DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement(s) filed on August 14, 2026 have/has been acknowledged and considered by the examiner. Initialed copies of supplied IDS(s) forms are included in this correspondence.
The information disclosure statement filed March 26, 2026 fails to comply with 37 CFR 1.98(a)(2), which requires a legible copy of each cited foreign patent document; each non-patent literature publication or that portion which caused it to be listed; and all other information or that portion which caused it to be listed. It has been placed in the application file, but the information referred to therein has not been considered.
Specifically, Examiner has not considered Foreign Doc #3, #7; NPL documents #1, #2, #3 for failure to provide a copy.
Response to Arguments
USC 112(f) + 112(b) issues
a) Regarding Applicant’s remarks as they pertain to the USC 112(b) rejection of claim 1 as it pertains to the “line of sight detection unit”, Examiner is not persuaded. While Examiner appreciates the table mapping the limitation to the corresponding disclosure, such remarks do not resolve the issue.
Applicant’s figures only disclose a proverbial black box (25). This black box is then recited to have the function of detecting the line of sight. There is no structure/material disclosed for detection of the line of sight. For instance, the camera (15) is not part of the light of sight detection unit. Specifically, the line of sight detection unit appears to be some sort of computer implemented function. The specification states unit (25) takes images from the camera (15) and determines angular components (theta, phi), yet Applicant’s specification fails to provide any, or sufficient, algorithm performed by the computer (unit 25) to take images and determine the various angles (theta, phi) based on the images.
b) Regarding Applicant’s remarks as they pertain to the USC 112(b) rejection of claim 1 as it pertains to the “visual recognition determination unit”, Examiner is not persuaded. While Examiner appreciates the table mapping the limitation to the corresponding disclosure, such remarks do not resolve the issue.
Applicant’s figures only disclose a proverbial black box (40) of no structure/material for performing the function. Such unit is understood to be a computer implemented function and as such, the necessary/sufficient algorithm is to be provided (MPEP 2181.II.B).
Applicant points to page 8, lines 1-6, amongst other portions, to provide support for sufficiency of algorithm, however such passage is precisely the problem. It fails to provide the sufficient algorithm to perform the function. Such passage makes reference to “logical determinative techniques” which is not at all the necessary and sufficient algorithm.
c) Regarding Applicant’s remarks as they pertain to the USC 112(b) rejection of claim 1 as it pertains to the “visual recognition detection feedback unit”, Examiner is not persuaded. While Examiner appreciates the table mapping the limitation to the corresponding disclosure, such remarks do not resolve the issue.
Applicant’s Figure 1 discloses a proverbial black box (65). Figures 2 and 3 are figures of displaying the target. None of which are algorithms for performing the function. Applicant also refers to page 8, line 16 through page 10 line 29, however, such passage includes “methods for providing feedback with respect to detection of visual recognition, besides methods in which this is made known visually, it is also possible to make this known to the user tactilely, auditorily, and/or by way of other such sense(s)).” No details are provided for performing the function for “other such senses.”
USC 103 Rejection
Applicant considers the combination of Donalson I (Donalson) in view of Massengill to either a) be for a purpose contrary to and inconsistent with that suggested by Donaldson, but also b) change the principle of operation of Donaldson and render Donalson unfit for its intended purpose, Examiner is not persuaded.
Applicant appears to either misread or misunderstand Donaldson’s paragraph [0086]. Donaldson’s paragraph [0086] is not a statement regarding the only use for an eye tracker, but simply a hypothetical “may be provided” and this is in conjunction with resolving the issue of the practitioner (e.g. eye doctor) having to monitor the patient’s attention.
There is nothing in Donaldson’s para. [0086] which states the eye tracker cannot be used for any other purposes. Applicant’s statement “but only for determining when the user is daydreaming, looking elsewhere, or is otherwise not paying attention” is without evidence. Donaldson says nothing about any daydreaming, looking elsewhere, or not paying attention.
Regarding Applicant’s assertion that the combination of Donaldson would change the principle of operation and render Donaldson unfit for its intended purpose, Examiner fails to understand what principle of operation is being changed, or how Donaldson would be unfit for its intended purpose. Specifically, the purpose of Donaldson is to perform a visual field test. The combination of Donaldson and Massengill would continue to preserve this purpose. In other words, Donaldson, as modified by Massengill, would still be satisfactory for performing visual field tests. Similarly, the principle of operation of Donaldson is to perform visual field tests. The modification of Donalson by Massengill would not change the principle of operation to perform visual field tests.
Massengill teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art that the detection of the visual field target from line of sight information allows for determining whether the target was seen. This is the same principle of operation and intended purpose of Donaldson. Donaldson also desires determining whether target (11) was seen by the patient. Donaldson however employs a physical (e.g. tablet 9) type determination as opposed to an eye tracking based determination.
