DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Specification
Amendment of the Specification is Acknowledged.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 07/22/2026 has been considered by examiner and made of record in the application file.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 07/23/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant Argues (pages 11-13):
“i.) 3GPP fails to disclose identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as a fake base station cell in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information…”
Examiner Answer:
Examiner previous citation from the 3GPP page 64 Fig.6.19.2-1 was used to address the limitation when the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as the fake base station cell.
Examiner further cites 3GPP to disclose: when the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as the fake base station cell (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." and page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 9 to 17 (the for loop), “For each of the N cells…if either digital signatures or time counter is bad, mark the signature as bad and store the time counter; go to the next cell;” and page 69, page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 18-19, “By the end of the above procedure, an authentic cell should have been selected in normal scenario. If no cell has been selected, it could be one of the two scenarios:” (i.e., The loop describes for each cell, the UE is able to identify if there is a DS or not, and if there is to verify the DS, and if the verification is bad to then mark the signature which in turn is identifying the cell with bad DS.)).
Applicant Further Argues (pages 13-15):
“ii.) 3GPP fails to disclose lowering a priority of the fake base station cell, lowering a priority of a frequency band where the fake base station cell is located, raising priorities of other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA, or raising priorities of frequency bands where other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are located…
iii.) Ohlsson does not remedy the deficiency of 3GPP.”
Examiner Answer:
Applicant' s arguments/remarks made in pages 13-15, have been fully considered. In view of the amended claims and upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection, necessitated by the amendments is made in view of different interpretation of the previously applied references (and new prior art) as presented in this Office action. Applicant' s arguments with respect to claim(s) are therefore moot.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1-2, 4-10, 12, 25-27 and 29-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over 3GPP (3GPP TR 33.809 V0.9.0) in view of Ohlsson (US-20220256337-A1) in further view of Santhanam (US 20170238221 A1).
Regarding Claim 1, 3GPP discloses an information processing method (page 28-29, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures),
performed by User Equipment (UE) (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures, paragraph 2, "In order to enable the UE to validate the authenticity of received system information, the NR digitally signs the broadcasted system information as shown in Figure 6.7.2.1-1. System information to be broadcasted, Private security key (K-SIGPrivate) and Time Counter are input to security algorithm to generate the digital signature." and Figure 6.7.2.1-2 (i.e., page 28-29, and Figure 6.7.2.1-2 discloses a method performed by UE.)),
the method comprising:
receiving system information (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures, paragraph 4, "On receiving the system information the UE generates digital signature…The system information with digital signature received," (i.e., UE receives system information.)); and
authenticating a cell which broadcasts the system information based on whether the system information carrying Digital Signature (DS) information is received (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures , paragraph 4, "The system information with digital signature received, public security key (K-SIGPublic) and Time Counter of the time slot in which system information is received are used to check the authenticity of the SI. If authenticity verification is successful, then the system information is authentic and the UE considers the cell as authentic." (i.e., the system information with digital signature is received, and authentication is performed by the UE.)),
wherein the system information carrying the DS information is sent by a network device after determining a cell in a preset Tracking Area (TA) (page 29, Figure 6.7.2.1-2: Provisioning of Public Keys to the UE, "1. Pre-provisioned with the public keys [K-SIGPublic] for distribution for all TAIs under its control", and 6. "UE transit to Idle mode. UE in Idle mode enters into new TAI-2. UE verifies the DS in the SIB using the public key [K-SIGpublic] of TAI-2 and then reselects the cell" and 10. "RRC: SIB with DS" and page 48, 6.11.3.3 Threats that are not migated by signed SI messages, 2), "the second certificate provision method should be chosen in 6.11.2.1. when UE is registered into the network, the AMF in serving network shall privision a list of certificate for a bunch of gNBs. If the UE is provisioned the certificate of the gNB, then it shall verify the SIs from this gNB." (i.e., Examiner points to Fig.6.7.2.1-1, wherein the AMF-1 distributes K-SIG for all TAI thus indicating to the gNB to send DS information to the UE. At step 6 the gNB sends the SIB with the DS as it determines the UE is in TAI-2. However, the explicit of the network "determining" a cell in a preset tracking area (TA) will be relied by another reference.));
wherein authenticating the cell which broadcasts the system information based on whether the system information carrying the DS information is received comprises:
when the UE receives a digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to not receiving the system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as a fake base station cell (page 48, 6.11.3.3, 1), "the MNOs make sure to provision all the gNB with privatekeys/certificates, then when UE received a SIB without a signature, it can be taken as a false one." (i.e., Examiner points to the title wherein "false one" refers to "False Base station"));
or when the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as the fake base station cell (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." and page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 9 to 17 (the for loop), “For each of the N cells…if either digital signatures or time counter is bad, mark the signature as bad and store the time counter; go to the next cell;” and page 69, page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 18-19, “By the end of the above procedure, an authentic cell should have been selected in normal scenario. If no cell has been selected, it could be one of the two scenarios:” (i.e., The loop describes for each cell, the UE is able to identify if there is a DS or not, and if there is to verify the DS, and if the verification is bad to then mark the signature which in turn is identifying the cell with bad DS.)).
