Prosecution Insights
Last updated: July 17, 2026
Application No. 18/784,983

METHOD AND CONTROL UNIT FOR TRANSFERRING eSIM PROFILE DATA

Non-Final OA §103
Filed
Jul 26, 2024
Priority
Aug 24, 2023 — EU 23193171.8
Examiner
BATAILLE, FRANTZ
Art Unit
Tech Center
Assignee
NXP Semiconductors N.V.
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
82%
Grant Probability
Favorable
1-2
OA Rounds
2m
Est. Remaining
82%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 82% — above average
82%
Career Allowance Rate
585 granted / 715 resolved
+21.8% vs TC avg
Minimal +0% lift
Without
With
+0.3%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Fast prosecutor
2y 1m
Avg Prosecution
23 currently pending
Career history
733
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
0.9%
-39.1% vs TC avg
§103
92.9%
+52.9% vs TC avg
§102
4.2%
-35.8% vs TC avg
§112
0.5%
-39.5% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 715 resolved cases

Office Action

§103
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Priority Examiner acknowledges the following data: Parent data 18784983 filed 07/26/2024 claims foreign priority to 23193171.8, filed 08/24/2023 Status of the Application This Non-final office action is in response to Applicant’s amendment received by the Office on 26 July 2024. Claims 1-29 have been presented in the application, of which, claims 1-11 are cancelled, and claims 12-29 are new. Accordingly, pending claims 12-29 are addressed herein. Information Disclosure statements The information disclosure statements (IDS) were submitted and filed on 07/26/2024 and 09/29/2025. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statements are being considered by the examiner. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claims 12-29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee et al (US 2023/0403563) in view of Yang et al (US 2021/0314148). Regarding claim 12, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2) for transferring eSIM profile data from a first eUICC device to a target entity, the method comprising (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10): a. providing encrypted eSIM profile data on the first eUICC device, the encrypted eSIM profile data having been encrypted by means of profile encryption keys (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8); b. transferring the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device to the target entity (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10); c. deleting the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device (The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device. In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 7-13); d. transferring the profile encryption keys from the first eUICC device to the target entity only after completion of steps b. and c. (In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device. The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 10-12, [0021], lines 1-5); and e. decrypting the encrypted eSIM profile data by means of the profile encryption keys (The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device. The encrypted version of the activation code can only be decrypted by the eUICC of the source wireless device and cannot be decrypted by a local profile assistant (LPA) operable on a processor of the source wireless device external to the eUICC, as only the eUICC possesses a one-time-use eUICC private key (otSK.sub.eUICC), [0021], lines 1-5) Lee et al does not specifically disclose concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity. However, Yang et al specifically teaches concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity (The eSIM profile 704 (along with sensitive data extracted from a decrypted version of the eSIM algorithm data 706) can be installed on the source device eUICC 108-1 within a dedicated security domain for the eSIM 208, e.g., within an ISD-P, while the K.sub.s encrypted eSIM algorithm data 706 can be stored at the source device eUICC 108-1 (e.g., inside or outside the ISD-P containing the installed eSIM 208, e.g., in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or in some embodiments on a memory of the mobile wireless device 102 external to the source device eUICC 108-1, [0027], lines 8-13). At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Lee et al with concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity of Yang et al. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve methods and apparatus to support credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMs (eSIMs) between wireless devices, (Yang et al, [0002], lines 1-2) Regarding claim 13, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein in step a. the profile encryption keys are generated together with the eSIM profile data (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8). Regarding claim 14, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the profile encryption keys are encrypted on the first eUICC device by means of at least one key, resulting in encrypted encryption keys, wherein the encrypted encryption keys are suitable for a single target entity (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10). Regarding claim 15, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein in step a. the profile encryption keys are encrypted by key creation material, which has been agreed upon in a handshake process between the first eUICC device and the target entity (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 16, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the profile encryption keys are decrypted by means of the key creation material (The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device. The encrypted version of the activation code can only be decrypted by the eUICC of the source wireless device and cannot be decrypted by a local profile assistant (LPA) operable on a processor of the source wireless device external to the eUICC, as only the eUICC possesses a one-time-use eUICC private key (otSK.sub.eUICC), [0021], lines 1-5) Regarding claim 17, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the key creation material and the profile encryption keys are generated emphemeral (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8). Regarding claim 18, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the first eUICC device is arranged on a card and the target entity is a second eUICC device (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 19, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the first eUICC device is arranged on a card and the target entity is arranged on a server (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 20, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein at least a single eSIM profile is transferred from the first eUICC device to the target entity (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 21, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2) for transferring eSIM profile data from a first eUICC device to a target entity, the method comprising (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10): a. providing encrypted eSIM profile data on the first eUICC device, the encrypted eSIM profile data having been encrypted by means of profile encryption keys (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8); b. transferring the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device to the target entity (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10); c. deleting the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device( The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device. In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 7-13); d. transferring the profile encryption keys from the first eUICC device to the target entity only after completion of steps b. and c. (In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device. The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 10-12, [0021], lines 1-5); and e. decrypting the encrypted eSIM profile data by means of the profile encryption keys and, wherein the profile encryption keys are encrypted on the first eUICC device by means of at least one key, resulting in encrypted encryption keys, and wherein the encrypted encryption keys are suitable for a single target entity (The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device. The encrypted version of the activation code can only be decrypted by the eUICC of the source wireless device and cannot be decrypted by a local profile assistant (LPA) operable on a processor of the source wireless device external to the eUICC, as only the eUICC possesses a one-time-use eUICC private key (otSK.sub.eUICC), [0021], lines 1-5) Lee et al does not specifically disclose concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity. However, Yang et al specifically teaches concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity (The eSIM profile 704 (along with sensitive data extracted from a decrypted version of the eSIM algorithm data 706) can be installed on the source device eUICC 108-1 within a dedicated security domain for the eSIM 208, e.g., within an ISD-P, while the K.sub.s encrypted eSIM algorithm data 706 can be stored at the source device eUICC 108-1 (e.g., inside or outside the ISD-P containing the installed eSIM 208, e.g., in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or in some embodiments on a memory of the mobile wireless device 102 external to the source device eUICC 108-1, [0027], lines 8-13). At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Lee et al with concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity of Yang et al. