DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The claims recite a method and system for providing guidance to a user. Under MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(lIl), concepts relating to mental processes are drawn to abstract ideas. Additionally, teaching methods are categorized as abstract methods of organizing human activity under MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C), This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the provision of generic computer components does not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea.
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception under the factors set forth in MPEP 2106. Such factors include:
• Improvements to another technology or technical field;
• Improvements to the functioning of the computer itself;
• Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine;
• Transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state of being;
• Adding a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application; or
• Other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
Further guidance is provided by Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 110 USPQ2d 1976 (U.S. 2014). Alice held that a method of mitigating settlement risk was drawn to an abstract idea. Alice further held that the performance of the method performed on a computer did not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea, and thus the claimed invention was drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea:
These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Mayo, supra, at_(slip op., at 3). Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Bilski, supra, at 610-611. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement]” an abstract idea “on ... a computer,” Mayo, supra, at_(slip op., at 16), that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our §101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, see 717 F.3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring), wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Mayo, 566 U.S., at_(slip op., at 8-9).
Id at pp 1983-1984. Alice further held that apparatus claims drawn to a computer system were subject to the same analysis as the method claims, and were also not patentable subject matter:
Petitioner's claims to a computer system and a computer-readable medium fail for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims. En Banc Response Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 11 -1301 (CA Fed.) p. 50, n. 3. As to its system claims, petitioner emphasizes that those claims recite “specific hardware” configured to perform “specific computerized functions.” Brief for Petitioner 53. But what petitioner characterizes as specific hardware— a “data processing system” with a “communications controller” and “data storage unit,” for example, see App. 954, 958, 1257—is purely functional and generic. Nearly every computer will include a “communications controller” and “data storage unit” capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method bclaims. See 717 F.3d, at 1290 (Lourie, J., concurring). As a result, none of the hardware recited by the system claims “offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,’ that is, implementation via computers.” Id., at 1291 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S., at 610-611).
Id. at pp 1984-1985. Turning to the claimed invention, a method and system for receiving and analyzing information, and displaying the results of the analysis, is directed to an abstract idea. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(ll)(D) and Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 -52, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1740 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Each of the steps recited in claim 1 – receiving cleaning history data, generating cleaning guidance, and providing a user-perceptible output -- is a mental process pertaining to receiving and analyzing information. The method is performed by a generic computing device which under Alice is not sufficient to impart patentability to the system or method.
Consideration of the factors listed above pertaining to what is significantly more than the judicial exception, as viewed in light of the holding in Alice, weighs against patentability. While the method includes the use of a computer, the method does not involve an improvement in the function of a computer or other technology. Rather, generic computer components are used in their usual and customary way to perform the method. Mere automation of mental processes to improve efficiency is not sufficient to show an improvement in computer functionality. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055, 123 USPQ2d 1100, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 2017), as cited in MPEP 2106.05(a)(I), and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as cited in MPEP 2106.05(f).
The claimed method does not require the use of a particular machine, as a generic computer system is not a “particular machine” under Alice, nor does it result in the transformation of a physical article. Rather, the result of the claimed method is a determination as to whether a calculated metric is outside a given set of ranges, which itself is an abstract concept.
Dependent claims 2-10, 12 and 14 also fail to recite limitations which would overcome the rejection. These claims are generally directed to the types of information being received, analyzed and displayed as part of the method. Again, generic computer components are being used in their routine and conventional way. Because the claimed invention does not involve significantly more than the abstract concept of analyzing information, the claims are rejected under 35 USC 101.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed March 31, 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
With respect to applicant’s arguments concerning whether the claimed invention recites a mental process, under MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(lIl), claims that recite mental processes performed by humans are not distinguished from claims that recite mental processes performed on a computer. The test for patentability is not whether steps such as controlling a feedback unit to provide a user-perceptible output can be performed by a human, but rather whether the underlying method is capable of being performed by a human. It remains the Examiner’s position that the underlying invention, which comprises steps of:
receiving data pertaining to cleaning history and cleaning position,
detecting one or more cleaning positions based on the received data,
generating cleaning guidance based on an analysis of the data, and
communicating the generated cleaning guidance to a user,
is an abstract mental process capable of being performed by a human, using a computer system as a tool, and is analogous to the method and system for receiving and analyzing information and displaying the results of the analysis at issue in Electric Power Group.
