DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
The amendment filed 28 June 2026 is acknowledged and has been entered.
Newly submitted claims 21 and 22 directed to an invention that is independent or distinct from the invention originally claimed for the following reasons:
The inventions can be shown to be distinct if either or both of the following can be shown: (1) the process for using the product as claimed can be practiced with another materially different product or (2) the product as claimed can be used in a materially different process of using that product. See MPEP § 806.05(h). The products can be used in a materially different process than those of claims 21 and 22.
Since applicant has received an action on the merits for the originally presented invention, this invention has been constructively elected by original presentation for prosecution on the merits. Accordingly, claims 21 and 22 are withdrawn from consideration as being directed to a non-elected invention. See 37 CFR 1.142(b) and MPEP § 821.03.
To preserve a right to petition, the reply to this action must distinctly and specifically point out supposed errors in the restriction requirement. Otherwise, the election shall be treated as a final election without traverse. Traversal must be timely. Failure to timely traverse the requirement will result in the loss of right to petition under 37 CFR 1.144. If claims are subsequently added, applicant must indicate which of the subsequently added claims are readable upon the elected invention.
Should applicant traverse on the ground that the inventions are not patentably distinct, applicant should submit evidence or identify such evidence now of record showing the inventions to be obvious variants or clearly admit on the record that this is the case. In either instance, if the examiner finds one of the inventions unpatentable over the prior art, the evidence or admission may be used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a) of the other invention.
Claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 13-20 have been cancelled.
Claims 1, 3, 6, 8 and 11-12 are presented for examination on the merits.
Note on claim interpretation: For purposes of examination the claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation. The claims under examination are directed to a composition containing inter alia an ethanol extract of pine heartwood of Pinus densiflora, the intended use of which does not effectively limit the composition per se. That is -- a recitation of the intended use (e.g., as a functional food, pharmaceutical, for preventing, ameliorating, or treating alcoholic liver disease, etc.) of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. The functional effects of such a composition are inherent properties of such an extract.
Thus the claims read on any composition that contains an ethanol extract of pine heartwood of Pinus densiflora.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1, 3, 6, 8 and 11-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 3 is rendered vague and indefinite by the phrase “wherein a concentration of the ethanol is 10% to 98% (v/v)”. Does this percentage refer to the percentage of ethanol in the solvent used to extract the Pinus densiflora or the percentage of the ethanol extract in the composition?
Also, claim 3 is dependent on claim 2, which is a cancelled claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 3, 6, 8 and 11-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Claim 1 (and claims dependent thereon) are directed to a composition comprising natural products. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Effective January 7, 2019, subject matter eligibility determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 101 follow the procedure explained in the Federal Register notice titled 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.4, 50-57), which is found at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf. Applicants are kindly asked to review this guidance as well as MPEP 2106.
The statutory categories of invention under 35 U.S.C. 101 are processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. However, certain members of these categories constitute judicial exceptions, i.e., the courts have determined that these entities are not patentable subject matter. These judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. The Office released guidance on December 16, 2014 for the examination of claims reciting natural products under 35 U.S.C. 101 in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116, 106 USPQ2d 1972 (2013)) and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories (566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012)), Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)) and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. - 333 U.S. 127 (1948)). (inter alia). See eg. MPEP 2106.04(b)
The Supreme Court has explained that the judicial exceptions reflect the Court’s view that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are "the basic tools of scientific and technological work", and are thus excluded from patentability because "monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it." Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980 (quoting Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 106 USPQ2d at 1978 and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012)). The Supreme Court’s concern that drives this "exclusionary principle" is pre-emption. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980. The Court has held that a claim may not preempt abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena; i.e., one may not patent every "substantial practical application" of an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon, even if the judicial exception is narrow.
While preemption is the concern underlying the judicial exceptions, it is not a standalone test for determining eligibility. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052, 119 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, questions of preemption are inherent in and resolved by the two-part framework from Alice Corp. and Mayo (the Alice/Mayo test referred to by the Office as Steps 2A and 2B). It is necessary to evaluate eligibility using the Alice/Mayo test, because while a preemptive claim may be ineligible, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate that a claim is eligible.
