DETAILED ACTION
1. The present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
2. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant’s submission filed on 03/30/2026 has been entered.
3. Currently claims 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 17 and 19 have been amended; and therefore, claims 1-20 are pending in this application.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
4. Non-Statutory (Directed to a Judicial Exception without an Inventive Concept/Significantly More)
35 U.S.C.101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
● Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Step 1
The current claims fall within one of the four statutory categories of invention (MPEP 2106.03).
Step 2A [Wingdings font/0xE0] Prong One:
The claim(s) recite a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea, as shown below:
— Considering each of claims 1, 9 and 17 as representative claims, the following claimed limitations recite an abstract idea:
a first user identifying one or more users to invite to a competition, the one or more users includes a second user;
[send] an invite to the competition;
responsive to receiving acceptance of the invite, receive first athletic activity data generated during performance of a first athletic activity by the first user and second athletic activity data generated during performance of a second athletic activity by the second user;
modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition;
adjust one or more training parameters corresponding to a portion of the training program associated with a second time period;
[show] an indication of whether the adjusted one or more training parameters satisfy predetermined training program constraints;
aggregate the first athletic activity data and the second athletic activity data to generate aggregated athletic data;
[show] the aggregated athletic data;
request to view additional data; and
[show] a second subset of the aggregated athletic data.
Thus, the limitations identified above recite an abstract idea since the limitations correspond to certain methods of organizing human activity, and/or mental processes, which are part of the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas identified according to the current eligibility standard (see MPEP 2106.04(a)). For instance, the current claims correspond to managing personal behavior (e.g., social activities), wherein a user sends an invitation to each of one or more users to participate in a competition; and based on the acceptance of the invitation, the competition is conducted; the user further modifies a time period of a training program associated with the competition, wherein one or more parameters corresponding to part of the training program are adjusted; including providing an indication regarding whether the adjustment above satisfied preset training program constraints; and wherein performance results related to the competition is also presented; such as, presenting the user with a subset of a first athletic data; and furthermore, responsive to the user’s request, the user is presented with a second subset of the aggregated athletic data, etc.
Similarly, given the limitations that recite the process of: receiving first athletic activity data (generated during performance of a first athletic activity by the first user) and second athletic activity data (generated during performance of a second athletic activity by the second user); receiving a request to modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition; adjusting, based on the request, one or more training parameters corresponding to a portion of the training program associated with a second time period; presenting an indication of whether the adjusted one or more training parameters satisfy predetermined training program constraints; and aggregating the first athletic activity data and the second athletic activity data to generate aggregated athletic data, etc., the claims also overlap with the group mental processes; such as, limitations that can be performed in the human mind and/or using a pen and paper (e.g., an evaluation, an observation, a judgment process, etc.).
Step 2A [Wingdings font/0xE0] Prong Two:
The claim(s) recite additional element(s), wherein a first computing device, a second computing device, a communication network, etc., are utilized to facilitate the recited steps/functions regarding: collecting inputs from a user (e.g., “receiving, from a first computing device associated with a first user, identification of one or more users to invite to a competition, the one or more users including a second user”); transmitting data to one or more devices (e.g., “outputting, to a second computing device associated with the second computing device, an invite to the competition”); collecting further data, including performance parameters related to users (e.g., “responsive to receiving acceptance of the invite from the second computing device, receiving, via a network, first athletic activity data generated during performance of a first athletic activity by the first user and second athletic activity data generated during performance of a second athletic activity by the second user”; “receiving, from the first computing device, a request to modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition”); analyzing the collected data using an algorithm (“adjusting, based on the request, one or more training parameters corresponding to a portion of the training program associated with a second time period”; “aggregating the first athletic activity data and the second athletic activity data to generate aggregated athletic data”); generating a first result (e.g., “. . . display . . . an indication of whether the adjusted one or more training parameters satisfy predetermined training program constraints”; “display . . . a subset of the aggregated athletic data”); generating a second result based on a request (e.g., “receiving . . . a user request to view additional data; and . . . display . . . a second subset of the aggregated athletic data”), etc.
