DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
Acknowledgement is made of Applicant’s Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) form PTO-1149 filed 03/07/2024. This IDS has been considered.
Specification
The title of the invention is not descriptive. A new title is required that is clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Legal Framework
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, the Office is guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, Examiners first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, Examiners turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101 and further updated this guidance in October 2019. This guidance is now found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (MPEP), and particularly Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). See MPEP §§ 2103–2106.07(c) (9th ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, Examiners first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do Examiners then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Analysis
Examiners consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest reasonable construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in light of the Specification at the time of filing.
The Examiner finds, under Step 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, that claims 1-12 and 19, are directed to an apparatus and claims 13-18 are directed to a method and, therefore, all claims recite a statutory category of invention.
Revised Step 2A, Prong One –recites a judicial exception
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). The Memorandum instructs Examiners first to determine whether each claim recites any judicial exception to patent eligibility. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. The Memorandum identifies three judicially-excepted groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. Id. at 52. Examiners primarily focus here on the first and third groupings - mathematical concepts and mental processes.
Regarding independent claim 1, the limitation estimating a weight of the transfer object on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information is considered a mental process because it can be performed in the human mind or with the aid of a pencil and paper.
Similarly, regarding independent claim 7, the limitation estimating a weight of the transfer object on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information is considered a mental process because it can be performed in the human mind or with the aid of a pencil and paper.
Regarding independent claim 13, the limitation estimating a weight of the transfer object on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information is considered a mental process because it can be performed in the human mind or with the aid of a pencil and paper.
Thus it is determined that independent claims 1, 7, and 13 recite abstract ideas and therefore judicial exceptions.
Revised Step 2A, Prong Two – Practical Application
Having determined that claims 1, 7, and 13 recite abstract ideas, Examiners next look to determine whether the claims recite “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h); 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Reg. at 53–54. Integration into a practical application requires an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see also id. at 55 (setting forth exemplary considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application).
In the current instance, there are no limitations integrating the abstract ideas into a practical application as there is no improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field, it is not used by a particular machine or to effect a particular transformation.
Step 2B–Inventive Concept
Because the Examiner has determined that claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to an abstract idea and they do not include additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, the Examiner looks to whether each claim provides an inventive concept, i.e., adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. That is not the case here. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that “the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself”).
The additional elements of independent claim 1 are acquiring sensor information that changes in accordance with a distance between a transfer object and a transfer vehicle that is transferring the transfer object and a processor for carrying out the claimed processes.
The first element, acquiring sensor information, does not impose any meaningful limitation on the abstract idea because it is considered routine data gathering (it is required for any and all uses of the claimed abstract idea) and therefore insignificant extrasolution activity. See MPEP§2106.05(g).
As to the claimed processor, the Supreme Court has ruled that “merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”. Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
Therefore, because there are no additional elements that can provide an inventive concept, the Examiner concludes that claim 1 does not recite patent eligible subject matter.
As to independent claim 7, the additional elements of the claim are acquiring sensor information that changes in accordance with a distance between a transfer object and a transfer vehicle that is transferring the transfer object and a processor for carrying out the claimed processes.
The first element, acquiring sensor information, does not impose any meaningful limitation on the abstract idea because it is considered routine data gathering (it is required for any and all uses of the claimed abstract idea) and therefore insignificant extrasolution activity. See MPEP§2106.05(g).
As to the claimed processor, the Supreme Court has ruled that “merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”. Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
Therefore, because there are no additional elements that can provide an inventive concept, the Examiner concludes that claim 7 does not recite patent eligible subject matter.
As to independent claim 13, there are no additional elements recited, therefore because there are no additional elements that can provide an inventive concept, the Examiner concludes that claim 13 does not recite patent eligible subject matter.
The remaining dependent claims (2-6, 8-12, 14-19) further limit the abstract idea by reciting methods steps related to the data analysis (this further limits the abstract estimation step) or how the data is obtained (further limiting the insignificant extrasolution activity) and do not impose any meaningful limitations to their respective independent claims.
Applying the guidance set forth in the Memorandum, the Examiner concludes that claims 1-19 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 7, 13, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Rogness et al. (US 2021/0390307; “Rogness”) in view of Wojtkowicz et al. (US 2013/0311058; “Wojtkowicz”).
Regarding claim 1, Rogness discloses in at least figures 1, 6, and 9 a transfer system (¶ [0044]) comprising at least one processor (102) (¶¶ [0041], [0056]), the at least one processor (102) carrying out an acquisition process for acquiring sensor information (¶ [0044]), and an estimation means process for estimating a weight of the transfer object (figure 9A: 902, ¶ [0118])) on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information (¶ [0044]).
Rogness discloses that the weight of the transfer object can be estimated using force information obtained from sensors from a trailer hitch using a magnetoelastic sensor, a load cell, a strain gauge, an accelerometer, etc. (¶ [0044]) but is silent specifically to sensor information relating to distance.
In the same field of endeavor, Wojtkowicz teaches estimating tensile and compressive forces in a trailer hitch using a force sensor (32) that can be embodied as a traditional load cell, but can also be embodied as a sensor whose readings change in accordance with a distance between a transfer object and a transfer vehicle that is transferring the transfer object (¶ [0021]; VCU determines loads using proximity/radar sensor, contact distance sensor (e.g. a cable), or a camera.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing of the invention to use Wojtkowicz’s distance sensor to determine tensile loads in a transfer object as a means of estimating weight of the transfer object as taught by Rogness for the purpose of using existing cameras or ranging sensors associated with the transfer vehicle for the benefit of not needing to retrofit some vehicles with hitch sensors by capitalizing on existing technology.
