DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions
Applicant's election with traverse of Group I, claims 1-12 and 14-15, in the reply filed on 02-17-2026 is acknowledged. The traversal is on the ground(s) that the Examiner has not provided any indication that the content of the claims interpreted in light of the description was considered in making the assertion of lack of unity, there is a technical relationship that involves the same special technical feature, a search of all the claims would not impose a serious burden on the Office, the Office has not considered the relationship of the inventions of Groups I-II with respect to 35 CFR 1.475(b)(4) and MPEP 806.03, and Group II depends from and includes all of the limitations of Group I. This is not found persuasive because the shared technical feature cited in the restriction requirement does not make a contribution over the prior art for the reasons cited in the Restriction Requirement, and thus does not constitute a special technical feature for unity of invention. This determination was made in light of the description, but it is noted that although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification cannot be read into the claims. Applicant has not specifically pointed out any errors in the Office’s showing that the shared technical feature does not make a contribution over the prior art. Further, search and examination burden under MPEP 803 is a standard for US restriction practice. However, this application was filed as a 371 and is subject to lack of unity restriction, which does not require such a showing of search or examination burden. Additionally, Examiner considered 37 CFR 1.475(b), but that is only the first part of the analysis for unity of invention. If an application contains claims to one of the listed combination of categories, then the claims are further evaluated for a same or corresponding special technical feature. As described above and previously, the instant claims require common technical features, but these features do not constitute special technical features because they do not make a contribution over the prior art. Regarding MPEP 806.03, this is again directed to restriction under US practice for evaluation of distinct inventions, rather than unity of invention under 371. Finally, while Group II (claim 13) references Group I (claim 1), it does not include all of the limitations of Group I. Group II is an apparatus claim, which does not and cannot include all of the method steps that are limitations of Group I.
The requirement is still deemed proper and is therefore made FINAL.
Claim 13 is withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Applicant timely traversed the restriction (election) requirement in the reply filed on 02-17-2026.
Claim Interpretation
In the terms “inlet mean(s)” and “outlet mean(s)”, “mean(s)” is interpreted as one or more means, that is, either singular or plural.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
The following terms are being interpreted under 35 USC 112(f): “electrical heating means”, “inlet mean(s)”, “outlet mean(s)” in claims 1 and 15; “oxy-combustion heating means” in claims 1, 3, 14, and 15.
Claim Objections
Claims 1-2 and 15 are objected to because of the following informalities:
Claim 1, lines 6, 9, and 16 - “inlet mean(s)” and “outlet mean(s)” should be written out explicitly as --at least one inlet means--/--at least one outlet means-- or alternatively --one or more inlet means--/--one or more outlet means-- because it would not make sense to remove the “s” from means, i.e., an “inlet mean” or an “outlet mean” is not normal grammar.
Claim 1, line 10 - “a total amount of vitrifiable materials” should be --a total amount of the vitrifiable materials--.
Claim 2, line 3 - “the total amount of vitrifiable materials” should be --the total amount of the vitrifiable materials--.
Claim 12, line 2 - “raw materials” should be --the raw materials-- since the limitation has already been recited in claim 1.
Claim 15, line 10 - “a total amount of vitrifiable materials” should be --a total amount of the vitrifiable materials--.
Appropriate correction is required.
Applicant is advised that should claim 1 be found allowable, claim 15 will be objected to under 37 CFR 1.75 as being a substantial duplicate thereof. When two claims in an application are duplicates or else are so close in content that they both cover the same thing, despite a slight difference in wording, it is proper after allowing one claim to object to the other as being a substantial duplicate of the allowed claim. See MPEP § 608.01(m).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-2, 4-8, 12, and 15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Takagi ‘859 (US 2006/0101859 A1) in view of Reynolds ‘559 (WO 2020/229559 A1) and Kapoor ‘929 (US 5,743,929).
