DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly more.
In sum, claim 1-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) and do not include an inventive concept that is something “significantly more” than the judicial exception under the January 2019 patentable subject matter eligibility guidance (2019 PEG) analysis which follows.
Step 1 - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 1 analysis, it must first be determined whether the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying step 1 of the analysis for patentable subject matter to the claims, it is determined that the claims are directed to the statutory category of a machine and a process. Therefore, we proceed to step 2A, Prong 1.
Step 2A, Prong One - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2A, Prong 1 analysis, it must be determined whether the claims recite an abstract idea that falls within one or more designated categories of patent ineligible subject matter (i.e., organizing human activity, mathematical concepts, and mental processes) that amount to a judicial exception to patentability.
Here, with respect to claims 1-3 and 5-7, the claims recite the abstract idea of
(A) an electronic processor that processes a sensor signal output from a sensor mounted to a vehicle
(B) acquire the sensor signal output from the sensor
(C) generate a first output signal through a first filter for extracting a first frequency band from the sensor signal
(D) generate a second output signal through a second filter for extracting a second frequency band, which differs from the first frequency band, from the sensor signal
(E) output the first output signal and the second output signal at once
(F) sends the first output signal to a first controller that uses a signal limited to the first frequency band
(G) sends the second output signal to a second controller that uses a signal limited to the second frequency band
(H) wherein the sensor signals include plural types of signals
(I) the electronic processor generates plural types of the first output signals
(J) the electronic processor generates plural types of the second output signals
(K) the electronic processors selects a type of a signal requested by the first controller from the plural types of the first output signals
(L) the electronic processors sends such a signal to the first controller
(M) the electronic processors selects a type of a signal requested by the second controller from the plural types of the second output signals
(N) the electronic processors sends such a signal to the second controller
Mental Process:
Steps B, E, H, K, and M fall within one or more of the three enumerated 2019 PEG categories of patent ineligible subject matter, specifically, a mental process, that can be performed in the human mind since each of the above steps could alternatively be performed in the human mind or with the aid of pen and paper. This conclusion follows from CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where our reviewing court held that section 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. see also In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (CCPA 1982); Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F. 3d 1350, 1354–1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”).
For example, a human could perform steps B, E, H, K, and M entirely mentally when reading the output of a sensor and making decisions on how to process the sensor readings. These limitations exemplify abstract idea of a mental process since details include concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion.
Furthermore, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Mathematical Concepts: (Mathematical Relationships, Mathematical Formulas or Equations, Mathematical Calculations)
In addition, limitations C, D, I, and J recite(s) the abstract idea of a mathematical concept in addition to being a mental process since the limitations invoke the functions of generating signals based on sensor data, filtering data using filter functions, and using signals produced by the processor in the appropriate controllers. The instant Specification fails to attribute special definitions to the language used in limitations C, D, I, and J. Consequently, the words and phrases of the limitation(s) have been given the plain meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. (See MPEP §§ 2173.01, 2173.05(a), and 2111.01). These steps are common computer processing functions that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known generic computers were capable of performing and would have associated with generic computers. (See MPEP § 2106.05(d)II). See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter eligibility p. 3-4 “Mathematical Relationships” and “Mathematical Calculations” (“A mathematical relationship may be expressed in words or using mathematical symbols . . . [t]here is no particular word or set of words that indicates a claim recites a mathematical calculation. That is, a claim does not have to recite the word “calculating” in order to be considered a mathematical calculation. For example, a step of “determining” a variable or number using mathematical methods or “performing” a mathematical operation may also be considered mathematical calculations when the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification encompasses a mathematical calculation.”) citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89, 209 USPQ 1, 9 (1981), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), and Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“using a formula to convert geospatial coordinates into natural numbers”).
Step 2A, Prong Two - Revised Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2A, Prong 2 analysis, the identified abstract idea to which the claim is directed does not include limitations that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, since the recited features of the abstract idea are being applied on a computer or computing device or via software programming that is simply being used as a tool (“apply it”) to implement the abstract idea. (See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f)). This follows conclusion follows from the claim limitations which only recite a generic “non-transitory computer readable medium” outside of the abstract idea.
In addition, merely “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.”), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Accordingly, the additional elements of an electronic processor, a sensor, and a vehicle do not transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea.