Products of Nature: When a law of nature or natural phenomenon is claimed as a physical product, the courts have often referred to the exception as a "product of nature". Products of nature are considered to be an exception because they tie up the use of naturally occurring things, but they have been labeled as both laws of nature and natural phenomena. See Myriad 133 S. Ct. at 2116-17, 106 USPQ2d at 1979 (claims to isolated DNA held ineligible because they "claim naturally occurring phenomena" and are "squarely within the law of nature exception"); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 USPQ 280, 281 (1948) (claims to bacterial mixtures held ineligible as "manifestations of laws of nature" and "phenomena of nature"). Step 2A of the Office’s eligibility analysis uses the terms "law of nature" and "natural phenomenon" as inclusive of "products of nature".
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It is important to keep in mind that product of nature exceptions include both naturally occurring products and non-naturally occurring products that lack markedly different characteristics from any naturally occurring counterpart. Instead, the key to the eligibility of all non-naturally occurring products is whether they possess markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart.
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When a claim recites a nature-based product limitation, examiners use the markedly different characteristics analysis discussed in MPEP § 2106.04(c) to evaluate the nature-based product limitation and determine the answer to Step 2A. Nature-based products, as used herein, include both eligible and ineligible products and merely refer to the types of products subject to the markedly different characteristics analysis used to identify product of nature exceptions.
The Markedly Different Characteristics Analysis
The markedly different characteristics analysis is part of Step 2A, because the courts use this analysis to identify product of nature exceptions. If the claim includes a nature-based product that has markedly different characteristics, then the claim does not recite a product of nature exception and is eligible. If the claim includes a nature-based product that does not exhibit markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, then the claim is directed to a "product of nature" exception (Step 2A: YES), and requires further analysis in Step 2B to determine whether any additional elements in the claim add significantly more to the exception.
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Nature-based Product Claim Analysis
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product by itself, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the entire product.
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product produced by combining multiple components, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the resultant nature-based combination, rather than its component parts. Where the claim is to a nature-based product in combination with non-nature based elements, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied only to the nature-based product limitation. For a product-by-process claims, the analysis turns on whether the nature-based product in the claim has markedly different characteristics from its naturally occurring counterpart.
The markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state. Markedly different characteristics can be expressed as the product’s structure, function, and/or other properties, and are evaluated based on what is recited in the claim on a case-by-case basis. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does not exhibit markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is a product of nature exception. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does have markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is not a product of nature exception.
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Because the markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, the first step in the analysis is to select the appropriate counterpart(s) to the nature-based product.
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When there are multiple counterparts to the nature-based product, the comparison should be made to the closest naturally occurring counterpart. When the nature-based product is a combination produced from multiple components, the closest counterpart may be the individual nature-based components of the combination. Because there is no counterpart mixture in nature, the closest counterparts to the claimed mixture are the individual components of the mixture, i.e., each naturally occurring species by itself. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130, 76 USPQ at 281 (comparing claimed mixture of bacterial species to each species as it occurs in nature).
Markedly changed characteristics can include structural, functional, chemical changes. In order to show a marked difference, a characteristic must be changed as compared to nature, and cannot be an inherent or innate characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart or an incidental change in a characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 106 USPQ2d at 1974-75. Thus, in order to be markedly different, applicant must have caused the claimed product to possess at least one characteristic that is different from that of the counterpart.
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If there is no change in any characteristic, the claimed product lacks markedly different characteristics, and is a product of nature exception.
The claims are directed to a composition comprising nature-based components (i.e. pine heartwood extract), which is not markedly different from its closest naturally-occurring counterpart because there is no indication that their combination or preparation has caused the nature-based product to have any characteristics that are markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring product and the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. The rationale for this determination is explained below:
Step 1: Determine if the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101: a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. YES, the claims are directed to a composition of matter, which is a statutory category within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter.
