FEDERATED UNLEARNING METHOD BASED ON MALICIOUS TERMINAL INTERVENTION TRAINING

Application No. 18/697,677

• Filed: Apr 01, 2024
• Priority: Apr 10, 2023 — CN 202310371399.3
  • Aug 18, 2023 — nonprovisional of PCTCN2023113649
• Examiner: STARKS, WILBERT L
• Assignee: Dalian University
• OA Round: 1 (Non-Final)

Office Action

DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-10 have been examined.

Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .

Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

The invention, as taught in Claims 1-10, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• setting clients (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps) C={C1, C2, . . . , CN} involved in training and local training data D={D1, D2, . . . , DN} of the clients
• improving the setting of experimental parameters (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps)
• setting the parameters as the parameters of the final global model minus each round of parameter update of the malicious client (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps)
• deciding whether to terminate the unlearning operation in advance by judging the predicting score of the unlearning model (i.e., mental steps)
• after obtaining the corresponding predicting score, determining the performance of the model (i.e., mental steps)

Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?

The preamble of the claim recites “1. A federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training, comprising the following steps…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”

Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:

Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?

YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• setting clients (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps) C={C1, C2, . . . , CN} involved in training and local training data D={D1, D2, . . . , DN} of the clients
• improving the setting of experimental parameters (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps)
• setting the parameters as the parameters of the final global model minus each round of parameter update of the malicious client (i.e., mental steps or mathematical steps)
• deciding whether to terminate the unlearning operation in advance by judging the predicting score of the unlearning model (i.e., mental steps)
• after obtaining the corresponding predicting score, determining the performance of the model (i.e., mental steps)

Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:

Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?

Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “building an FL framework”/“constructing a convolutional neural network model” / “performing FL training”/“obtaining a final global model MT”/“establishing an unlearning model MT′”/“performing normal training on the unlearning model using the benchmark dataset for a specified number of times to recover model performance deviations produced when performing the unlearning operation”
(2) A “clients”/“a malicious client”
(3) A “storing a benchmark dataset Db in a central server”/“loading the final global model MT obtained in step 2 and the parameter updates of the malicious client”/“loading the unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3”/“loading the model obtained in step 4”
(4) A “recording each round of training parameter update ΔM of the malicious client in the central server”
(5) A “conducting tests to obtain a predicting score acc(MT)”
(6) A “performing unlearning operation”
(7) A “outputting the unlearning model at this moment as a final model”
(8) A “inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model”

(1) A “building an FL framework”/“constructing a convolutional neural network model” / “performing FL training”/“obtaining a final global model MT”/“establishing an unlearning model MT′”/“performing normal training on the unlearning model using the benchmark dataset for a specified number of times to recover model performance deviations produced when performing the unlearning operation” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:

(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.

Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.

This “building an FL framework”/“constructing a convolutional neural network model” / “performing FL training”/“obtaining a final global model MT”/“establishing an unlearning model MT′”/“performing normal training on the unlearning model using the benchmark dataset for a specified number of times to recover model performance deviations produced when performing the unlearning operation” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(2) A “clients”/“a malicious client” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:

For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

This “clients”/“a malicious client” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(3) A “storing a benchmark dataset Db in a central server”/“loading the final global model MT obtained in step 2 and the parameter updates of the malicious client”/“loading the unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3”/“loading the model obtained in step 4” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

***

iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);

This “storing a benchmark dataset Db in a central server”/“loading the final global model MT obtained in step 2 and the parameter updates of the malicious client”/“loading the unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3”/“loading the model obtained in step 4” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(4) A “recording each round of training parameter update ΔM of the malicious client in the central server” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

***

iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);

This “recording each round of training parameter update ΔM of the malicious client in the central server” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(5) A “conducting tests to obtain a predicting score acc(MT)” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:

(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.

Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.

This “conducting tests to obtain a predicting score acc(MT)” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(6) A “performing unlearning operation” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:

(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.

Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.

This “performing unlearning operation” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(7) A “outputting the unlearning model at this moment as a final model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:

2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]

Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.

This “outputting the unlearning model at this moment as a final model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

(8) A “inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:

2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]

Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.

This “inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).

The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.

Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?

Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “building an FL framework”/“constructing a convolutional neural network model” / “performing FL training”/“obtaining a final global model MT”/“establishing an unlearning model MT′”/“performing normal training on the unlearning model using the benchmark dataset for a specified number of times to recover model performance deviations produced when performing the unlearning operation”
(2) A “clients”/“a malicious client”
(3) A “storing a benchmark dataset Db in a central server”/“loading the final global model MT obtained in step 2 and the parameter updates of the malicious client”/“loading the unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3”/“loading the model obtained in step 4”
(4) A “recording each round of training parameter update ΔM of the malicious client in the central server”
(5) A “conducting tests to obtain a predicting score acc(MT)”
(6) A “performing unlearning operation”
(7) A “outputting the unlearning model at this moment as a final model”
(8) A “inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model”

(1) A “building an FL framework”/“constructing a convolutional neural network model” / “performing FL training”/“obtaining a final global model MT”/“establishing an unlearning model MT′”/“performing normal training on the unlearning model using the benchmark dataset for a specified number of times to recover model performance deviations produced when performing the unlearning operation” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:

For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

Therefore, simply using the “models” to produce a result is not eligible.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(2) A “clients”/“a malicious client” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:

2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]

Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.

Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(3) A “storing a benchmark dataset Db in a central server”/“loading the final global model MT obtained in step 2 and the parameter updates of the malicious client”/“loading the unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3”/“loading the model obtained in step 4” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

***

iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(4) A “recording each round of training parameter update ΔM of the malicious client in the central server” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

***

iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(5) A “conducting tests to obtain a predicting score acc(MT)” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:

For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

Therefore, simply using the “model” to produce a result is not eligible.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(6) A “performing unlearning operation” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:

For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.

Therefore, simply using the “model” to produce a result is not eligible.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(7) A “outputting the unlearning model at this moment as a final model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:

The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:

2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").

Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

(8) A “inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:

The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.

i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …

Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:

2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").

Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.

Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).

Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.

Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 2
Claim 2 recites:

2. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 1, wherein the step 1 specifically comprises:

step 1.1: for an MNIST dataset, performing FL using a customized network CNNMNIST, and defining two convolutional layers and two fully connected layers, wherein the first convolutional layer Conv1 has an input dimension of 3, an output dimension of 20, a convolution kernel size of 5 and a step size of 1; the second convolutional layer Conv2 has an input dimension of 20, an output dimension of 50, a convolution kernel size of 3 and a step size of 1; the first fully connected layer Fc1 maps 1250 dimensions to 500 dimensions; and the second fully connected layer Fc2 maps 500 dimensions to 10 dimensions;

the specific structure of a CNNMNIST model is as follows:

firstly, executing the convolutional layers; after each convolutional layer is run, continuing to execute an activation function and a maximum pooling layer; and executing the first convolutional layer Cony and then the second convolutional layer Conv2, with the process expressed by formula (1):

***
Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches steps in training a convolutional neural network to process a MNIST standard test set. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:

3. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 1, wherein the step 2 specifically comprises:

step 2.1: defining a dataset which contains correct data and is close to the local training data DN of the client in data size as a benchmark dataset Db; storing the benchmark dataset Db in the central server in advance to facilitate subsequent repair of the performance deviations of the unlearning model; and since the size of the benchmark dataset is 1/N of the local training data D, only a small amount of storage space is required to complete the performance recovery of the unlearning model;

step 2.2: FL is a process in which each client involved in training downloads the current training round of global model from the central server;

after using local data to train the current training round of global model downloaded from the central server, generating a local model;

then uploading updated parameters of the local model to the central server, aggregating to generate a new round of global model, and iterating until the converge of the global model; and the FL training process is expressed by formula (5):

Mt=Mt-1+1N∑C=1NΔMCt(5)

wherein Mt is a global model generated by the tth round of FL, t≥1;

N is the total number of clients involved in training; and

ΔMC t represents parameter update generated by the local model of the client C in the tth round;

step 2.3: using a test set Dt for prediction of results to obtain a predicting score acc(MT) of the model, wherein the test process is expressed by formula (6):

acc(MT)=test(Dt,MT)(6)

wherein test is a test function, and Dt and MT are input variables.

Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches defining a dataset and basic steps for using a convolutional neural network. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:

4. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 1, wherein the step 3 specifically comprises:
step 3.1: the parameters of the global model after each round of aggregation and the parameters of the previous round of global model differ by parameters obtained by weighted aggregation of the local model of each client in the current round, and the parameter update ΔMt of the tth round of global model is expressed by formula (7):
Δ⁢Mt=1N⁢∑C=1NΔ⁢MCt(7)
step 3.2: since the malicious client is also involved in the training, the parameter updates of local models of excellent clients and the malicious client can be calculated separately, so the parameter update ΔMt of the tth round of global model is expressed by formula (8):
Δ⁢Mt=1N⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt+1N⁢Δ⁢MNt(8)
wherein ΔMN t is parameter update generated by the local model of the malicious client CN in the tth round;
step 3.3: from the perspective of retrained federated unlearning, the tth round of parameter update ΔMt′ of the unlearning model is parameter aggregation of local models of N−1 excellent clients, which is decomposed into formula (9) through formula simplification:
Δ⁢Mt′=1N-1⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt=NN-1⁢Δ⁢Mt-1N-1⁢Δ⁢MNt(9)
then, assuming that the tth round of parameter update of the malicious client is 0, that is, no contribution is made, the simplification result is expressed by formula (10):
Δ⁢Mt′=1N⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt=Δ⁢Mt-1N⁢Δ⁢MNt(10)
step 3.4: combining formula (10) and formula (4), thus obtaining that the final global model of FL minus each round of parameter update of the malicious client is the final unlearning model MT′, which is expressed by formula (11):
MT′=M0+∑t=1TΔ⁢Mt-1N⁢∑t=1TΔ⁢MNt=MT-1N⁢∑t=1TΔ⁢MNt(11)
wherein T is the number of times of the final round of training of federated unlearning;
step 3.5: choosing to judge the effect of the unlearning model to determine whether to terminate the unlearning operation in advance; and during the 1st round of unlearning operation, the previous round of unlearning model Mpre′ is the final global model MT, and the current round of unlearning model Mcur′ is the previous round of unlearning model minus the 1st round of parameter update of the malicious client, as shown in formula (12), until the accuracy of the previous round of unlearning model is greater than that of the current round of unlearning model, indicating that an over-unlearning phenomenon occurs, the unlearning operation can be terminated in advance, and the final unlearning model is the previous round of unlearning model;
Mcur′=Mpre′-1N⁢MNt(12) Mpre′={MT(t=1)Mcur′(t>1)} if⁢acc⁡(Mpre′)>acc⁡(Mcur′): MT′=Mpre′.

Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches the use of a set of mathematical weighted averages. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 5
Claim 5 recites:

5. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 3, wherein the step 3 specifically comprises:

step 3.1: the parameters of the global model after each round of aggregation and the parameters of the previous round of global model differ by parameters obtained by weighted aggregation of the local model of each client in the current round, and the parameter update ΔMt of the tth round of global model is expressed by formula (7):
Δ⁢Mt=1N⁢∑C=1NΔ⁢MCt(7)

step 3.2: since the malicious client is also involved in the training, the parameter updates of local models of excellent clients and the malicious client can be calculated separately, so the parameter update ΔMt of the tth round of global model is expressed by formula (8):
Δ⁢Mt=1N⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt+1N⁢Δ⁢MNt(8)
wherein ΔMN t is parameter update generated by the local model of the malicious client CN in the tth round;

step 3.3: from the perspective of retrained federated unlearning, the tth round of parameter update ΔMt′ of the unlearning model is parameter aggregation of local models of N−1 excellent clients, which is decomposed into formula (9) through formula simplification:
Δ⁢Mt′=1N-1⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt=NN-1⁢Δ⁢Mt-1N-1⁢Δ⁢MNt(9)
then, assuming that the tth round of parameter update of the malicious client is 0, that is, no contribution is made, the simplification result is expressed by formula (10):
Δ⁢Mt′=1N⁢∑C=1N-1Δ⁢MCt=Δ⁢Mt-1N⁢Δ⁢MNt(10)
step 3.4: combining formula (10) and formula (4), thus obtaining that the final global model of FL minus each round of parameter update of the malicious client is the final unlearning model MT′, which is expressed by formula (11):
MT′=M0+∑t=1TΔ⁢Mt-1N⁢∑t=1TΔ⁢MNt=MT-1N⁢∑t=1TΔ⁢MNt(11)
wherein T is the number of times of the final round of training of federated unlearning;