However, the claimed additional element(s) fail to integrate the abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application since the additional element(s) are utilized merely as a tool to facilitate the abstract idea. Thus, when each claim is considered as a whole, the additional element(s) fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application since they fail to impose meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. For instance, when each of the claims is considered as a whole, none of the claims provides an improvement over the relevant existing technology.
The observations above confirm that the claims are indeed directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B
Accordingly, when the claim(s) is considered as a whole (i.e., considering all claim elements both individually and in combination), the claimed additional elements do not provide meaningful limitations to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts to “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself (also see MPEP 2106). The claimed additional elements are directed to conventional computer elements, which are serving merely to perform conventional computer functions.
Accordingly, when each of the current claims is considered as a whole (e.g., see the discussion under Prong Two above regarding such consideration of the claim as a whole), none of the claims recites an element—or a combination of elements—directed to an inventive concept.
In addition, the practice of utilizing the conventional computer/network technology to facilitate social activities; such as, allowing two or more users to communicate with one another in order to participate in a competition, including generating one or more performance data based on data collected regarding each of the users, etc., is directed to a well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the art (e.g., US 2006/0136173; US 2002/0045519; US 2005/0250458, etc.).
The above observation confirms that the current claimed invention fails to amount to “significantly more” than an abstract idea.
It is worth noting that the above analysis already encompasses each of the current dependent claims (i.e., claims 2-8, 10-16 and 18-20). Particularly, each of the dependent claims also fails to amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea since each dependent claim is directed to a further abstract idea, and/or a further conventional computer element(s) utilized to facilitate the abstract idea.
Accordingly, the findings above demonstrate that none of the claims implements an element—or a combination of elements—directed to an inventive concept (e.g., none of the current claims is reciting an element—or a combination of elements—that provides a technological improvement over the existing/conventional technology).
► Applicant’s arguments directed to section §101 have been fully considered (the arguments filed on 03/30/2026). However, the arguments are not persuasive at least for the following reasons:
Firstly, regarding Applicant’s remark directed to the memo (the August 4, 2025 memorandum), it is important to note that the memo does not change the eligibility analysis; and therefore, quite similar to the previous claims, Applicant’s current claims are still subjected to the same eligibility analysis (i.e., the eligibility analysis based on the Alice/Mayo framework).
Secondly, besides misapplying the MPEP (e.g., MPEP 2106.04) and the court’s analysis regarding Enfish, Applicant also appears to fail to properly construe the inquiry set forth under Prong One of Step 2A. For instance, while referring to the Office’s findings presented under Prong One of Step 2A, Applicant asserts that “there is a key distinction between claims directed to an exception (which require further eligibility analysis) and claims that merely involve an exception . . . the Action confuses this concept: it mistakes the hypothetical presence of an exception (e.g., that the claims might in some attenuated way relate to a social activity) as indicating that the claims are, as a whole, directed to the exception. (Action, p. 3). This is simply not the case” (emphasis added).
However, as quite evident from the claim language, the clams are positively reciting—as opposed to simply involving—an abstract idea. For instance, considering current claim 1, the claim recites the step of receiving identification of one or more users to invite to a competition, the one or more users including a second user. This is a positive recitation of an abstract idea. It is signifying the collection of information regarding the individuals to be invited to a competition. Current claim 1 also recites the step of outputting the invite to the competition. This is also a positive recitation of the abstract idea. This signifies the presentation of the invite information. Of course, current claim 1 also recites the step of receiving, responsive to the acceptance of the invite, first athletic activity data generated during performance of a first athletic activity by the first user and second athletic activity data generated during performance of a second athletic activity by the second user. This is also a positive recitation of an abstract idea. The above is signifying yet another step of collecting information—namely, a first athletic data that relates to a first athletic activity and a second athletic data that relates to a second athletic activity. Accordingly, regardless of Applicant’s theory regarding the so-called “hypothetical presence of an exception”, the current claims do recite an abstract idea (also see above the finding under Prong One regarding further limitations that recite abstract idea).
