DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Applicant’s election without traverse of Group I, claims 1-10, in the reply filed on 13 July 2026 is acknowledged.
Claims 11-19 are withdrawn as being directed to a nonelected invention.
Claims 1-10 are presented for examination on the merits.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 1 is rendered vague and indefinite by the phrase “a urea-soluble fraction of decellularized, nuclease-digested ligament tissue”. It is unclear how “urea-soluble” is meant to limit the fraction of decellularized, nuclease-digested ligament. Does this mean that urea is actually used to solubilize something? That is – does this language refer to the method by which the fraction is obtained or merely to define a characteristic of the fraction? If the latter, then the ligament itself can be considered a composition comprising a fraction which is urea-soluble.
Appropriate clarification is required.
All other claims depend directly or indirectly from rejected claims and are, therefore, also rejected under U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, for the reasons set forth above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yang et al. (2013a) in view of Yang et al. (2013b). [cited by Applicant in IDS filed 10/31/2024].
Yang et al. (2013a) beneficially teaches a composition comprising a urea-soluble fraction of decellularized, nuclease- digested tendon tissue (the whole document). Yang et al. also teaches the bio-functionality of tendon ECM (tECM) on human adipose stem cells (hASC) behavior in 3D culture under tension, and strongly suggest the feasibility of using tECM to facilitate hASC-based tendon healing and regeneration (discussion). The aim of Yang et al. (2013a) was to support the utility of tECM in creating biofunctional scaffolds for tendon tissue engineering (abstract).
The reference does not explicitly disclose the use of ligament tissue in the preparation of the decellularized extract.
Yang et al. (2013b) teaches that tendons and ligaments have similar ultrastructure and physiology, as well as fulfilling similar functional roles. Therefore the lessons learned regarding the regeneration repair of tendons are applicable to ligaments as well (see introduction).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claim invention was made to employ the method of producing a urea-soluble extract of tendon tissue such as advantageously taught by Yang et al. (2013a) to produce an extract from ligament tissue based on the similarities between the two tissue types as taught e.g. by Yang et al. (2013b).
Where the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254-1255, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430, 432-33 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
In KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Supreme Court emphasized a flexible approach to the obviousness question, stating that the analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 "need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." Id. at 418; see also id. at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is... a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."). In KSR, the Supreme Court indicated that the obviousness analysis should consider the “background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Under KSR, information deemed within PHOSITA’s general knowledge is more powerful than that found buried in a prior art reference because we assume that PHOSITA would consider using their general knowledge in combination with the prior art — even absent any express motivation to do so. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the obviousness inquiry turns not only on the prior art, but whether “the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. Regardless of the tribunal, the inquiry into whether any “differences” between the invention and the prior art would have rendered the invention obvious to a skilled artisan necessarily depends on such artisan’s knowledge. See Philips v. Google & Microsoft 2020.
“[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40oC and 80oC and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100oC and an acid concentration of 10%); See also, Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ 2d at 1382 ("The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages."); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references where held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ 2d 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ 2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ 2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
From the teachings of the references, it is apparent that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in producing the claimed invention. Therefore, the invention as a whole was prima facie obvious to one of skill in the art at the time the invention was made, as evidence by the references, especially in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1-10 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-5 of U.S. Patent No. 12,070,475. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because each are directed compositions comprising a urea-soluble fraction of decellularized, nuclease-digested ligament tissue, and a pharmaceutically-acceptable excipient.
In addition, please note that the instant claims encompass and/or are encompassed by the "475 claims.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RUSSELL G FIEBIG whose telephone number is (571)270-5366. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-4.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anand Desai can be reached at 5712720947. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/RUSSELL G FIEBIG/Examiner, Art Unit 1655
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