DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions & Status of Claims
Claims 1-9 were amended in Applicant’s reply and under examination.
Claims 10-13 remain withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on 14 July 2025.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
List 1
Element
Instant Claims
(mass%)
Prior Art
(mass%)
C
0.05 – 0.3
0.075 – 0.300
Si
0.01 – 2.0
0.30 – 2.50
Mn
1.5 -3.0
1.30 – 3.50
Al
0.01 – 0.1
0.001 – 1.500
P
0.001 – 0.015
0.001 – 0.050
S
0.001 – 0.01
0.0001 – 0.0100
N
0.001 – 0.01
0.0001 – 0.0100
Cr, Mo, B
Claim 8: one or more of Cr: 1.0 or less, Mo: 0.2 or less and B: 0.005 or less
Cr: 0.01 – 2.00
Fe + impurities
Balance
Balance
Claims 1-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over JP 2013-163827 A of Azuma and its English machine translation (JP’827).
Regarding claims 1-9, JP 2013-163827 A of Azuma and its English machine translation (JP’827) teaches “a high-strength cold-rolled steel sheet, a high-strength galvanized steel sheet, and a high-strength galvannealed steel sheet, and relates to a high-strength steel sheet having excellent bendability” with a composition wherein the claimed ranges of the constituent elements of the instant alloy of the instant claims overlap or lie inside the ranges of various elements of the alloy of the prior art as shown in the List 1 above. As the claimed ranges overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art, a prima facie case of obviousness is established as it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains to select the claimed composition over the prior art disclosure since the prior art teaches the similar property/utility throughout the disclosed ranges. In the case where the claimed ranges "overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art" a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-71, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2144.05 I. {JP’827 abstract, [0001]-[0002], [0013]-[0088], tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3 claims 1-14}.
The prior art is silent regarding the recited [Relational Expression 1] and its range of instant claim 1. However, as the prior art discloses a composition wherein the claimed ranges of the various elements of the instant alloy overlap or lie inside the ranges of various elements of the alloy of the prior art as shown above, the ranges of the formulaic expression of the instant claims would also overlap or lie inside the values of the prior art resulting from the instant formulaic expressions. In addition, it is well settled that there is no invention in the discovery of a general formula if it covers a composition described in the prior art, In re Cooper and Foley 1943 C.D. 357, 553 O.G. 177; 57 USPQ 117, Saklatwalla v. Marburg, 620 O.G. 685, 1949 C.D. 77, and In re Pilling, 403 O.G. 513, 44 F(2) 878, 1931 C.D. 75.
The prior art teaches that its steel sheet has “900 MPa or higher tensile maximum strength”, points out many examples above 1200 MPa in Tables 3-1 to 3-3 and also teaches “Those satisfying the conditions of the present invention have both a maximum tensile strength of 900 MPa or more and good bendability. The balance of strength (TS) -total elongation (El) (TS × El) was also as good as 18000 (MPa·%) or more.” thereby reading on the recited tensile strength range of instant claim 6 as well the range of the product of tensile strength and elongation of instant claim 7.
The prior art further teaches it steel sheet structure has 50% or more Bainite, 3-30% Residual Austenite, 47% or less Tempered Martensite and 15% or less Fresh Martensite thereby reading on the recited microstructure of the instant claims 1-5. Regarding the sum of bainite and martensite, the prior art allows the sum of bainite and martensite to as high as 97% (see the various phases, their minimum and maximum) thereby meeting the recited limitation of instant claim 1.
It is noted that the prior art is silent regarding its alloy having the properties of a) “an average number of surface defects satisfying one or more conditions of a depth of 100 μm or more and a short side length of 1 mm or more, is less than 10/m2” [claim 1], b) “a yield strength is 870 MPa or more” [claim 6] and c) “a difference in yield strength between both end portions and a center portion is 100 MPa or less, in a width direction of the cold-rolled steel sheet” [claim 9] as recited in the instant claims. Where the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977). See MPEP § 2112.01 I. “Products of identical chemical composition can not have mutually exclusive properties.” A chemical composition and its properties are inseparable. Therefore, if the prior art teaches the identical chemical structure, the properties applicant discloses and/or claims are necessarily present. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See MPEP § 2112.01 II. Therefore, it is expected that the alloy of the prior art possesses the properties as claimed in the instant claims since a) the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition (see compositional analysis above) and b) the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition (see microstructure analysis above). Since the Office does not have a laboratory to test the reference alloy, it is applicant’s burden to show that the reference alloy does not possess the properties as claimed in the instant claims. See In re Best, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977); In re Marosi, 218 USPQ 289, 292-293 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Fitzgerald et al., 205 USPQ 594 (CCPA 1980).
