DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-16 have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The invention, as taught in Claims 1-16, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• obtaining,…from the training dataset, an unpaired training example from the second sequence domain
• generate a sample from the first sequence domain
• determining,…, a first likelihood that the unpaired training example from the second sequence domain is output from a decoder model when conditioned on the sample from the first sequence domain generated by the encoder model
• updating,…, one or more parameter values of the decoder model based at least in part on the first likelihood
• generating…, a sample from the second sequence domain using the decoder model when conditioned on data from the first sequence domain
• determining,…, a second likelihood that the data from the first sequence domain is output by the encoder model when conditioned on the sample from the second sequence domain
• updating,…, one or more parameter values of the encoder model based at least in part on the second likelihood
• unpaired training example from the second sequence domain
Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computer-implemented method to learn a noisy channel generative model for a first sequence domain and a second sequence domain, the method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• “the computing system”
• “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations”
• “encoder model”
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “the computing system”
(2) A “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations”
(3) A “encoder model”
(1) A “computing system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “computing system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “encoder model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “encoder model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “the computing system”
(2) A “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations”
(3) A “encoder model”
(1) A “computing system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Applicant's claimed “computing system” is generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant’s Specification, paragraphs [0069]-[0070] recites:
[0069] The user computing device 102 can be any type of computing device, such as, for example, a personal computing device (e.g., laptop or desktop), a mobile computing device (e.g., smartphone or tablet), a gaming console or controller, a wearable computing device, an embedded computing device, or any other type of computing device.
[0070] The user computing device 102 includes one or more processors 112 and a memory 114. The one or more processors 112 can be any suitable processing device (e.g., a processor core, a microprocessor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a controller, a microcontroller, etc.) and can be one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 114 can include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media, such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The memory 114 can store data 116 and instructions 118 which are executed by the processor 112 to cause the user computing device 102 to perform operations.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed models are generic, well-understood, routine and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0071] recites:
[0071] In some implementations, the user computing device 102 can store or include one or more machine-learned models 120. For example, the machine-learned models 120 can be or can otherwise include various machine-learned models such as neural networks (e.g., deep neural networks) or other types of machine-learned models, including non-linear models and/or linear models. Neural networks can include feed-forward neural networks, recurrent neural networks (e.g., long short-term memory recurrent neural networks), convolutional neural networks or other forms of neural networks. Some example machine-learned models can leverage an attention mechanism such as self-attention. For example, some example machine-learned models can include multi-headed self-attention models (e.g., transformer models). Example machine-learned models 120 are discussed with reference to Figures lA-E.
Therefore, simply using the “generative training iterations”/ “variational training iterations” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “encoder model” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “encoder model” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “encoder model” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed models are generic, well-understood, routine and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0071] recites:
[0071] In some implementations, the user computing device 102 can store or include one or more machine-learned models 120. For example, the machine-learned models 120 can be or can otherwise include various machine-learned models such as neural networks (e.g., deep neural networks) or other types of machine-learned models, including non-linear models and/or linear models. Neural networks can include feed-forward neural networks, recurrent neural networks (e.g., long short-term memory recurrent neural networks), convolutional neural networks or other forms of neural networks. Some example machine-learned models can leverage an attention mechanism such as self-attention. For example, some example machine-learned models can include multi-headed self-attention models (e.g., transformer models). Example machine-learned models 120 are discussed with reference to Figures lA-E.
Therefore, simply using the “encoder model” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 2
Claim 2 recites:
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the first sequence domain comprises textual sequences and the second sequence domain comprises sequences of speech data.
Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches mentally understood input data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the second sequence domain comprises textual sequences and the first sequence domain comprises sequences of speech data.
Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches mentally understood input data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:
4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the first sequence domain comprises textual sequences and the second sequence domain comprises sequences of image data corresponding to rendered characters.
Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches mentally understood input data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 5
Claim 5 recites:
5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the first sequence domain comprises sequences expressed in a first language and the second sequence domain comprises sequences expressed in a second language.
Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches mentally understood input data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:
6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the data from the first sequence domain comprises a sample from the first sequence domain generated by a prior model.
Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches mentally understood input data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 7
Claim 7 recites:
7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, further comprising, for one or more of the generative training iterations:
obtaining, by the computing system from the training dataset, an unpaired training example from the first sequence domain;
determining, by the computing system, a third likelihood that the unpaired training example from the first sequence domain is output from the prior model; and
updating, by the computing system, one or more parameter values of the prior model based at least in part on the third likelihood.
Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches the receipt of training data, determination of a likelihood, and the updating of mathematical data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites:
8. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising, for one or more of the generative training iterations:
obtaining, by the computing system from the training dataset, a paired training example comprising paired training data from the first sequence domain and paired training data from the second sequence domain;
determining, by the computing system, a fourth likelihood that the paired training data from the first sequence domain is output from the prior model;
updating, by the computing system, one or more parameter values of the prior model based at least in part on the fourth likelihood;
determining, by the computing system, a fifth likelihood that the paired training data from the second sequence domain is output from the decoder model when conditioned on the paired training data from the first sequence domain; and
updating, by the computing system, one or more parameter values of the decoder model based at least in part on the fifth likelihood.
Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches the receipt of training data, the mental/mathematical determination of a likelihood, the updating of mathematical data, another determination of a likelihood, and the updating of more mathematical data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 9
Claim 9 recites:
9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the decoder model is expressed as a product of time-local factors.
Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches a mathematical product. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:
10. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:
inverting, by the computing system, the decoder model to generate data from the first sequential domain when provided with data from the second sequential domain.
Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches the generic use of a computer and a decoder model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11
Claim 11 recites:
11. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein one or both of the encoder model and decoder model comprise autoregressive recurrent neural networks.
Applicant’s Claim 11 merely teaches the use ofgeneric autoregressive recurrent neural networks. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 12
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “12. A computer system, comprising…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 12 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 12 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• two sequences
• instructions
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A non-transitory computer-readable media
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model”
(4) An execution by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “non-transitory computer-readable media” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “non-transitory computer-readable media” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) A “execution by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “execution by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A non-transitory computer-readable media
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model”
(4) An execution by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Applicant's claimed “processor” is generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant’s Specification, paragraphs [0069]-[0070] recites:
[0069] The user computing device 102 can be any type of computing device, such as, for example, a personal computing device (e.g., laptop or desktop), a mobile computing device (e.g., smartphone or tablet), a gaming console or controller, a wearable computing device, an embedded computing device, or any other type of computing device.
[0070] The user computing device 102 includes one or more processors 112 and a memory 114. The one or more processors 112 can be any suitable processing device (e.g., a processor core, a microprocessor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a controller, a microcontroller, etc.) and can be one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 114 can include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media, such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The memory 114 can store data 116 and instructions 118 which are executed by the processor 112 to cause the user computing device 102 to perform operations.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “non-transitory computer-readable media” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed models are generic, well-understood, routine and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0071] recites:
[0071] In some implementations, the user computing device 102 can store or include one or more machine-learned models 120. For example, the machine-learned models 120 can be or can otherwise include various machine-learned models such as neural networks (e.g., deep neural networks) or other types of machine-learned models, including non-linear models and/or linear models. Neural networks can include feed-forward neural networks, recurrent neural networks (e.g., long short-term memory recurrent neural networks), convolutional neural networks or other forms of neural networks. Some example machine-learned models can leverage an attention mechanism such as self-attention. For example, some example machine-learned models can include multi-headed self-attention models (e.g., transformer models). Example machine-learned models 120 are discussed with reference to Figures lA-E.
Therefore, simply using the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learning using a variational posterior model” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) A “execution by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Applicant's claimed “processor” is generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant’s Specification, paragraphs [0069]-[0070] recites:
[0069] The user computing device 102 can be any type of computing device, such as, for example, a personal computing device (e.g., laptop or desktop), a mobile computing device (e.g., smartphone or tablet), a gaming console or controller, a wearable computing device, an embedded computing device, or any other type of computing device.
[0070] The user computing device 102 includes one or more processors 112 and a memory 114. The one or more processors 112 can be any suitable processing device (e.g., a processor core, a microprocessor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a controller, a microcontroller, etc.) and can be one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 114 can include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media, such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The memory 114 can store data 116 and instructions 118 which are executed by the processor 112 to cause the user computing device 102 to perform operations.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 13
Claim 13 recites:
13. The computer system of claim 12, wherein the variational posterior model has been trained with a KL encoder loss function.
Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches the use of a generic variational posterior model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The computer system of claim 13, wherein the KL encoder loss comprises a KL divergence to a generative distribution of the noisy channel generative model.
Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches a mathematical function in the art called a “KL encoder loss”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 15
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “15. A computer system, comprising …” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 15 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 15 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• two sequences
• KL encoder loss function
• instructions
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A non-transitory computer-readable medium
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “non-transitory computer-readable medium” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A processor
(2) A non-transitory computer-readable medium
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Applicant's claimed “processor” is generic, well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant’s Specification, paragraphs [0069]-[0070] recites:
[0069] The user computing device 102 can be any type of computing device, such as, for example, a personal computing device (e.g., laptop or desktop), a mobile computing device (e.g., smartphone or tablet), a gaming console or controller, a wearable computing device, an embedded computing device, or any other type of computing device.
[0070] The user computing device 102 includes one or more processors 112 and a memory 114. The one or more processors 112 can be any suitable processing device (e.g., a processor core, a microprocessor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a controller, a microcontroller, etc.) and can be one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected. The memory 114 can include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media, such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof. The memory 114 can store data 116 and instructions 118 which are executed by the processor 112 to cause the user computing device 102 to perform operations.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed models are generic, well-understood, routine and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0071] recites:
[0071] In some implementations, the user computing device 102 can store or include one or more machine-learned models 120. For example, the machine-learned models 120 can be or can otherwise include various machine-learned models such as neural networks (e.g., deep neural networks) or other types of machine-learned models, including non-linear models and/or linear models. Neural networks can include feed-forward neural networks, recurrent neural networks (e.g., long short-term memory recurrent neural networks), convolutional neural networks or other forms of neural networks. Some example machine-learned models can leverage an attention mechanism such as self-attention. For example, some example machine-learned models can include multi-headed self-attention models (e.g., transformer models). Example machine-learned models 120 are discussed with reference to Figures lA-E.
Therefore, simply using the “noisy channel generative model”/ “learned using a KL encoder loss function”/ “executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to implement the noisy channel generative model to convert data from a second sequence domain to a first sequence domain” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
16. The computer system of claim 15, wherein the KL encoder loss comprises a KL divergence to a generative distribution of the noisy channel generative model.
Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches a mathematical function in the art called “KL encoder loss”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Conclusion
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov.
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/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122
WLS
23 JUN 2026
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