Regarding claims 1 and 15, Takagi ‘859 teaches:
providing a furnace (furnace 1, Figs. 1, 10, 11) comprising (i) at least one melting tank comprising electrical heating means (melting tank 10 with electrodes 12; ¶ [0038], [0044], [0108]), (ii) a fining tank provided with oxy-combustion heating means (fining chamber 30 with burner 31; ¶ [0028], [0044], [0108]), (iii) at least one neck separating the at least one melting tank and the fining tank (throat 40), (iv) inlet mean(s) located at the at least one melting tank (inlet 11), and (v) outlet mean(s) located downstream of the fining tank (outlet to feeder 50)
charging vitrifiable materials comprising raw materials and cullet in at the at least one melting tank with the inlet mean(s) (¶ [0108]; Figs. 1, 10, 11)
melting the vitrifiable materials in the at least one melting tank by heating with the electrical heating means (¶ [0108])
fining the melt in the fining tank by heating with the oxy-combustion heating means alimented with gas and/or hydrogen (¶ [0028], [0044], [0107]-[0108])
flowing the melt from the fining tank to a working zone through the outlet mean(s) (¶ [0111]; Figs. 1, 10, 11).
Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding an amount of cullet being at least 10% in weight of a total amount of the vitrifiable materials. However, Takagi ‘859 does suggest that a wide variety of glass compositions may be used (¶ [0072]-[0073]). In analogous art of glass melting, Reynolds ‘559 suggests a composition of vitrifiable materials for glass melting (Abstract) that includes an amount of cullet of 50-70% in weight of a total amount of vitrifiable materials, which overlaps the claimed range, as a composition for making green glass (p. 25, lines 30-32). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by making the amount of cullet be at least 10% in weight of a total amount of the vitrifiable materials as a known composition for glass melting, for making green glass as suggested by Reynolds ‘559.
Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding an electrical input fraction for melting and fining ranging from 50% to 85%. Reynolds ‘559 suggests a glass melting furnace, including a melting tank and a fining tank, heated with electrical heating means and oxy-combustion heating means, wherein an electrical input fraction for melting and fining ranges from 20% to 80%, which overlaps the claimed range, for the benefit of balancing energy costs and availability and energy provided to the glass melt throughout the furnace (p. 9, lines 10-11, 21-22; p. 10, lines 13-15; p. 17, line 33-p. 18, line 2; p. 18, line 19-p. 19, line 20; p. 21, line 27-p. 23, line 23). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by making an electrical input fraction for melting and fining range from 50% to 85% for the benefit of balancing energy costs and availability and energy provided to the glass melt throughout the furnace, as suggested by Reynolds ‘559.
Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding capturing CO2 from flue gas, comprising compression and/or dehydration, said flue gas having a CO2 concentration of at least 35%. In analogous art of capturing CO2 from glass melting furnace flue gas, Kapoor ‘929 suggests capturing CO2 from flue gas of a glass melting furnace, comprising compression and/or dehydration, said flue gas having a CO2 concentration of at least 35% (column 1, lines 5-8, 34-36; column 4, lines 55-67; column 5, lines 37-41; column 8, lines 45-52) for the benefit of recycling CO2 from waste flue gas for reuse (column 3, lines 13-19; column 5, lines 42-45). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by capturing CO2 from flue gas, comprising compression and/or dehydration, said flue gas having a CO2 concentration of at least 35%, or the benefit of recycling CO2 from waste flue gas for reuse as suggested by Kapoor ‘929.
Regarding claim 2, Reynolds ‘559 further suggests the amount of cullet is at least 30% in weight of a total amount of vitrifiable materials (p. 25, lines 30-32).
Regarding claims 4 and 5, Kapoor ‘929 further suggests the flue gas has a CO2 concentration of at least 40%, or at least 50% (column 1, lines 34-36).
Regarding claim 6, Kapoor ‘929 further suggests the capturing CO2 from flue gas consists essentially of compression and/or dehydration (column 8, lines 48-50).
Regarding claims 7-8, Kapoor ‘929 further suggests eliminating acidic components from the flue gas, prior to or concurrent to the step of capturing CO2, for the benefit of purifying the flue gas for CO2 capture (column 2, lines 24-30). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by eliminating acidic components from the flue gas, prior to or concurrent to the step of capturing CO2, for the benefit of purifying the flue gas for CO2 capture, as suggested by Kapoor ‘929.
Regarding claim 12, Takagi ‘859 further teaches the raw materials comprise less than 25% in weight of carbonate compounds (¶ [0072] - wherein 50% or more of oxides includes 75% or more of oxides, with would necessitate less than 25% of non-oxides including carbonate compounds).