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1-9 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-13 of copending Application No. 18/694,598 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the reference application recite a high-strength cold rolled steel sheet with substantially identical composition, microstructure and properties. It is noted that the claims of the reference application does not require the presence of austenite as required by instant claim 2. However, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains to take the sheet of the reference application and include residual austenite to improve the ductility of the steel sheet.
In addition, it is noted that there is a slight difference between the recited values of [Relational Expression 1] between the two applications. MPEP § 2144.05 I provides the guidance that Similarly, a prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges or amounts do not overlap with the prior art but are merely close. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner,778 F.2d 775, 783, 227 USPQ 773, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Court held as proper a rejection of a claim directed to an alloy of "having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% molybdenum, up to 0.1% iron, balance titanium" as obvious over a reference disclosing alloys of 0.75% nickel, 0.25% molybdenum, balance titanium and 0.94% nickel, 0.31% molybdenum, balance titanium. "The proportions are so close that prima facie one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties."). As both the instant claims and that of the reference application recites substantially identical properties such as the ranges of “surface defects”, “tensile strength”, “yield strength” as well as “difference in yield strength” between various portions, there is no there is no evidence on the record that the difference of the ranges such as “1.2” (lower limit of instant claim) vs “less than 1.2” (upper limit of reference application) for the [Relational Expression 1] would provide different distinguishable properties.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 11/19/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
With respect to the arguments that the embodiments provided by the prior art do not teach the claimed matter, the arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Patents are relevant as prior art for all they contain. "The use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions or to the problems with which they are concerned. They are part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they contain." In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1332-33, 216 USPQ 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting In re Lemelson, 397 F.2d 1006, 1009, 158 USPQ 275, 277 (CCPA 1968)). Disclosed examples and preferred embodiments do not constitute a teaching away from a broader disclosure or nonpreferred embodiments. In re Susi, 440 F.2d 442, 169 USPQ 423 (CCPA 1971).See MPEP § 2123.
Regarding the argument that the ranges of Relational Expression 1 is critical to attaining the claimed steel sheet, Whether the unexpected results are the result of unexpectedly improved results or a property not taught by the prior art, the “objective evidence of nonobviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence is offered to support.” In other words, the showing of unexpected results must be reviewed to see if the results occur over the entire claimed range. In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1036, 206 USPQ 289, 296 (CCPA 1980). See MPEP § 716.02(d). To establish unexpected results over a claimed range, applicants should compare a sufficient number of tests both inside and outside the claimed range to show the criticality of the claimed range. In re Hill, 284 F.2d 955, 128 USPQ 197 (CCPA 1960). See MPEP § 716.02(d) II. However, there is no data in the instant that clearly demonstrates the criticality of the claimed range and therefore the claimed range is deemed obvious over the prior art teachings. Although the prior art is silent regarding the recited [Relational Expression 1] and its range of instant claim 1,as the prior art discloses a composition wherein the claimed ranges of the various elements of the instant alloy overlap or lie inside the ranges of various elements of the alloy of the prior art as shown above, the ranges of the formulaic expression of the instant claims would also overlap or lie inside the values of the prior art resulting from the instant formulaic expressions. In addition, it is well settled that there is no invention in the discovery of a general formula if it covers a composition described in the prior art, In re Cooper and Foley 1943 C.D. 357, 553 O.G. 177; 57 USPQ 117, Saklatwalla v. Marburg, 620 O.G. 685, 1949 C.D. 77, and In re Pilling, 403 O.G. 513, 44 F(2) 878, 1931 C.D. 75.
Regarding the argument that the prior art does not teach a substantially identical method of making the alloy and therefore it would not have the claimed properties, it is noted that the rejection states that it is expected that the alloy of the prior art possesses the properties as claimed in the instant claims since a) the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition (see compositional analysis above) and b) the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition (see microstructure analysis above). As the prior art teaches an identical or substantially identical in microstructure and composition as shown above, one would expect the prior art to have the properties recited in the instant claim. Applicant’s own specification teaches that the recited properties that the prior art is silent of is attained in all conditions meeting the compositional and microstructural limitation recited in claim 1.
As noted above, the prior art renders the instant claims obvious. If a prima facie case of obviousness is established, the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with arguments and/or evidence to rebut the prima facie case. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Rebuttal evidence and arguments can be presented in the specification, In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750, 34 USPQ2d 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1995), by counsel, In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 299, 36 USPQ2d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1995), or by way of an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132, e.g., Soni, 54 F.3d at 750, 34 USPQ2d at 1687; In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1474, 223 USPQ 785, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However, arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40, 40 USPQ2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See MPEP § 2145. Attorney argument is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art. The arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness."). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of attorney statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration. See MPEP § 2145 I.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOPHY S. KOSHY whose telephone number is (571)272-0030. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8:30 AM- 5:00 PM.
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/JOPHY S. KOSHY/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1733