Donaldson’s para. [0086] in no way suggests an eye tracking based determination cannot replace the tablet cursor type or provide additional functionality to the tablet cursor type such as in Massengill.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are:
a) line of sight detection unit that detects…in claim 1.
b) visual recognition determination unit that carries…in claim 1.
c) visual recognition detection feedback unit which…carries out…in claim 1.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
As to claim 1, the claim limitations “line of sight detection unit”; “visual recognition determination unit”; “visual recognition detection feedback unit” invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the entire claimed function and to clearly link the structure, material, or acts to the function.
Regarding the “line of sight detection unit”, such unit (25) is disclosed as a computer implemented function. As a computer implemented means-plus-function limitations (MPEP 2181.II.B), both the computer and the necessary algorithm must be disclosed (MPEP 2181.II.B - For a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitation, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or else the claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign. Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367, 88 USPQ2d 1751, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). As discussed above, Applicant’s originally filed specification fails to provide the necessary/sufficient algorithm to perform the function. Applicant’s specification discusses determining angles (theta, phi) from images, however the necessary/sufficient algorithm to determine such line of sight angles is not disclosed.
Regarding the “visual recognition determination unit”, such unit (40) is disclosed as a computer implemented function. As a computer implemented means-plus-function limitations (MPEP 2181.II.B), both the computer and the necessary algorithm must be disclosed (MPEP 2181.II.B - For a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitation, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or else the claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign. Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367, 88 USPQ2d 1751, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). As discussed above, Applicant’s originally filed specification fails to provide the necessary/sufficient algorithm to perform the function. Applicant’s specification discusses using “logical determinative techniques” which is not the necessary and sufficient algorithm.
Regarding the “visual recognition detection feedback unit”, such unit (65) is disclosed as a computer implemented function. As a computer implemented means-plus-function limitations (MPEP 2181.II.B), both the computer and the necessary algorithm must be disclosed (MPEP 2181.II.B - For a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitation, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or else the claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign. Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367, 88 USPQ2d 1751, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). As discussed above, Applicant’s originally filed specification fails to provide the necessary/sufficient algorithm to perform the function. Specifically, Applicant’s specification discusses providing “other such feedback” to “other such sense(s)”, however the necessary/sufficient to perform the function is not disclosed.
Therefore, the claim is indefinite and is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
Applicant may:
(a) Amend the claim so that the claim limitation will no longer be interpreted as a limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph;
(b) Amend the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites what structure, material, or acts perform the entire claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(c) Amend the written description of the specification such that it clearly links the structure, material, or acts disclosed therein to the function recited in the claim, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)).
If applicant is of the opinion that the written description of the specification already implicitly or inherently discloses the corresponding structure, material, or acts and clearly links them to the function so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed function, applicant should clarify the record by either:
(a) Amending the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function and clearly links or associates the structure, material, or acts to the claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(b) Stating on the record what the corresponding structure, material, or acts, which are implicitly or inherently set forth in the written description of the specification, perform the claimed function. For more information, see 37 CFR 1.75(d) and MPEP §§ 608.01(o) and 2181.
Claims 2-16 are rejected as dependent upon claim 1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a1) as being anticipated by Jones et al. (Portable Perimetry Using Eye-Tracking on a Tablet Computer—A Feasibility Assessment ; cited by Applicant; herein Jones).
As to claim 1, Jones teaches a visual field testing apparatus for testing a range of visual field of a user (Jones Fig. 1) comprising
a display for displaying a first target (Jone Fig. 1A) ;
a line of sight detection unit that detects a line of sight of the user and that outputs line of sight information pertaining to a direction of the line of sight (Jones Fig. 1C; page 3 - Tobii EyeX eye-tracker);
a visual recognition determination unit that carries out determination as to whether or not the user has visually recognized the first target based on the line of sight information and position information of the first target (Jones Fig. 1C; page 4 - If, within 1500 ms of trial onset, the participant’s gaze fell within 2.9o of the stimulus, then the trial was scored as a Hit (target seen));
a visual field testing unit that displays the first target at a first prescribed location at the display (Jones Figs. 1B, 1C).
wherein the first target is one among a plurality of targets and the first prescribed location is one among a plurality of prescribed locations (Jones Figs. 1B, 1C), and the visual field testing unit sequentially displays the plurality of targets at the plurality of prescribed locations and carries out testing of the range of visual field based on output from the visual recognition determination unit (Jones Figs. 1B, 1C; page 4 - The underlying measurement grid is shown in Figure 1B. It consisted primarily of points from the standard 24-2 that could be fit within the view angle of the screen, along with four additional points at (±10o, ±10o). The four most central points from the 24-2 grid were omitted, as the spatial imprecision of the eye-tracker meant that measurements at these
locations would be unreliable. The test attempted to test each location four times).
wherein the visual field testing unit comprises a visual recognition detection feedback unit which, when it is detected due to the output from the visual recognition determination unit that the user has visually recognized the first target when the first target is currently displayed at the display, carries out feedback processing for a prescribed time to let the user know that detection has occurred (Jones Fig. 1C; page 4 - If a trial was scored a Hit, then the current stimulus remained visible on the screen
until the next point was fixated).