Step 2A: PRONG ONE: Evaluate whether the claim recites a Judicial Exception
(e.g., law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). YES, the claims are product claims reciting something that appears to be a nature-based product (i.e., pine heartwood extract) which is not markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring counterpart (i.e., the individual nature-based product(s)).
Note: with respect to extracts of natural products such as plants, the closest naturally-occurring counterpart is always the same compounds found in the extract, present in the non-isolated form in the source plant material. Extracts that are made simply by separating the extracted components from the non-extracted components, is a partitioning process that absent any specific chemical modification, merely separates the compounds leaving their activities unchanged.
Ingredients recited in the claims are natural products that would occur naturally; thus, the claims involve the use of judicial exceptions. There is no indication in the record of any markedly different characteristics (either structural or functional) of the composition as broadly claimed. For example, there is no evidence of record of a structural difference between the extract(s) in the claimed composition and that of their nature-based counterparts. Consequently, the claimed compositions are structurally the same as their closest naturally- occurring counterparts.
Nor is there any difference in functional characteristics. To show a marked difference, the characteristic(s) must be changed as compared it closest natural-occurring counterpart. For example, an assertion of changed functionality must be accompanied with evidence of a comparison of the claimed composition with its closest naturally-occurring counterpart and should apply to the full scope of the claim. Furthermore, inherent or innate characteristics of the naturally occurring counterpart cannot show a marked difference. Likewise, differences in the characteristics that came about or were produced independently of any effort or influence by Applicant cannot show a marked difference.
The recitation of specific amounts of the ingredients does not affect this analysis because it is well known and routine in the art to mix specific amounts of active ingredients with additional ingredients. Therefore, the claim is not meaningfully limited and does not amount to significantly more than each product of nature by itself. Finally, the claimed mixture is like the novel bacterial mixture of Funk Brothers, which was held ineligible because each species of bacteria in the mixture (like each component in the instantly claimed mixture) continued to have “the same effect it always had”, i.e., it lacked markedly different characteristics. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948), discussed in Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. While not discussed in the opinion, it is noted that several of the claims held ineligible in Funk Brothers recited specific amounts of the bacterial species in the mixture, e.g., claims 6, 7 and 13. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 128 n.1.
Thus, there is no evidence of record to indicate that the claimed product is markedly different, structurally, chemically, functionally, than its closest naturally occurring counterpart.
PRONG TWO: Evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. The claims are directed to a composition, not its practical use such as a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition.
Thus the cited claims are directed to a judicial exception to patentable subject matter.
Step 2b: Determine whether the claim directed to a judicial exception provides an inventive concept. For example, the claims may recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. In the instant case, NO, the claims are directed to an extract composition without any other components that could add significantly more to the exception. No other specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field at a high level of generality have been added to the claimed nature-based product (e.g., addition of well-known ingredients).
Thus, the claimed product is not eligible subject matter under current 35 USC 101 standards.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1, 3, 6, 8 and 11-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over KR10-2001-0006972 in view of Hwang et al. (2020) [cited by Applicant in IDS filed 5/7/2024].
The cited Korean patent publication discloses the use of a pine tree extract obtained from the stem of a pine tree in functional foods or drinks with effects on hangover relief (see claim 1, and paragraph [0046])
The cited reference does not explicitly state the method of extraction of the pine extract.
Hwang et al. beneficially teach wherein distilled water is added to pine, followed by ultrasound extraction to obtain an extract useful for alleviating hangover (see page 382, right column, and page 383). Furthermore, alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) activity of the pine extract (P. densiflora Gnarl) was measured to have about 340%, with the alcohol dehydrogenase activity of the control group set to a baseline of 100% (see page 384, left column, page 385, right column, and figure 1(A)). Also the acetaldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH) activity of the pine extract (P. densitlora Gnarl) was measured to have 144.5±5.5%, with the alcohol dehydrogenase activity of the control group set to a baseline of 100% (see page 384, left column, page 386, left column, and figure 1(B)).
