tech. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 84 USPQ2d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 85 USPQ2d 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also In re Cortright, 49 USPQ2d 1464, 1466 and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 49 USPQ2d 1370.
Pursuant to In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988), one considers the following factors to determine whether undue experimentation is required: (A) The breadth of the claims; (B) The nature of the invention; (C) The state of the prior art; (D) The level of one of ordinary skill; (E) The level of predictability in the art; (F) The amount of direction provided by the inventor; (G) The existence of working examples; and (H) The quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure. Some experimentation is not fatal; the issue is whether the amount of experimentation is “undue”; see In re Vaeck, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444.
The analysis is as follows:
(1) Breadth of claims.
(a) Scope of the compounds. The scope of compound is broad.
(b) Scope of the diseases covered. Cancer is not a single disease, or cluster of closely related disorders. There are hundreds of cancers, which have in common only some loss of controlled cell growth. Cancers are highly heterogeneous at both the molecular and clinical level, something seen especially in, for example, the cancers of the breast, brain and salivary glands. They can occur in pretty much every part of the body. For example, leukemia is any malignant neoplasm of the blood-forming tissues. Leukemia can arise from many different sources. These include viruses such as EBV, which causes Burkitt's lymphoma, and HTLV-1, linked to certain T cell leukemias. Others are linked to genetic disorders, such as Fanconi's anemia, which is a familial disorder, and Down's syndrome. Other leukemias are caused by exposure to carcinogens such as benzene, and some are actually caused by treatment with other neoplastic agents. Still other leukemias arise from ionizing radiation, and many are idiopathic. Leukemias also differ greatly in the morphology, degree of differentiation, body location (e.g., bone marrow, lymphoid organs, etc.) There are dozens of leukemias. There are B-Cell Neoplasms such as B-cell prolymphocytic leukemia and Hairy cell leukemia (HCL, a chronic Lymphoid leukemia). There are T-Cell Neoplasms such as T-cell prolymphocytic leukemia, aggressive NK cell leukemia, adult T cell leukemia/lymphoma (ATLL), and T-cell granular Lymphocytic leukemia. There are different kinds of acute myeloid leukemias (undifferentiated AML, acute myeloblastic, acute myelomonocytic leukemia, acute monocytic leukemias, acute monoblastic, acute megakaryoblastic (AmegL), acute promyelocytic leukemia (APL), and erythroleukemia). There is also lymphoblastic leukemia, hypocellular acute myeloid leukemia, Ph-/BCR- myeloid leukemia, and acute basophilic leukemia. Chromic leukemias include chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL, which exists in a B-cell and a T-cell type), prolymphocytic leukemia (PLL), large granular lymphocytic leukemia (LGLL, which goes under several other names as well), chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), chronic myelomonocytic leukemia (CMML), chronic neutrophilic leukemia, chronic eosinophilic leukemia (CEL), and many others.
(2) The nature of the invention and predictability in the art: With specific reference to cancer, Ex parte Kranz, 19 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 notes the “general unpredictability of the field [of] …anti-cancer treatment.” In re Application of Hozumi et al., 226 USPQ 353 notes the “fact that the art of cancer chemotherapy is highly unpredictable”. More generally, the invention is directed toward medicine and is therefore physiological in nature. It is well established that “the scope of enablement varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved,” and physiological activity is generally considered to be an unpredictable factor. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970).
(3) Direction or Guidance: That provided is very limited. There is no dosage information.
(4) State of the Prior Art: So far as the examiner is aware there has not been a single drug which has successfully been used as a general anti-cancer agent.
(5) Working Examples: There are no examples for treating any cancer in the specification. Case law is clear on this point. In an unpredictable art, such as cancer therapy, models may be used for enablement only if there is a well-established correlation between the assay and clinical efficacy. Applicants have not demonstrated nor have they alleged there is any correlation between the in vitro assays they disclose and clinical efficacy against cancer generally.
