Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 04, 2026
Application No. 18/696,268

SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR GENERATING SPATIOTEMPORAL SENSORY CODES

Non-Final OA §101
Filed
Mar 27, 2024
Priority
Sep 28, 2021 — provisional 63/249,314 +1 more
Examiner
STARKS, WILBERT L
Art Unit
3791
Tech Center
3700 — Mechanical Engineering & Manufacturing
Assignee
Dandelion Science Corp.
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
75%
Grant Probability
Favorable
1-2
OA Rounds
9m
Est. Remaining
78%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 75% — above average
75%
Career Allowance Rate
500 granted / 669 resolved
+4.7% vs TC avg
Minimal +3% lift
Without
With
+3.2%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 5m
Avg Prosecution
33 currently pending
Career history
731
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
34.0%
-6.0% vs TC avg
§103
14.8%
-25.2% vs TC avg
§102
39.7%
-0.3% vs TC avg
§112
6.0%
-34.0% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 669 resolved cases

Office Action

§101
DETAILED ACTION Claims 1, 3-4, 6-10, 12-13, 15-17, and 20-26 have been examined. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The invention, as taught in Claims 1, 3-4, 6-10, 12-13, 15-17, and 20-26, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more. The claims recite: • sampling a spatiotemporal sensory code generation model with a first encoding vector (i.e., mathematical steps) • determining an outcome function based, at least in part, on said one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • producing a second encoding vector based, at least in part, on the first encoding vector and the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • iteratively repeating said sampling (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • determining with the second encoding vector, and any successive encoding vectors, until a defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function is satisfied (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) Claim 1 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “1. A method for providing spatiotemporal sensory inputs to one or more participants to produce a stimulus map of the brain, the method comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • sampling a spatiotemporal sensory code generation model with a first encoding vector (i.e., mathematical steps) • determining an outcome function based, at least in part, on said one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • producing a second encoding vector based, at least in part, on the first encoding vector and the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • iteratively repeating said sampling (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • determining with the second encoding vector, and any successive encoding vectors, until a defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function is satisfied (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. This “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part: Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include: *** vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *** Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation. This “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… This “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0112] recites: [0112] The system 700 outputs a visual code or codes to the electronic display 725 of the personal electronic device, e.g., mobile device 720. The visual codes are adapted to act as the visual stimulus to produce physiological responses having therapeutic or performance- enhancing effects. In particular implementations, the neural response may be one that affects an emotional state, a brain state, a physiological state, an interoceptive state, and/or a behavioral state of the user. The outputting to the electronic display 725, e.g., to the electronic display of the user's mobile device 720 (or other type of personal electronic device), the visual code or codes induces a reaction in the user resulting, for example, in an emotional change, a physiological change, an interoceptive change, and/or a behavioral change. The change in state and/or induced reaction in the user 710 may result in, inter alia, enhanced alertness, reduced anxiety, reduced pain, reduced depression, migraine relief, fear relief, and increased happiness. In implementations, the therapeutic effect may be usable as a substitute for, or adjunct to, anesthesia. Therefore, simply using the outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 3 Claim 3 recites: 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the generation model comprises procedural graphics using input parameters including one or more of: spatial frequencies, temporal frequencies, spatial locations, spatial extents, and translation-based motion vectors. Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches the generic graphical display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 4 Claim 4 recites: 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the spatiotemporal sensory code generation model comprises a generative adversarial network or deep diffusion model and the first encoding vector points to a location in a latent generation space. Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches The generic use of an “AI model” that can be either a generative adversarial network or deep diffusion model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 6 Claim 6 recites: 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the first video sequence has N frames starting from time Ti, and the method further comprises: applying a per-frame window function to the first video sequence; and adding the result to an output frame buffer, filling frames from Ti to Ti+N. Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches the application of a mathematical window function. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 7 Claim 7 recites: 7. The method of claim 1, wherein successive encoding vectors are produced based at least in part on the outcome function and a plurality of preceding encoding vectors. Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches The use of a mathematical outcome function and mathematical encoding vectors. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 8 Claim 8 recites: 8. The method of claim 1, wherein said producing the second encoding vector is done at time Ti+S, where S<=N, and the method further comprises: applying the per-frame window function to the second video sequence; and adding the result to the output frame buffer, resulting in the output frame buffer comprising frames Ti to Ti+S+N. Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches the application of a mathematical window function. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 9 Claim 9 recites: 9. The method of claim 8, wherein, during said outputting, frames from Ti to Ti+S are output from the output frame buffer to be presented to said one or more participants while the second video sequence is being produced. Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches the generic retrieval of data from a data buffer. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 10 Claim 10 recites: 10. The method of claim 1, wherein said outputting comprises displaying said sequence of spatiotemporal sensory inputs to one or more electronic screens. Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches the generic display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 12 Claim 12 recites: 12. The method of claim 1, wherein said one or more neural response measurements are received from a multiple-channel buffer comprising current multiple-channel neural response measurements and previous multiple-channel neural response measurements. Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches the generic receipt of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 13 Claim 13 recites: 13. The method of claim 1, further comprising: aligning timewise, across said one or more participants, said one or more neural response measurements; extracting one or more features for each measurement time step across said one or more neural response measurements and across said one or more participants; and comparing said one or more extracted features to targets to calculate the outcome function. Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches the mental steps of aligning neural response measurements, extracting one or more features, and comparing said one or more extracted features to targets. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 15 Claim 15 recites: 15. The method of claim 1, wherein, in storing said resulting spatiotemporal sensory code to form part of the stimulus map of the brain, a feature representation of said one or more neural response measurements is associated with a location in a high dimensional space. Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches the generic storing of data and the mental step of association. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 16 Claim 16 recites: 16. The method of claim 1, said resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is associated with a neural state at a specific brain location. Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches the mental step of association. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 17 Claim 17 recites: 17. The method of claim 1, said resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is associated with a whole-brain neural state which is defined in terms of multivariate cross-coherence across spectral bands and said resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is adapted to maximize the cross-coherence across one or more pairs of nodes of the brain map. Applicant’s Claim 17 merely teaches the mental step of association. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 20 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “20. A system for providing spatiotemporal sensory inputs to one or more participants to produce a stimulus map of the brain, the system comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 20 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 20 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • sampling a spatiotemporal sensory code generation model with a first encoding vector (i.e., mathematical steps) • determining an outcome function based, at least in part, on said one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • producing a second encoding vector based, at least in part, on the first encoding vector and the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • iteratively repeating said sampling (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • determining with the second encoding vector, and any successive encoding vectors, until a defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function is satisfied (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (5) A “processor” (6) A “memory” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. This “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part: Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include: *** vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *** Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation. This “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… This “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (5) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (6) A “memory” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. This “memory” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (5) A “processor” (6) A “memory” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0112] recites: [0112] The system 700 outputs a visual code or codes to the electronic display 725 of the personal electronic device, e.g., mobile device 720. The visual codes are adapted to act as the visual stimulus to produce physiological responses having therapeutic or performance- enhancing effects. In particular implementations, the neural response may be one that affects an emotional state, a brain state, a physiological state, an interoceptive state, and/or a behavioral state of the user. The outputting to the electronic display 725, e.g., to the electronic display of the user's mobile device 720 (or other type of personal electronic device), the visual code or codes induces a reaction in the user resulting, for example, in an emotional change, a physiological change, an interoceptive change, and/or a behavioral change. The change in state and/or induced reaction in the user 710 may result in, inter alia, enhanced alertness, reduced anxiety, reduced pain, reduced depression, migraine relief, fear relief, and increased happiness. In implementations, the therapeutic effect may be usable as a substitute for, or adjunct to, anesthesia. Therefore, simply using the outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (5) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (6) A “memory” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 21 Claim 21 recites: 21. The system of claim 20, wherein the first video sequence has N frames starting from time Ti, and the method further comprises: applying a per-frame window function to the first video sequence; and adding the result to an output frame buffer, filling frames from Ti to Ti+N. Applicant’s Claim 21 merely teaches the application of a mathematical window function. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 21 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 22 Claim 22 recites: 22. The system of claim 20, wherein said producing the second encoding vector is done at time Ti+S, where S<=N, and the method further comprises: applying the per-frame window function to the second video sequence; and adding the result to the output frame buffer, resulting in the output frame buffer comprising frames Ti to Ti+S+N. Applicant’s Claim 22 merely teaches the application of a mathematical window function. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 22 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 23 Claim 23 recites: 23. The system of claim 20, wherein said outputting comprises displaying said sequence of spatiotemporal sensory inputs to said one or more electronic screens. Applicant’s Claim 23 merely teaches the generic display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 23 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 24 Claim 24 recites: 24. The system of claim 20, wherein said one or more neural response measurements are received from a multiple-channel buffer comprising current multiple-channel neural response measurements and previous multiple-channel neural response measurements. Applicant’s Claim 24 merely teaches the generic receipt of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 24 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 25 Claim 25 recites: 25. The system of claim 20, wherein the memory further stores instructions executable by said one or more processors to perform: aligning timewise, across said one or more participants, said one or more neural response measurements; extracting one or more features for each measurement time step across said one or more neural response measurements and across said one or more participants; and comparing said one or more extracted features to targets to calculate the outcome function. Applicant’s Claim 25 merely teaches the mental steps of aligning neural response measurements, extracting one or more features, and comparing said one or more extracted features to targets. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 25 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 26 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “26. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause said one or more processors to perform a method for providing spatiotemporal sensory inputs to one or more participants to produce a stimulus map of the brain, the method comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “non-transitory computer-readable medium” (or “product of manufacture”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.” Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 26 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 26 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • sampling a spatiotemporal sensory code generation model with a first encoding vector (i.e., mathematical steps) • determining an outcome function based, at least in part, on said one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • producing a second encoding vector based, at least in part, on the first encoding vector and the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • iteratively repeating said sampling (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • determining with the second encoding vector, and any successive encoding vectors, until a defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function is satisfied (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) • satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria for the outcome function (i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (5) A “processor” (6) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. This “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part: Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include: *** vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *** Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation. This “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… This “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (5) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). (6) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea. Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites: 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. This “non-transitory computer-readable medium” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” (3) An “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” (5) A “processor” (6) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” (1) A “spatiotemporal sensory code generation model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (2) A “receiving one or more neural response measurements for said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (3) A “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is a broad term which is described at a high level. Further, since the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0112] recites: [0112] The system 700 outputs a visual code or codes to the electronic display 725 of the personal electronic device, e.g., mobile device 720. The visual codes are adapted to act as the visual stimulus to produce physiological responses having therapeutic or performance- enhancing effects. In particular implementations, the neural response may be one that affects an emotional state, a brain state, a physiological state, an interoceptive state, and/or a behavioral state of the user. The outputting to the electronic display 725, e.g., to the electronic display of the user's mobile device 720 (or other type of personal electronic device), the visual code or codes induces a reaction in the user resulting, for example, in an emotional change, a physiological change, an interoceptive change, and/or a behavioral change. The change in state and/or induced reaction in the user 710 may result in, inter alia, enhanced alertness, reduced anxiety, reduced pain, reduced depression, migraine relief, fear relief, and increased happiness. In implementations, the therapeutic effect may be usable as a substitute for, or adjunct to, anesthesia. Therefore, simply using the outputting the first video sequence” / “one or more neural response measurements being performed while the first spatiotemporal sensory input is being presented to each respective one of said one or more participants to produce a result is not eligible. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (4) A “resulting spatiotemporal sensory code is stored to form part of a stimulus map of the brain” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (5) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). (6) A “non-transitory computer-readable medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 26 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Reasons for Not Rejecting the Clams Under Art Claims 1, 3-4, 6-10, 12-13, 15-17, and 20-26 are not rejected since when reading the claims in light of the Specification, as per MPEP § 2111.01, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 1. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Chang, et al., The Code for Facial Identity in the Primate Brain, Cell, 169, 01 JUN 2017, pp. 1013-1028 fails to expressly teach: Claim 1's "...spatiotemporal sensory code generation model..." Claim 1's "...set of stopping criteria..." Claim 1's "...satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria" Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 20. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Chang, et al., Cell, 169, 01 JUN 2017, pp. 1013-1028 fails to expressly teach: Claim 20's "...spatiotemporal sensory code generation model..." Claim 20's "...set of stopping criteria..." Claim 20's "...satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria" Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 26. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Chang, et al., Cell, 169, 01 JUN 2017, pp. 1013-1028 fails to expressly teach: Claim 26's "...spatiotemporal sensory code generation model..." Claim 26's "...set of stopping criteria..." Claim 26's "...satisfying the defined set of stopping criteria" Only to the extent that these limitations (specifically as defined above) are not found in the prior art of record is the present case not rejected over the prior art. Conclusion Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov. If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to (571) 273-8300. If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at (571) 272-3719. Hand-delivered responses should be delivered to the Receptionist @ (Customer Service Window Randolph Building 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22313), located on the first floor of the south side of the Randolph Building. Finally, information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Moreover, status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have any questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) toll-free @ 1-866-217-9197. /WILBERT L STARKS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122 WLS 23 SEP 2026
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Prosecution Timeline

Mar 27, 2024
Application Filed
Oct 01, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §101 (current)

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