step 3.5: choosing to judge the effect of the unlearning model to determine whether to terminate the unlearning operation in advance; and during the 1st round of unlearning operation, the previous round of unlearning model Mpre′ is the final global model MT, and the current round of unlearning model Mcur′ is the previous round of unlearning model minus the 1st round of parameter update of the malicious client, as shown in formula (12), until the accuracy of the previous round of unlearning model is greater than that of the current round of unlearning model, indicating that an over-unlearning phenomenon occurs, the unlearning operation can be terminated in advance, and the final unlearning model is the previous round of unlearning model;
Mcur′=Mpre′-1N⁢MNt(12) Mpre′={MT(t=1)Mcur′(t>1)} if⁢acc⁡(Mpre′)>acc⁡(Mcur′): MT′=Mpre′.

Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches weighted averages, parameter updates, combining mathematical formulas, and judging the effect of the model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:

6. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 1, wherein the step 4 specifically comprises: for the final unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3, the final unlearning model MT′ is trained with the benchmark dataset Db for additional m times, which can enhance the final model prediction effect.

Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches training of a convolutional neural network. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 7
Claim 7 recites:

7. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 3, wherein the step 4 specifically comprises: for the final unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3, the final unlearning model MT′ is trained with the benchmark dataset Db for additional m times, which can enhance the final model prediction effect.

Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches training of a convolutional neural network. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 8
Claim 8 recites:

8. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 4, wherein the step 4 specifically comprises: for the final unlearning model MT′ obtained in step 3, the final unlearning model MT′ is trained with the benchmark dataset Db for additional m times, which can enhance the final model prediction effect.

Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches training of a convolutional neural network. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 9
Claim 9 recites:

9. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 1, wherein the step 5 specifically comprises: loading the final unlearning model trained in step 4, inputting data test set images for testing the model into the trained final unlearning model, and after obtaining the corresponding predicting score by calculating whether the predicting labels of the test data are consistent with the actual labels, determining the performance of the model.

Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches training a neural network and assessing its performance with test data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:

10. The federated unlearning method based on malicious terminal intervention training according to claim 2, wherein in the step 1.1, for an FMNIST dataset, performing FL using the customized network CNNFMNIST; and the CNNFMNIST is similar to CNNMNIST in the structure except for only having the first fully connected layer, and the first fully connected layer FMNIST_Fc1 maps 1250 dimensions to 10 dimensions.

Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches the use of a convolutional neural network that was trained to use MNIST test data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Reasons for Not Rejecting the Clams Under Art
Claims 1-10 are not rejected since when reading the claims in light of the Specification, as per MPEP § 2111.01, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 1. Specifically, the closest prior art of Cao, et al., FedRecover: Recovering from Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning using Historical Information, arXiv:2210.10936v1 [cs.CR] 20 OCT 2022, pp. 1-18 fails to expressly teach:
Claim 1's "...unlearning model..."
Claim 1's "...deciding whether to terminate the unlearning operation in advance..."
Claim 1's "...judging the predicting score of the unlearning model..."
Claim 1's "...parameters of the final global model minus each round of parameter update of the malicious client..."

Only to the extent that these limitations (specifically as defined above) are not found in the prior art of record is the present case not rejected over the prior art.

Conclusion
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at [phone] or email: [e-mail].

If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to [phone].

If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at [phone].

Hand-delivered responses should be delivered to the Receptionist @ (Customer Service Window Randolph Building 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22313), located on the first floor of the south side of the Randolph Building.

Finally, information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Moreover, status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have any questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) toll-free @ 1-866-217-9197.

/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122

WLS
10 AUG 2026

Prosecution Timeline

• Apr 01, 2024: Application Filed
• Aug 13, 2026: Non-Final Rejection mailed — §101 (current)