(6) Skill of those in the art: the prior art knows that there never has been a compound capable of treating cancers generally. “The cancer therapy art remains highly unpredictable, and no example exists for efficacy of a single product against tumors generally.” (<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/1pecba.htm#7> ENABLEMENT DECISION TREE, Example F, situation 1). A similar statement appears at In re Application of Hozumi et al., 226 USPQ 353: “In spite of the vast expenditure of human and capital resources in recent years, no one drug has been found which is effective in treating all types of cancer. Cancer is not a simple disease, nor is it even a single disease, but a complex of a multitude of different entities, each behaving in a different way.” There are compounds that treat a modest range of cancers, but no one has ever been able to figure out how to get a compound to be effective against cancer generally, or even a majority of cancers.
The attempts to find compounds to treat the various cancers arguably constitute the single most massive enterprise in all of pharmacology. This has not resulted in finding any treatment for tumors generally. Indeed, the existence of such a "silver bullet" is contrary to our present understanding in oncology. This is because it is now understood that there is no “master switch” for cancers generally; cancers arise from a bewildering variety of differing mechanisms. Even the most broadly effective antitumor agents are only effective against a small fraction of the vast number of different cancers known. This is true in part because cancers arise from a wide variety of sources, primarily a wide variety of failures of the body's cell growth regulatory mechanisms, but also such external factors such as viruses (an estimated at least 20% are of viral origin e.g. Human papillomavirus, EBV, Hepatitis B and C, HHV-8, HTLV-1 and other retroviruses, and quite possibly Merkel cell polyomavirus, and there is some evidence that CMV is a causative agent in glioblastoma), exposure to chemicals such as tobacco tars, excess alcohol consumption (which causes hepatic cirrhosis, an important cause of HCC), ionizing radiation, and unknown environment factors.
Accordingly, there is substantive “reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope” (In re Langer, 183 USPQ 288, 297).
Similarly, In re Novak, 134 USPQ 335, 337-338, says “unless one with ordinary skill in the art would accept those allegations as obviously valid and correct, it is proper for the examiner to ask for evidence which substantiates them.” There is no such evidence in this case. Likewise, In re Cortright, 49 USPQ2d 1464, states: “Moreover, we have not been shown that one of ordinary skill would necessarily conclude from the information expressly disclosed by the written description that the active ingredient” does what the specification surmises that it does. That is exactly the case here. Even if applicants’ assertion that cancer in general could be treated with these compounds were plausible--- which it is not ---, that would not suffice, as was stated in Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 75 USPQ2d 1297, 1301: “If mere plausibility were the test for enablement under section 112, applicants could obtain patent rights to “inventions” consisting of little more than respectable guesses as to the likelihood of their success.”
Different types of cancers affect different organs and have different methods of growth and harm to the body, and different vulnerabilities. The skill thus depends on the particular cancer involved. There are some cancers where the chemotherapy skill level is high and there are multiple successful chemotherapeutic treatments. The mechanism in these situations, however, is not necessarily the same as is alleged for these compounds.
(7) The quantity of experimentation needed: Given the fact that, historically, the development of new cancers drugs has been difficult and time consuming, and especially in view of factors 1 and 4 and 6, the quantity of experimentation needed is expected to be great.
MPEP 2164.01(a) states, “A conclusion of lack of enablement means that, based on the evidence regarding each of the above factors, the specification, at the time the application was filed, would not have taught one skilled in the art how to make and/or use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993).” That conclusion is clearly justified here.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1, 11-12, 14, 25 and 34-42 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-44 of U.S. Patent No. 10,723,717.
Claims 1, 11-12, 14, 25 and 34-42 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-19 of U.S. Patent No. 11,986,531.
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the instant claims and the patented claims overlap substantially. The instant claims differ from the reference claims by reciting specific species and an overlapping genus of reference. It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to select any of the species of the genus taught by the reference claims, including those instantly claimed, because the skilled chemist would have the reasonable expectation that any of the species of the genus would have similar properties and, thus, the same use as taught for the genus as a whole. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to select the claimed compounds from the genus in the reference since such compounds would have been suggested by the reference as a whole. It has been held that a prior art disclosed genus of useful compounds is sufficient to render prima facie obvious a species falling within a genus. In re Susi, 440 F.2d 442, 169 USPQ 423, 425 (CCPA 1971), followed by the Federal Circuit in Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, 847 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ 2d 1843, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to BRUCK KIFLE whose telephone number is (571)272-0668. The examiner can normally be reached 8 AM - 6 PM, M-F.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jeffrey H. Murray can be reached at 571-272-9023. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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August 5, 2026
/BRUCK KIFLE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1624
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