DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-20 have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The invention, as taught in Claims 1-20, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• associated with (i.e., mental steps)
• a media-providing service having a listenership (i.e., organizing
human activity)
• a respective first set of training data based on one or more selection
criteria for the respective subset of the listenership, the respective first set
of training data comprising a plurality of first texts (i.e., mental
linguistic expressions)
• a respective second set of training data comprising (i) respective second
texts and (ii) classifications indicating whether the respective second texts
meet one or more moderation criteria (i.e., mental linguistic expressions)
• indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning
model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an
explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more
moderation criteria (i.e., mental steps and mental linguistic expressions)
• predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more
moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood
(i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps)
Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “1. A method, comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• associated with (i.e., mental steps)
• a media-providing service having a listenership (i.e., organizing
human activity)
• a respective first set of training data based on one or more selection
criteria for the respective subset of the listenership, the respective first set
of training data comprising a plurality of first texts (i.e., mental
linguistic expressions)
• a respective second set of training data comprising (i) respective second
texts and (ii) classifications indicating whether the respective second texts
meet one or more moderation criteria (i.e., mental linguistic expressions)
• indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning
model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an
explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more
moderation criteria (i.e., mental steps and mental linguistic expressions)
• predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more
moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood
(i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps)
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “computer system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
***
Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation.
This “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “training” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of the AI models at issue and thus the training of those AI models at issue, Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0008] recites the following:
[0008] Thus, systems are provided with improved methods for content moderation of media content items through the use of different machine-learning models (e.g., neural networks such as large language models) to generate culturally-attuned moderation results.
Therefore, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “display” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “display” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of Applicant’s claimed display, paragraph [0029] of Applicant’s Specification recites the following:
[0029] In some embodiments, the electronic device 102 includes a user interface 204, including output device(s) 206 and/or input device(s) 208. In some embodiments, the input devices 208 include a keyboard, mouse, or track pad. Alternatively, or in addition, in some embodiments, the user interface 204 includes a display device that includes a touch-sensitive surface, in which case the display device is a touch-sensitive display. In electronic devices that have a touch-sensitive display, a physical keyboard is optional (e.g., a soft keyboard may be displayed when keyboard entry is needed). In some embodiments, the output devices (e.g., output device(s) 206) include a speaker 252 (e.g., speakerphone device) and/or an audio jack 250 (or other physical output connection port) for connecting to speakers, earphones, headphones, or other external listening devices. Furthermore, some electronic devices 102 use a microphone and voice recognition device to supplement or replace the keyboard. Optionally, the electronic device 102 includes an audio input device (e.g., a microphone) to capture audio (e.g., speech from a user).
Therefore, simply using the display to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 2
Claim 2 recites:
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more moderation criteria comprise one or more content policy violation criteria.
Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches the mental step of a policy. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
3. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria is a first predicted likelihood generated by a first machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models;
the explanation of the predicted likelihood is a first explanation of the first predicted likelihood generated by the first machine learning model; and
the method further includes:
displaying a second predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and a second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by a second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models.
Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches the output of multiple machine learning models and the display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:
4. The method of claim 3, further including:
comparing the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item generated by the first machine learning model with the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by the second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models; and
displaying a summary of the comparison of the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item and the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood.
Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches the comparison of likelihoods and the display of a summary of that comparison which are all mental steps. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 5
Claim 5 recites:
5. The method of claim 1, wherein:
each respective subset of the listenership corresponds to a geographical area; and
the one or more selection criteria for the respective subset of the listenership include a criterion that is met when data originates from the geographical area.
Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches the mental steps of correspondence and satisfying of a selection criterion. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:
6. The method of claim 1, wherein providing the media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models includes providing at least a portion of a transcript of the media content item.
Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches the generic presentation of the transcript to a machine learning model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 7
Claim 7 recites:
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and the explanation of the predicted likelihood are displayed in a user interface for a chatbot.
Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches the generic display of mathematical data and its explanation. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites:
8. The method of claim 1, wherein each respective machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models includes a language model.
Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches a generic language model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 9
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “9. A computer system associated with a media-providing service having a listenership, comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 9 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 9 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• associated with (i.e., mental steps)
• a media-providing service having a listenership (i.e., organizing
human activity)
• a respective first set of training data based on one or more selection
criteria for the respective subset of the listenership, the respective first set
of training data comprising a plurality of first texts (i.e., mental
linguistic expressions)
• a respective second set of training data comprising (i) respective second
texts and (ii) classifications indicating whether the respective second texts
meet one or more moderation criteria (i.e., mental linguistic expressions)
• indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning
model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an
explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more
moderation criteria (i.e., mental steps and mental linguistic expressions)
• predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more
moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood
(i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps)
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(6) A “memory”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “computer system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
***
Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation.