However, 3GPP does not explicitly disclose wherein the system information carrying the DS information is sent by a network device after determining a cell in a preset Tracking Area (TA); wherein the method further comprises at least one of: lowering a priority of the fake base station cell.
Ohlsson discloses wherein the system information carrying the DS information is sent by a network device after determining a cell in a preset Tracking Area (TA) (paragraph [0090], Fig.6, "The network/operator, e.g. the network node 101, may configure the UE 103 with one or more public keys for SI signature verification where each public key is associated with an area of the access network where the public key is valid. The area may be referred to as a validity area. For more details, see the corresponding step 501 on the UE side in FIG. 5." and paragraph [0096], "For each cell in the access network using signed SI, the network/operator, e.g. the network node 101, generates a signature using the private key corresponding to the area that the cell belongs to." and paragraph [0097], "Step 602 may be summarized as follows: The network node 101 generates a SI signature for at least one cell in the access network using a private key corresponding to a validity area that the cell belongs to." and paragraph [0098], "The SI, which includes the area identification information, e.g. TAC or Cell ID, is broadcasted by the network node 101 in the cell together with the SI signature generated in the previous step." (i.e., Before the network sends signed information, the network determines if a cell belongs to a corresponding area and generates a SI signature for that particular cell.)).
3GPP and Ohlsson are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified 3GPP to implement the method of Ohlsson as it provides improvement in handling of SI, and enables signed SI in shared and non-shared networks without requiring multiple SI signatures to be broadcasted (Ohlsson, paragraph [0037], “An objective of embodiments herein is therefore to obviate at least one of the above disadvantages and to provide improved handling of SI. It provides improved signing of SI in shared and non-shared networks. It enables signed SI in shared and non-shared networks without requiring multiple SI signatures to be broadcasted, the operators use the same private/public key pair for the SI signature generation/verification.”).
However, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson do not explicitly disclose wherein the method further comprises at least one of: lowering a priority of the fake base station cell.
Santhanam discloses wherein the method further comprises at least one of: lowering a priority of the fake base station cell (paragraph [0060], Fig.3, "At step 315, UE 115-b may deprioritize the first cell (i.e., the cell from base station 105-c) relative to a priority of a second cell. In some cases, the cell may be deprioritized (or barred) for selection, reselection, or out-of-service (OOS) scanning for a certain time period, after which the cell may be reprioritized. In some cases, the deprioritization may be based on stored or crowd-sourced information about the cell. Thus, UE 115-b may identify a cell ranking based on S-criteria or R-criteria and then perform an additional independent prioritization based on lower layer failures. Thus, in some cases, a deprioritized cell may still be the highest ranked cell in the S-criteria ranking." and paragraph [0061], "At step 320, UE 115-b may select the second cell (i.e., a different cell supported by base station 105-d). In some cases (not shown) the second cell may be supported by the same base station (i.e., on a different frequency). In some cases, UE 115-b may select the second cell as part of a selection, a reselection, or a OOS scanning operation." (i.e., par.60 and Fig.3 discloses of deprioritization of a cell after failing connectivity, for instance 3GPP discloses UE not connecting to a fake base station because of a failure of DS.)).
3GPP in view of Ohlsson and Santhanam are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same wireless communication. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified 3GPP to implement the method of Santhanam in order to improve the UE mobility by changing the ranking of the cells when performing cell selection or reselection as described in Santhanam Fig.3 (Santhanam, paragraph [0056], “In some cases, if all or a significant number of cells associated with a given frequency are deprioritized, UE 115-a may bar the frequency for a duration of time. This may allow UE 115-a to camp on a lower priority cell (e.g, of base station 105-b) instead of camping on a higher priority cell (e.g., of base station 105-a) where service is not possible due to lower layer failures. Additionally, based on mobility detection (which may be determined using inertial sensors, such as accelerometers, pedometers, etc.), UE 115-a may un-bar the frequency in the case where UE 115-a finds coverage in a different cell. In some cases, UE 115-a may deprioritize a group of cells (such as a PLMN or tracking area (TA)) for a certain duration of time. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-a may consider a network as deprioritized to enable it to move to a different network.”).