See also Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 117 USPQ2d 1693, (Fed. Cir. 2016), also cited in MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(lIl), which held that a computer-implemented method and system for anonymous loan shopping comprising an interface which receives user information, a database which stores loan package data, a grading module which analyzes the information provided by the computer, and a display for communicating results of the analysis to the user, was an abstract idea because it could be performed by humans without a computer. Under the holdings of Electric Power Group and Mortgage Grader, controlling a feedback unit to provide a user-perceptible output representative of guidance was not sufficient to impart patentability to the method. A human being is capable of performing the underlying step of communicating results of an analysis to a user; whether a human being is literally capable of controlling a feedback unit is again not the test for patentability.
With respect to the applicant’s arguments concerning the newly added limitations to claim 1 reciting the use of sensors for receiving information, the mere use of one or more sensors in this fashion is not sufficient to amount to substantially more than the abstract idea. Rather, the step of acquiring this information from a sensor is insignificant extra-solution activity under MPEP 2106.05(g). The claim recites a generic and well-known sensor, used in its customary way, and does not involve any advancement in the technology of tooth position determination. See paragraph [0097] of applicant’s specification, which indicates that “[s]ensors for determining a position of a tooth cleaning device within a mouth of a subject, and methods for determining the position of the tooth cleaning device based on data from sensors, are well known and commonly used by smart tooth cleaning devices and tooth cleaning related apps”. The claim limitations reciting the receipt of data from sensors further amounts to mere data gathering. See e.g. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40; 12 USPQ2d 1824, 1827-28 (Fed. Cir. 1989), as cited in MPEP 2106.05(g), which held that performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain input for an equation was insignificant extra-solution activity. See also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012), which held that a generic step of determining a level of a biomarker in blood was similarly insignificant extra-solution activity. The step of using a sensor to determine a tooth position is analogous to the steps of performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain input for an equation and determining a level of a biomarker in blood and is also not sufficient to constitute substantially more than the abstract idea, notwithstanding that a human being is not capable of determining a level of biomarker in blood.
With respect to applicant’s arguments concerning whether the claimed invention recites a method of organizing human activity, the result of the claimed method is providing cleaning guidance to a user, which is a teaching method. As noted by applicant, teaching is one of the explicitly enumerated sub-groups of managing personal behavior under 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C). The teaching interaction need not be “between people” to constitute a method of managing personal behavior, as 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C) cites several examples of methods involving the use of a computer system for providing information or guidance to a person, which were held to constitute abstract methods of managing personal behavior. See e.g. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2015), BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 119 USPQ2d 1236, (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Interval Licensing LLC, v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 127 USPQ2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
With respect to applicant’s arguments concerning whether the claimed invention integrates the judicial exception to significantly more than the abstract idea, again, providing feedback to a user based on analysis by a computer system is not considered to constitute “significantly more” than the abstract idea under court holdings such as Electric Power Group and Mortgage Grader. Applicant is also advised regarding the argument that “[t]here is no proper basis for denying the utility of claim features that improve tooth cleaning by the feedback features in the claims” that patent eligibility under 35 USC 101 is not be evaluated based on whether the claimed invention has utility, because “[u]tility is not the test for patent-eligible subject matter.” See Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1380, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2016), as cited in MPEP 2106(I).
Because the claimed invention recites an abstract idea without significantly more, the claims remain rejected under 35 USC 101.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KURT FERNSTROM whose telephone number is (571)272-4422. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 10-6.
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/KURT FERNSTROM/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3715
May 29, 2026
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