Moreover, again unlike Applicant’s theory, Prong One of Step 2A does not consider the “directed to” inquiry; rather, Prong One requires one to identify merely the limitations that recite the judicial exception—i.e., the abstract idea; MPEP 2106.07(a), emphasis added),
For Step 2A Prong One, the rejection should identify the judicial exception by referring to what is recited (i.e., set forth or described) in the claim and explain why it is considered an exception. For example, if the claim is directed to an abstract idea, the rejection should identify the abstract idea as it is recited (i.e., set forth or described) in the claim and explain why it is an abstract idea.
Accordingly, as evident from the excerpt above, Prong One does not require the consideration of claimed computer elements, which are the additional elements; and this confirms that Prong One excludes the additional elements from the consideration. This is because the additional elements are considered under Prong Two of Step 2A, which requires the consideration of the claim as a whole (of course, the same is true per Step 2B). In contrast, while mistaking the inquiry of Prong Two for that of Prong One, Applicant incorrectly asserts that the Office’s Prong One analysis fails to consider the “directed to” inquiry and/or the claim as a whole. Consequently, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive.
Applicant further asserts, “The claims are not directed to ‘managing personal behavior’ or ‘social activities.’ The present claims are not directed to such topics. The claims recite, in part, ‘receiving, via a network, first athletic activity data generated during performance of a first athletic activity by the first user . . . second athletic activity by the second user,’ . . . and ‘causing display, at the first computing device, of a second subset of the aggregated athletic data.’ This is not the kind of ‘managing personal behavior’ that courts have held to be an abstract idea. Nor are the claims specifically directed to mental processes as the Office contends. Applicant submits that the above identified features cannot practically be performed in the human mind” (emphasis added).
However, once again while conflating the claimed additional elements with the abstract idea, Applicant is attempting to challenge the Office’s findings presented under Prong One; namely, the findings regarding the abstract idea groups mental processes and certain method of organizing human activity (e.g., social activity). In contrast, as already pointed out above, Prong One does not require the consideration of any of the claimed computer elements; rather, it requires one to identify only the limitations that recite the judicial exception. Thus, none of the claimed computer elements (e.g., the network, the first computing device, the second computing device, etc.) is being considered when identifying the abstract idea that the claims are reciting (i.e., the group certain methods of organizing human activity, and the group mental processes). Thus, Applicant’s attempt to challenge the findings under Prong One, while relying on the claimed computer elements, is once again inaccurate.
Furthermore, even basic common sense dictates that inviting users to a competition event, including gathering activity data related to each of the one or more users during such competition event, etc., is indeed a social activity. In this regard, except for the conclusory assertion that “[the] claims are not directed to such topics”, Applicant fails to provide any rationale and/or evidence to substantiate the assertion. Instead, Applicant is simply quoting the limitations that the claims are reciting, which includes the computer elements. Consequently, Applicant’s conclusory assertion fails to even challenge—much less negate—the Office’s findings.
Although the issue relates to Prong Two of Step 2A, it is important to note that the claimed computer-based system (e.g., the computer-based system that comprises the network, the first computing device, the second computing device, etc.) does not change the fact regarding the social activity that the current claims are reciting. This is again because the claimed computer system is being used—merely as a tool—to facilitate the social activity that the claims are reciting.
Moreover, unlike Applicant’s assumption, the current claims do recite limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind and/or using a pen and paper. In this regard, the mere recitation of computer elements does not necessarily make the claim immune from such abstract idea; also see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A) (emphasis added),
Claims do not recite a mental process when they do not contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind, for instance when the human mind is not equipped to perform the claim limitations. See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
Accordingly, per the excerpt above, a claim does not recite a mental process if it does not contain a limitation that can practically be performed in the human mind; but, if the claim contains a limitation that can practically be performed in the human mind, the claim does recite a mental process. The analysis below demonstrates how a human—such as a coach or a competition organizer—performs the core of the claimed process mentally and/or using a pen and paper. For instance, considering claim 1 as an example, a coach can perform—at least using a pen and paper—the core of the claimed process as follows:
the coach collects, using a pen and paper, an invitation from a fist user; wherein the invitation identifies one or more users—including a second user—invited to a competition;
the coach provides the invitation to the second user (also the other users, as needed);
once the second user has accepted the invitation (including other users, as needed), the coach collects—via a pen and paper—performance information; such as, (i) first athletic activity data generated by the first user during performance of a first athletic activity, and (ii) second athletic activity data generated during performance of a second athletic activity by the second user;
the coach further receives a verbal and/or a written request from the first user to modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition;
the coach subsequently adjusts, based on the request above, one or more training parameters corresponding to a portion of the training program associated with a second time period; such as, the coach edits one or more entries in a training document; and wherein such editing my relate to: schedules, an intensity of a given exercise(s); a time period(s), etc.