This “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(6) A “memory” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “memory” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(6) A “memory”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “training” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of the AI models at issue and thus the training of those AI models at issue, Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0008] recites the following:
[0008] Thus, systems are provided with improved methods for content moderation of media content items through the use of different machine-learning models (e.g., neural networks such as large language models) to generate culturally-attuned moderation results.
Therefore, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “display” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “display” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of Applicant’s claimed display, paragraph [0029] of Applicant’s Specification recites the following:
[0029] In some embodiments, the electronic device 102 includes a user interface 204, including output device(s) 206 and/or input device(s) 208. In some embodiments, the input devices 208 include a keyboard, mouse, or track pad. Alternatively, or in addition, in some embodiments, the user interface 204 includes a display device that includes a touch-sensitive surface, in which case the display device is a touch-sensitive display. In electronic devices that have a touch-sensitive display, a physical keyboard is optional (e.g., a soft keyboard may be displayed when keyboard entry is needed). In some embodiments, the output devices (e.g., output device(s) 206) include a speaker 252 (e.g., speakerphone device) and/or an audio jack 250 (or other physical output connection port) for connecting to speakers, earphones, headphones, or other external listening devices. Furthermore, some electronic devices 102 use a microphone and voice recognition device to supplement or replace the keyboard. Optionally, the electronic device 102 includes an audio input device (e.g., a microphone) to capture audio (e.g., speech from a user).
Therefore, simply using the display to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(6) A “memory” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:
10. The computer system of claim 9, wherein the one or more moderation criteria comprise one or more content policy violation criteria.
Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches the mental steps of a policy violation criterion. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11
Claim 11 recites:
11. The computer system of claim 9, wherein:
the predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria is a first predicted likelihood generated by a first machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models;
the explanation of the predicted likelihood is a first explanation of the first predicted likelihood generated by the first machine learning model; and
the one or more programs further comprise instructions for:
displaying a second predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and a second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by a second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models.
Applicant’s Claim 11 merely teaches the output of multiple machine learning models and the display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 12
Claim 12 recites:
12. The computer system of claim 11, wherein the one or more programs further comprise instructions for:
comparing the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item generated by the first machine learning model with the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by the second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models; and
displaying a summary of the comparison of the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item and the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood.
Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches the comparison of likelihoods and the display of a summary of that comparison which are all mental steps. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 13
Claim 13 recites:
13. The computer system of claim 9, wherein:
each respective subset of the listenership corresponds to a geographical area; and
the one or more selection criteria for the respective subset of the listenership include a criterion that is met when data originates from the geographical area.
Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches the mental steps of correspondence and satisfying of a selection criterion. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The computer system of claim 9, wherein providing the media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models includes providing at least a portion of a transcript of the media content item.
Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches the generic presentation of the transcript to a machine learning model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 15
Claim 15 recites:
15. The computer system of claim 9, wherein the predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and the explanation of the predicted likelihood are displayed in a user interface for a chatbot.
Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches the generic display of mathematical data and its explanation. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
16. The computer system of claim 9, wherein each respective machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models includes a language model.
Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches a generic language model. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 17
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “17. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs configured for execution by a computer system associated with a media-providing service having a listenership, the one or more programs comprising instructions for:…” Therefore, it is a “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” (or “product of manufacture”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 17 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 17 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• associated with (i.e., mental steps)
• a media-providing service having a listenership (i.e., organizing
human activity)
• a respective first set of training data based on one or more selection
criteria for the respective subset of the listenership, the respective first set
of training data comprising a plurality of first texts (i.e., mental
linguistic expressions)
• a respective second set of training data comprising (i) respective second
texts and (ii) classifications indicating whether the respective second texts
meet one or more moderation criteria (i.e., mental linguistic expressions)
• indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning
model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an
explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more
moderation criteria (i.e., mental steps and mental linguistic expressions)
• predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more
moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood
(i.e., mathematical steps or mental steps)
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(6) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “computer system” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
***
Examiners should be aware that the courts often use the terms “technological environment” and “field of use” interchangeably, and thus for purposes of the eligibility analysis examiners should consider these terms interchangeable. Examiners should also keep in mind that this consideration overlaps with other considerations, particularly insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). For instance, a data gathering step that is limited to a particular data source (such as the Internet) or a particular type of data (such as power grid data or XML tags) could be considered to be both insignificant extra-solution activity and a field of use limitation.
This “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(6) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(g) recites:
2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more in Step 2B is whether the additional elements add more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. The term “extra-solution activity” can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim. Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity.