Regarding Claim 2, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 1.
3GPP further discloses wherein the preset TA comprises at least one of: a TA where a cell on which the UE camps is located (page 29, Figure 6.7.2.1-2: Provisioning of Public Keys to the UE, 6. "UE transit to Idle mode. UE in Idle mode enters into new TAI-2. UE verifies the DS in the SIB using the public key [K-SIGpublic] of TAI-2 and then reselects the cell" and 7., "UE in Idle mode enters into a new TAI-4. UE detects it has entered a new TA (TAI-4) that is not in the list of TAIs that the UE register with the network. After cell reselection, UE performs a TAU procedure before it camps on the new cell…" (i.e., The authentication is performed based on the camping cell.));
a part of one or more TAs in a Registration Area (RA) of the UE (page 29, Figure 6.7.2.1-2: Provisioning of Public Keys to the UE, 5. "Registration accept [list of TAIs and corresponding Public keys" and 9., "Location update accept [list of TAIs and corresponding Public Keys" (i.e., UE is provided with a list of TAI in step 5 comprising TAI-1, TAI-2, and TAI-3 which form a registration area, when the UE moves to a registration area that is outside such as TAI-4 it needs to update the list as seen in step 8-11 of Figure 6.7.2.1-2.)).
Regarding Claim 4, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim [[3]]1.
3GPP further discloses wherein in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as the fake base station cell comprises: in response to an authentication failure of any of one or more pieces of system information carrying the DS information, identifying the cell which broadcasts the system information as the fake base station cell (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." and page 64, 6.19.2 Solution details, 6., "UE compares the received hash values of the MIB/SIBs with the locally computed ones and determines whether the MIB/SIBs that it has read are correct." and Note 3, "UE may determine to change the cell if a MitM false base station is highly suspected based on the received MIB/SIBs from the gNB." (i.e., "one or more pieces of system information" is reading as MIB/SIB is matching with the computed MIB/SIB and if they don't match then determining the base station is a man in the middle (MitM) false base station.)).
Regarding Claim 5, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim [[3]]1.
3GPP further discloses further comprising at least one of:
discarding the system information (page 42, 6.9.2.3.1 Security procedure for broadcast messages, paragraph 2 on page 42, “If verification fails, the UE marks the cell as fake cell in cache, otherwise remove the cell from the cache.”); or
triggering the UE to perform a cell selection operation (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." (i.e., UE performs cell-reselection when the cell is not authentic.)).
Regarding Claim 6, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 1.
3GPP further discloses further comprising: when the UE does not receive a digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, in response to receiving the system information carrying the DS information, determining not to authenticate the cell which broadcasts the system information (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." and page 48, 6.11.3.3, 1), "the MNOs make sure to provision all the gNB with privatekeys/certificates, then when UE received a SIB without a signature, it can be taken as a false one." and 2), "the second certificate provision method should be chosen in 6.11.2.1. when UE is registered into the network, the AMF in serving network shall privision a list of certificate for a bunch of gNBs. If the UE is provisioned the certificate of the gNB, then it shall verify the SIs from this gNB." (i.e., page 32 and page 48 indicate when the UE receives SIB without a signature, the UE determines the base station is false and does not authenticate and performs cell re-selection.)).
Regarding Claim 7, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 6.
3GPP further comprising: using the system information (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures , paragraph 4, "On receiving the system information the UE generates digital signature…The system information with digital signature received," and page 48, 6.11.3.3, 1), "the MNOs make sure to provision all the gNB with privatekeys/certificates, then when UE received a SIB without a signature, it can be taken as a false one." and 2), "the second certificate provision method should be chosen in 6.11.2.1. when UE is registered into the network, the AMF in serving network shall privision a list of certificate for a bunch of gNBs. If the UE is provisioned the certificate of the gNB, then it shall verify the SIs from this gNB." (i.e., the digital signature comprising SIB with signature.)).
Regarding Claim 8, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 1.