the coach also marks the training document above (e.g., adding a symbol and/or a comment, etc.) in order to indicate whether the adjustment above complies with predetermined training program constraints;
the coach further calculates an aggregated data by aggregating the first athletic data and the second athletic data;
the coach also presents, to the first user, the subset of the aggregated athletic data;
the coach further presents, once receiving—from the first user—a request to view additional data, a second subset of the aggregated athletic data to the first user, etc.
The analysis above confirms that the current claims do recite a mental process. In contrast, while misapplying the MPEP—namely, MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III), Applicant is attempting to challenge the above while referring to the operations of the claimed computer system. In particular, Applicant is asserting that “a mental process cannot be used to perform the steps of: ‘causing display, at the first computing device, an indication of whether the adjusted one or more training parameters satisfy predetermined training program constraints;’ . . . ‘causing display, at the first computing device, of a subset of the aggregated athletic data;’ or ‘causing display, at the first computing device, of a second subset of the aggregated athletic data.’” (emphasis added). Thus, Applicant’s arguments are still not relevant to challenge—much less negate—the Office’s findings.
Although the exemplary analysis above is based on a coach, it is worth noting that similar analysis applies if one of the users—such as, the first user—is considered instead of the coach.
Thirdly, regarding Prong Two, Applicant is asserting that “the claims implement any such abstract idea into a practical application in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea . . . Claim 1 recites a combination of additional elements, including, for example: ‘receiving, from the first computing device, a request to modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition;’ . . . The claims recite that training parameters corresponding to a portion of the training program associated with a particular time period are adjusted based on a request, and this allows the system to determine whether the adjusted training parameters satisfy predetermined constraints, and further causes the system to display an indication of the determination. Accordingly, the claims recite a specific manner of adjusting training parameters of a training program for a competition, and providing an indication of a determination as to whether the adjusted parameters satisfy predetermined constraints for the training program” (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Applicant is incorrectly relying on the abstract idea itself in an attempt to show the alleged integration of the abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application. In contrast, an integration (if any) of the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application is demonstrated if any of the current claims is reciting an element—or a combination of elements—that provides a technological improvement over the existing computer/network technology. This is because the underlying technology, per the claimed—and originally disclosed—system/method is the existing computer/network technology. Applicant fails to show a claimed/disclosed technological feature (if any)—or a combination of technological features (if any)—that is considered to be an advance over the existing computer/network technology. Instead, Applicant is relying on part of the abstract idea to substantiate the alleged integration of the abstract idea. For instance, adjusting a parameter(s) of a portion a training program that is associated with a particular time period, and subsequently providing an indication after determining that the adjusted parameters above satisfy—or fail to satisfy—one or more predetermined constraints, etc., is itself an abstract idea. Accordingly, regardless of Applicant’s alleged “specific manner of adjusting training parameters for a training program” and/or the alleged “specific implementation of adjusting training parameters, displaying an indication of whether the adjusted parameters satisfy training program constraints, and causing a display of aggregated athletic data for the competition”, the above has nothing to do with technology, much less an advanced one that provide an improvement over the relevant existing technology. Consequently, Applicant’s arguments are still not persuasive.
Furthermore, unlike Applicant’s assumption, the Office’s analysis does not oversimplify any of the claims. In contrast, the Office’s analysis is based on the limitations that the claims are positively reciting (e.g., see the analysis under Prong One, which identifies the limitations that claims are positively reciting). Moreover, Applicant’s disclosure itself confirms the lack of technological improvement. This is because the disclosed implementation as a whole is relying merely on the existing computer/network technology. Consequently, Applicant’s attempt to challenge the Office’s analysis, while misapplying some of the court decisions (e.g., Enfish, McRO) and/or a section from the MPEP—such as, MPEP 2106.05(a)—is also not persuasive.