Claim(s) 3 and 14 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Takagi ‘859 (US 2006/0101859 A1), Reynolds ‘559 (WO 2020/229559 A1), and Kapoor ‘929 (US 5,743,929) in view of Chmelar ‘530 (WO 2021/233530 A1).
Regarding claims 3 and 14, Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding the oxy-combustion heating means being alimented with at least 50% hydrogen, or with at least 80% hydrogen. In analogous art of glass melting, Chmelar ‘530 suggests oxy-combustion heating means alimented with at least 50% hydrogen, or with at least 80% hydrogen as a known fuel composition for oxy-combustion heating means in glass melting furnaces, and for the benefit of providing high temperatures in the furnace (p. 6, lines 6-27; p. 2, lines 10-14; p. 9, lines 11-16). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by alimenting the oxy-combustion heating means with at least 50% hydrogen, or with at least 80% hydrogen, as a known fuel composition for oxy-combustion heating means in glass melting furnaces, and for the benefit of providing high temperatures in the furnace, as suggested by Chmelar ‘530.
Claim(s) 9-10 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Takagi ‘859 (US 2006/0101859 A1), Reynolds ‘559 (WO 2020/229559 A1), and Kapoor ‘929 (US 5,743,929) in view of Alexander ‘529 (US 5,773,529).
Regarding claims 9-10, Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding cullet pre-heating, at least partially by recovering heat from the furnace before charging the cullet in the at least one melting tank, wherein a maximum temperature of cullet at the cullet pre-heating is 450°C. In analogous art of glass melting, Alexander ‘529 suggests pre-heating cullet, at least partially by recovering heat from a glass melting furnace before charging the cullet in at least one melting tank, wherein a maximum temperature of cullet at the cullet pre-heating is 450°C, for the benefit of providing efficiency to the system by using waste heat to heat the cullet, and to purify the cullet before introduction to the furnace, but at temperatures that do not cause detrimental softening or fusion of the cullet in the pre-heating apparatus (column 3, lines 22-29; column 7, lines 13-17, 40-43; column 9, lines 57-61). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by pre-heating the cullet, at least partially by recovering heat from the furnace before charging the cullet in the at least one melting tank, wherein a maximum temperature of cullet at the cullet pre-heating is 450°C, for the benefit of providing efficiency to the system by using waste heat to heat the cullet, and to purify the cullet before introduction to the furnace, but at temperatures that do not cause detrimental softening or fusion of the cullet in the pre-heating apparatus, as suggested by Alexander ‘529.
Claim(s) 11 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Takagi ‘859 (US 2006/0101859 A1), Reynolds ‘559 (WO 2020/229559 A1), and Kapoor ‘929 (US 5,743,929) in view of Suzuki ‘904 (US 4,135,904).
Regarding claim 11, Takagi ‘859 is silent regarding pre-melting at least a part of the cullet in an auxiliary melting tank and flowing a pre-melted cullet to the at least one melting tank. In analogous art of glass melting, Suzuki ‘904 suggests pre-melting at least a part of cullet in an auxiliary melting tank and flowing a pre-melted cullet to at least one melting tank for the benefit of improving thermal efficiency and cost efficiency of the system (column 3, lines 2-21, 36-39; column 4, lines 2-23, 47-49; column 10, lines 11-15). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Takagi ‘859 by pre-melting at least a part of the cullet in an auxiliary melting tank and flowing a pre-melted cullet to the at least one melting tank for the benefit of improving thermal efficiency and cost efficiency of the system, as suggested by Suzuki ‘904.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-11 and 13-14 of copending Application No. 18/708837 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘837 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 and 14-15 of copending Application No. 18/710389 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘389 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-11 and 13-14 of copending Application No. 18/710437 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘437 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-13 of copending Application No. 18/869322 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘322 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-13 of copending Application No. 18/870799 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘799 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of copending Application No. 18/871281 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘281 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim 1-12 and 14-15 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of copending Application No. 18/871289 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims of the ‘289 application encompass all of the limitations of the instant claims.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Erin Snelting whose telephone number is (571)272-7169. The examiner can normally be reached Monday to Friday, 8:00 to 5:00.
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/ERIN SNELTING/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1741