Extra-solution activity – See MPEP §2106.05(g)
In addition, limitations A constitute(s) insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (presenting offers and gathering statistics amounted to mere data gathering). Accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Furthermore, limitations F, G, L, and N constitute insignificant post-solution activity. The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
Step 2B - Revised Guidance:
Under the 2019 PEG step 2B analysis, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they amount to something “significantly more” than the recited abstract idea. (i.e., an innovative concept). Here, the additional elements, such as an electronic processor, a sensor, a controller, and inertial measurement unit, nor a vehicle do not amount to an innovative concept since, as stated above in the step 2A, Prong 2 analysis, the claims are simply using the additional elements as a tool to carry out the abstract idea (i.e., “apply it”) on a computer or computing device and/or via software programming (See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05(f)). The additional elements are specified at a high level of generality to simply implement the abstract idea and are not themselves being technologically improved. See, e.g., MPEP §2106.05 I.A; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves.
The additional elements of the dependent claims merely refine and further limit the abstract idea of the independent claims and do not add any feature that is an “inventive concept” which cures the deficiencies of their respective parent claim under the 2019 PEG analysis. None of the dependent claims considered individually, including their respective limitations, include an “inventive concept” of some additional element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claims in practice amount to something “significantly more” than patent-ineligible subject matter to which the claims are directed.
The elements of the instant process steps when taken in combination do not offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone. The claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claims do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of an electronic device itself which implements the abstract idea (e.g., the general purpose computer and/or the computer system which implements the process are not made more efficient or technologically improved); the claims do not perform a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (i.e., the claims do not use the abstract idea in the claimed process to bring about a physical change. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was imparted by the claimed process; contrast, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where a physical change, and thus patentability, was not imparted by the claimed process); and the claims do not move beyond a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., an electronic processor and a sensor in a vehicle) in Claims 1, and 5-7
Regarding Claim 4: These claims depend from Claim 1 and only add further details to the steps in that independent claim. Therefore, they are also rejected on the same grounds as Claim 1. Similarly, Claims 5-7 contain mostly the same limitations as Claim 1 and the further details do not add significantly to the inventive concept. Therefore, they are also rejected on the same grounds as Claim 1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-2 and 5-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and (a)(2) as being anticipated by Reidl et al. (PG Pub 2015/0025850).
Regarding claim 1, Reidl teaches an electronic processor (figure 1, element 104; paragraph 22) that processes a sensor signal output from a sensor (figure 1, element 102; paragraph 22) mounted to a vehicle (paragraphs 2 and 22), the electronic processor configured to:
acquire the sensor signal output from the sensor (figure 1, elements 116 and 118; paragraph 23);
generate a first output signal through a first filter for extracting a first frequency band from the sensor signal (paragraph 28; figure 1, element 112);
generate a second output signal through a second filter for extracting a second frequency band, which differs from the first frequency band, from the sensor signal (paragraphs 26 and 28; figure 1, element 114); and
output the first output signal and the second output signal at once (figure 1, element 107; paragraphs 26 and 29).
Regarding claim 2, Reidl teaches the electronic processor according to claim 1, wherein the electronic processors
sends the first output signal to a first controller that uses a signal limited to the first frequency band (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 206), and
sends the second output signal to a second controller that uses a signal limited to the second frequency band (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 208).
Regarding claim 5, Reidl teaches a sensor device (figure 1, element 102; paragraph 22) comprising:
a sensor (figure 1, elements 108 and 110) that is mounted to a vehicle (paragraphs 2 and 22); and
an electronic processor (figure 1, element 104; paragraph 22) that processes a sensor signal output from the sensor, wherein
the electronic processor is configured to:
acquire the sensor signal output from the sensor (figure 1, elements 116 and 118; paragraph 23);
generate a first output signal through a first filter for extracting a first frequency band from the sensor signal (paragraph 28; figure 1, element 112);
generate a second output signal through a second filter for extracting a second frequency band, which differs from the first frequency band, from the sensor signal (paragraphs 26 and 28; figure 1, element 114); and
output the first output signal and the second output signal at once (figure 1, element 107; paragraphs 26 and 29).
Regarding claim 6, Reidl teaches a control system comprising:
a sensor device (figure 1, element 102) including a sensor (figure 1, elements 108 and 110) that is mounted to a vehicle (paragraphs 2 and 22) and an electronic processor (figure 1, element 104; paragraph 22) that processes a sensor signal output from the sensor (figure 1, element 102; paragraph 23); and
plural controllers (figure 1, element 104; paragraph 22), wherein
the electronic processor (figure 1, element 104; paragraph 22) is configured to:
acquire the sensor signal output from the sensor (figure 1, elements 116 and 118; paragraph 23);
generate a first output signal through a first filter for extracting a first frequency band from the sensor signal (paragraph 28; figure 1, element 112);
generate a second output signal through a second filter for extracting a second frequency band, which differs from the first frequency band, from the sensor signal (paragraphs 26 and 28; figure 1, element 114); and
output the first output signal and the second output signal at once (figure 1, element 107; paragraphs 26 and 29),
the plural controllers include:
a first controller that uses a signal limited to the first frequency band (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 206); and
a second controller that uses a signal limited to the second frequency band (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 208), and
the electronic processor
sends the first output signal to the first controller (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 120) and
sends the second output signal to the second controller (paragraph 31; figure 2, element 122).