3GPP further discloses Wherein: the DS information comprises: a digital signature key (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures, paragraph 2, "In order to enable the UE to validate the authenticity of received system information, the NR digitally signs the broadcasted system information as shown in Figure 6.7.2.1-1. System information to be broadcasted, Private security key (K-SIGPrivate) and Time Counter are input to security algorithm to generate the digital signature." (i.e., Private security key (K-SIGPrivate))); or
the DS information comprises: a digital signature key and time indication information, wherein the time indication information is used to indicate validity time of the digital signature key (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures, paragraph 2, "In order to enable the UE to validate the authenticity of received system information, the NR digitally signs the broadcasted system information as shown in Figure 6.7.2.1-1. System information to be broadcasted, Private security key (K-SIGPrivate) and Time Counter are input to security algorithm to generate the digital signature." and page 32, 6.7.4.1a UE aspects 1., "On receiving the system information the UE generates digital signature. The system information with digital signature received, public security key (K-SIGPublic) and Time Counter of the time slot in which system information is received are used to check the authenticity of the SI. If authenticity verification is successful, then the system information is authentic and the UE considers the cell as authentic." (i.e., Private security key (K-SIGPrivate) and Time Counter)).
Regarding Claim 9, 3GPP discloses an information processing method (page 28-29, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures),
broadcasting system information carrying Digital Signature (DS) information (page 29, Figure 6.7.2.1-2: Provisioning of Public Keys to the UE, "1. Pre-provisioned with the public keys [K-SIGPublic] for distribution for all TAIs under its control", and "10. RRC: SIB with DS" (i.e., base station broadcasting RRC with DS as shown in the Figure 6.7.2.1-2.)),
wherein the DS information is used for User Equipment (UE) to authenticate a cell
which broadcasts the system information (page 28, 6.7.2.1 System Information Verification using Digital Signatures, paragraph 4, "The system information with digital signature received, public security key (K-SIGPublic) and Time Counter of the time slot in which system information is received are used to check the authenticity of the SI. If authenticity verification is successful, then the system information is authentic and the UE considers the cell as authentic." (i.e., The DS is used for authentication of the cell.));
wherein when the UE receives a digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to not receiving the system information carrying the DS information, the cell which broadcasts the system information is identified as a fake base station cell (page 48, 6.11.3.3, 1), "the MNOs make sure to provision all the gNB with privatekeys/certificates, then when UE received a SIB without a signature, it can be taken as a false one." (i.e., Examiner points to the title wherein "false one" refers to "False Base station"));
or when the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA when performing registration, in response to an authentication failure of the received system information carrying the DS information, the cell which broadcasts the system information is identified as the fake base station cell (page 32, 6.7.4.1b, "…If the verification of the signature fails at UE, then the UE considers system information is not authentic and therefore the cell is not authentic. The UE initiates cell re-selection procedure." and page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 9 to 17 (the for loop), “For each of the N cells…if either digital signatures or time counter is bad, mark the signature as bad and store the time counter; go to the next cell;” and page 69, page 69, 6.20.2.5.5 Cell Selection and Reselection, lines 18-19, “By the end of the above procedure, an authentic cell should have been selected in normal scenario. If no cell has been selected, it could be one of the two scenarios:” (i.e., The loop describes for each cell, the UE is able to identify if there is a DS or not, and if there is to verify the DS, and if the verification is bad to then mark the signature which in turn is identifying the cell with bad DS.)).
However, 3GPP does not explicitly disclose performed by a base station, the method comprising: when a cell of the base station is located in a preset Tracking Area (TA), wherein a priority of the fake base station cell is lowered.
Ohlsson discloses performed by a base station, the method comprising: when a cell of the base station is located in a preset Tracking Area (TA) (paragraph [0090], Fig.6, "The network/operator, e.g. the network node 101, may configure the UE 103 with one or more public keys for SI signature verification where each public key is associated with an area of the access network where the public key is valid. The area may be referred to as a validity area. For more details, see the corresponding step 501 on the UE side in FIG. 5." and paragraph [0096], "For each cell in the access network using signed SI, the network/operator, e.g. the network node 101, generates a signature using the private key corresponding to the area that the cell belongs to." and paragraph [0097], "Step 602 may be summarized as follows: The network node 101 generates a SI signature for at least one cell in the access network using a private key corresponding to a validity area that the cell belongs to." and paragraph [0098], "The SI, which includes the area identification information, e.g. TAC or Cell ID, is broadcasted by the network node 101 in the cell together with the SI signature generated in the previous step." And paragraph [0128], Fig.8A, “The embodiments herein in the network node 101 may be implemented through one or more processors, such as a processor 3101 in the network node 101 depicted in FIG. 8a, together with computer program code for performing the functions and actions of the embodiments herein.” And paragraph [0129], “The network node 101 may further comprise a memory 3103 comprising one or more memory units.” And paragraph [0142], “In some embodiments, the computer-readable storage medium 3110 may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,” (i.e., Before the network sends signed information, the network determines if a cell belongs to a corresponding area and generates a SI signature for that particular cell. Fig.8A shows network node structure such as a base station.)).
