DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Information Disclosure Statement
The listing of references in the specification is not a proper information disclosure statement. 37 CFR 1.98(b) requires a list of all patents, publications, or other information submitted for consideration by the Office, and MPEP § 609.04(a) states, "the list may not be incorporated into the specification but must be submitted in a separate paper." Therefore, unless the references have been cited by the examiner on form PTO-892, they have not been considered.
Claim Objections
Claims 2-16 are objected to because of the following informalities:
In claims 2-16: “The processor” should read “The brain-organoid CMOS processor” in Line 1 of each claim.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 11, 14-15, and 23-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Regarding claims 11, 14-15, and 23-24, A broad range or limitation together with a narrow range or limitation that falls within the broad range or limitation (in the same claim) may be considered indefinite if the resulting claim does not clearly set forth the metes and bounds of the patent protection desired. See MPEP § 2173.05(c). In the present instance, claims 11, 14-15, and 23-24 recites the broad recitation “at least one CMOS device”, and the claims also recites “a plurality of CMOS devices” which is the narrower statement of the range/limitation. The claim(s) are considered indefinite because there is a question or doubt as to whether the feature introduced by such narrower language is (a) merely exemplary of the remainder of the claim, and therefore not required, or (b) a required feature of the claims.
Claim 11 recites “at least two of which” and it is unclear what “which” is meant to refer to.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because Section 33(a) of the America Invents Act reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.
Claims 1-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 and section 33(a) of the America Invents Act as being directed to or encompassing a human organism. See also Animals - Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987) (indicating that human organisms are excluded from the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101). Claims 1 and 17 appear to positively recite a human organism. A brain organoid as noted in the specification is from human stem cells (Paragraph 0006) thus it would appear the claims are directed to or encompassing a human organism.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 1-2, 4, 17-18, and 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023).
Regarding claim 1, Suzuki teaches a brain-organoid complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) processor (Abstract; Introduction), comprising:
at least one culture (Section 2.6: “Figure 7A-a shows DRG neurons cultured on HD-CMOS-MEA at 6 WIV (weeks in vitro). A peculiar appearance of DRG neurons with different soma sizes”) including:
at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”), and
at least one CMOS device configured to interface with the at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”),
wherein the at least one CMOS device is configured to stimulate and record information from the at least one brain organoid (Section 2.6; Figure 7).
Regarding claim 2, Suzuki teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device is configured to electro-physiologically interface with the at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”).
Regarding claim 4, Suzuki teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device is configured to perform at least one operation or at least one computation to interface with the at least one brain organoid (Page 2: “This MEA employs a disaggregated differential amplifier and one-sided feedback and auto-zero circuit to reduce the pixel size and suppress the noise.”).
Regarding claim 17, Suzuki teaches a method for utilizing a brain-organoid complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) structure (Abstract; Introduction), comprising:
providing at least one culture (Section 2.6: “Figure 7A-a shows DRG neurons cultured on HD-CMOS-MEA at 6 WIV (weeks in vitro). A peculiar appearance of DRG neurons with different soma sizes”) which includes:
at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”), and
at least one CMOS device configured to interface with the at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”); and
stimulating and recording information from the at least one brain organoid using the at least one CMOS device (Section 2.6; Figure 7).
Regarding claim 18, Suzuki teaches further comprising electro-physiologically interfacing the CMOS device with the at least one brain organoid (Section 2.10: “The electrical activity of human cerebral organoids prepared from iPS cells derived from Rett syndrome patients was measured using a HD-CMOS-MEA.”).
Regarding claim 20, Suzuki teaches further comprising causing the at least one CMOS device to perform at least one operation or at least one computation to interface with the at least one brain organoid (Page 2: “This MEA employs a disaggregated differential amplifier and one-sided feedback and auto-zero circuit to reduce the pixel size and suppress the noise.”).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 3 and 19 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Shin et al. (Reference V on PTO-892; 2021).
Regarding claim 3, Suzuki is silent on the optical interfacing. Shin teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device is configured to optically interface with the at least one brain organoid (Page 2, Paragraphs 2-5). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shin because it allows for precise modulation of neural networks, and a miniaturized incubating and recording system for daily recordings of the developing neural networks (Page 2, Paragraph 5 of Shen).
Regarding claim 19, Suzuki is silent on the optical interfacing. Shin teaches further comprising optically interfacing the CMOS device with the at least one brain organoid (Page 2, Paragraphs 2-5). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shin because it allows for precise modulation of neural networks, and a miniaturized incubating and recording system for daily recordings of the developing neural networks (Page 2, Paragraph 5 of Shen).
Claim(s) 5 and 21 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Trujillo et al. (Reference W on PTO-892; 2019).
Regarding claim 5, Suzuki is silent on the at least one operation specifics. Trujillo teaches wherein the at least one operation includes a performance of (i) encoding and decoding spikes from the at least one brain organoid (Page 562, Paragraph 2), and (ii) input or output layer training (Page 565, Paragraph 3). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Trujillo because it allows the ability to evaluate the cortical organoid functionality in a mesoscopic level (Page 562, Paragraph 2 of Trujillo) and it allows for analysis of genetically programmed developmental timelines being detected by machine learning algorithms (Page 565, Paragraph 4 of Trujillo).
Regarding claim 21, Suzuki is silent on the at least one operation specifics. Trujillo teaches wherein the at least one operation includes a performance of (i) encoding and decoding spikes from the at least one brain organoid (Page 562, Paragraph 2), and (ii) input or output layer training (Page 565, Paragraph 3). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Trujillo because it allows the ability to evaluate the cortical organoid functionality in a mesoscopic level (Page 562, Paragraph 2 of Trujillo) and it allows for analysis of genetically programmed developmental timelines being detected by machine learning algorithms (Page 565, Paragraph 4 of Trujillo).