Fourthly, regarding Step 2B, Applicant is asserting that “the claims amount to significantly more than any such abstract idea . . . ‘courts have held computer-implemented processes to be significantly more than an abstract idea (and thus eligible), where generic computer components are able in combination to perform functions that are not merely generic.’ May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update at 4 (emphasis added). The present independent claims do precisely this by reciting a combination of non-generic features, such as how the claims describe how the system handles receiving ‘a request to modify a first time period of a training program associated with the competition’ and ‘adjusting, based on the request one or more training parameters . . . and causing display of the indication at the first computing device. As such, even assuming for the sake of argument that one or more of the features recited in the present independent claims could be individually analogized to a generic computer component performing generic computer functions, the combination of specific features recited in the present claims amount to significantly more than the alleged abstract” (emphasis added).
However, Applicant appears to fail to properly apply the inquiry under Step 2B, which evaluates whether a claim(s) is directed to a well-understood, routine, conventional activity (hereinafter WRCA) in the art. It is worth noting that the WRCA test is evaluating the technology that the claim is implementing even if the claim is reciting a new abstract idea. In particular, while considering the claim as a whole (i.e., the abstract idea along with the additional elements), Step 2B evaluates whether the claim is directed to a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of the additional elements. In the instant case, given the fact that the underlying technology, per Applicant’s currently claimed—and originally disclosed—system/method is merely the conventional computer/network technology, each of the claims—when considered as a whole—is directed to the conventional and generic arrangement of the additional elements. In particular, the claimed (and the originally disclosed) system/method is utilizing the conventional computer/network technology—merely as a tool—to facilitate the claimed abstract idea (e.g., see the abstract idea identified under Prong One). The above confirms that the current claims lack an inventive concept that amounts to “significantly more” than an abstract idea.
In contrast, while simply emphasizing part of the abstract idea, which the claimed computer is utilized—as a tool—to facilitate, Applicant is attempt to show the alleged eligibility of the claims under Step 2B. For instance, per Applicant’s theory, the alleged non-generic features are “how the claims describe how the system handles receiving ‘a request to modify a first time period . . . and causing display of the indication at the first computing device” (emphasis added). However, as already pointed out above, the steps of adjusting a parameter(s) of a portion a training program that is associated with a particular time period, and subsequently providing an indication after determining that the adjusted parameters above satisfy—or fail to satisfy—one or more predetermined constraints, etc., is itself an abstract idea. Accordingly, utilizing the conventional computer/network technology to facilitate the above abstract idea does not constitute “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Moreover, except for the generic assertion regarding the alleged description in the claim, namely “how the claims describe how the system handles receiving”, Applicant fails to point out a specific manner (if any) of receiving the request, much less one that is considered to be an advanced one. Thus, neither Applicant’s arguments nor the original disclosure as a whole demonstrates any incentive concept. Of course, besides the generic and conventional arrangement of the additional elements, the lack of technological improvement also confirms the lack of inventive concept; see MPEP 2106.05(a), (emphasis added),
While improvements were evaluated in Alice Corp. as relevant to the search for an inventive concept (Step 2B), several decisions of the Federal Circuit have also evaluated this consideration when determining whether a claim was directed to an abstract idea (Step 2A). See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-16, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1102-03 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Visual Memory, LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259-60, 123 USPQ2d 1712, 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, an examiner should evaluate whether a claim contains an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field at Step 2A Prong Two and Step 2B, as well as when considering whether the claim has such self-evident eligibility that it qualifies for the streamlined analysis.
Thus, at least for the reasons above, the Office concludes that none of the current claims—when considered as a whole—implements an inventive concept that amounts to “significantly more” than an abstract idea.
Prior Art
5. Considering each of claims 1, 9 and 17 as a whole (including the respective dependent claims), the prior art does not teach or suggest the current claims (regarding the state of the prior art, see the office action dated 12/31/2025).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to BRUK A GEBREMICHAEL whose telephone number is (571) 270-3079. The examiner can normally be reached from 7:00 AM - 3:00 PM.
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/BRUK A GEBREMICHAEL/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3715
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