As to claim 5, Jones teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, and Jones further teaches the visual field testing unit is such that, upon conclusion of the feedback processing, the first target is made to disappear after the first target has been visually recognized, and a second target is thereafter displayed at the display (Jones page 4 - If a trial was scored a Hit, then
the current stimulus remained visible on the screen until the next point was fixated, but any previous points were hidden. From the user’s perspective, they effectively ‘‘chased’’ a dot around the screen).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
Claims 2-4, 6-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Jones as applied to claims and 5 above, and further in view of Donaldson (US 2017/0245753; herein US 753; of record).
As to claim 2, Jones teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, but doesn’t specify the target changes color when visually recognized.
In the same field of endeavor US 753 teaches causing a target to change color when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide a color change since, as taught by US 753, such color change is well known as a visual notification the user has reached/seen the target (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claim 3, Jones teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, but doesn’t specify the target changes shape when visually recognized.
In the same field of endeavor US 753 teaches causing a target to change shape when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide a shape change since, as taught by US 753, such shape change is well known as a visual notification the user has reached/seen the target (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claim 4, Jones in view of US 753 teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 2, and US 753 further teaches causing a target to change shape when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claims 6, 7, 8, Jones in view of US 753 teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claims 2, 3, 4, and Jones further teaches the visual field testing unit is such that, upon conclusion of the feedback processing, the first target is made to disappear after the first target has been visually recognized, and a second target is thereafter displayed at the display (Jones page 4 - If a trial was scored a Hit, then the current stimulus remained visible on the screen until the next point was fixated, but any previous points were hidden. From the user’s perspective, they effectively ‘‘chased’’ a dot around the screen).
Claims 9 ,13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Jones as applied to claims 1, 5 above, and further in view of Stewart et al. (US 2003/0036907 - Stewart; of record).
As to claims 9, 13, Jones teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, but doesn’t specify the prescribed time is 200ms to 800ms. In the same field of endeavor Stewart teaches providing a visual indicator prescribed time of a visual field target for 200mn to 800ms (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024] - teaching 1/5 of a second which is 200ms).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide the time as 200-800ms since, as taught by Stewart, such time is well known in the art for rapid flashing of the visual field target (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024]).
Claim 10-12, 14-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Jones and US 753 as applied to claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 above, and further in view of Stewart (cited above).
As to claims 10-12, 14-16, Jones in view of US 753 teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, but doesn’t specify the prescribed time is 200ms to 800ms. In the same field of endeavor Stewart teaches providing a visual indicator prescribed time of a visual field target for 200mn to 800ms (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024] - teaching 1/5 of a second which is 200ms).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide the time as 200-800ms since, as taught by Stewart, such time is well known in the art for rapid flashing of the visual field target (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024]).
Claims 1 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Donaldson (US 2017/0049316; of record) in view of Massengill et al. (US 6,290,357 - Massengill; of record).
As to claim 1, Donaldson teaches a visual field testing apparatus for testing a range of visual field of a user (Donaldson Figs. 1-2), the visual field testing apparatus comprising
a display for displaying a first target (Donaldson Fig. 1 - 3; para. [0060]; Fig. 2 - 11; para. [0069]);
a line of sight detection unit that detects a line of sight of the user and that outputs line of sight information pertaining to a direction of the line of sight (Donaldson para. [0086] - eye tracker);
a visual recognition determination unit that carries out determination as to whether or not the user has visually recognized the first target (Donaldson Fig. 1 - 1, 3; para. [0069]-[0070]);
a visual field testing unit that displays the first target at a first prescribed location at the display (Donaldson Fig. 2 - 11, 13; para. [0069]-[0070]);
wherein the first target is one among a plurality of targets and the first prescribed location is one among a plurality of prescribed locations (Donaldson Fig. 2 - 11; para. [0073]), and the visual field testing unit sequentially displays the plurality of targets at the plurality of prescribed locations and carries out testing of the range of visual field based on output from the visual recognition determination unit (Donaldson Fig. 2 - 11; para. [0073]);
wherein the visual field testing unit comprises a visual recognition detection feedback unit (Donaldson para. [0034]) which, when it is detected due to the output from the visual recognition determination unit that the user has visually recognized the first target when the first target is currently displayed at the display, carries out feedback processing for a prescribed time to let the user know that detection has occurred (Donaldson para. [0034], [0070], [0073] - as discussed, the feedback is either visual or auditory, which is necessarily an arbitrary “prescribed time” as having been programmed into the computer).