The reference further discloses that a pine extract exhibits high levels of alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) and acetaldehyde dehydrogenase (ADLH) activity that affects the breakdown of acetaldehyde, which induces alcoholic liver diseases (see page 382, page 385, right column, page 386, left column, and figure 1).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the effective filing date of the Application to employ pine extracts in compositions for hangover relief as taught by the cited Korean patent publication and to obtain those extracts with extraction solvents such as water as taught by Hwang et al.
Where the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254-1255, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430, 432-33 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
With respect to functional properties such as promoting activity of ADH or ALDH, such would be an inherent property of the pinewood extract. It is noted that there is no requirement that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the inherent disclosure at the time of invention, but only that the subject matter is in fact inherent in the prior art reference. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377, 67 USPQ2d 1664, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date and allowing expert testimony with respect to post-critical date clinical trials to show inherency); see also Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313, 1320, 69 USPQ2d 1584, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(“[T]he fact that a characteristic is a necessary feature or result of a prior-art embodiment (that is itself sufficiently described and enabled) is enough for inherent anticipation, even if that fact was unknown at the time of the prior invention.”); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Because sufficient aeration’ was inherent in the prior art, it is irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the] invention…. An inherent structure, composition, or function is not necessarily known.”)>; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343-44, 74 USPQ2d 1398, 1406-07 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a prior art patent to an anhydrous form of a compound “inherently” anticipated the claimed hemihydrate form of the compound because practicing the process in the prior art to manufacture the anhydrous compound “inherently results in at least trace amounts of” the claimed hemihydrate even if the prior art did not discuss or recognize the hemihydrate) (See MPEP 2112).
The adjustment of particular conventional working conditions (e.g., determining the best extraction conditions, optimizing the most effectives dosage to obtain a desired results) is deemed merely a matter of judicious selection and routine optimization which is well within the purview of the skilled artisan.
Accordingly, the instant claims, in the range of proportions where no unexpected results are observed, would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill having the above cited references before him/her.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's amendments/arguments filed with respect to the 35 USC 101 rejections have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant respectfully submits that claim 1, as amended, is not directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Even assuming arguendo that pine heartwood extract is a product of nature, the specific ethanol extract of heartwood as now claimed possesses markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart (whole pine heartwood or generic pine stem extracts).
For example, the instant specification provides sufficient evidence of markedly different characteristics as follows (MPEP § 2106.04(c)):
" The instant specification provides comparative data (FIGS. 2A-2F and 3A-3C, and corresponding Examples) demonstrating that the ethanol extract of heartwood outperforms extracts from other pine parts such as needles and roots in reducing blood
ethanol levels and modulating ADH/ALDH activity.
" Heartwood is structurally and chemically distinct (paragraph [43]: inner trunk portion after removal of bark and sapwood; enriched in specific resins and bioactive compounds not equally present in sapwood or other parts).
" The extraction process (ethanol or aqueous ethanol) concentrates and/or modifies the active components, resulting in enhanced functional properties (ADH promotion >200%, ALDH promotion >140%, and measurable reduction in blood ethanol at multiple time points) that are not inherent in the natural pine heartwood itself.
Applicant respectfully submits that these differences are not incidental; they result from Applicants' selection of the specific heartwood portion and extraction solvent, as evidenced by the data above.
This is unpersuasive. As stated previously, an assertion of changed functionality must be accompanied with evidence of a comparison of the claimed composition with its closest naturally-occurring counterpart and should apply to the full scope of the claim. The changed functionality that Applicant points to was obtained by a specific extract such as that obtained by the extraction method described in paragraphs [68] to [70] of the specification.