3GPP and Ohlsson are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same field Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified 3GPP to implement the method of Ohlsson as it provides improvement in handling of SI, and enables signed SI in shared and non-shared networks without requiring multiple SI signatures to be broadcasted (Ohlsson, paragraph [0037], “An objective of embodiments herein is therefore to obviate at least one of the above disadvantages and to provide improved handling of SI. It provides improved signing of SI in shared and non-shared networks. It enables signed SI in shared and non-shared networks without requiring multiple SI signatures to be broadcasted, the operators use the same private/public key pair for the SI signature generation/verification.”).
However, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson do not explicitly disclose wherein a priority of the fake base station cell is lowered.
Santhanam discloses wherein a priority of the fake base station cell is lowered (paragraph [0060], Fig.3, "At step 315, UE 115-b may deprioritize the first cell (i.e., the cell from base station 105-c) relative to a priority of a second cell. In some cases, the cell may be deprioritized (or barred) for selection, reselection, or out-of-service (OOS) scanning for a certain time period, after which the cell may be reprioritized. In some cases, the deprioritization may be based on stored or crowd-sourced information about the cell. Thus, UE 115-b may identify a cell ranking based on S-criteria or R-criteria and then perform an additional independent prioritization based on lower layer failures. Thus, in some cases, a deprioritized cell may still be the highest ranked cell in the S-criteria ranking." and paragraph [0061], "At step 320, UE 115-b may select the second cell (i.e., a different cell supported by base station 105-d). In some cases (not shown) the second cell may be supported by the same base station (i.e., on a different frequency). In some cases, UE 115-b may select the second cell as part of a selection, a reselection, or a OOS scanning operation." (i.e., par.60 and Fig.3 discloses of deprioritization of a cell after failing connectivity, for instance 3GPP discloses UE not connecting to a fake base station because of a failure of DS.)).
3GPP in view of Ohlsson and Santhanam are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same wireless communication. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified 3GPP to implement the method of Santhanam in order to improve the UE mobility by changing the ranking of the cells when performing cell selection or reselection as described in Santhanam Fig.3 (Santhanam, paragraph [0056], “In some cases, if all or a significant number of cells associated with a given frequency are deprioritized, UE 115-a may bar the frequency for a duration of time. This may allow UE 115-a to camp on a lower priority cell (e.g, of base station 105-b) instead of camping on a higher priority cell (e.g., of base station 105-a) where service is not possible due to lower layer failures. Additionally, based on mobility detection (which may be determined using inertial sensors, such as accelerometers, pedometers, etc.), UE 115-a may un-bar the frequency in the case where UE 115-a finds coverage in a different cell. In some cases, UE 115-a may deprioritize a group of cells (such as a PLMN or tracking area (TA)) for a certain duration of time. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-a may consider a network as deprioritized to enable it to move to a different network.”).
Regarding Claim 33, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 1.
Santhanam further discloses further comprising: performing cell reselection, by the UE, based on priorities of the fake base station cell and other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA, after the priority of the fake base station cell is lowered and the priorities of other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are raised (paragraph [0032], “According to the present disclosure, a UE may increment a counter on each failure, and may then modify the cell selection process (e.g., based on the number or type of failures). For example, the UE may alter the ranking of cells…” and paragraph [0039], “A UE 115 may perform a cell selection procedure to establish a connection with a base station 105 or to reselect a neighboring cell of the same or another base station 105 with better performance or higher priority.” and paragraph [0049], “…As an example, the deprioritization of cells may be done by decreasing the rank of deprioritized cells for a period of time (e.g., T.sub.rcc seconds) to provide an opportunity for alternate cells to be treated with higher priority…” and paragraph [0060], Fig.3, " At step 315, UE 115-b may deprioritize the first cell (i.e., the cell from base station 105-c) relative to a priority of a second cell. In some cases, the cell may be deprioritized (or barred) for selection, reselection, or out-of-service (OOS) scanning for a certain time period, after which the cell may be reprioritized." And paragraph [0061], “At step 320, UE 115-b may select the second cell (i.e., a different cell supported by base station 105-d).” (i.e., the prioritization is lowered for a specific cell such as a fake base station, which allows for alternative cells to be treated with higher priority, and Fig.3 shows cell reselection.)).