While Donaldson teaches the use of eye tracking (light of sight detection unit), Donaldson doesn’t clarify if the visual recognition of the target is based on the eye tracking.
In the same field of endeavor Massengill teaches visual field testing devices with a line of sight detection unit (Massengill Fig. 1 - 5; col. 6:35-40; col. 7:5-15) and a visual recognition determination unit that carries out determination as to whether or not the user has visually recognized the first target based on the line of sight information and position information of the first target (Massengill Fig. 1 - 2, 11, 12, 14, 5; col. 6:35-40; col. 7:5-15; claim 1).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to determine visual recognition via gaze tracking since, as taught by Massengill, such features allow for HMD visual field testing to perform interactively with the patient, in real-time, and help eliminate the need for a technician (Massengill col. 2:15-35).
As to claim 5, Donaldson in view of Massengill teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, and Donaldson further teaches the visual field testing unit is such that, upon conclusion of the feedback processing, the first target is made to disappear after the first target has been visually recognized, and a second target is thereafter displayed at the display (Donaldson para. [0073]).
Claims 2-4, 6-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Donaldson and Massengill as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of US 753 (cited above).
As to claim 2, Donaldson in view of Massengill teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, and while Donaldson teaches the feedback is a visual indicator when the first target is currently displayed at the display and has been visually recognized (Donaldson para. [0073]), doesn’t specify the visual indicator is a change of color.
In the same field of endeavor US 753 teaches causing a target to change color when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide a color change since, as taught by US 753, such color change is well known as a visual notification the user has reached/seen the target (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claim 3, Donaldson in view of Massengill teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 1, and while Donaldson teaches the feedback is a visual indicator when the first target is currently displayed at the display and has been visually recognized (Donaldson para. [0073]), doesn’t specify the visual indicator is a shape change.
In the same field of endeavor US 753 teaches causing a target to change shape when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide a shape change since, as taught by US 753, such shape change is well known as a visual notification the user has reached/seen the target (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claim 4, Donaldson in view of Massengill and US 753 teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 2, and US 753 further teaches causing a target to change shape when it has been visually recognized (US 753 Fig. 2 - T1, T2; para. [0038]).
As to claim 6-8, Donaldson in view of Massengill and US 753 teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claim 2, 3, 4, and Donaldson further teaches the visual field testing unit is such that, upon conclusion of the feedback processing, the first target is made to disappear after the first target has been visually recognized, and a second target is thereafter displayed at the display (Donaldson para. [0073]).
Claims 9, 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Donaldson and Massengill as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Stewart (cited above).
As to claims 9, 13, Donaldson in view of Massengill teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claims 1, 5, and while Donaldson teaches providing the target is indicated for a prescribed time (Donaldson para. [0073] - computer programmed visual or audible indicator), Donaldson doesn’t specify the prescribed time is 200ms to 800ms. In the same field of endeavor Stewart teaches providing a visual indicator prescribed time of a visual field target for 200mn to 800ms (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024] - teaching 1/5 of a second which is 200ms).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide the time as 200-800ms since, as taught by Stewart, such time is well known in the art for rapid flashing of the visual field target (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024]).
Claims 10-12, 14-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Donaldson, Massengill, and US 753 as applied to claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 above, and further in view of Stewart (cited above).
As to claims 10-12, 14-16, Donaldson in view of Massengill teaches all the limitations of the instant invention as detailed above with respect to claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and while Donaldson teaches providing the target indicated for a prescribed time (Donaldson para. [0073] - computer programmed visual or audible indicator) but doesn’t specify the prescribed time is 200ms to 800ms. In the same field of endeavor Stewart teaches providing a visual indicator prescribed time of a visual field target for 200mn to 800ms (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024] - teaching 1/5 of a second which is 200ms).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the instant invention to provide the time as 200-800ms since, as taught by Stewart, such time is well known in the art for rapid flashing of the visual field target (Stewart Fig. 1 - 155; para. [0024]).
Conclusion
Applicant's submission of an information disclosure statement under 37 CFR 1.97(c) with the timing fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(p) on August 14, 2026 prompted the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 609.04(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ZACHARY W WILKES whose telephone number is (571)270-7540. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-4 (Pacific).
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Ricky Mack can be reached at 571-272-2333. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/ZACHARY W WILKES/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2872 September 2, 2026
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