Applicant's amendments/arguments filed with respect to the 35 USC 103 rejections have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant asserts that KR '972 discloses a generic pine tree stem extract (or pine extract) for hangover relief in functional foods/drinks. However, KR '972 fails to disclose or suggest heartwood (the specific inner trunk portion defined in paragraph [43] of the instant specification) or an ethanol extract of heartwood. "Stem" in KR '972 would reasonably include sapwood and outer layers. Notably, heartwood is distinct portion and requires deliberate separation.
This is unpersuasive, since the claims do not explicitly exclude other portions. Thus “stem” could included heartwood.
Applicant further asserts that functional limitations such as promotion of ADH/ALDH activity and in vivo blood ethanol reduction are not inherently disclosed or recognized in KR '972. Inherency requires that the missing feature is necessarily present, not merely possible (Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). KR '972 provides no such data or recognition for heartwood ethanol extract. Also, the comparative Examples in the instant specification show unexpected superiority of heartwood ethanol extract over other pine parts, which cannot be inherent in the generic stem extract of KR '972.
It is noted that there is no requirement that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the inherent disclosure at the time of invention, but only that the subject matter is in fact inherent in the prior art reference. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377, 67 USPQ2d 1664, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date and allowing expert testimony with respect to post-critical date clinical trials to show inherency); see also Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313, 1320, 69 USPQ2d 1584, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(“[T]he fact that a characteristic is a necessary feature or result of a prior-art embodiment (that is itself sufficiently described and enabled) is enough for inherent anticipation, even if that fact was unknown at the time of the prior invention.”); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Because sufficient aeration’ was inherent in the prior art, it is irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the] invention…. An inherent structure, composition, or function is not necessarily known.”)>; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343-44, 74 USPQ2d 1398, 1406-07 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a prior art patent to an anhydrous form of a compound “inherently” anticipated the claimed hemihydrate form of the compound because practicing the process in the prior art to manufacture the anhydrous compound “inherently results in at least trace amounts of” the claimed hemihydrate even if the prior art did not discuss or recognize the hemihydrate) (See MPEP 2112).
Furthermore, the claimed functionality was obtained only with a very specific ethanol extract. Thus, if functionality is actually a limitation that Applicant is relying upon to distinguish the extracts, then the written description is insufficient and a 35 USC 112(a) rejection would be appropriate.
Applicant further asserts that KR '972 and Hwang teach generic pine/stem extracts. There is no teaching or suggestion in either reference to focus on heartwood, as opposed to needles, roots, gnarl/knots, or whole stem. The instant specification explicitly teaches that heartwood is distinct and provides comparative data (FIGS. 2A-2F) showing heartwood ethanol extract is superior for the claimed purposes.
Again, this is unpersuasive, since the other parts of the trunk/stem are not explicitly excluded.
Finally, Applicant respectfully submits that the specific combination of heartwood + ethanol extraction + demonstrated enzymatic and in vivo effects was not obvious. Routine optimization does not apply where the prior art provides no direction toward heartwood or the particular extraction that yields the observed benefits.
This is also unpersuasive, since contrary to Applicant’s assertion, the claimed composition show those supposedly unexpected results, but rather a very specific extract. With respect to such unexpected results, please note that in KSR, the Court also reaffirmed that evidence of unexpected results may overcome an examiner's prima facie case of obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 ("The fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams' design was not obvious to those skilled in the art" - discussing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39). However, "any superior property must be unexpected to be considered as evidence of non-obviousness." Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, "[m]ere improvement in properties does not always suffice to show unexpected results ....[W]hen an applicant demonstrates substantially improved results.., and states that the results were unexpected, this should suffice to establish unexpected results in the absence of evidence to the contrary." In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, in order to establish unexpected results for claimed invention, objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence is offered to support. In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189 (CCPA 1978). Please also note that "the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is usually obvious." Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d at 1368. The rationale for determining the optimal parameters for prior art result effective variables "flows from the 'normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known.'" Id. (quoting In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RUSSELL G FIEBIG whose telephone number is (571)270-5366. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-4.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anand Desai can be reached at 5712720947. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/RUSSELL G FIEBIG/ Examiner, Art Unit 1655
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