This “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computer system”
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine
learning model of the plurality of machine learning models
corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for
each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first
set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” /
“using the second set of training data to train the respective machine
learning model”
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a
respective second set of training data”
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning
model of the plurality of machine learning models”
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item
meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of
the predicted likelihood”
(6) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium”
(1) A “computer system” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “training a plurality of machine learning models, each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models corresponding to a respective subset of the listenership, including, for each respective machine learning model” / “using the respective first set of training data, training the respective machine learning model” / “using the second set of training data to train the respective machine learning model” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “training” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of the AI models at issue and thus the training of those AI models at issue, Applicant’s Specification, paragraph [0008] recites the following:
[0008] Thus, systems are provided with improved methods for content moderation of media content items through the use of different machine-learning models (e.g., neural networks such as large language models) to generate culturally-attuned moderation results.
Therefore, simply using the “training” to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “retrieving a respective first set of training data” / “retrieving a respective second set of training data” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) A “providing a media content item to each machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(5) A “displaying a predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and an explanation of the predicted likelihood” is a broad term which is described at a high level.
Further, since the “display” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the “display” to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Regarding the generic nature of Applicant’s claimed display, paragraph [0029] of Applicant’s Specification recites the following:
[0029] In some embodiments, the electronic device 102 includes a user interface 204, including output device(s) 206 and/or input device(s) 208. In some embodiments, the input devices 208 include a keyboard, mouse, or track pad. Alternatively, or in addition, in some embodiments, the user interface 204 includes a display device that includes a touch-sensitive surface, in which case the display device is a touch-sensitive display. In electronic devices that have a touch-sensitive display, a physical keyboard is optional (e.g., a soft keyboard may be displayed when keyboard entry is needed). In some embodiments, the output devices (e.g., output device(s) 206) include a speaker 252 (e.g., speakerphone device) and/or an audio jack 250 (or other physical output connection port) for connecting to speakers, earphones, headphones, or other external listening devices. Furthermore, some electronic devices 102 use a microphone and voice recognition device to supplement or replace the keyboard. Optionally, the electronic device 102 includes an audio input device (e.g., a microphone) to capture audio (e.g., speech from a user).
Therefore, simply using the display to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(6) A “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites:
18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the one or more moderation criteria comprise one or more content policy violation criteria.
Applicant’s Claim 18 merely teaches the mental steps of a policy violation criterion. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 18 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 19
Claim 19 recites:
19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein:
the predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria is a first predicted likelihood generated by a first machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models;
the explanation of the predicted likelihood is a first explanation of the first predicted likelihood generated by the first machine learning model; and
the one or more programs further comprise instructions for:
displaying a second predicted likelihood of the media content item meeting the one or more moderation criteria and a second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by a second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models.
Applicant’s Claim 19 merely teaches the output of multiple machine learning models and the display of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 19 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 20
Claim 20 recites:
20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 19, wherein the one or more programs further comprise instructions for:
comparing the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item generated by the first machine learning model with the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood generated by the second machine learning model of the plurality of machine learning models; and
displaying a summary of the comparison of the first predicted likelihood and the first explanation of the first predicted likelihood of the media content item and the second predicted likelihood and the second explanation of the second predicted likelihood.
Applicant’s Claim 20 merely teaches the comparison of likelihoods and the display of a summary of that comparison which are all mental steps. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Reasons for Not Rejecting the Clams Under Art
Claims 1-20 are not rejected since when reading the claims in light of the Specification, as per MPEP § 2111.01, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 1. Specifically, the closest prior art of Teblunthuis, et al., Effects of Algorithmic Flagging on Fairness: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Wikipedia, Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction (PACMHCI), Vol.5, No. CSCW1, Article 56, 22 APR 2021, pp. 1-27 fails to expressly teach:
Claim 1's "...selection criteria for the respective subset of the listenership..."
Claim 1's "...explanation of the predicted likelihood..."
Claim 1's "...train the respective machine learning model to indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more moderation criteria..."
Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 9. Specifically, the closest prior art of Teblunthuis, et al. fails to expressly teach:
Claim 9's "...selection criteria for the respective subset of the listenership..."
Claim 9's "...explanation of the predicted likelihood..."
Claim 9's "...train the respective machine learning model to indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more moderation criteria..."
Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 17. Specifically, the closest prior art of Teblunthuis, et al. fails to expressly teach:
Claim 17's "...selection criteria for the respective subset of the listenership..."
Claim 17's "...explanation of the predicted likelihood..."
Claim 17's "...train the respective machine learning model to indicate whether text that is input to the respective machine learning model meets the one or more moderation criteria and to provide an explanation of why the text does or does not meet the one or more moderation criteria..."
Only to the extent that these limitations (specifically as defined above) are not found in the prior art of record is the present case not rejected over the prior art.
Conclusion
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov.
If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to (571) 273-8300.
If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at (571) 272-3719.
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/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122
WLS
29 SEP 2026