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve methods and apparatus to support credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMs (eSIMs) between wireless devices, (Yang et al, [0002], lines 1-2. Regarding claim 22, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein in step a. the profile encryption keys are generated together with the eSIM profile data (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8). Regarding claim 23, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein in step a. the profile encryption keys are encrypted by key creation material, which has been agreed upon in a handshake process between the first eUICC device and the target entity (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 24, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the profile encryption keys are decrypted by means of the key creation material (The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device. The encrypted version of the activation code can only be decrypted by the eUICC of the source wireless device and cannot be decrypted by a local profile assistant (LPA) operable on a processor of the source wireless device external to the eUICC, as only the eUICC possesses a one-time-use eUICC private key (otSK.sub.eUICC), [0021], lines 1-5). Regarding claim 25, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the key creation material and the profile encryption keys are generated emphemeral (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8). Regarding claim 26, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the first eUICC device is arranged on a card and the target entity is a second eUICC device (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 27, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein the first eUICC device is arranged on a card and the target entity is arranged on a server (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 28, Lee et al discloses method (FIG. 5A illustrates a flowchart of an exemplary method performed by a local profile assistant (LPA) of a source wireless device, [0012], lines 1-2), wherein at least a single eSIM profile is transferred from the first eUICC device to the target entity (At 414, the eUICC 108 of the source wireless device 102A initiates a mutual authentication procedure, via the LPA 404 of the source wireless device 102A, with an MNO provisioning server 116 associated with the cellular wireless service subscription of the selected eSIM profile 208. At 416, the LPA 404 sends to the eUICC 108 a server authentication message, e.g., an ES10b Authenticate Server message, which includes a unique identifier, e.g., an integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) value, for the selected eSIM profile 208, [0028], lines 10-15). Regarding claim 29, Lee et al discloses control unit (fig. 2 item 104, processor) configured to perform a method for transferring eSIM profile data from a first eUICC device to a target entity, the method comprising (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10): a. providing encrypted eSIM profile data on the first eUICC device, the encrypted eSIM profile data having been encrypted by means of profile encryption keys (eUICC provides to the MNO provisioning server an eUICC-signed message that includes a one-time-use eUICC public key (otPK.sub.eUICC). The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 2-3 and lines 6-8); b. transferring the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device to the target entity (The MNO provisioning server uses i) the one-time-use eUICC public key otPK.sub.eUICC and ii) a one-time-use server private key (otSK.sub.Server) to generate a session key. The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device, [0020], lines 6-10); c. deleting the encrypted eSIM profile data from the first eUICC device (The MNO provisioning server subsequently encrypts, using the session key, an activation code linked to an eSIM profile for the target wireless device and provides the encrypted version of the activation code along with a one-time-use server public key (otPK.sub.Server), which corresponds to the one-time-use server private key otSK.sub.Server, in a server-signed data message to the source wireless device. In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 7-13); d. transferring the profile encryption keys from the first eUICC device to the target entity only after completion of steps b. and c. (In some embodiments, the server-signed data message includes a deletion flag indicating that deletion of the eSIM profile, from the eUICC of the source wireless device, is required before the activation code can be used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription to the eSIM profile for the target wireless device. The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device, [0020], lines 10-12, [0021], lines 1-5); and e. decrypting the encrypted eSIM profile data by means of the profile encryption keys (The activation code can be used to transfer the cellular wireless service subscription associated with the eSIM profile of the source wireless device to a corresponding eSIM profile designated for the target wireless device. The encrypted version of the activation code can only be decrypted by the eUICC of the source wireless device and cannot be decrypted by a local profile assistant (LPA) operable on a processor of the source wireless device external to the eUICC, as only the eUICC possesses a one-time-use eUICC private key (otSK.sub.eUICC), [0021], lines 1-5) Lee et al does not specifically disclose concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity. However, Yang et al specifically teaches concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity (The eSIM profile 704 (along with sensitive data extracted from a decrypted version of the eSIM algorithm data 706) can be installed on the source device eUICC 108-1 within a dedicated security domain for the eSIM 208, e.g., within an ISD-P, while the K.sub.s encrypted eSIM algorithm data 706 can be stored at the source device eUICC 108-1 (e.g., inside or outside the ISD-P containing the installed eSIM 208, e.g., in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or in some embodiments on a memory of the mobile wireless device 102 external to the source device eUICC 108-1, [0027], lines 8-13). At the time the invention was filed, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified system of Lee et al with concept of installing the decrypted eSIM profile data on the target entity of Yang et al. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification in order to improve methods and apparatus to support credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMs (eSIMs) between wireless devices, (Yang et al, [0002], lines 1-2). Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FRANTZ BATAILLE whose telephone number is (571)270-7286. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 9:00 AM-5:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Akwasi Sarpong can be reached on 571-270-3438. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /FRANTZ BATAILLE/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2681
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Prosecution Timeline

Jul 26, 2024
Application Filed
Jun 24, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103 (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

1-2
Expected OA Rounds
82%
Grant Probability
82%
With Interview (+0.3%)
2y 1m (~2m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
Low
PTA Risk
Based on 715 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

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