The proposed combination as well as the motivations for combining the references presented in the rejection of the parent claim apply to this claim and are incorporated herein by reference.
Regarding Claim 10, which is similar in scope to claim 2, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 12, which is similar in scope to claim 8, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 25, which is similar in scope to claim 1, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Examiner further notes 3GPP discloses a UE (page 29, Figure 6.2.2.1-1).
The processor, memory are inherited by the UE and also can be found in Ohlsson (paragraphs [0106]-[0110], [0123], Fig.7a).
See motivation made claim 1.
Regarding Claim 26, which is similar in scope to claim 1, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 27, which is similar in scope to claim 2, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 29, which is similar in scope to claim 4, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 30, which is similar in scope to claim 5, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 31, which is similar in scope to claim 9, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding Claim 32, which is similar in scope to claim 9, thus rejected under the same rationale.
Claim(s) 34 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over 3GPP (3GPP TR 33.809 V0.9.0) in view of Ohlsson (US-20220256337-A1) in view of Santhanam (US 20170238221 A1) in further view of ZHU (US 20230370916 A1).
Regarding Claim 34, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam discloses all the limitation of claim 1.
However, 3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam do not explicitly disclose further comprising: performing a measurement for cell reselection by the UE based on priorities of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located and the priorities of frequency bands where other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are located, after the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located is lowered and the priorities of frequency bands where other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are located are raised.
ZHU discloses further comprising: performing a measurement for cell reselection by the UE based on priorities of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located and the priorities of frequency bands where other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are located, after the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located is lowered and the priorities of frequency bands where other cells than the fake base station cell in the preset TA are located are raised (paragraph [0103], Fig.4, " As shown by reference number 405, the base station may transmit, and the UE may receive, configuration information…" and paragraph [0104], “…the configuration information may indicate that the UE is to determine that a first set of neighbor cells is associated with a first network operator and that a second set of neighbor cells is associated with a second network operator…the configuration information may indicate that the UE is to prioritize the first set of neighbor cells relative to the second set of neighbor cells based at least in part on the first set of neighbor cells…” and paragraph [0106], “As shown by reference number 415, the UE may receive, and the base station may transmit, a neighbor cell list. For example, the UE may receive a neighbor cell list including entries for two or more sets of neighbor cells.” And paragraph [0112], “As shown by reference number 430… In some aspects, the UE may prioritize neighbor cells of the first set of neighbor cells based at least in part on pruning (e.g., deleting, removing, and/or ignoring, among other examples) entries for the second set of neighbor cells from the neighbor cell list.” And paragraph [0114], “As shown by reference number 435, the UE may measure one or more neighbor base cells based at least in part on prioritizations of the neighbor cells.” And paragraph [0115], “As shown by reference number 440, the UE may transmit, and the base station may receive, a measurement report. In some aspects, the UE may indicate (e.g., implicitly and/or explicitly) a preferred neighbor cell for a redirection and/or handover operation.” (i.e., Paragraphs 103 to 112 is to show the UE is adjusting the prioritization similarly disclosed in Santhanam and then the UE can perform measurement for cell redirection as disclosed in paragraphs 114-115.)).
3GPP in view of Ohlsson in further view of Santhanam and ZHU are considered to be analogous to the claimed invention because they are in the same wireless communication. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified 3GPP to implement the method of ZHU of performing measurement for cell reselection in order to reduce failure rate between two different RAT, and may even save power (ZHU, paragraph [0100], “the UE may reduce interaction failure rate between communications using the first RAT and communications using the second RAT. This may conserve computing, power, communication, and/or network resources that may otherwise be used to detect and/or recover from a communication failure and/or a redirection and handover failure. Additionally, or alternatively, the UE may conserve computing, communication, and/or power resources that may otherwise have been used to perform a search and/or measurement for neighbor cells to which the UE is not a subscriber and/or to which the UE does not have access.”).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Erkin S. Abdullaev whose telephone number is (571)272-4135. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday - 8:00 am - 5:00 pm.
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ERKIN S. ABDULLAEV
Examiner
Art Unit 2648
/ERKIN ABDULLAEV/Examiner, Art Unit 2648
/WESLEY L KIM/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2648
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