Furthermore, it’s been held that applying a known technique (using distance between towed object and towing vehicle as a measure of tensile and compressive forces imparted by the towed object) to a known method (using tensile and compressive forces on a trailer hitch to determine towed load weight) is within the purview of one having ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-421 (2007).
Regarding claim 7, Rogness discloses in at least figures 1, 6, and 9 a transfer apparatus (¶ [0044]) comprising at least one processor (102) (¶¶ [0041], [0056]), the at least one processor (102) carrying out an acquisition process for acquiring sensor information (¶ [0044]), and an estimation means process for estimating a weight of the transfer object (figure 9A: 902, ¶ [0118])) on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information (¶ [0044]).
Rogness discloses that the weight of the transfer object can be estimated using force information obtained from sensors from a trailer hitch using a magnetoelastic sensor, a load cell, a strain gauge, an accelerometer, etc. (¶ [0044]) but is silent specifically to sensor information relating to distance.
In the same field of endeavor, Wojtkowicz teaches estimating tensile and compressive forces in a trailer hitch using a force sensor (32) that can be embodied as a traditional load cell, but can also be embodied as a sensor whose readings change in accordance with a distance between a transfer object and a transfer vehicle that is transferring the transfer object (¶ [0021]; VCU determines loads using proximity/radar sensor, contact distance sensor (e.g. a cable), or a camera.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing of the invention to use Wojtkowicz’s distance sensor to determine tensile loads in a transfer object as a means of estimating weight of the transfer object as taught by Rogness for the purpose of using existing cameras or ranging sensors associated with the transfer vehicle for the benefit of not needing to retrofit some vehicles with hitch sensors by capitalizing on existing technology.
Furthermore, it’s been held that applying a known technique (using distance between towed object and towing vehicle as a measure of tensile and compressive forces imparted by the towed object) to a known method (using tensile and compressive forces on a trailer hitch to determine towed load weight) is within the purview of one having ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-421 (2007).
Regarding claim 13, Rogness discloses in at least figures 1, 6, and 9 a transfer method (¶ [0044]) acquiring sensor information (¶ [0044]), and estimating a weight of the transfer object (figure 9A: 902, ¶ [0118])) on the basis of time-series data of the sensor information (¶ [0044]).
Rogness discloses that the weight of the transfer object can be estimated using force information obtained from sensors from a trailer hitch using a magnetoelastic sensor, a load cell, a strain gauge, an accelerometer, etc. (¶ [0044]) but is silent specifically to sensor information relating to distance.
In the same field of endeavor, Wojtkowicz teaches estimating tensile and compressive forces in a trailer hitch using a force sensor (32) that can be embodied as a traditional load cell, but can also be embodied as a sensor whose readings change in accordance with a distance between a transfer object and a transfer vehicle that is transferring the transfer object (¶ [0021]; VCU determines loads using proximity/radar sensor, contact distance sensor (e.g. a cable), or a camera.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing of the invention to use Wojtkowicz’s distance sensor to determine tensile loads in a transfer object as a means of estimating weight of the transfer object as taught by Rogness for the purpose of using existing cameras or ranging sensors associated with the transfer vehicle for the benefit of not needing to retrofit some vehicles with hitch sensors by capitalizing on existing technology.
Furthermore, it’s been held that applying a known technique (using distance between towed object and towing vehicle as a measure of tensile and compressive forces imparted by the towed object) to a known method (using tensile and compressive forces on a trailer hitch to determine towed load weight) is within the purview of one having ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-421 (2007).
Regarding claim 19, Rogness as modified by Wojtkowicz discloses a computer-readable non-transitory storage medium storing a program (see Rogness, ¶ [0056]) for causing a computer to function as a transfer device according to claim 7, the program for causing the computer to carry out the acquisition process and the estimation process (see rejection of claim 7 above).
The reasons and motivation for combining are the same as recited in the rejection of claim 7 above.
Allowable Subject Matter
There are no prior art rejections for claims 2-6, 8-12, and 14-18. While Wojtkowicz generally discloses estimating tensile and compressive forces on a tow hitch using a distance sensor, these claims are all drawn to specific details of the calculations not disclosed or rendered obvious by Wojtkowicz or any other prior art.
However, because currently all claims are rejected under §101, Examiner cannot comment on the allowability as a whole at this time.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
US 2013/0253814 discloses the state of the art of trailer hitch load sensing.
US 2025/0065888 and US 2025/0118045 discloses determining trailer weight based on camera images.
US 2020/0353997 generally discloses using a camera or other sensor to detect parameters associated with a towed object.
US 2022/0043452 discloses estimating the load of an object being transferred by an autonomous vehicle.
US 2020/0198423 discloses determining trailer weight based on a hitch load sensor that is based on magnetic field sensing (which uses a measure of distance).
US 2017/0334256 and USPN 3,700,053 disclose determining trailer weight based on a hitch load sensor that is based on distance between two sensing elements.
USPN 3,990,032 and DE 10 2016 109 424 discloses determining trailer weight based on a hitch load sensor that is based on elastic deformation of a spring type sensor which (which uses a measure of distance).
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to NATALIE HULS whose telephone number is (571)270-5914. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-5 EST.
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/NATALIE HULS/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2855
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