Regarding claim 7, Reidl teaches a processing method for a sensor signal that is output from a sensor (figure 1, element 102; paragraph 23) mounted to a vehicle (paragraphs 2 and 22), the processing method comprising:
a first step of acquiring the sensor signal that is output from the sensor (figure 1, elements 116 and 118; paragraph 23);
a second step of generating a first output signal through a first filter for extracting a first frequency band from the sensor signal acquired in the first step (paragraph 28; figure 1, element 112));
a third step of generating a second output signal through a second filter for extracting a second frequency band, which differs from the first frequency band, from the sensor signal acquired in the first step (paragraphs 26 and 28; figure 1, element 114); and
a fourth step of outputting the first output signal and the second output signal at once (figure 1, element 107; paragraphs 26 and 29).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 3 and 4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Reidl et al. (PG Pub 2015/0025850) in view of Chino et al. (PG Pub 2019/0285663).
Regarding claim 3, Reidl teaches the electronic processor according to claim 2.
Reidl is silent as to wherein
the sensor signals include plural types of signals,
the electronic processor generates plural types of the first output signals,
the electronic processor generates plural types of the second output signals, and
the electronic processors
selects a type of a signal requested by the first controller from the plural types of the first output signals and sends such a signal to the first controller
selects a type of a signal requested by the second controller from the plural types of the second output signals and sends such a signal to the second controller.
Chino teaches wherein
the sensor signals include plural types of signals (paragraphs 54 and 70; figure 2, elements 30x, 30y, 30z, 40a, and 40b),
the electronic processor generates plural types of the first output signals (figure 2, element BS1; paragraph 62; figure 22 shows the substrate for BS1),
the electronic processor generates plural types of the second output signals (figure 2, element BS2; paragraph 62; figure 22 shows the substrate for BS2), and
the electronic processors
selects a type of a signal requested by the first controller from the plural types of the first output signals and sends such a signal to the first controller (paragraphs 62-64; figure 2, elements BS1 and 83 are connected) and
selects a type of a signal requested by the second controller from the plural types of the second output signals and sends such a signal to the second controller (paragraphs 62-64; figure 2, elements BS2 and 84 are connected).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art as of the effective filing date of the invention to combine the sensor of Chino with the electronic processor of Reidl since doing so would be an example of applying a known technique to a known device ready for improvement to yield predictable results. In this case, Chino specifically teaches both an acceleration sensor and an angular velocity sensor in 3 dimensions, so both acceleration and velocity are signals sent by the sensors. Reidl is simply silent as to the type of sensor but the bus configurations and sensor types of Chino can be substituted for the processors and sensors of Reidl without significant alterations to the configuration of the electronic processor and controllers of Reidl. Therefore, it would have been obvious to use the sensors of Chino on the device of Reidl.
Regarding claim 4, Reidl teaches the processor according to claim 1.
Reidl is silent as to wherein
the sensor is an inertial measurement unit that detects acceleration in three axial directions and angular velocities around three axes, and
the sensor signals include a signal indicating the acceleration in the three axial directions and a signal indicating the angular velocities around the three axes.
Chino teaches wherein the sensor is an inertial measurement unit that detects acceleration in three axial directions and angular velocities around three axes (paragraphs 54-59; figure 1, element 10), and
the sensor signals include a signal indicating the acceleration in the three axial directions and a signal indicating the angular velocities around the three axes (figure 1, elements BS2 and BS1; paragraphs 54 and 62).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art as of the effective filing date of the invention to combine the sensor of Chino with the electronic processor of Reidl since doing so would be an example of applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results. In this case, Chino specifically teaches both an acceleration sensor and an angular velocity sensor in 3 dimensions, so both acceleration and velocity are signals sent by the sensors. Reidl is simply silent as to the type of sensor but the bus configurations and sensor types of Chino can be substituted for the processors and sensors of Reidl without significant alterations to the configuration of the electronic processor and controllers of Reidl. Therefore, it would have been obvious to use the sensors of Chino on the device of Reidl.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record on PTO-892 and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
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/Susan E Scharpf/Examiner, Art Unit 3747
/LINDSAY M LOW/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3747