Claim(s) 6, 9, 11, 14-16, and 23-25 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Shepard et al. (US 2020/0155828).
Regarding claim 6, Suzuki is silent on the wireless interface of the CMOS. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes one or more wireless interfaces (Paragraphs 0007 and 0032). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the implantation without wires or external physical connections (Paragraph 0007 of Shepard).
Regarding claim 9, Suzuki is silent on the CMOS being thinned. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device is thinned (Paragraph 0009). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it enables more pliability to conform (Paragraph 0009 of Shepard).
Regarding claim 11, Suzuki is silent on the plurality of CMOS and the stacked configuration. Shepard wherein the at least one CMOS device is a plurality of CMOS devices, at least two of which are mounted in a back-to-back or stacked configuration with respect to one another (Paragraph 0048). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the necessary pliability associated with desired design requirements (Paragraph 0048 of Shepard), and thus one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the optimal structuring through routine experimentation.
Regarding claim 14, Suzuki is silent on the plurality of CMOS and the 3-D configuration. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes a plurality of CMOS devices which are provided in a three-dimensional configuration (Paragraph 0048). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the necessary pliability associated with desired design requirements (Paragraph 0048 of Shepard), and thus one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the optimal structuring through routine experimentation.
Regarding claim 15, Suzuki is silent on the plurality of CMOS and the stacked configuration. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes a plurality of CMOS devices which are provided in a stacked configuration (Paragraph 0048). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the necessary pliability associated with desired design requirements (Paragraph 0048 of Shepard), and thus one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the optimal structuring through routine experimentation.
Regarding claim 16, Suzuki is silent on the wireless interface of the CMOS. Shepard teaches further comprising at least one interface providing a wireless connection, wherein the at least one interface is coupled to the at least one CMOS device (Paragraphs 0007 and 0032 and 0055). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the implantation without wires or external physical connections (Paragraph 0007 of Shepard).
Regarding claim 23, Suzuki is silent on the plurality of CMOS and the 3-D configuration. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes a plurality of CMOS devices which are provided in a three-dimensional configuration (Paragraph 0048). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the necessary pliability associated with desired design requirements (Paragraph 0048 of Shepard), and thus one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the optimal structuring through routine experimentation.
Regarding claim 24, Suzuki is silent on the plurality of CMOS and the stacked configuration. Shepard teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes a plurality of CMOS devices which are provided in a stacked configuration (Paragraph 0048). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the necessary pliability associated with desired design requirements (Paragraph 0048 of Shepard), and thus one of ordinary skill in the art could determine the optimal structuring through routine experimentation.
Regarding claim 25, Suzuki is silent on the wireless interface of the CMOS. Shepard teaches further comprising providing a wireless connection using at least one interface which is coupled to the at least one CMOS device (Paragraphs 0007 and 0032 and 0055). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Shepard because it allows for the implantation without wires or external physical connections (Paragraph 0007 of Shepard).
Claim(s) 7-8 and 12 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Cai et al. (Reference X on PTO-892; March 2023).
Regarding claim 7, Suzuki is silent on the organoid operating as a reservoir. Cai teaches wherein the at least one brain organoid is configured to operate as a reservoir in a reservoir computing model (Page 3, Lines 14-17). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Cai because it allows for the adapting to signals and to perform “feature engineering” (Page 3, Lines 14-17 of Cai).
Regarding claim 8, Suzuki is silent on the learning structure or memory of the organoid. Cai teaches wherein the at least one brain organoid has at least one of learning structure or a long-term memory which is utilized in a computing model (Figure 3f). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Cai because of the high plasticity and adaptability of organoids, this allows for the flexibility to change and reorganize in response to electrical stimulation, highlighting the ability to learn and adapt over training, necessary for developing AI systems (Page 5, Lines 8-10 of Cai).
Regarding claim 12, Suzuki is silent on the organoid being a co-processor. Cai teaches wherein the one or more brain organoids acts a co-processor (Page 2, Line 43 - Page 3, Line 26). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Cai because of the high plasticity and adaptability of organoids, this allows for the flexibility to change and reorganize in response to electrical stimulation, highlighting the ability to learn and adapt over training, necessary for developing AI systems (Page 5, Lines 8-10 of Cai).
Claim(s) 10 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Tyler et al. (US 2006/0241718).
Regarding claim 10, Suzuki is silent on the holes of the CMOS. Tyler teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device has one or more holes etched therethrough (Paragraphs 0522-0523). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Tyler because it is a design choice in manufacturing that one of ordinary skill in the art would determine through routine experimentation with expectation of predictable results.
Claim(s) 13 and 22 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Suzuki et al. (Reference U on PTO-892; April 2023) in view of Tasnim et al. (Reference U on Page 2 of PTO-892; 2022).
Regarding claim 13, Suzuki is silent on the feedback loop. Tasnim teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes at least one feedback back loop connected to the at least one brain organoid (Conclusion). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Tasnim because it allows for control of the developmental trajectories or the acceleration of the maturation of the organoids (Conclusion of Tasnim).
Regarding claim 22, Suzuki is silent on the feedback loop. Tasnim teaches wherein the at least one CMOS device includes at least one feedback back loop connected to the at least one brain organoid (Conclusion). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified Suzuki with Tasnim because it allows for control of the developmental trajectories or the acceleration of the maturation of the organoids (Conclusion of Tasnim).
Conclusion
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/PATRICK FERNANDES/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3791